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Official Citation: 2026 IHC 253064
Court / Jurisdiction: Islamabad High Court
Parties: Muhammad Muneeb Arshad vs Mst. Ammara Maroof etc
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Islamabad High Court, officially reported as 2026 IHC 253064. In this matter between Muhammad Muneeb Arshad and Mst. Ammara Maroof etc, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Islamabad High Court (Honourable Mr. Justice Muhammad Azam Khan) AUTHOR JUDGE: Honourable Mr. Justice Muhammad Azam Khan DECISION DATE: 03-FEB-2026 CASE NO: Writ Petition-5459-2025 CITATION: 2026 IHC 253064 PARTIES: Muhammad Muneeb Arshad VS Mst. Ammara Maroof etc LAW / SECTION: - SUBJECT: Family Matter, Closure of Defence REMARKS: Petitioner assails the order dated 10.12.2025 closing his right of defense in a family dispute. ============================================================ JUDGMENT SHEET
IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 5459 of 2025
MUHAMMAD MUNEEB ARSHAD
VERSUS
MST. AMMARA MAHROOF, ETC.
Petitioner by : Mr. Akhtar Hussain Bharwana, Advocate. Respondents by : Mr. Awais Mehmood Awan, Advocate for the Respondents No.1 & 2. Assisted by : Ms. Amna Danial Khawaja, Judicial Law Clerk. Date of hearing : 03.02.2026
MUHAMMAD AZAM KHAN, J. 1. The Petitioner, Muhammad Muneeb Arshad, has filed the instant writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, challenging the Order dated 10.12.2025 (“Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Judge Family Court, West-Islamabad (“Trial Court”) whereby his right of defense has been struck off under section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 on the ground of default in payment of interim maintenance. BACKGROUND: 2. Brief facts of the case, as per the contents of the instant petition, are that Mst. Ammara Mahroof (“Respondent No. 1”) filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance against the Petitioner, before the learned Trial Court, with the prayer that the following decree may kindly be issued in her favor: - i. A decree to the effect that the Defendant pay an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- per month on account of maintenance of the Plaintiff No. 1 from 19.11.2021 till the completion of Iddat period. P a g e | 2 W.P No.5459/2025
ii. A decree to the effect that the Defendant pay the maintenance of the Plaintiff No. 2, calculated at PKR 1,67,772/- per month from the date of birth of Plaintiff No. 2, with an increase of 25% per annum. 3. The suit was contested by the Petitioner/Defendant by filing a written statement, raising objections, among other defenses, touching upon maintainability and jurisdiction, with the consistent stance that the parties’ residence and the minor’s welfare/maintenance issues were already within the cognizance of courts in Ireland. However, the learned Trial Court vide Order dated 11.11.2024 fixed a sum of Rs. 25,000/- as interim maintenance in favour of the minor, namely Minha Muneeb, payable by the Petitioner on or before the 14th day of each month. Issues were framed, including the maintainability of the suit, and the matter proceeded further. It is pertinent to note herein that the Petitioner/Defendant had also moved an application seeking dismissal of the suit at the threshold, inter alia, on the ground that parallel proceedings before the Court in Ireland had already decided the minor’s maintenance, by virtue of which the Respondent No. 2/Plaintiff No. 2 has been receiving maintenance thereunder. The Petitioner/Defendant further invoked the principles of Res Judicata by invoking Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The said application filed by the Petitioner/Defendant was dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide Order dated 02.10.2025, indicating that the controversy reflected in the issues framed would be adjudicated in accordance with law at the appropriate stage. For ready reference, the Order dated 02.10.2025 is being reproduced hereunder: -
“Order 02-10-2025
The Application under section 11 CPC filed by the defendant party stands dismissed with the observation that the matter requires evidence and the fate of the case will be decided after conclusion of trial. Certainly, the Issues No. 3 & 4 were framed regarding the jurisdiction and as well as about maintainability of instant case, which will be decided after the conclusion of trial. The parties are P a g e | 3 W.P No.5459/2025
strictly directed to conclude the evidence by next date i.e., 06-11-2025 without failure.”
