Al Wakeelo
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Petitioner: Brandon Lance Rinehart VS Respondent: State of California
Court Name: Supreme Court of United States Judge(s): N/A Title: Brandon Lance Rinehart vs State of California Case No.: No, 16-970 Date of Judgment:2017-12-01 Reported As: 2018 P.S.C. 667 Result: Petition dismissed
Judgment ORDER INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES This brief is filed in response to 'the Court's order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. In the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. STATEMENT A. The Mining Act of 1872 Until 1866, miners who entered federal lands to find and extract gold and other minerals were trespassers. Pet. App. A14-A15; see Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 773-774 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884). Congress wanted to encourage the discovery and extraction of valuable mineral deposits, but was concerned that people would "not lend their capital to mining projects" if their property rights were uncertain because "the title to the soil is in the Government." Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 686 (1865). In 1866 and 1870, Congress enacted statutes formally opening federal lands for mineral exploration and establishing a process by which miners could acquire property rights in the mineral deposits they found. Pet. App. A14-A15. Congress carried forward a similar process in the Mining Act of 1872 (Mining Act), 30 U.S.C. 22 et seq., which remains in effect today. Pet. App. A14-A15 & n.6. The Mining Act provides that, subject to exceptions: [A]ll valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.
---
## Page 2
30 U.S.C. 22. A person who discovers a valuable mineral deposit and complies with the Mining Act's other requirements for perfecting a mining claim obtains a possessory interest in the land and the right to extract the minerals. 30 U.S.C. 26, 35. The Mining Act also allows the holder of a mining claim to obtain a patent, which confers fee simple title to the land and terminates federal ownership. 30 U.S.C. 29, 37. But even without taking that step, the holder of a valid mining claim has a possessory interest and mineral rights that are "property in the fullest sense of that term." Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316 (1930). The Mining Act thus removes obstacles to mineral development on federal lands that had been posed by federal ownership. But the Mining Act is generally silent on matters other than the process of establishing mining claims and allocating property interests among miners and between miners and the United States. It does not, for example, regulate the process of mining, and it "expressed no legislative intent on the as yet rarely contemplated subject of environmental regulation." California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 582 (1987). Instead, those subjects have long been governed by other federal, state, and local laws. For example, in the 1880s, courts applied California nuisance law to enjoin the practice of hydraulic mining, which "involved blasting hillsides with large volumes of high-pressure water" and which imposed "substantial environmental impacts" on downstream communities. Pet. App. A18; see, e.g., Woodruff, 18 F. at 806-809. B. California's Moratorium On Suction Dredging. Suction dredging is a method of extracting gold and other minerals from the beds of streams and rivers. A high-powered suction hose vacuums loose material from the streambed and feeds it into a sluice box. The gold settles out, and the water, gravel, and other sediment is discharged back into the stream. Pet. App. A2. California has required a permit for suction dredging since 1961, shortly after the method first came into use. 1961 Cal. Stat. 3864. The State's permitting regime originally required a showing that the use of a suction dredge would not be "deleterious to fish." Ibid. California later designated certain waterways off-limits to suction dredging. Pet. App. A2. In 2009, the California Legislature found that "suction or vacuum dredge mining results in various adverse environmental impacts to protected fish species, the water quality of this state, and the health of the wople of this state." Cal. Stat. 2009, ch. 62, 2. The Legislature accordingly suspended the permitting regime and prohibited suction-dredge mining pending an environmental review by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) and the issuance of new regulations. Pet App. A3; see Cal. Fish & Game Code 5653.1(b) (West 2013). In. 2011, the Legislature enacted an amendment providing that the moratorium would end no later than June 30, 2016. Pet. App. A3. That was the legal regime in effect when the conduct at issue in this case occurred. Ibid.; see id. at C2. In 2012, the CDFW finished its environmental review, but determined that it did not have authority to adopt the regulations that would be required to fully mitigate the adverse impacts it had identified. Pet. App. A3; see