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Official Citation: 2025 LHC 4079
Court / Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court
Year of Decision: 2025
Decision Date: 2025-06-18
Parties: Muhammad Yaseen vs Govt. of Pakistan etc
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court on 2025-06-18, officially reported as 2025 LHC 4079. In this matter between Muhammad Yaseen and Govt. of Pakistan etc, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
Case cited as 2025LHC4079
Court Name: Lahore High Court Judge(s): Shujaat Ali Khan Title: Muhammad Yaseen vs Govt. of Pakistan etc Case No.: Writ Petition No. 37044 of 2024 Date of Judgment:2025-06-18 Reported As: 2025 LHC 4079 Result: Petition Disposed of
JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT Shujaat Ali Khan, J: - Briefly the facts, forming factual canvass of this petition, are that the petitioner, while serving as Officer Grade-I in National Bank of Pakistan (the Bank), was posted as Member Financial Crimes Investigation Wing, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Punjab, Lahore, on secondment/attachment basis, pursuant to the approval by the President of the Bank through communication, dated 02.01.2006. The petitioner served NAB on deputation/ secondment basis till 28.12.2012. During his posting in NAB, the petitioner's performance was gauged as outstanding while recording remarks in his Annual Performance Appraisal (APA). In view of his satisfactory performance in NAB, he was promoted as Assistant Vice President (AVP), on 01.01.2009. His further promotion against the post of Vice President was due on 01.01.2012 but he was not promoted due to lack of required threshold in the APAs. Being aggrieved of non- consideration of evaluation done by NAB authorities in his APAs for the years 2007 to 2012 and non- promotion against the post of Vice President, the petitioner filed Writ Petition (No.5373 of 2016) before this Court which was disposed of through order, dated 05.07.2017. Though the petitioner was promoted against the post of Vice President but his other grievances were not redressed, as a result, he filed Writ Petitions (Nos.25596/2019, 24262/2020) in addition to Contempt Petition (Crl. Org. No.7647-W/2020) which were disposed of through orders, dated 13.10.2023, directing the petitioner to file representation before the President of the Bank, agitating all his left out grievances. Pursuant to orders passed by this Court, the petitioner filed representation, on 23.10.2023, before the President of the Bank agitating multiple grievances. The President of the Bank rejected the same factum whereof was conveyed to the petitioner, through letter, dated 09.01.2024; hence this
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petition.2. The submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, at the rostrum and those presented in written form (paper book (Mark/A) containing precedent law, notifications, APAs and other documents), can be summed up in the words that since the petitioner remained posted in NAB on deputation basis, from the year 2006 to 2012, the competence to complete/initialize his APAs vested with the Director General NAB, being his supervisory officer, thus, the remarks recorded by DG NAB, in APAs of the petitioner, for the said period could not be revisited/substituted by the Bank authorities; that when the petitioner was held entitled to perks and privileges admissible to MTOs, he had vested right to receive the same but refusal on the part of the Bank authorities speaks loud about their mala-fide conduct; that since the petitioner was appointed in the Bank, on 12.04.1994, his terms & conditions of service are to be governed under the NBP Staff Service Rules, 1973 (the Rules, 1973); that according to Circular, dated 27.08.2021, OG-I/AVP are to be posted as Branch Managers whereas the Vice Presidents deserve to be posted as Regional Heads but posting of the petitioner as Branch Manager at a far-off place speaks loud about the personal vendetta of the respondents against the petitioner just on account of approaching this Court; that though the NAB authorities graded the performance of the petitioner under category-A but the same was unauthorizedly lowered down by the Bank authorities to category-C just to deprive him of the future service prospects; that mala fide conduct of the respondents is also evident from the fact that though the performance of the petitioner was gauged as outstanding but they substituted the same with lower category while completing his C.R. Dossiers; that contumacious conduct of the respondents is evinced from the fact that order, dated 05.07.2017, passed by this Court in W.P. No.5373 of 2016, was not complied by them despite the fact that the same, having not been upset by any higher forum, still holds the field; that as per recitals of the letter relating to posting of the petitioner in NAB, on deputation basis, he was entitled to deputation pay/ allowance at the rate of 20% of the gross salary but the said amount has not been paid to him till date and that mala-fide on the part of the respondents is clear from the fact that they have not paid the entire amount of deputation pay even at the rate of 20% of the basic pay. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank, while opposing the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that since the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner are governed under non-statutory service rules, instant petition is not maintainable; that as the petitioner was promoted as Vice President, w.e.f. 01.01.2015, the order passed by this Court in that regard stood complied with; that since the petitioner has already received emoluments admissible to MTO Officers, pursuant to compromise agreement, dated 20.07.2020, he has no cheeks to agitate said issue again, before this Court; that this Court through order, dated 10.03.2023, passed in W.P. No.51414/2022, has held that when an employee of the Bank receives a specific amount under a settlement, he cannot be allowed to claim anything in excess thereof and the said order having been upheld by a learned Division Bench of this Court has binding force; that since the petitioner has not challenged the vires of the Promotion Policy 2016, he cannot be promoted against a higher post in violation of the said policy; that after repeal of the Rules, 1973 by the Cabinet, the terms & conditions of service of the petitioner are being governed under non- statutory rules and that when the petitioner submitted Undertaking to the effect that he had no grievance against the Bank or its management he was estopped to file instant petition. To fortify his contentions, learned counsel has relied on the cases reported as Umar Asghar Qureshi and another v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others (2024 PLC (C.S.) 640), Muhammad Saleem Awan and another v. National Bank of Pakistan through President and 2 others (2024 PLC (C.S.) 607), order, dated 08.05.2025, passed by a learned Division Bench of this Court in ICA No.27498 of 2025, titled Asif Ali Khatana v. National Bank of Pakistan etc. order, dated 10.04.2025, passed by this Court in W.P. No.6713 of 2022, titled Asif Ali Khatana v. National Bank of Pakistan etc., judgment, dated 16.10.2024, passed by this Court in W.P. No.45531 of 2022, titled Muhammad Akmal and
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others v. Federation of Pakistan and others and Writ Petition No.45065 of 2022, titled Qamar uz Zaman etc. v. Federation of Pakistan etc. and judgment, dated 06.03.2023, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in W.P. No.3008/2021, titled All Pakistan NBP Officers Association etc. v. Federation of Pakistan etc. and other allied matters. 4. In exercise of their right of rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner submit that since the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 2021 (the Rules, 2021) have been declared ultra-vires by the Peshawar High Court, through judgment, dated 06.02.2025, passed in W.P. No.1418-P/2022, titled Muhammad Naeem, Assistant Vice President (AVP), National Bank of Pakistan, Nodeh Toru, Mardan v. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others, the terms & conditions of service of the petitioner are to be governed under the Rules, 1973, which being statutory in nature, this petition is maintainable. Adds that as the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported as Muhammad Tariq Badar and another v. National Bank of Pakistan and others (2013 SCMR 314), has held that Writ Petition on behalf of employees of NBP is maintainable, thus, the cases referred by learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable. Further adds that since petitioner was compelled to sign blank stamp paper, which was subsequently used for preparation of the acclaimed Undertaking, the same has no bearing upon the case of the petitioner. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also gone through the documents, annexed with this petition and those forming part of the Paper Book (Mark-A), as well as the case-law, cited at the bar. 6. Firstly, taking up the objection of learned counsel representing the Bank against maintainability of this petition, I am of the view that there is no cavil with the proposition that if terms and conditions of service of an employee are governed under non-statutory rules, constitutional petition before this court is not maintainable but at the same time it is equally true that if rules governing terms and conditions of service of an employee are statutory in nature, jurisdiction of this court to entertain a matter on behalf of such employee cannot be abridged. As per the learned counsel, representing the Bank, the Rules, 2021, having been framed by the Board of Directors of the Bank, do not enjoy the statutory status. On the contrary, learned counsel for the petitioner has produced copy of judgment, dated 06.02.2025, passed by a learned Division Bench of Peshawar High Court in W.P. No.1418-P/2022, relevant part whereof reads as under: - "22. The above legal discourse leads us to the conclusion that Section 32(2)(xxviii) of the Ordinance of 1949 mandates the Central Board of Directors of NBP to frame bye-laws regulating the recruitment and terms and conditions of the employees of the NBP. The said legal provision is still part of the statute; therefore, the framing of any rules relating to the terms and conditions of the employees under bye-law 51 of the Bye-laws 2015 is obviously beyond the authority of the Central Board of Directors. Hence, it is not only ultra vires the Ordinance of 1949 but, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sarhad Development Authority (supra), the Central Board of Directors of NBP as well as the Federal Government are bound to frame byelaws/rules in respect of the terms and conditions of the employees of NBP. 23. Turning to the validity of the respondents' actions following the repeal of the 1973 Rules: As outlined earlier, the 1973 Rules governed the terms and conditions of NBP employees and were given statutory status by the Apex Court in Muhammad Tariq Badr (supra). However, through Letter No. F.No.1(7)Bkg-III/2001-1953, dated 23.01.2015, the Finance Division communicated the Federal Government's approval of the revised NBP Bye-laws, which had been finalized in consultation with all stakeholders. Consequently, under S.R.O. (1)/2015, the NBP Board of Directors, with prior Federal Government approval, enacted the 2015 Bye-laws, repealing the 1970 Bye-laws through Bye-law 66.