4. On 06.11.2025, the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff filed an application under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, read with all other enabling provisions of law, seeking the striking off of the defense of the Petitioner/Defendant. The said application was contested by the Petitioner/Defendant by filing a written reply. After hearing the arguments, the learned Trial Court, vide Impugned Order dated 10.12.2025, struck off the defense of the Petitioner/Defendant under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, on account of his default in payment of the interim maintenance allowance. Being aggrieved by the said Impugned Order, the Petitioner/Defendant has filed the instant petition. Consequent thereto, on 18.12.2025, the learned Trial Court proceeded to decree maintenance for the minor @ Rs. 25,000/- (Twenty-Five Thousand Rupees) with annual increase of 10% with effect from April 2023 till her legal entitlement. The decree was passed on the premise that the right of defense of the Petitioner/Defendant had already been struck off under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 vide Impugned Order dated 10.12.2025, and that the record did not reflect any arrangement or compliance by the Petitioner/Defendant towards payment of the interim maintenance as directed. Accordingly, the suit was decreed to the extent of the minor’s maintenance under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, in the terms reflected in the decree. Thereafter, the proceedings were fixed for further steps, including cross- examination of the Plaintiff’s witnesses to the extent of the remaining claim i.e., the personal maintenance allowance towards the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff No. 1. It is also material to mention herein that the instant writ petition challenges solely the Order dated 10.12.2025, whereby the right of defense of the Petitioner/Defendant was struck off by the learned Trial Court; subsequent decree dated 18.12.2025 has not been specifically assailed before this Court in the instant matter.
P a g e | 4 W.P No.5459/2025
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Defendant has contended that the Impugned Order dated 10.12.2025 is contrary to law and facts, based on surmises and conjectures, and passed without proper application of judicial mind. Alongside the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court in Pakistan, the Petitioner/Defendant has placed on record orders passed by the learned District Court, Ballinasloe, Ireland, relating to maintenance for the minor, whereby the Petitioner/Defendant’s weekly liability towards the minor was fixed at different stages, which ultimately is reflected as €125 per week vide Order dated 12.09.2024. The Petitioner/Defendant also relies upon payment proofs/bank remittances to show regular payments to the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff in terms of the arrangement settled by the District Court, Ballinasloe, Ireland. It has been argued that the learned Trial Court acted in haste, ignored the settled law laid down by the Superior Courts requiring matters to be decided on merits rather than technicalities, and failed to consider the available record. It was further submitted that the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff No. 1 has never denied receipt of the said maintenance, yet the learned Trial Court failed to consider this material fact while passing the Impugned Order. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Defendant lastly contends that the Impugned Order dated 10.12.2025 is contrary to law and the record, suffers from non-application of mind, and has been passed in a mechanical manner, resulting in grave prejudice by depriving the Petitioner/Defendant of his substantive right to defend. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1: 6. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff No. 1 has controverted the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the Petitioner/Defendant, thereby supporting the Impugned Order dated 10.12.2025. It was contended that the Petitioner/Defendant willfully had failed to comply with the Interim Order dated 11.11.2024 passed by the learned Trial Court, thereby attracting the penal consequences under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. It was argued that payment of maintenance, pursuant to an order rendered P a g e | 5 W.P No.5459/2025
by a foreign court, does not absolve the Petitioner/Defendant from complying with the lawful orders passed by the competent court in Pakistan. Learned counsel further submitted that the Petitioner/Defendant has deliberately avoided payment of maintenance towards the Respondent No. 2/Minor and failed to comply with the directions of the learned Trial Court, which, therefore, has rightly struck off his defense after providing due opportunity. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and perused the record. 