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Official Citation: 2025 IHC 241907
Court / Jurisdiction: Islamabad High Court
Parties: Zuhra Jabeen vs First Women Bank, etc
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Islamabad High Court, officially reported as 2025 IHC 241907. In this matter between Zuhra Jabeen and First Women Bank, etc, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Islamabad High Court (Honourable Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas) AUTHOR JUDGE: Honourable Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas DECISION DATE: 31-OCT-2025 CASE NO: Writ Petition-1051-2022 CITATION: 2025 IHC 241907 PARTIES: Zuhra Jabeen VS First Women Bank, etc LAW / SECTION: Under Standing Order 8(2) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968|Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973|under Article 199 of the Constitution SUBJECT: Miscelleneous, Other REMARKS: NIRC: An ex-cashier of First women Bank impugns order of full bench wherein the appeal by Bank was confirmed and the termination of Petitioner on basis of misconduct of absence was re-affirmed. ============================================================ JUDGMENT SHEET ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Writ Petition No.1051 of 2022
Mst. Zohra Jabeen
Versus
First Women Bank and others
Petitioner by: M/s Mansoor Ahmad and Shamshad Ullah Cheema, Advocates.
Respondents No.1 & 2 by: Mr. Shahid Anwar Bajwa, Advocate along with Ms. Rozina Raja, Regional Operation Manager and Attorney.
Dates of Hearing: 03.09.2025 & 10.09.2025.
INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J.- Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 17.11.2021 (“Impugned Order”), passed by the learned Full Bench, National Industrial Relations Commission (“NIRC”), whereby appeal filed by respondent No.1 (“Respondent Bank”) was allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Bench, NIRC dated 25.09.2019 was set aside and the grievance petition of the petitioner was dismissed. 2. Brief facts are that the petitioner was initially appointed by Respondent Bank on 16.11.2000 in the Mobile Credit Projects as Recovery Representative. After her satisfactory performance the petitioner was given regular appointment as Assistant on 16.01.2006 and later on she was promoted as OG-III on 25.06.2009 and since her regular appointment she was assigned the duty of cashier. While performing her duties as a cashier, she negligently made a wrong entry of Rs.405,567/- on 06.11.2015 in the account of Mohammad Anwar, which should have been posted in another account in the name of Muhammad Anwar. The said amount was withdrawn by the unauthorized account holder causing loss to the actual account holder as well as the Respondent Bank. Thereafter, the petitioner remained unauthorized 2 W.P No.1051/2022
absent from duty for more than one month so she was served with charge sheet on 29.04.2016, to which her reply was found unsatisfactory. Therefore, an inquiry was conducted, in which the petitioner participated and after conclusion of the inquiry, she was dismissed from service on 28.06.2016. Thereafter, the petitioner filed grievance petition before the learned Single Bench, NIRC, in which Respondent Bank appeared and contested the same by filing its written reply. The learned Single Bench after recording of evidence and hearing the arguments allowed the grievance petition vide order dated 25.09.2019 and she was reinstated in service with full back benefits. Respondent Bank assailed the said order before the learned Full Bench, NIRC in appeal, which was allowed vide order dated 11.08.2020. The petitioner assailed the order dated 11.08.2020 before this Court through Writ Petition No.1371 of 2021, which was allowed vide judgment dated 27.08.2021 (“Remand Order”) and the order dated 11.08.2020 passed by the learned Full Bench was set aside and the matter was remanded back for decision afresh. Thereafter, the learned Full Bench, NIRC passed the Impugned Order and order of the learned Single Bench, NIRC was again set aside and the grievance petition was dismissed, hence, this writ petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the learned Full Bench, NIRC misread oral as well as the documentary evidence; that Respondent Bank wrongly denied the petitioner’s leave application and falsely claimed it was submitted late, though it failed to produce the record of receipt; that Respondent Bank also took contradictory stances, first denying any leave, then alleging a false or tampered medical prescription, without pleading or proving any of these claims through evidence; that the petitioner had 119 privilege leaves in her credit in accordance with the Respondent Bank’s rules, which remained un-rebutted and her absence could not legally be treated as misconduct; that the learned Full Bench disregarded these facts and the specific directions issued by this Court in Writ Petition No. 1371/2021 vide order dated 27.08.2021; that findings of the learned Full Bench, NIRC are based on material not forming part of the evidence, thus violated the petitioner’s right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, resulting in a miscarriage of justice and that the Impugned Order is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 3 W.P No.1051/2022