id. at E23-E26. On June 27, 2012, the Legislature responded by eliminating the 2016 sunset and requiring the CDFW to submit a report on the statutory changes that would be needed to authorize the required regulations. Id. at A3; see Cal. Stat. 2012, ch. 39, 7. In 2015, after the CDFW's report, the legislature amended the state to grant the necessary regulatory authority. Pet. App. A3; see Cal. Stat. 2015, ch. 680, 2, 4. The moratorium on suction dredging remains in place pending the issuance of the required regulations. Pet. App. A3; see Cal. Fish & Game Code. 5653.1(b) (West 2013). California has stated that the process of developing those regulations is ongoing. Br. in Opp. 21. C. The Present Controversy 1. Petitioner is the part owner of an unpatented mining claim, which was located in 2010 in the Plumas National Forest in California. On June 16, 2012, a game warden found him using a suction
---
## Page 3
dredge on the claim. Petitioner did not have the suction-dredge permit required by California law, and because of the moratorium he could not have obtained one. Pet. App: A3-A4, C2-C3. California charged petitioner with two misdemeanors: operating a suction dredge without a permit and possessing a suction dredge in a closed area. Pet. App. A3. In a bench trial on stipulated facts, petitioner admitted to violating California law. Id. at A3. As relevant here, his only defense was that the Mining Act preempted California's moratorium on suction dredging to the extent it applies on federal lands. Id. at A4.3 The trial court rejected that argument, convicted petitioner on both charges, and sentenced him to three years of probation. Id. at A5. 2. The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reversed. Pet. App. C1-C25. The court concluded that the moratorium would be preempted if it rendered gold {{FOOTNOTE}} 3 Petitioner also argued that the moratorium was preempted by another federal mining statute, 30 U.S.C. 612(b). Pet. App. A4. The California Supreme Court rejected that argument, id. at A26-A30, and petitioner does not renew it in this Court. {{FOOTNOTE}} mining on petitioner's claims "commercially impracticable." Id. at 024. The court remanded to allow the trial court to consider petitioner's proffer of evidence that he argued would establish that suction dredging is the only commercially viable method of mining his claims. Ibid. 3. The California Supreme Court granted discretionary review and upheld petitioner's conviction. Pet. App. A1-A30. The court explained that, in general, "[a] state 'is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws' on federal land,4 :unless those laws conflict with federal legislation or regulation." Id. at A6 (quoting Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 :U.S. 529, 543 (1976)). The court noted that the Mining Act "contain[s] no express preemption provision" and does not "occupy a relevant field that would foreclose state regulation" altogether. Ibid. Indeed, the court observed that this Court's decision in Granite Rock "rejected the argument that the [Mining Act] categorically forecloses states from imposing, permit requirements" and other environmental regulations on mining "on federal land." Id. at A9 (citing Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 582-584) Petitioner therefore relied solely on obstacle preemption, "the principle that a state may not adopt laws impairing 'the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Id. at A7 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). The California Supreme Court rejected petitioner's contention that the moratorium on suction dredging is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the Mining Act's purposes. Pet. App. A9-A26. The court explained that the Mining Act focuses on "the allocation of real property interests among those who would exploit 'the mineral wealth of the nation's lands, not regulation of the process of exploitation--the mining--itself." Id. at A11. The court added that the Mining Act expressly contemplates the continued application of state law by, for example, requiring miners to comply "with State, territorial, and local regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possessory title." 30 U.S.C. 26; see Pet. App. A11. And after reviewing the Mining Act's history and the contemporaneous state regulation of mining activities--including California's prohibition do hydraulic mining--the court found no support for petitioner's contention that Congress sought "to confer a right to mine, immune in whole or in part from curtailment by regulation." Pet. App. A16- A17; see id, at A13-A22. The court therefore held that California's temporary ban on suction dredging was not preempted by the Mining Act. Id. at A25-A26. DISCUSSION Petitioner renews his contention (Pet. 20-32) that the Mining Act preempts California's moratorium on suction dredging. Petitioner relies exclusively on obstacle preemption, asserting (Pet. 21) that the moratorium is preempted because it "frustrates the Mining Law's purpose" of promoting mining.