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Similarly, on 18.03.2021, the Cabinet Committee of the Federal Government approved the repeal of the 1973 Rules. This decision was subsequently placed before the Cabinet, which formally ratified the repeal on the same date. 24. It is an established principle, as encapsulated in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, that any authority empowered to make an order also holds the authority to revoke it. However, in the present case, Section 32(2)(xxviii) of the Ordinance of 1949 explicitly mandates that the NBP Board of Directors is responsible for framing rules regarding the recruitment, terms, and conditions of service for the Bank's officers and staff. The Apex Court, in Tariq Badr (supra), has firmly established that the executive lacks the authority to annul, invalidate, or otherwise undermine statutory mandates (last three lines of Para-9 of the judgment in Muhammad Tariq Badr's case). The same legal principle was reiterated in Sarhad Development Authority (supra). Consequently, the executive's repeal of the Rules of 1973 without enacting statutory rules contravenes both; Section 32 of the Ordinance of 1949 and the Apex Court's rulings in Muhammad Tariq Badr and Sarhad Development Authority. Therefore, the Federal Government's decision dated 18.03.2021 is unlawful and made without legal authority. 25. In view of what has been stated above, we hold and declare; i. Since the NBP Board of Directors lacks the authority to frame rules governing employee terms and conditions under Section 11 of the Act of 1974 and Bye-law 51 of the Bye-Laws of 2015, the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 2021, are thus ultra vires Section 32 of the Ordinance of 1949. ii. The Federal Government's decision dated 18.03.2021 to repeal the 1973 Rules is also without lawful authority and has no legal effect. Therefore, the respondents shall treat the petitioners in accordance with the Rules of 1973. From above, it is vividly clear that not only the Rules, 2021, have been declared ultra-vires but also the repeal of the Rules, 1973 has been declared illegal meaning thereby that at the moment the terms & conditions of employees of the Bank are governed under the Rules, 1973, which as per the judgment of the Apex Court of the country, reported as Muhammad Tariq Badar and another (Supra), enjoy statutory nature; hence the objection against maintainability of this petition is spurned. 7. Learned counsel for the Bank has also challenged the maintainability of this petition on the ground that since the petitioner submitted Undertaking, on 12.12.2017, with the averments that all his grievances were settled, he was estopped to file the petition in hand. The referred Undertaking, for convenience of reference, is imaged below: - As per the afore-imaged Undertaking the same was submitted on 12.12.2017 wherein designation of the petitioner was mentioned as Vice President, ARD-North, National Bank of Pakistan, Lahore which suggests that he was promoted as Vice President prior to the said date. The said fact stands contradicted from the promotion letter of the petitioner as Vice President as the same bears the date as 13.12.2017, meaning thereby that on 12.12.2017, he was not promoted as Vice President. It is very painful that the President of the Bank with a view to show that the petitioner was promoted as Vice President prior to 12.12.2017, while passing the impugned, has inter-alia observed as under: - "In addition thereto, you vide letter dated 20.10.2017 have been promoted as Vice President with effect from 01.01.2015 with all perks and privileges and were granted 4 months' deputation allowance at the rate of 20% of the basic pay subject to maximum of Rs.6000/- per month." (emphasis provided) Since the above-quoted portion runs contrary to record, it cannot be used to believe that the petitioner was promoted as Vice President prior to 13.12.2017, thus he could not be treated as Vice President on 12.12.2017 notwithstanding the fact that his promotion was actuated w.e.f. 01.01.2015. In
