Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

P L D 2025 Supreme Court 633 Present: Shahid Waheed, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION-FBR, through Director and others---Petitioners Versus TAJ INTERNATIONAL (PVT.) LTD. and others---Respondents Civil Appeals Nos. 350 to 698 of 2016, 424, 511, 512, 673, 1183 and 1184 of 2020, Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 1066 of 2018, Criminal Appeal No. 177 of 2019 and C.M.A. No. 12231 of 2021, decided on 4th December, 2024. (Against the judgments/order dated 19.09.2013, 20.03.2014, 02.04.2015, 07.04.2015, 16.03.2015, 26.07.2016, 18.10.2017 and 11.12.2018 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, High Court of Sindh, Karachi, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Writ Petitions Nos. 5047/2012, 17743/2012, 11294/2012, 27865/2011, 21612/2012, 873/2011, 28231/2012, 10852/ 2012, 11297/2012, 10698/2012, 2726/2011, 18221/2012, 10456/2012, 9652/2012, 11519/2012, 22738/2011, 11455/2012, 7918/2012, 6743/ 2012, 20298/2011, 18058/2011,27422/2011, 26489/2011, 9020/2011, 12384/2012, 10908/2011, 7029/2011, 18029/2012, 10330/2012, 8256/ 2011, 9654/2012, 11268/2012, 27863/2011, 21725/2011, 15927/2011, 417/2012, 9736/2012, 5634/2012, 6794/2012, 25182/2011, 11746/2012, 12568/2011, 27864/2011, 9048/2012, 20261/2012, 10838/2012, 14436/ 2011, 9324/2012, 11555/2012, 418/2012, 11030/2012, 20160/2012, 9616/ 2012, 11745/2012, 5048/2012, 21611/2012, 15791/2012, 10688/2012, 7188/2012, 8695/2011, 17106/2012, 9936/2012, 26855/2011, 5381/ 2012, 25622/2012, 9017/2012, 9017/2012, 8402/2012, 10246/2012, 26857/2011, 25623/2012, 9655/2011, 9107/2012, 10499/2012, 9653/ 2012, 15281/2012, 17286/2012, 11921/2012, 9570/2012, 8257/2011, 15660/2012, 15470/2012, 9104/2012, 14136/2012, 11922/2012, 9354/ 2011, 13991/2012, 29671/2011, 15179/2012, 6391/2012, 18098/2012, 10330/2012, 9019/2011, 6848/2011, 10331/2012, 10331/2012, 16754/ 2012, 16997/2012, 887/2012, 6878/2013, 5300/2012, 9086/2012, 5334/ 2014, 7802/2011, 7895/2011, 8190/2012, 21449/2013, 9742/2012, 9742/2012, 11665/2012, 11021/2012, 21884/2013, 7686/2011, 21671/ 2012, 8568/2012, 10674/2011, 13721/2011, 9047/2012, 9087/2012, 13721/2011, 9651/2012, 11298/2012, 12159/2011, 18521/2011, 5885/ 2012, 22737/2011, 6572/2013, 15471/2012, 22075/2012, 10598/2012, 19218/2012, 8926/2011, 7670/2012, 20657/2012, 17332/2012, 26554/ 2010, 3173/2012, 19219/2012, 7877/2012, 20297/2011, 10341/2012, 6001/2012, 8740/2012, 13969/2012, 7917/2012, 24736/ 2012, 24736/2012, 11923/2012, 17447/2012, 9614/2012, 19673/2012, 20658/2012, 8271/2012, 6547/2013, 5246/2013, 5139/2013, 9041/2011, 19862/2011, 31741/2012, 8359/2011, 9157/2012, 9355/2013, 8226/ 2012, 9500/2012, 14205/2012, 20657/2012, 22447/2012, 8786/2012, 17447/2012, 8191/2012, 20657/2012, 11268/2012, 7648/2012, 19674/ 2012, 11300/2012, 11744/2012, 8848/2012, 11027/2012, 15251/2012, 8494/2012, 20922/2012, 8492/2012, 20674/2012, 9506/2012, 8943/ 2012, 9047/2012, 7658/2012, 9872/2012, 9512/2012, 8270/2012, 9504/ 2012, 7514/2012, 9503/2012, 9505/2012, 9505/2012, 12631/2012, 9113/2012, 9616/2012, 9615/2012, 9876/2012, 17918/2012, 26440/ 2012, 11137/2012, 14874/2012, 13838/2012, 11138/2012, 9166/2012, 6572/2013, 11544/2012, 888/2013, 888/2013, 13426/2012, 367/2013, 14784/2012, 14784/2012, 13805/2013, 368/2013, 5450/2013, 9255/ 2012, 16622/2011, 9486/2012, 16328/2012, 13577/2012, 27742/2012, 9158/2012, 11020/2012, 16810/12, 16811/12, 16812/12, 16813/12, 7657/2012, 10926/2012, 14784/2012, 17815/2012, 18758/2012, 25801/ 2012, 5109/2013, 5138/2013, 6412/2013, 8994/2012, 12461/2012, 22571/2012, 6572/2013, 20452/2013, 17589/2012, 5450/2013, 132/ 2013, 7074/2013, 22231/2013, Const. P.D-2273/2011, C.P.D-814/2012, 21438/2013, 21440/2013, 21440/2013, 26815/2012, 9920/2012, 22594/ 2012, 29753/2012, 21439/2013, 9873/2012, 12160/2011, 29411/2012, 18015/2011, 27352/2012, 11296/2012, 8154/2011, 1082/2012, 29563/ 2012, 11666/2012, 7406/2011, 20004/2012, 16607/2011, 9656/2011, 58/2013, 26568/2010, 109/2013, 22908/2013, 9045/2012, 11359/2011, 15800/2012, 2941/2012, 1110/2013, 9219/2011, 12493/2012, 20092/ 2012, 7056/2013, 29603/2012, 28912/2012, 8647/2011, 27866/2011, 110/2013, 23251/2010, 5333/2012, 9018/2011, 28142/2012, 26856/ 2011, 57/2013, 11256/2011, 12153/2011, 4580/2011, 9118/2011, 711/2013, 2145/2013, 5049/2012, 4478/2010, 2379/2012, 1985/2012, 19644/2011, 1043/2012, 11343/ 2011, 61/2013, 21441/2013, 4439/2010, 29751/2012, 11972/2012, 23402/ 2012, 29582/2011, 19107/2011, 59/2013, 27266/2011, 27803/2012, 10498/2012, 13031/2012, 1686/ 2012, 60/2013, 9423/2012, 7695/2012, 13657/2011, 8015/2012, 12670/ 2012, 4440/2010, 4440/2010, 26814/ 2012, 21770/2013, 17671/2013, 10935/2012, 26555/2010, 27578/2012, 24686/2011, 29653/2012, 6795/ 2012, 26769/2010, 12104/2012, 1879/ 2013, 6230/2012, 1076/2012, 1400/2011, 7315/2013, 34364/2015, 33510/ 2015, 45696/2017 and Cr.A.134/2017). (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 3, 11 & 37-A---Recovery of sales tax---Power to arrest and prosecute---Principle---Authorities were aggrieved of quashing of FIRs by High Court registered against respondents/taxpayer for initiating criminal