---
## Page 4
The California Supreme Court correctly rejected that argument, and its decision neither conflicts with any decision of this Court nor implicates any division among the lower courts warranting this Court's intervention. And even if the question presented otherwise warranted this Court's review, the ongoing changes in California law would make this case a poor vehicle in which to consider it. The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. A. The California Supreme Court Correctly Held That The Mining Act Does Not Preempt California's Moratorium On Suction Dredging The Mining Act's text, relevant federal regulations, and this Court's decision in California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987), all make clear that the Mining Act does not displace state environmental regulation of mining on federal land, The California Supreme Court thus correctly held that the State's moratorium on a method of mining that raises environmental concerns is a permissible regulation. Petitioner's attempt to equate that narrow measure with an impermissible total ban on mining is unpersuasive. 1. The Mining Act contemplates continued state regulation of mining on federal land a. The Mining Act seeks to encourage discovery and extraction of valuable mineral deposits on federal lands. See United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599. 602 (1968). But as this Court has often instructed, "no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs." CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2185 (2014) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1987) (per curiam)). "Congressional intent" therefore must be "discerned primarily from the statutory text." Ibid. The text of the Mining Act makes clear that "Congress was concerned principally with removing federal obstacles to mining, and specifically the threat of a property sale." Pet. App. A16. The Mining Act thus opens federal lands to exploration by miners, 30 U.S.C. 22; prescribes detailed requirements for taking, perfecting, and maintaining mining claims, e.g., 30 U.S.C. 23-281; and allows the holder of a mining claim to obtain a patent conferring fee simple title to the land, 30 U.S.C. 29, 37. Those provisions encourage the exploitation of valuable minerals by creating a scheme that defines and allocates property rights in the minerals and the lands where they are found. But the Mining Act does not address "the process of exploitation--the mining--itself." Pet. App. A11. Nor does the Mining Act reflect any intent to displace state regulation of mining. Just the opposite: Congress expressly provided that the exclusive rights granted to petitioner and other holders of unpatented mining, claims are conditioned on compliance "with State, territorial, and local regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possessory title." 30 U.S.C. 26. And the provision on which petitioner relies likewise contemplates the continued application of state law by specifying that federal land is open to exploration for mining "under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States." 30 U.S.C. 22 (emphasis added); see O'Donnell v. Glenn, 19 P. 302, 306 (Mont. 1888) ("The expression, 'under regulations prescribed by law,' is ample enough to embrace, not only the laws of congress, but also those of the territory."). That understanding is reinforced by a more recent statute expressly setting forth the objectives of the federal mining laws. In the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. 21a, Congress declared "that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government" to foster "economically sound and stable domestic mining industries." Ibid. Congress was particularly focused on large-scale industrial mining that could reduce or eliminate the Nation's dependence on foreign sources of valuable resources. H.R. Rep. No, 1442, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1970). But Congress also emphasized the Nation's "environmental needs," and it articulated a policy of reducing the "adverse impact of mineral extraction and processing upon the physical environment." Ibid. b. The federal lands covered by the Mining Act are primarily administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service in the Department of