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the given circumstances, the assertion of the petitioner that he was compelled to sign blank stamp paper which was subsequently used as an Undertaking on his behalf deserves due consideration. Even otherwise, the Apex Court of the country in the case of Ikram Bari and 524 others v. National Bank of Pakistan through President and another (2005 SCMR 100), while dilating upon the consequences of an undertaking by an employee relinquishing his right, has inter-alia held as under:- "15. An Islamic Welfare State is under an obligation to establish a society which is free from exploitation wherein social and economic 'justice is guaranteed to its citizens. The temporary Godown staff and the daily wages employees were continued in service of the Bank on payment of meagre emoluments fixed by the Bank. In most of the cases of these employees, there were artificial breaks in their service so as to circumvent the provisions of the Labour Laws and the Rules of the Bank and to deny them the salaries and other service benefits of regular employees. In some cases, the Bank did not issue formal letters of appointment or termination to the employees so as to preclude them to 'have access to justice. There was no equilibrium of bargaining strength between the employer and the employees. The manner in which they had been dealt with by the Bank was a fraud on the Statute. A policy of pick and choose was adopted by the Bank in the matter of absorption/ regularization of the employees. By Article 2-A of the Constitution, which has been made its substantive part, it is unequivocally enjoined 'that in the State of Pakistan principle of equality, social and economic justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed which shall be guaranteed as fundamental right. The principle of policy contained in Article 38 of the Constitution also provide, inter alia, that the State shall secure the well being of the people by raising their standards of living and by ensuring equitable adjustment of rights between employers and 'employees and provide for all citizens, within the available resources of the country, facilities for work and adequate livelihood and reduce 'disparity in income and earnings of individuals. Similarly, Article 3 of the Constitution makes it obligatory upon the State to ensure the elimination of all forms of exploitation and the gradual fulfilment of the, fundamental principle, from each according to his ability, to each according to his work. It is difficult to countenance the approach of the Bank that the temporary Godown staff and the daily wages employees should be continued to be governed on disgraceful terms and conditions of service for an indefinite period. In view of section 24-A of the General Clauses Act 1897, the National Bank was required to act reasonably, fairly and justly. An employee being jobless and in fear of being shown the door had no option but to accept and continue with the appointment on whatever conditions it was offered by the Bank. In the case of Pakistan v. Public at Large PLD 1987 SC 304, it was contended before the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court that the provisions of law impugned therein amounted to a contract between the Government and the civil servant and thus they involved his consent. It was observed that in fact it as not in the nature of a free consent between the agents. On the one hand, State power was projected in the form of a Statute and on the other, the civil servant had no choice of a bargain on those provisions when joining the service. He could not get it changed. In Habibullah v. Government of the Punjab and 5 others PLD 1980 Lah. 37, it was held that the employer being placed in a position of authority and strength could always coerce employees to waive their legal protection and accept, contractual terms at the pains of losing his job." If the fate of the referred Undertaking is considered in the light of the afore-quoted judgment, there leaves no doubt that the same being dubious in nature cannot be used against the petitioner especially when the petitioner remained en-locked in multiple litigation with the Bank. 8. Considering from another angle, it is the stance of the thus, he was debarred to approach this court. To appreciate the plea of the Bank, I have gone through the letter relating to the promotion of the petitioner which, for convenience of reference, is imaged below: -
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The above-imaged Promotion Letter of the petitioner does not entertain any ambiguity that he was promoted upon fulfillment of required eligibility criteria and there is no reference to the acclaimed settlement; hence, the plea of the Bank that he was promoted as Vice President as a result of some settlement with the Bank, cannot be given any weightage. 