proceedings without determination of tax liabilities---Validity---Criminal penalties are linked with tax loss or amount of tax involved and tax due ---Instead of providing for imprisonment or fine (ordinarily a certain sum of money) or both as punishment, fine under Sales Tax Act, 1990 requires taxpayer to pay the tax loss or amount of tax involved and tax due, thereby indirectly criminalizing, recovery of tax due ---Measure of sentence is linked with amount or loss of tax involved and tax due and prima facie, cannot be imposed unless there is some determination or duly assessed tax liability of sales tax due through the processes of assessment for adjudication as per law---Such linkage, uses the tool of imposition of penalty as a mode of recovery of tax---Criminalization under Sales Tax Act, 1990 goes beyond the pale of retribution and deterrence and is principally focused on recovery of tax---Without investigative audit or issuance of show cause notice or providing opportunity to explain the matters, registration of FIR, initiation of criminal proceeding and arrest of registered person was without jurisdiction and lawful authority---Prosecution was to follow adjudication and assessment of tax under section 11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 therefore, pre-trial steps including arrest and detention could not be given effect to unless tax liability of taxpayer was determined in accordance with law---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments/orders passed by High Court---Appeal was dismissed. Pakistan Accumulator (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan Writ Petition No.1076-P of 2012; Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FBR 2014 PTD 1807; Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation, FBR v. Naeem Ahmed Siddiqui Criminal Appeal No. 177 of 2019; Messrs F. M. Textile and others v. FBR 2017 PTD 1875; Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. FBR and others 2014 PTD 1807; Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 PTD 1734; D. G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2004 SCMR 456 and Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah and others PLD 2018 SC 81 rel. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 33 & 37-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4 & 10A---Recovery of sales tax---Criminal proceedings, initiation of---Pre-requisites---Two pre requisites for invoking provisions of sections 33 and 37-A of Sales Tax Act, 1990 are: dependence of fine on the amount or loss of tax involved and window of compoundability which is available to taxpayer, who can pay the amount of tax due along with such default surcharge and penalty as determined under the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 ---If such purpose is simple retribution and deterrence, then there is no need to make the fine dependent with the amount or loss of tax involved---If fine under criminal prosecution is to be dependent with amount or loss of tax, such a criminal construct must be prefaced with mandatory requirement of assessment of tax through civil adjudication provided under section 11 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---This precondition is the minimum Constitutional requirement to ensure fair trial and due process under Articles 4 and 10-A of the Constitution. (c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 2 (37), 3, 11, 33 & 37A---Assessment of tax---Offences and penalties---Criminal proceedings---Principle---Perusal of Section 37A of Sales Tax Act, 1990 shows that if such provisions are allowed to be invoked independently without any reference to the other relevant provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 including section 2(37) tax fraud , section 3 Scope of Tax , section 11 Assessment of tax and section 33 Offences and Penalties , the same would be in violation of substantial provisions relating to charge of sales tax and assessment of sales tax, as it would give unbridled powers to officials of sales tax to initiate criminal prosecution against a registered person or any person within the supply chain, including registration of FIR and arrest, even without creating a lawful demand under the law---Such interpretation in respect of provisions of section 37-A of Sales Tax Act, 1990 would make the provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990 redundant, whereas, redundancy cannot be attributed to legislation. Zaheer Ahmed v. Directorate General of Intelligence and Investigation-IR and 4 others 2015 PTD 349 and Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) and another v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. 