---
## Page 5
Agriculture. Both agencies have promulgated regulations governing mining operations, and those regulations require compliance with state environmental laws--including California's moratorium on suction dredging. The BLM's regulations specify that they preempt conflicting state law, but expressly provide that "there is no conflict if the State law or regulation requires a higher standard of protection for public lands." 43 C.F.R. 3809.3. In promulgating that regulation, the BLM explained that "States may apply their laws to [mining] operations on public lands," and it specifically identified a Montana law banning a particular mining method, "cyanide leaching," as the sort of permissible regulation that would "operate on public lands." 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,008-70.009 (Nov 21, 2000): see Mont. Code Ann. 82-4-390 (2015). The Forest Service's regulations likewise require compliance with state environmental regulations. including "State air quality standards." 36 C.F.R. 228.8(a); "State water quality standards," 36 C.F.R. 228.8(b); and "State standards for the disposal and treatment of solid wastes," 36 C.F.R. 228.8(c); see also '36 C.F.R. 228.5(b) (referring to "compliance with the requirements of Federal and State laws") (emphasis added). See Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 583 (discussing -these Forest Service regulations). And, as particularly relevant here, the Forest Service has informed miners that it "recognizes [California's] state ban on suction dredge mining" and that "as long as the state moratorium is in effect," suction dredging is not permitted "within National Forest System lands" in California.' The Department of the Interior's implementation of the Mining Act presupposes the application of state environmental regulations in another respect. The Mining Act applies only to "valuable mineral deposits," 30 U.S.C. 22, and a person seeking to perfect a mining claim thus must show that it contains minerals that are "valuable in an economic sense." Coleman, 390 U.S. at 602. "Minerals which no prudent man will extract because there is no demand for them at a price higher than the costs of extraction and transportation" cannot support a valid mining claim. Ibid. In applying that standard, the Department of the Interior has long taken into account the costs of extraction in compliance with all applicable laws, including state "environmental protection laws." United States v. Pittsburgh Pac. Co., 30 I.B.L.A. 388, 393, 404- 405 (1977); see, e.g., Great Basin Mine Watch, 146 I.B.L.A. 248, 256 (1998) {{FOOTNOTE}} Forest Serv., In Search of Gold: Panning, Dredging and Mining: Stanislaus National Forest 1 (Aug. 2013), httos://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/ FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd534692.pdf; see Forest Serv., Mining: Plumas NationalForest1- (Feb.2013),https://www.fs.usda.gov/ Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5435954.pdf (similar). {{FOOTNOTE}} ("[T]he costs of compliance with all applicable Federal and State laws (including environmental laws) are properly considered in determining whether or not the mineral deposit is presently marketable at a profit."). c. This Court's decision in Granite Rock confirms that the Mining Act does not preempt state environmental regulations. In that case, a mining company argued that a state permitting requirement was preempted by several different federal statutes. See 480 U.S. at 581-582. In the portion of its decision addressing the Mining Act, the Court rejected the argument that the Mining Act confers a right to conduct mining on federal land "unhindered by any state environmental regulation." Id. at 582. The Court emphasized that the applicable Forest Service regulations "expressly contemplate coincident compliance with state as well as with federal law," and it concluded that those regulations confirm that the Mining Act does not displace state environmental regulation. Id. at 584.