9. Now reverting to merits of the case, I have observed that while contesting the claim of the petitioner for payment of dues on account of non-MTO, the Bank has relied upon compromise agreement, dated 20.07.2020 (Annexure-R/2 with report and parawise comments submitted on behalf of the Bank), which, for convenience of reference, is imaged below: - As per clause 6 of the afore-imaged compromise agreement, the compromise between the parties was subject to withdrawal of Writ Petition No.171031/2018 and the Contempt Petition, if any, within thirty days and in the event of non-fulfilment of said condition by the petitioner, the compromise was to be revoked automatically. It is well settled by now that a conditional/ contingent agreement or compromise or contract loses its efficacy if the stipulated condition is not fulfilled by either side within the prescribed period and nobody can claim its enforcement. If any case-law is required, reference can be made to the case of Muhammad Anwar v. Muhammad Aslam and others (2012 SCMR 345) wherein the Apex Court of the country has inter-alia been held as under: - "15. We are not impressed by the contention of the learned counsel. We have noticed that contract of such a nature is covered by the definition of 'contingent contract' in terms of section 31 of the Contract Act, 1872. Section 32 of the said Act provides how contingent contracts are enforceable in law. The law allows enforcement of a contingent contract, after the event upon which it was contingent, has happened. In order to seek enforcement of a contingent contract, the party suing to enforce an obligation, which is conditioned upon the occurrence of an event, has to only establish that the event has occurred in a manner contemplated by the contract for the obligation to arise." Further, the High Court AJ&K in the case of Ashfaq Ahmed and 6 others v. Ch. Maqbool Raza and 4 others (2008 CLC 1340) while highlighting the consequences of a contingent contract in absence of fulfillment of the condition has inter-alia held as under:- "After perusal of section 31 of the Contract Act, in light of the above precedents, I am of the considered view that the test to determine as to whether a contract is `contingent' or `absolute' is that if there is mere stipulation in the agreement-to-sell that the sale-deed would be executed after obtaining permission from any public functionary then such a condition is not collateral to the contract and the contract cannot be construed as a `contingent' contract because the condition was forming the part of the consideration. However, where vendor is not in possession of the absolute title and execution of the sale-deed depends upon the grant of proprietary rights by the Government then such a contract could be declared as `conditional' or `contingent', as has been opined in the Tribhuban Parkash Nayya r v. The Union of India AIR 1970 SC 540." Insofar as the case in hand is concerned, a perusal of the file shows that the petitioner did not withdraw the aforesaid Writ Petition rather the same was disposed of by this Court vide order, dated 13.04.2018, and matter was referred to the Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Islamabad which fact has duly been noted on the first page of the impugned order. It is very strange to note that implementation of the compromise agreement was subjected to withdrawal of the writ petition which was decided prior to execution of compromise agreement which fact is sufficient to believe that the conduct of the Bank authorities throughout the proceedings was not above the board. 10. It is matter of record that contempt petition (Crl.Orig.No.7647/W/2020) filed by the petitioner against the Bank authorities, on 08.02.2020, was disposed of alongwith other matters through order, dated 13.10.2023, meaning thereby that condition regarding withdrawal of contempt petition
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within one month, as postulated under clause 6 supra, remained unfulfilled, hence, the compromise agreement stood revoked automatically and any step taken by either side in pursuance to the said compromise agreement was inconsequential. In this backdrop, reliance of the respondents on the compromise agreement is misconceived. 11. Though, learned counsel representing the Bank addressed the Court at reasonable length but has not been able to convince this Court as to how the said agreement/compromise had binding force upon the parties especially when the condition stipulated therein remained unfulfilled on the part of the petitioner. 12. While opposing the prayer of the petitioner regarding his posting as per Circular bearing No.237/2010, dated 26.10.2010, learned counsel representing the Bank took specific plea that the referred Circular only envisages minimum qualification/criteria for posting against different seats in the Bank. There is no cavil with the fact that in the Circular, under discussion, minimum criteria has been chalked out for posting against a particular post but the said fact cannot be used to deprive the petitioner of his posting as Regional Head…
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