2005 SCMR 1166 rel. (d) Tax--- ----Imposing of tax---Principle---Under modern democratic system of Government, which is run by elected representative of people under their respective Constitutions, unbridled powers and authority to impose tax arbitrarily, without having any rationale or reasonableness, is now being regulated under the Constitutional restraints, whereby taxes are to be imposed reasonably, without discrimination and in such a manner that those may not encroach upon fundamental rights of a person as guaranteed under the Constitution. For the Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)/Applicant(s) Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court along with Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG (Law) FBR Aqeel A. Sidduqui, DG I&I-IR Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court Muhammad Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) Izhar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 600/2016) For the Respondent(s) Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court Nadeem Mehmood Mian, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Huriya Fatima, Advocate High Court Sh. Zafar ul Islam, ASC along with Tanveer Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court Muhammad Idris, Advocate Supreme Court Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record Sh. Mehmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record Ali Sibtain Fazli, Advocate Supreme Court along with Hasham Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court (associated by Isa Ahmed, Advocate) Abdul Bari Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court Ch. Munir Sadiq, Advocate Supreme Court Dr. Farhat Zafar Advocate Supreme Court Babar Bilak, ASC and Syed Tauqeer Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court Muhammad Munir Paracha Advocate Supreme Court Qazi Isaac Ali, Advocate Supreme Court For the Respondent(s) through Branch Registry Lahore Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court along with Shehryar Kasuri, Advocate Supreme Court Shahbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court Shahid Baig, Advocate Supreme Court Haroon Duggal, Advocate Supreme Court Saood Nasrullah, Advocate Supreme Court Ch. Muhammad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court Tahir Munir Malik, Advocate Supreme Court Ibrar Ahmad Advocate Supreme Court Rana Munir Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court Mian Ashiq Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court Ms. Tabinda Islam, Advocate Supreme Court Hassan Kamran Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court Assisted by: Ms. Zainab Bashir, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 4th December, 2024. JUDGMENT AQEEL AHMED ABBASI, J.---Through this consolidated judgment, we intend to decide all the listed matters as they involve common questions of law. 2. In the above bunch of cases, the judgment dated 19.09.2013, passed by the Divisional Bench of Lahore High Court, is the first judgment, wherein, after detailed scrutiny of the facts and the examination of the relevant legal provisions, particularly, the scope and the application of Section 37A of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (the "Act"), as well as legality of pre-trial steps including arrest and detention of a person pursuant to registration of FIR on the charges of tax fraud, has been decided. Whereas, in nutshell, it has been held by the Lahore High Court that unless the sales tax liability of the taxpayers is determined in accordance with Section 11 of the Act, above penal provisions, cannot be invoked, therefore, the criminal proceedings initiated by the sales tax department, the registration of FIRs and arrest made pursuant to FIRs, is illegal and without lawful authority. Accordingly, the same were quashed for being unconstitutional, violative of fundamental right, ultra vires to the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The reasoning of the above conclusion by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court will be discussed in detail in later part of the judgment for being more elaborate and exhaustive on the legal issue to be decided by us. In Civil Appeal No.511/2020 arising out of judgment dated 07.04.2015 passed by the Peshawar High Court in Writ Petition No.1076-P/2012 titled Pakistan Accumulator (Pvt) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan, under similar facts and circumstances, registration of FIR was declared to be, without jurisdiction and of no legal effect, consequently, the same was quashed while placing reliance in the judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Taj International (Pvt) Ltd. v. FBR (2014 PTD 1807) as referred to hereinabove. Whereas, in Criminal Appeal No. 177/2019 titled as Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation, FBR v. Naeem Ahmed Siddiqui filed against the order dated 11.12.