Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

Court Name: Lahore High Court Judge(s): Malik Muhammad Qayyum Title:NASIR MAHMOOD DAR and 27 others vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, MINISTRY

JUDGMENT

Reported As: 1998 PTD 3906 Result: Order accordingly Judgment JUDGMENT ' This judgment shall dispute of the following writ petitions in all of which circular issued by the Central Board of Revenue on 6-11-1997 has been challenged. (1) Writ Petition No,282 of 1998, (2) Writ Petition No,27684 of 1997, (3) Writ Petition No,27819 of 1997, (4) Writ Petition No, 28831 of 1997, (5) Writ Petition No, 28765 of 1997, (6) Writ Petition No,28766 of 1997, (7) Writ Petition No, 28767 of 1997, (8) Writ Petition No, 28768 of 1997, (9) Writ Petition No, 28769 of 1997, (10) Writ Petition No, 28770 of 1997, (11) Writ Petition No, 28771 of 1997, (12) Writ Petition No, 28772 of 1997, (13) Writ Petition No, 28773 of 1997, (14) Writ Petition No, 28774 of 1997, (15) Writ Petition No, 28775 of 1997, (16) Writ Petition No, 28776 of 1997, (17) Writ Petition No, 28777 of 1997, (18) Writ Petition No,28778 of 1997, (19) Writ Petition No, 28779 of 1997, (20) Writ Petition No, 28780 of 1997, (21) Writ Petition No, 28784 of 1997, (22) Writ Petition No, 28785 of 1997, (23) Writ Petition No, 28786 of 1997, (24) Writ Petition No, 28787 of 1997, (25) Writ Petition No, 28788 of 1997, (26) Writ Petition No, 28789 of 1997, (27) Writ Petition No, 28790 of 1997, (28) Writ Petition No, 28791 of 1997, (29) Writ Petition No, 28792 of 1997, (30) Writ Petition No, 28793 of 1997, (31) Writ Petition No, 28794 of 1997, (32) Writ Petition No, 28795 of 1997, (33) Writ Petition No, 28796 of 1997, (34) Writ Petition No, 28798 of 1997, (35) Writ Petition No, 28799 of 1997, (36) Writ Petition No, 28800 of 1997, (37) Writ Petition No, 28801 of 1997, (38) Writ Petition No, 28802 of 1997,. (39) Writ Petition No, 28803 of 1997, (40) Writ Petition No, 28804 of 1997, (41) Writ Petition No, 28809 of 1997, (42) Writ Petition No, 29005 of 1997, (43) Writ Petition No, 29164 of 1997, (44) Writ Petition No, 29343 of 1997, (45) Writ Petition No,29495 of 1997, (46) Writ Petition No, 29496 of 1997, (47) Writ Petition No, 29497 of 1997, (48) Writ Petition No,

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29498 of 1997, (49) Writ Petition No, 29499 of 1997, (50) Writ Petition No, 29501 of 1997, (51) Writ Petition No, 29502 of 1997, (52) Writ Petition No, 29503 -of 1997, (53) Writ Petition No, 29504 of 1997, (54) Writ Petition No, 29505 of 1997, (55) Writ Petition No, 29506 of 1997, (56) Writ Petition No, 59507 of 1997,. (57) Writ Petition No, 29508 of 1997, (58) Writ Petition No,29509 of 1997, (59) Writ Petition No, 29510 of 1997, (60) Writ Petition No, 29511 of 1997, (61) Writ Petition No, 29512 of 1997, (62) Writ Petition No, 29513 of 1997, (63) Writ Petition No, 29514 of 1997, (64) Writ Petition No, 29515 of 1997, (65) Writ Petition No,29516 of 1997, (66) Writ Petition No,29517 of 1997, (67) Writ Petition No, 29518 of 1997, (68) Writ Petition No, 29519 of 1997, (69) Writ Petition No, 29520 of 1997, (70) Writ Petition No, 29521 of 1997, (71) Writ Petition No, 29522 of 1997, (72) Writ Petition No,29523 of 1997, (73) Writ Petition No, 29524 of 1997, (74) Writ Petition No, 29525 of 1997, (75) Writ Petition No, 29526 of 1997, (76) Writ Petition No, 29527 of 1997, (77) Writ Petition No, 29528 of 1997, (78) Writ Petition No, 29529 of 1997, (79) Writ Petition No,29530 of 1997, (80) Writ Petition No, 29531 of 1997, (81) Writ Petition No, 29532 of 1997, {{BLUR PAGE}} "JabiA palsistan. Tax Decisions 1998 04) Writ pojtion No, 41533 of 1997, (83) Writ Petitioiallo. 29534 of PO, ($4), Writ PetitiottiNp 29535 of 19974 (85); Nth Petition No, 29536 of 1997, (86) .11ritvPigittioti No,2960914.1M1 (87) Writ 1\ v8E. Petition No, 29683 of,A97, (0)Writ...F'etition NA:,i26696 of 1997, no (89) Writ Petition No7839740-19{,-4 997; 094 Writ pctition,No, 28163 of 1997, (91) Writ PetitiowNo4;:?838kof 1997.;:(9j Vitt Petition N 0,,,21P49 ; of 1997, (93) Wiit fttitiowN442,850,014997) t94) Writ !iptsit01) Nr(-4, 484,01928,0 ouw.Rit Petitiort1Noc'M0Thof 1998, 1.Ifff t t z )(,(ik,W.A.Tt."141043..TA496443,101-1-PriS, (97) Writ Retiti00110. 363 of vgr.,> I . 