4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent Bank resisted the instant writ petition and contended that the Impugned Order has been passed in accordance with law as the petitioner admitted the allegations before the inquiry officer and the charge against her was proved, which is based on documentary evidence and her admission. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the record with their able assistance. 6. It is trite law that certiorari orders can be granted solely when a clear error of law is evident on the face of the record and to rectify jurisdictional errors committed by subordinate Courts or tribunals. Reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Shakeel and others vs. Additional District Judge, Faisalabad and others, (PLD 2025 SC 572). It is apparent from the record that order of the learned Single Bench, NIRC dated 25.09.2019 was assailed by the Respondent Bank before the learned Full Bench, NIRC in appeal, which was accepted vide order dated 11.08.2020. This order was assailed by the petitioner before this Court through Writ Petition No.1371 of 2021, which was allowed vide the Remand Order and the order dated 11.08.2020 passed by the learned Full Bench, NIRC was set aside and the matter was remanded back. Thereafter, the learned Full Bench, NIRC passed the Impugned Order. 7. It is evident from the record that the learned Full Bench, NIRC did not fully adhere to the observations and directions contained in this Court’s Remand Order, rendered in Writ Petition No. 1371 of 2021. Although the matter was remanded for decision afresh in accordance with law, it is manifest that the learned Full Bench, NIRC fell in error by limiting its consideration solely to the questions enumerated in the penultimate paragraph of the Remand Order and by confining its determination exclusively to those aspects, without undertaking a holistic re-examination of the issues as directed. For ease the relevant paragraph is reproduced below:- “35. Whether or not the petitioner had applied for leave; the date of the leave application; whether F.W.B. was justified in not allowing or turning down the leave application; whether the petitioner’s absence from duty without approval of her leave application justified the penalty of dismissal from service; or whether there was a forged medical certificate attached to the 4 W.P No.1051/2022
leave application were all matters for the Full Bench, N.I.R.C. to consider and decide before overturning the decision of the learned Member, N.I.R.C. This Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, cannot determine these questions, or in other words do what the learned Full Bench, N.I.R.C. was supposed to have done. The High Court in writ jurisdiction has full powers to do justice but cannot substitute its own decision for the decision of the tribunal below.” 8. In doing so, the learned Full Bench overlooked a material aspect of the case i.e. the first charge framed in the letter of charge, which constituted a substantive factor of the disciplinary proceedings and required independent consideration in accordance with the directions of this Court in the Remand Order. As per record the petitioner was dismissed from service on account of charges reproduced below:- “1. You unauthorizedly posted a number of wrong entries with malafide intention, one of them is amounting to Rs.405,567/- credited in the account No.0026009467720001 title of account M. Anwar, which should have been credited to A/c No.002600895420001 title of account Mohammad Anwar/Idrees Anwar on 06.11.2015. 2. You have borrowed money from customers/account holders of the Bank. The details of a few borrowing from customers are as under:- (i) Rs.56,000/- from Mr. Nadir Khan Durrani of Asghar Agencies in the month of January, 2016. (ii) Amount of Rs.5000/- from Malik Kashif Noman of account No.0018012640420001. 3. You are absent without leave from your duty since 15.04.2016. Neither you applied for any leave nor any leave has been granted to you.” 9. The omission on the part of the learned Full Bench, NIRC to consider the first charge framed in the charge-sheet constitutes a material irregularity especially when the same was expressly dealt with in the Remand Order, thereby affecting the legality of the Impugned Order. When a matter is remanded by a superior Court with specific directions, it is incumbent upon the subordinate forum to comply therewith in letter and spirit. Any deviation therefrom amounts to a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by law. By disregarding a material aspect of the controversy, the learned Full Bench, NIRC rendered a decision, which is incomplete and non-speaking, thereby 5 W.P No.1051/2022
falling short of the standard of judicial determination required under the law. Such omission not only reflects non-compliance with the binding directions of this Court but also violates the principles of natural justice, thereby rendering the Impugned Order legally deficient and contrary to the spirit of the Remand Order. 10. Ordinarily such omission would warrant a remand for reconsideration, however, given the protracted history of litigation, this Court considers it appropriate to examine the matter itself in the interest of expeditious justice as the entire record pertaining to the said charge is already available before this Court. 11. With regard to the first charge that the petitioner had posted incorrect cheque entries without authorization and with mala fide intent, it is observed that the inquiry officer failed to objectively consider the petitioner’s explanation and instead treated her clarification as an admission of guilt. The petitioner had consistently maintained that she in capacity of cashier was not authorized to process transactions exceeding the prescribed limit of Rs.300,000/-. The disputed entry of Rs.405,567/- was therefore beyond her authority and could only have been executed by the Branch Manager. However, neither the Branch Manager nor the Operations Manager was examined during the inquiry to substantiate any allegation of mala fide intent or to demonstrate that the petitioner acted to the detriment of the account holder. 12. The record further reveals that the account holder, Muhammad Anwar, had voluntarily returned Rs.372,000/- and acknowledged utilization of the remaining Rs.33,567/- with an assurance to repay the same. Despite his direct involvement, he was never summoned as a witness to clarify the transaction. The inquiry officer instead proceeded solely on the petitioner’s written explanation and erroneously construed it as an admission of misconduct. Such an approach contravenes the settled principles of fairness in disciplinary proceedings, which require that findings rest on credible evidence rather than conjecture or presumption. Consequently, this Court holds that the first charge against the petitioner was not established in accordance with law. The 6 W.P No.1051/2022