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of Islamabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No.134/2017, similar FIR has been quashed and the SRO 116/2015 has been declared to be ultra vires vide judgment dated 06.07.2018 in the case of Messrs F. M. Textile and others v. FBR (2017 PTD 1875 Lahore), whereas, reliance has also been placed in the case of Taj International (Pvt) Ltd. v. FBR etc. (2014 PTD 1807). In the aforesaid judgment, in addition to determination of scope, and application and initiation of proceedings under the provisions of Section 37A of the Act before assessment or determination of sales tax liability, the provisions of Section 74A incorporated through amendment dated 31.10.2018 made in the Sales Tax Act, 1990, have also been examined, and it has been held that validation provision does not cover Section 30 (E), rather it only provides protection to the extent of appointment in terms of Section 30(A), whereas, since the Notification SRO 116(1)/2015 was issued by the FBR and not by the Director General (Intelligence and Investigation) as referred in Section 30(A), therefore, powers conferred under aforesaid SRO were not available to the complainant of FIR No.08/2015, hence, registration of criminal cases, which was not validly authorized, is of no legal effect, which otherwise could not be given retrospective effect. 3. In Civil Appeal No.600/2016 filed against the judgment of Sindh High Court in C.P.No.D-2273/2011 and others in the case of Waseem Ahmed and another v. Federation of Pakistan (2014 PTD 1734), whereby, 485 Constitutional Petitions were filed against registration of FIRs and submission of interim challan by the Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation, FBR, on the allegations of tax fraud, issuance of fake sales tax invoices to claim inadmissible input adjustment/ refund of sales tax, however, before determination or assessment of tax liability under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The Divisional Bench of the High Court of Sindh, after having examined the relevant facts and law applicable here to, decided the same in the following terms:- "62. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing discussion and analysis, and subject to the last preceding paragraph, we dispose off these petitions in the following terms: A. As to the jurisdictional point: a. SRO 48/2008 is declared to have been validly issued and effective accordingly. b. SRO 56/2010 is declared to be invalid, but its invalidity merely meant that SRO 48/2008 continued to effectively hold the field. c. SRO 775/2011 is declared to be ultra vires the Sales Tax Act. d. SRO 776/2011 is declared to be invalid, but its invalidity merely meant that, as before, SRO 48/2008 continued to effectively hold the field. e. Notwithstanding the changes in Sections 30 and 30A, SRO 48/ 2008 continued to remain effective for all purposes and it is declared that for the reasons as stated (i) the reference therein to officers of Sales Tax subsequently became a reference to officers of Inland Revenue, and (ii) the reference to the DG (I&I)-FBR subsequently became a reference to the DG (I&I)- IR. f. Notwithstanding sub -paragraph (e), it would be appropriate if FBR, in supersession of previous notifications, issues a fresh notification under Sections 30 and 30E that complies with both the required conditions, i.e., declares the officers of the DG (I&I)-IR "to be" officers of Inland Revenue (Section 30) and establishes their jurisdiction, etc. in relation to specified provisions (Section 30E). B. As to registration of FIRs, submissions of challans and notices under Section 37 in relation to the criminal cases: g. The FIRs, and the challans submitted and notices issued on or before 30.06.2011 and any investigation carried out by or before that date were validly issued and undertaken by the officers of the DG(I&I)-FBR and within jurisdiction. h. The challans submitted and notices issued on or after 01.07.2011 by officers of the DG(I&I)-FBR were irregular as this Directorate General had ceased to be of relevance for the Sales Tax Act on and after that date, but for reasons stated such irregularity does not vitiate their validity nor invalidate any investigation or inquiry nor render defective or invalid any proceedings taken before the Special Judge by such officers. i. All acts and proceedings with regard to the criminal cases (including by way of any further investigation) can now be done and/or continued only by officers of the DG(I&I)-IR, duly authorized and empowered under SRO 48/2008 or any subsequent validly issued notification. References herein below to "prosecution" shall thus mean and be references to the officers of the DG(I&I)-IR. j. If at any time the Federal Government validly exercises its powers under Section 37B (13), this paragraph 62 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the officers so notified. C. As to proceedings before the Special Judge: k. The Special Judge has jurisdiction only in relation to those clauses of Section 33 as create criminal offences. l. The proceedings pending before the Special Judge shall be taken and continued only in the manner as herein after stated, except bail applications and proceedings in the nature of Section 265-K, Cr.P.C., which may be taken up at any time in accordance with law. However, the listing and/or hearing of the applications under Section 265-K shall be subject to such case management directions as the Special Judge may deem appropriate. m. The prosecution shall, within eight weeks, or such further time as may be granted by the Special Judge distinguish, identify, isolate and establish the relevant supply chains in respect of the transactions in relation to which challans have been submitted, in the first