19* (9g)ii(WFA1101t4iorirNo4441,,of 1998,. (99) .Writ Petition 68 r8L No .,,365 Wit*titiog ;No,. 366 of 1998, (101) Writ ficalto Petition NQ.367 of 19980 ,1(Wrilyqiti,pgtitipt Na.. 368. Of 1998, .Voei -4193) WritgetiOn No, 30 of4998k4494.),,,,Wgitletition No, 370 :5ilfil1}9903.4(3197ii) ,;$1,(qt, -Petit* (No , 3744 cim clix) Wyit Petition ofiAp98, (47) WO Wtitiow Nov.373e:of 4(99i34108) Writ v(A31 ,Petiti9t1 No,.! 414 pfi.1998,,(199) Writ Petition4No;: 55-,t of 1998, aQv f ,(110)zjwo;ip4tition No, 666 47; 998, (14)1)i#FiAlliXttkti* No, 667 nol inq of 1998, (14?) Writ,Petitiomilloy. 8.35 9,10914)(100 fVEffit Petition v(A.)r No, 836 of 1998, 414) Wfi,t )?etlitioocNp. 837 99/3(T,k115) Writ Petition No, 838 of 1998,(16W4tp, Refit kity, of 1998, (117), Writ Petition No, 840 of 199$q (11)(W_Otflptitiogt No, 841 .; of 19911/44119) Writ P'etitiopNo,; 842*1998,A,14,Q1 Wfyit Petition -tc, 909g4 998 (121) W4t yetitiowNo,40 fl 22) Writ goititt)4 Tlegtif`&44.'74396 of 199,(.P4- YNYIPOitAPIIA19.,1602 of 1998, cl,;(1-24)!Writ,Petition No, 2544319094Am (1?, 4.4riit(110:4ippi-No, 3617 0:1998, (126) Virityetition No4,0403 *1,998,410iNcit Petition r(QQL- , No,4058 of 1998, (128) Writ PetitioRt.frI4919.Of 1998, noiTit: (129) Writ Petition*. 4060 oaf is,* q*) wAt1N4t1offNo, 4061 CeL of 1998, (131) Wtjt Petition No:. 40624 ti998,,(0052) Wit Petition 6(:)&s No, 4063 of 1998, (133) Writ,ffeWioty,Not090,010Al.99#,,4134) Writ p..44ition No, 4065 of 1998, (135) Writ petitO)No44060 of 1998, (c..?'1(p6) Writ Petition No, 407 of 1998, (137) Writ ,Petitiop,No, 4068 Q(,) c 4ip98, (13$) Writ Petitiop,No,. 4069 of ,1998, (139) Wit Petition E 4> ,t ci'friItaififf)6 o,1, 9, (140) Wrikpetition Noolpy of 1998, (141) Writ tion No, 9f 1998, (1441Writ .pilitim1*5234 of 1998 aiy4143) WitspeOtipn No,; 5940 of,1998,4) 2. Mr. 'Imtiaz Advocate has contended that the Central Board of Revenue has no jurisdiction to issue` anftirctilar as to curtail the discretion vesting in- the Adjudication Atikiroritigetilider the Iliaome Tax Ordinance, 1979 and the Cirettfat issued thii(lolding that die amounts received un* the Golden itailieshake ScfieirkviiialarieS'WOhltra vires

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the powers of the Central BoadOf Revenui: beehillaCed by the learned counsel on the cases of M/s. Central, Insurance Cony and others v. Central Board of Revenue, Islaital),id, :fixi_6ihers1993,)}t.t432. . I Vkf . Tr; 1;Jt. {{BLUR PAGE}} 3. The contention raised by the petitioner's learned counsel is unexceptionable and has not been seriously challenged by Mr, Muhammad Ilyas Khan, Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents who, on the other hand, submitted that the matter may be kept open for adjudication by the Adjudicating Officer irrespective of the circular issued by the Central Board of Revenue. This concession by the learned counsel is in accord with the legal position as expounded in the Supreme Court judgment in Central Insurance Company's. Case (supra). ' In this view of the matter, all these petitions are allowed and the circular issued by the Central Board of Revenue on 6-11-1997 is declared to be without any lawful authority and of no legal effect. The Adjudication Officer shall proceed to decide independently of the circular as to whether A the amounts received by the petitioners are tantamount to salaries or not and are taxable. {{BLUR PAGE}} ' The amounts, if p0-jy, wi0 21held by the Banks anjk=uhb n the amounts disbursecilti the departmen t under the impugned circular, shall be refunded to the petitioners. ' No order as to costs. st1. 3bizt 3.z lertudilT 7,nt-tmnowil t1),1)? r Wr..! 1 onvnicT `c, trilm Q.M.H./M-79511, Petitions accepted. Tr(' pq Imo kb1 tnii (II , 1998 PTD (Trib.) 3909 idinfmt(-1 0 7AT 5E7103 g";1151 a 7" ';'28/11acome-tax Appellate Tribunal Pakistan] 0 ,(17,113qt1103 1)..5m, Present: Muhammad Mujibuliah,Siddiqui, Chairman and fiDtiiW , Aftab lqbal Ratharej AccounicintiMember ; yd rf.QE I.T.A. No,867/KB of 1991-92, decided on 24th July, 1998. ilstf:,1 (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)-- ----Third Sched., Rr.8(8)(a) & 1(1)(1-A) C.B.R. Circular No,26 of 1988, dated 19-12-1988--- Interpretation---Binding effect of C.B.R. Circular--- C.B.R. Circular No,26 of 1988 did not,contain any