conclusion drawn by the inquiry officer and endorsed by the competent authority stands vitiated by material procedural and evidentiary defects. 13. So far as the second charge that the petitioner borrowed money from customers/account holders of the bank is concerned, it is observed that the learned Full Bench, NIRC disregarded to consider a material aspect of the matter. This Court in paragraph 30 of the Remand Order observed that no finding on the said charge had been given, despite that no finding has been rendered on the said charge in the Impugned Order. It is reflected from the record that no witness or evidence was produced during the inquiry to establish that the petitioner had borrowed any amount from the account holders. The entire finding of the inquiry officer rests merely on assumptions and without any supporting proof. The record does not contain any written acknowledgment, statement or testimony of any of the account holders or any other person confirming that such a transaction ever took place, whereas, the petitioner has explained this allegation that this is a private matter and has nothing to do with the business of the Respondent Bank and has not caused any damage to its reputation. It is a settled principle that in disciplinary proceedings the burden of proof lies upon the department to substantiate the charge through credible and independent evidence. In the present case, the inquiry officer failed to bring any material on record to demonstrate that the petitioner obtained or utilized any money from the account holders. Despite this, the inquiry officer proceeded to hold the charge as proved, without any cogent reasoning or documentary support. Such a finding, rendered in the absence of witnesses and evidence, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Auqaf Department vs. Secretary, Ministry of Religious Zakat, Usher and Minorities Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, (2009 SCMR 210) held that “in regard to finding of fact recorded by the respondent writ of “certiorari” could only be issued, if in recording such findings, the respondent had acted on evidence which was legally inadmissible or had refused to accept admissible evidence or if the findings were not supported by any evidence at all”. Therefore the conclusion drawn by the inquiry officer is speculative and contrary to the established standards of fair inquiry and must have been proved through reliable evidence rather than conjecture or suspicion. Consequently, this Court 7 W.P No.1051/2022
finds that the finding on the second charge is unsupported by the record and suffers from a clear lack of evidentiary basis. 14. With regard to third charge absent without leave from duty since 15.04.2016, it is evident from the record that the Respondent Bank’s own witness, while deposing before the inquiry officer, candidly admitted that the petitioner’s leave application was “neither accepted nor rejected.” This admission carries material legal significance. Standing Order 8 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, imposes a mandatory duty upon the employer to decide every leave request by either granting, refusing or postponing with reasons duly recorded. The object of this provision is to ensure procedural fairness and to guard against arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of employees. The Respondent Bank’s failure to render any decision at all constitutes a violation of this statutory duty. In law, silence or inaction cannot substitute for a lawful decision and the admitted fact that the application remained undecided reveals a serious procedural irregularity that undermines the validity of the disciplinary proceedings. Accordingly, the subsequent charge of unauthorized absence stands without lawful foundation. 15. The material on record further confirms that the petitioner had submitted a leave application accompanied by a hospital document. This is corroborated by the statement of the Respondent Bank’s own witness, who reiterated that the application was “neither recommended nor rejected” and was made on medical grounds. Despite being the custodian of relevant registers, the Respondent Bank failed to produce any receipt diary, inward- mail log, or other primary record to demonstrate that no such application was received. The deliberate withholding of such primary evidence attracts the presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, that had the evidence been produced, it would have operated against the Bank’s own case. On the balance of probabilities, therefore, this Court is satisfied that the petitioner’s leave application was duly submitted but remained undecided due to the Respondent Bank’s own omission. 16. The record further shows that at the time of her absence, the petitioner had 129 days of privilege leaves in her account. Under the Respondent Bank’s 8 W.P No.1051/2022