instance limiting the exercise only to those persons nominated in the challans, clearly showing the various suppliers along each supply chain and identifying the other persons (if any) who are accused of tax fraud as abettors, or connivers or are otherwise alleged to be involved in respect of any transaction along any supply chain amounting to any criminal offence under the clauses of Section 33. n. Once the supply chains have been established as above (or as each supply is so established, as the Special Judge may deem appropriate) the prosecution shall in respect of each such chain satisfy the Special Judge, "link" by "link", "block" by "block" in the manner as stated herein above, as to the alleged culpability of each person appearing on the supply chain and every other person (if any) alleged to be an abettor, conniver or otherwise involved in the tax fraud or any other criminal offence under the clauses of Section 33. o. The person whose matter is being so considered by the Special Judge shall be entitled to be present or represented at such consideration. p. If the Special Judge is satisfied that, on applying the law, inter alia, in terms as stated and explained in this judgment, there is no probability of the person under consideration being convicted of the criminal offence of tax fraud or any other criminal offence under any clause of Section 33, such person shall be discharged forthwith, whether by way of acquittal or otherwise as appropriate. q. In considering the case of any person, the Special Judge shall, inter alia, take into consideration the acquittal (if any) of any person antecedent or subsequent (as the case may be) on the relevant supply chain for the reasons as explained herein above (see in particular para 50). r. Once the supply chains have been considered as above, the Special Judge shall then proceed to consider the challans in respect of the persons not discharged or acquitted in terms as above and shall then (without prejudice to the next succeeding sub-paragraph (s)) if he is satisfied with regard to the challans proceed to try such persons in accordance with law. It is clarified that nothing in this paragraph 62 shall preclude the Special Judge from considering in accordance with law an application moved by an accused under Section 265-K, Cr.P.C. at or during such trial. s. The prosecution may at any stage, but with the prior permission of the Special Judge to be given in writing, continue investigation in respect of any supply chain identified and established in terms of sub-paragraph (m), but any person nominated on the basis of such further investigation shall, before he is put to trial, be dealt with in the first instance, mutatis mutandis, in the manner as herein before stated. It is clarified that the investigation referred to in this sub-paragraph includes proceedings in respect of or under any notice already issued under Section 37. t. Without prejudice to the next succeeding sub-paragraph (u), the accused on each supply chain shall be tried together but separately from the accused of another supply chain unless the Special Judge, for reasons to be recorded in writing, concludes that it would be appropriate to hold one trial in respect of more than one supply chain. Thus, it is expected that there will be more than one trial and it may be that one person, if he is an accused on more than one supply chain, will be tried in like manner. For purposes of proper case management of the trial(s) or for any other direction or guidance consistently with this judgment that may be deemed necessary, the Special Judge (but only he) may apply, either himself or on the request of the prosecution or any accused, for directions from the High Court. Any such application shall be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for such orders, directions or disposal as are deemed appropriate. u. Nothing in sub-paragraph (t) shall prevent the Special Judge, for reasons to be recorded in writing, for ordering the trial of any person or persons in a manner other than that specified in the said sub-paragraph (t) if the offence(s) of which the said person or persons are to be charged do not include the offence of tax fraud. It is however clarified that no such trial shall prevent the subsequent trial, if so warranted in accordance with law, of any such person or persons for the offence of tax fraud. v. Any person who has given (or may at any stage be required to give) post dated cheque(s) or other security may be required by the Special Judge to keep the cheque(s) from going stale in such manner as the latter may deem appropriate, but any such cheque(s) shall not be ordered to be encashed nor any such security forfeited except (i) on account of violation of any bail granted should such person be on bail; or (ii) on the conviction of the said person for any criminal offence and then only in relation to payment of any fine that may be imposed by the Special Judge. D. As to proceedings in respect of Section 37 notices already issued in relation to the FIRs and further investigations in respect of the…

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