legal, valid or authorised interpretation of law having binding`eftkt. [p. 3914] A ,P1W (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)--- ----Third Sched., Rr.8(8)(a), 1(1), (1-A)---C.B.R. Circular No,26itlf 1988, dated 19-12-1988-- Depreciation---Assessee a leasing company---Leased vehicles---Depreciation was claimedln, the basis of cost of vehicles--- Assessing Officer allowed depreciation oitilie restricted value of vehicles in term of R.8(8)(a) of Third Sched. Of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 treating same as finance lease which was confirmed by the First Appellate Authority---Contention that R.8(8)(a) should not be applied - to leasing {{BLUR PAGE}} company on the ground that neither the condition of ownership nor its use had been prescribed for the admissibility of depreciation for the leasing company in Rr.l(1) & 1(1-A) was repelled--- Admissibility as well as computation of depreciation was to be governed by the provision contained in R. 1 of the Third Sched. Only---Provisions contained in R. 8(8)(a) were fully applicable to a leasing company. [pp. 3917, 3919, 3921] B, C & D 1997 PTD (Trib.) 1447 distinguished. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)---

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----Third Sched., R. 7, proviso 2 [omitted by Finance Act (XII of 1991)]--Assessment year 1990-91--- Depreciation---Loss on leased assets---Assessing Officer disallowed loss on leased assets on the ground that the assets were part of the assessee's balance-sheet on which depreciation was charged from year to year and the entire class of assets had not been sold and the same was confirmed by the First Appellate Authority---Issue was decided without taking into consideration proviso 2 to R.7 of Third Sched.---Validity--Income-tax Appellate Tribunal set aside the issue to decide same afresh in the light of proviso 2 to R. 7 of Third Sched. Of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. [p. 3922] E (d) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)--- ----Preamble-Amortization of differed cost---No provision existed in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 in respect of amortization---Assessee a leasing company claimed amortization of differed cost in profit and loss account which was also disallowed with other expenses and the same was confirmed by the First Appellate Authority---Appellate Tribunal upheld the finding. [p. 3922] F Khalil A. Waggan, C.A. For Appellant. Misri Ladhani, D.R. For Respondent. Date of hearing: 21st July, 1998. ORDER ' MUHAMMAD MUJIBULLAH SIDDIQUI (CHAIRMAN).---Above appeal at the instance of assessee is directed against the order, dated 1-9-1991 by the learned C.I.T.(A), Zone-II, Karachi in I.T.A. No,1405 of 1991 relating to the assessm ent year 1990-91. 2. Heard Mr. Khalil Ahmed Waggan, C.A. Learned representative for the appellant and Mr. Misri Ladhani, learned representative for the department. 3. The appellant is a public Limited company carrying on the business of leasing of movable 'assets. The first objection raised on behalf of the appellant is to the confirmation of Assessing Officers finding, restricting the value of leased vehicles for the purpose of depreciation in terms of Rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. A perusal of the assessment order shows that the appellant company changed its policy in respect of depreciation on leased vehicles. In the assessm ent years 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 the appellant had claimed depreciation by calculating the value of leased vehicles in terms of Rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, while in the assessment year 1990-91 the depreciation was claimed on the basis of cost of the vehicles. The Assessing Officer confronted appellant on this point and sought explanation as to why the appellant has changed the method of valuation of the vehicles for the purpose of depreciation without any change in the law. The assessee/appellant was further confronted on the point that it was following financing method of accounting and not operating method, therefore, depreciation on cost is not to be allowed and the value of vehicles is to be restricted in accordance with Rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule. The explanation was furnished on behalf of appellant to the effect that under the provisions contained in the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 all leases are treated as operating leases irrespective of the fact whether a lease is a finance or operating lease and under Third Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, depreciation is allowed to the lessor. It was contended that neither in section 23 nor under Third Schedule to the Income-tax Ordinance any distinction is made between an operating or finance lease. The Assessing Officer observed that the contention was not correct and there was distinction between an operating lease and a finance lease in terms of section 23(1)(vi)(a) as explained by C.B.R. In Circular No,26 of 1988, dated 19-12-1988. Reliance, was placed in this behalf by the Assessing Officer on the following passage in the above circular: "A number of companies have started the business of leasing expensive cars. Rule 8(8)(a) placed a restriction on the W.D.V. Of motor car by limiting the value to a maximum of Rs,1,75,000 for purpose of depreciation, Car leases are so designed as to overcome this restriction. In the hands of the lessee, the entire amount paid as lease money is deductible whereas the lessor claims that the

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leased vehicles constitutes a vehicle plying for hire. Whereas the lessee is justified in claiming the amount paid as lease money, the lessor is not so justified unless the lease is an 'operating lease'." 4. The Assessing Officer on the basis of above view held by the C.B.R. Formed opinion that the law has prescribed different treatment in case of operating lease and finance lease for the purpose of depreciation. He further held that in the case of operating lease restriction of value as prescribed under Rule 8(8)(a) is not applicable while in the case of finance {{BLUR PAGE}} lease the restriction under Rule $(8)(a) is s4tiar elY applicable. The Assesking(' Officer ftirthevtiliserved as followS:' 9 ins I in(: A "The :yery fact that,,the assessee, company has not claimed full depreciation in respect of:least:4U. Vehicles, and restricted it in accordance with 4ple 8(3,)(4-Actiu,,assessment iyears 198,T 88 to fr(,/ifl9A9(79.0, as showm, tstarb reproduced rip t,para.. Il cif this 54jscussion, clearly shetwlsr, that the company himself, Alak,00:1*-, 3,10cognized and acceptedithe legal position, thus, its presei# slaiumk 291.:.-juothing but auafterthoufght,to gain some financial advantam.Le ;). .5. Foiiioth 'Teasons the Assessing OffigefVowed depreciation' on the reSiiieted value of the vehicles in terms of Rule ,l(a) of thy` `Third Sdhedule tb the Income Tax Ordinance, 1019. The 'learned C.I.T.(A) c6ntititild ifie treatment. ' - ,trujoxin tr. Hodkjin 9rtiwttiff :..j/i'A`01.104 6. iThetiappellant still feeling dissatisfied has preferredathis ,sectine appeal before- us. Mr. Khalil Waggan, learned representative for' the appellant has Stated thaythe view held by the C.B.R.Din Circular No,260f) 1988 on which the Assessing Officer has placed reliance has been upheld byq the Tribunal in the"judgment reported as 1997-PTII(Trib.) 1447 but hefeelsi5 that certain important points were 'neither agitatedirdurnig the conrse of arguments nor, considered and, therefore, he' may be allowed to address arguments on the point of apicability of Rule 8(8)(a) to the appellant. Khalil Ahmed Waggan was allowed to address arguments and toleebfree ino raising any plea relevant to the issue under consideration, notwithstanding) the earlier judgment of this Tribunal. 7. Ae..Arst contention raised by Mr. Khalil Waggan is that the circulars issued by C.B.R. Containing interprtation of law havelpp. Legal validity as the C.B.R. Has no authority to interpret the law. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the case, of ,Central Insurance Co. v. C.B.R., (1993):68 Tax 86. The pbint in issue already stands decided authoritatively by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan which has been followed Eby us'in a large number of cases and, therefore, there is no cavil to the proposition can by Mr. Khalil Waggan. It is held.That Circular No,26 of 1988 issuedibyltbe C.B.R. Containing interpre=0 n on the pox Authorities subordinate to C.B.R. But the Assessing Officers n ignore the same as it has no binding effect. Thus, we asked Mr. Khalil Waggan to address arguments on the point in issue, totally ignoring the interpretation/view contained in the C.B.R. CirCutar' No,26 of 1988. > 1)2E'' 9eT51 goitnokio 9th iii ;1.301 btlfl 'NAM+ 8. The learned 'counsel, fiziotho appellant has agreed that the point.Lorq 9. {{BLUR PAGE}} ' consideration is whether rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule is applicable to a leasing company. 9. Before proceeding further we would like to make a clarification in respect of our order reported as 1997 PTD (Trib.) 1447 wherein the application of Rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule to a leasing company has been upheld with reference to Circular No,26 of 1988. From the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant it appears that he has gathered impression, that the Tribunal while deciding the above cited case has placed reliance on Circular No,26 of 1988 for upholding the

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application of Rule 8(8)(a) to a leasing company. This impression is a result of some misunderstanding. We have already observed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has very clearly held that the C.B.R. Has no authority to interpret any provision of law and in any case any such interpretation has no binding effect and that we have followed the dictum in large number of cases. Thus, the question of placing any reliance on the Circular of C.B.R. As authoritative or valid interpretation of law does not arise. The correct position of the order reported as 1997 PTD (Trib.) 1447 which has been authored by one of us (Muhammad Mujibullah Siddiqui) is that the Assessing Officer applied Rule 8(8)(a) to a leasing company by restricting the value of leased vehicles for the purpose of depreciation under Third Schedule and the assessee placed reliance on C.B.R. Circular No,26 of 1988 in support of its contention that Rule 8(8)(a) should not be applied to the leasing company. The assessee placed reliance on C.B.R. Circular No,26 of 1988 which is evident from the observation in para. 10 of the above cited order. Plea on behalf of assessee in the cited case was different from the plea taken by the learned counsel for the appellant in the present case. In the cited case no plea was taken that Rule 8(8)(a) of Third Schedule was not applicable to the leasing company but a plea was taken that by virtue of leasing of vehicle to the lessees the leased vehicles should be treated as vehicle plying for hire and it was pleaded that instruction to this effect was contained in the C.B.R. Circular No,26 of 1988 and, therefore, the Assessing Officer should be directed to give treatment in accordance with C.B.R. Circular No,26 of 1988 and it should be held that when a vehicle is leased out it is to be treated as plying for hire under Circular No,26 of 1988. While examining this plea it was held that the contention was not correct. While deciding the factual and legal pleas canvassed in the cited case it was held that in the C.B.R. Circular No,26 of 1988 it has been stated that if vehicle is ultimately transferred to the assessee or his nominee it shall be treated as vehicle not plying for hire and in such cases the depreciation allowance shall be restricted in accordance with Rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule and that the learned counsel for the assessee in the cited case conceded that on the expiry of lease period the vehicles were transferred in favour of lessee on payment of nominal price and, therefore, in the case of leasing business by the leasing companies, where the asset is ultimately transferred in favour of lessee it was not a case of lease but in fact, it was a case of ordinary sale to the lessee by the lessor. It was ultimately held that the treatment given by the Assessing Officer was already in accordance with the Circular No,26 of 1988 and, therefore, the plea raised on behalf of assessee that direction be issued for giving treatment in accordance with Circular No,26 of 1988 was uncalled for and required no consideration. In the cited case we have nowhere