own leave policy, accumulated privilege leaves are intended to accommodate unforeseen or medical contingencies. The very purpose of maintaining such a balance is to safeguard employees in situations where prior intimation or formal approval may not be feasible. Even if the petitioner’s application was delayed or procedurally deficient, the Respondent Bank was under an obligation to consider adjusting her absence against the available privilege leaves balance rather than treating it as unauthorized. The failure to do so contravenes the Respondent Bank’s own policy framework and the broader principles of fairness and equity recognized in service jurisprudence. The existence of a substantial privilege leaves balance, therefore, negates any justification for imposing major penalty of dismissal and supports the petitioner’s contention that her absence could and should have been regularized in accordance with law. 17. The petitioner had rendered almost sixteen years of continuous and satisfactory service with the Respondent Bank, during which no prior act of misconduct or negligence was ever attributed to her. The alleged lapse pertains only to a limited period of absence, which neither resulted in any proven financial loss to the Respondent Bank nor caused disruption of its operations. Moreover, the duration of absence was finite and could have easily been adjusted against her available privilege leaves or treated as medical or leave without pay, in accordance with the established service rules. It is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that although the employer possesses discretion in determining the nature of penalty to be imposed after conducting due process, such discretion is neither absolute nor immune from judicial scrutiny. Even if it is assumed that there was a breach of Standing Order 8 regarding the timing of the leave application, such procedural irregularity could not justify the major penalty of dismissal from service. The Respondent Bank has failed to show that it considered any lesser penalty or even took into account the mitigating factors, such as long service, clean record, medical condition being lady and the availability of leaves balance. The imposition of major penalty of dismissal, without a reasoned evaluation of these considerations and without deciding the pending leave application stands out as arbitrary, harsh and shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the alleged misconduct. 9 W.P No.1051/2022
18. With regard to the observation of the learned Full Bench, NIRC, that “suffice it to say she had submitted forged medical certificate………………hence her absence was willfull so the penalty of dismissal from service was justified”, this Court finds such reasoning to be misconceived. Forgery, being a grave allegation carrying penal and disciplinary consequences, must be proved strictly in accordance with law through direct, cogent, and convincing evidence. In the present case, the allegation of tampering with the medical certificate was neither substantiated nor established through admissible evidence. The Respondent Bank rested its case solely on hearsay information allegedly obtained by the representative of its Management from a doctor, who was never produced or examined before any adjudicatory forum. It is a settled principle that the onus to prove forgery lies squarely on the party alleging it and failure to discharge that burden renders the conclusion legally untenable and contrary to established principles of evidentiary law. In the absence of any admissible or substantive evidence establishing that the medical certificate was forged, the charge of forgery remains wholly unproven and consequently the imposition of the major penalty of dismissal stands unsupported by law. The findings of the learned Full Bench, NIRC to the contrary are the result of a clear misreading of the record and a fundamental misapprehension of the burden of proof. 19. This Court has also noted grave procedural irregularities in the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings. The inquiry report, which constituted the very foundation of the petitioner’s dismissal, was placed on record only in shape of photocopy. The inquiry officer being the author of that report was never summoned or examined to verify its authenticity or to elucidate the reasoning underlying his findings. Such an omission strikes at the foundation of the report’s evidentiary worth, since without the supporting testimony of its author, the document cannot be said to have been duly proved by the mere production of its copy. Moreover, the Respondent Bank, being custodian of the relevant official records, failed to produce crucial documents such as the receipt registers, inward mail logs, and HR files that could have established whether the petitioner’s leave application was in fact submitted and duly received. The non-production of these vital records and the failure to examine 10 W.P No.1051/2022
the inquiry officer render the disciplinary proceedings procedurally defective, evidentially deficient and consequently not sustainable in the eyes of law. 20. Under Standing Order 8(2) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, the employer carries a clear legal duty to decide on any leave application within a prescribed timeframe either within one week of its submission or at least two days before the commencement of the requested leave and where the leave is to commence immediately or within three days, the order must be issued on the same day. In the present case, the Respondent Bank has not produced any documentary evidence to show that such an order of refusal, postponement or approval was ever passed. No leave register or written record of decision has been placed on file. In addition to this statutory obligation, the Respondent Bank’s own internal leave policy, relied upon by both sides, recognizes that where unplanned medical leave is taken, it must be supported by a medical certificate and in the absence of sufficient casual leave, may be adjusted against the employee’s privilege leaves. The record further shows that the Respondent Bank does not dispute that the petitioner had a substantial privilege leaves balance at her credit. Thus, both under the statutory Standing Orders and the Respondent Bank’s own policy framework, the management was duty bound to formally decide the leave application and consider adjustment from the available privilege balance. Its failure to do so amounts to non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements and undermines the justification for treating the petitioner’s absence as unauthorized. 21. It is an established principle of law…
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