---
## Page 6
2. California's moratorium on suction dredging is a permissible environmental regulation Petitioner does not dispute that "states have authority to regulate the environmental impacts of mining on federal lands." Pet. 4; see, e.g., Pei. 22 n.9; Reply Br. 6. The States have long exercised that authority. Pet. App. A17-A23. And like California's restrictions on hydraulic mining in the 1880s and Montana's more recent prohibition on cyanide leaching, California's moratorium on suction dredging is not preempted by the Mining Act. Petitioner provides no sound reason to conclude otherwise. a. Petitioner's most basic argument is that because the Mining Act seeks to "encourage productive mining on federal lands," state laws that interfere with such mining are preempted. Reply Br. 1; see, e.g., Pet. 3-4, 2021. But "it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law Rodriguez. 480 U.S. at 526. This Court has thus rejected preemption claims grounded in broadly formulated statutory purposes like the one petitioner invokes here. For example, the Court held that federal statutes establishing a national policy "to encourage and foster the greater use of coal" did not preempt a state tax on coal extracted from federal lands. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 633 (1981) (citation omitted).2 So too here. The Mining Act seeks to encourage mining on federal lands, but that general policy cannot sensibly be read to preempt a state law merely because that law limits particular mining methods. It would be especially unsound to infer such a sweeping preemptive intent from a statute that explicitly contemplates the continued application of state laws regulating mining. See 30 U.S.C. 22, 26. Ultimately, petitioner does not appear to disagree. He ackhowledges (Pet. 4) that "federal law gives states ample room to regulate suction dredge mining--and any other form of mining--to mitigate environmental impacts." Because regulations mitigating those impacts may make mining more difficult--and may entirely prevent mining in particular areas, or using particular methods--the mere fact that a state law has that consequence cannot be sufficient to establish that it is preempted. b. Petitioner's other principal argument is that California's moratorium is preempted because it is a "mining ban" rather than an environmental regulation. Indeed, the characterization of the California law as an "outright ban[] on mining" pervades the petition. Pet. 21; see, e.g., Pet i, 5, 20, 25, 27; Reply Br. 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10. But petitioner's proffered {{FOOTNOTE}} See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 221 (1983) (rejecting an argument that that all state regulation limiting the use of atomic energy is preempted by a federal statute "encourag[ing] widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy") (citation omitted); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132- 134 (1978) (rejecting the argument that because the federal antitrust laws favor free competition as a "basic national policy," a state law regulating retail distribution of gasoline was preempted). {{FOOTNOTE}} distinction between a permissible "regulation" and an impermissible "ban" does not withstand scrutiny, The United States agrees that a state prohibition on all mining within its borders would be preempted as applied to unpatented mining claims on federal land because it would stand as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of the Mining Act. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). But California has not adopted such a ban, and the California Supreme Court did not hold that it could do so. Instead, California adopted, and the California Supreme Court upheld, a moratorium on the use of a specific apparatus, the suction dredge. Suction dredges are used to mine particular minerals (here, gold) in a particular location
---
## Page 7
(rivers and streams). The ban on the use of suction dredges leaves undisturbed all mining operations on land, and all other methods of extracting minerals from streams and rivers. It thus cannot reasonably be equated with the sort of total prohibition on mining that would frustrate the operation of the Mining Act. And that is particularly true because even with respect to gold, the specific mineral at issue here, the ban leaves undisturbed the land-based operations that account for the large majority of California's total production. See Br. in Opp. 29-30 & nn.20-21. c. Petitioner also asserts that, rather than imposing a general moratorium, California should have adopted more targeted restrictions to mitigate "suction dredge mining's potential environmental impacts." Pet. 24; see Pet. 4. But state environmental regulations may take the form of prohibitions on harmful activities, mitigating regulations, or some combination of the two. Montana, for example, chose to prohibit rather than merely regulate cyanide leaching. See Mont. Code Ann. 82-4- 390 (2015). Nothing in the Mining Act suggests that Congress denied States the ability to make those policy choices. Petitioner's argument is particularly misplaced here because California is in the process of developing a more targeted system of rules to "regulate suction dredge mining's potential environmental impacts" (Pet. 24). The State's initial prohibition on suction-dredge permits was enacted in 2009, after a state court held that the prior permit regime violated state environmental laws. Pet. App. A3; Br. in Opp. 4. The Legislature was concerned that suction dredging "contributed to mercury contamination of both fish and humans," and it found that suction dredging "'results in various adverse environmental impacts to protected fish species, the water quality of this state, and the health of the people .of this state.- Pet. App. A3 (citation omitted). And although the moratorium has been amended several times, in all of its forms it has been set to expire once the State implements a revised set of regulations that adequately mitigates those harms. Ibid. B. The California Supreme Court's Decision Does Not Warrant Further Review Petitioner contends (Pet.…
Read the unabridged text and precedent citation network on Al Wakeelo Legal Research Platform.