held that Circular No,26 of 1988 contains any legal, valid or authorized interpretation of law having binding effect. In fact, in the cited case we have not-examined at all if according to the provisions contained in the Income-tax Ordinance itself, Rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule is applicable to a leasing company or not, for the simple reason that no such objection was raised in this behalf before us and as such we had confined our finding to the pleadings and arguments raised before us on the principle contained in the maxim "secondum allegata et probata" (a party can succeed according to what was alleged and proved). This principle has been approved by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgment reported as 1998 SCM R 593, Amir Shah v. Ziarat Gul. 10. After the above clarification we will examine the issue if Rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule is applicable to a leasing company. Mr. Khalil Waggan, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the provisions contained in Rule 8(8)(a) and sub-rules (1) and (1-A) of Rule 1 of the Third Schedule to the Income-tax Ordinance, section 12(19) and section 23(1) clauses (v) and (vi-a) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. For the sake of convenience the above provisions are reproduced below: "Rule 1(1), Third Schedule:---

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"Allowance for depreciation.---(1) Where in any income year, any building, machinery, plant or furniture owned by an assessee is used for purposes of any business or profession carried on by him, or in any income year commencing on or after the first day of July, 1982, any machinery or plant is given on lease by the assessee, being a scheduled bank, a financial institution or such modaraba or leasing company as is approved by the Central Board of Revenue for purposes of this Schedule, on such conditions as may be specified, an allowance for depreciation shall be made in computing the profits and gains of the business or profession of the assessee in the manner hereinafter provided. ' (1-A) The provisions of sub-rule (1) shall in the like manner apply to a building given on lease in any income year commencing on or after the first day of July, 1986, provided that the said building is used by the lessee for the purposes of his business or profession. ' Rule 8(8)(a), Third Schedule:--- ' For the purpose of clause (7).---(a) in the case of road transport vehicles being passenger transport vehicles, not plying for hire, the actual cost to the assessee shall be deemed not to exceed (six hundred thousand rupees.] (The valuation has been increased from time to time through amendments by Finance Acts). ' Section 12(19). ' Where an assessee, being a scheduled bank, a financial institution, or such modaraba or leasing company as is approved by the Central Board of Revenue for the purposes of the Third Schedule, has leased out, on or after the first day of July, 1985, any asset, whether owned by it or not, to another person, any amount paid or payable by the said person in connection with the lease of the said asset shall be deemed to be the income of the said assessee. ' Section 23. Deductions. (1) In computing the income under the head 'income from business or profession', the following allowances and deductions shall be made, namely:--- (v) in respect of depreciation of any such building, machinery, plant, furniture or fittings, being the property of the assessee, the allowance admissible under the Third Schedule: except depreciation on assets given on lease shall be allowed against income from lease rentals only. (vi-a) any sum paid on or after the first day of July, 1985, to a scheduled hank, a financial institution, or such modaraba or leasing company as is approved by the Central Board of Revenue for the purposes of the Third Schedule, by way of lease money in respect of an asset taken on lease by the assessee and used for the purposes of any business or profession carried on by him. 11. As already observed, Mr. Khalil Waggan was allowed to argue on the point if rule 8(8)(a) of the Third Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 is applicable to…

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