8. Examination of the record shows that there remains an undisputed cross- border litigation inter se the parties qua the maintenance allowance for the Respondent No. 2/Minor before the District Court, Ballinasloe, Ireland, wherein cognizance had already been taken by fixing maintenance payable by the Petitioner/Defendant towards the Respondent No. 2/Minor. The record reveals that an application under Section 11(1) of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, was filed before the District Court, Ballinasloe, Ireland, regarding the welfare of the Respondent No. 2/Minor by the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff No. 1, whereby the Irish Court had fixed the maintenance for the Respondent No. 2/Minor at €50 per week vide Order dated 07.12.2023. Thereafter, vide Order dated 11.01.2024, the said Court enhanced the maintenance towards the Respondent No. 2/Minor at €100 per week by invoking the provisions of Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976, read with the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964. Currently, the Petitioner/Defendant has been paying maintenance regularly in compliance with the directions of the District Court, Ballinasloe, Ireland, which had further fixed the maintenance towards the Respondent No. 2/Minor at €125 per week vide Final Order dated 12.09.2024. The Petitioner/Defendant, in this regard, has placed on record documentary proofs of such payments, which have not been disputed before this Court by the contesting party. On this premise, it is urged that the Petitioner/Defendant could not have been treated as a willful defaulter, and that striking off the defense, being a harsh procedural consequence, was wholly disproportionate. P a g e | 6 W.P No.5459/2025
9. The record also ostensibly shows that the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff had instituted a suit in Pakistan for maintenance payable towards herself and the Respondent No. 2/Minor under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 on 08.06.2023, whereby the Learned Trial Court vide Order dated 11.11.2024 fixed the interim maintenance payable towards the Respondent No. 2/Minor only at the rate of Rs. 25000/- per month, which shall be paid by the Petitioner/Defendant by 14th day of every calendar month, failing which the Court reserved the right to strike off the defense and decree the suit. Prior to the fixation of interim maintenance, the Petitioner/Defendant had already moved an application for return/rejection of the suit before the learned Trial Court, which was finally adjudicated on 02.10.2025, whereby his application was dismissed on the ground that the matter required evidence, thus, the fate of the case will be decided at the conclusion of trial. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court vide Order dated 10.12.2025 struck off the defense of the Petitioner/Defendant under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 due to his default in the payment of the interim maintenance allowance towards the Respondent No. 2/Minor. The learned Trial Court further observed that the Petitioner/Defendant remained reluctant to oblige the Order dated 11.11.2024. Consequent thereto, on 18.12.2025, the learned Trial Court proceeded to decree maintenance for the Respondent No. 2/Minor @ Rs. 25,000/- (Twenty-Five Thousand Rupees) with annual increase of 10% with effect from April 2023 till her legal entitlement. The decree was passed on the premise that as the right of defense of the Petitioner/Defendant had already been struck off under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 vide Impugned Order dated 10.12.2025, therefore, there was no evidence on record to show any arrangements made or compliance by the Petitioner/Defendant towards payment of the interim maintenance as directed. Accordingly, the suit was decreed to the extent of the minor’s maintenance under Section 17-A of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Defendant contends that the Impugned Order dated 10.12.2025 is contrary to law and the record, suffers from non-application of mind, and has been passed in a mechanical manner, resulting in grave prejudice by depriving the Petitioner/Defendant of his P a g e | 7 W.P No.5459/2025
substantive right to defend. Learned counsel has further submitted that the learned Trial Court ought to have dealt with the jurisdiction/maintainability objection as a preliminary matter, particularly in a case where the minor is within a foreign jurisdiction and a foreign court is already seized of the matter, and that postponing the jurisdictional determination while simultaneously imposing the sanction of Section 17-A is legally unsustainable. POINTS OF DETERMINATION: 10. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and after careful perusal of the record, the following moot questions arise for determination:
1. Notwithstanding that both parties presently reside within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign court, can the Family Courts in Pakistan validly assume and exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute in view of Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965?
2. Where a competent foreign court has already taken cognizance of the minor’s maintenance between the same parties and has fixed the father’s liability, can a Family Court in Pakistan concurrently take cognizance and proceed to pass overlapping orders on the same subject matter, between the same parties, and for the same cause of action?
3. Whether the Respondent No. 1/Plaintiff No. 1, having invoked and pursued the foreign forum for fixation/enforcement of the minor’s maintenance and obtained operative orders therefrom, is bound by the doctrine of election and thus precluded from simultaneously pursuing an overlapping claim for the same minor-maintenance liability before Pakistani courts?
P a g e | 8 W.P No.5459/2025
4. Whether permitting parallel maintenance proceedings/orders in Pakistan amounts to impermissible double burdening of the father and results in unjust enrichment/double recovery for the same liability and period?
5. Whether judicial propriety requires the Courts in Pakistan to avoid passing overlapping/contradictory maintenance orders when a foreign court has already fixed and is enforcing the minor’s maintenance?
6. If the Impugned Order striking off the Petitioner’s defense under Section 17-A is found to be unlawful for want of reasons and absence of a finding of willful default, can the consequential decree dated 18.12.2025 founded upon that unlawful order legally survive?
POINT NO. 1: 11. There is no cavil to the proposition that territorial competence of a Family Court is not determined solely by the current physical residence of the parties abroad, it is determined by the statutory framework, principally Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, which is reproduced herein below for ready reference:
“Rule 6. The Court which shall have jurisdiction to try a suit will be that within the local limits of which: -
(a) the cause of action wholly or in part has arisen, or (b) where the parties reside or last resided together: Provided that in suits for dissolution of marriage or dower, the Court within the local limits of which the wife ordinarily resides shall also have jurisdiction.” A bare reading of Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, reveals that merely because the parties presently reside abroad does not, by P a g e | 9 W.P No.5459/2025
itself, render the Family Courts in Pakistan incompetent to entertain a family dispute. Jurisdiction of the Family Court is governed by the statutory framework, which contemplates jurisdiction through recognized connecting factors, including inter alia the ordinary residence, last residence, and/or where the cause of action wholly or partly arose, as applicable. Reliance in this regard is placed “Sohail Ahmed Versus Mst. Samreena Rasheed Memon and another” (2024 SCMR 634), wherein the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan observed the following while interpreting Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965: - “7. With regard to the question raised before us by the petitioner as to whether Family Courts in Pakistan have jurisdiction to entertain the case when the plaintiff/wife is a dual citizen of Pakistan and the USA and is residing in the USA at the time of the institution of the suit, whereas, the husband is national and permanent resident of Pakistan. In this regard Rule 6 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965 is relevant which is reproduced herein-below: “6. The Court which shall have jurisdiction to try a suit will be that within the local limits of which: -
(a) the cause of action wholly or in part has arisen, or (b) where the parties reside or last resided together. Provided that in suits for dissolution of marriage or dower, the court within the local limits of which the wife ordinarily resides shall also have jurisdiction.” 8. In the above-proviso, the Legislature has intentionally used the word “ordinarily” which has a different meaning than that of permanent residence. According to Black's Law Dictionary (VIth Edition) word "ordinary" means "usual, common, settled, customary, and reasonable". Furthermore, Dicey, a renowned jurist, in his book, "Conflict of Laws" at page 96 explains expression "Ordinarily resides" in the following words: “It is not, as a matter of law, necessary that the residence should be long in point of time, residence for a few days or P a g e | 10 W.P No.5459/2025
even for part of a day is enough. The length of residence is not important in itself.” 9. In the present case, although the Respondent is living in the USA at the time of the institution of the suit through her duly constituted attorney. However, the respondent usually comes to Pakistan; have acquired her education in Karachi and visits her family in Karachi from time to time.
10. By this proviso, the rigour of normal rule providing for territorial jurisdiction for trial of cases in Family Court have been relaxed in favour of female filing a suit for dissolution of marriage or recovery of dower. The words "Ordinarily resides" and "shall also have jurisdiction" used in proviso demonstrate the intention of parliament is to facilitate things for the wife and off-set her handicap. Therefore, the option of instituting such suits vests with the wife and the Court is bound to take her convenience subject to law. Hence, Family Courts in Pakistan have jurisdiction to entertain the matter and the trial court has rightly exercised so.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
12. Keeping in view the above rationale, it becomes ostensible that cross- border elements in matrimonial disputes do not automatically oust the jurisdiction of Pakistani family fora once the statutory jurisdictional touchstones under Rule 6 are met. Consequently, the objection that the Courts in Pakistan are barred from adjudication simply because both parties are within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign court is legally unsustainable.
POINT NO. 2: 13. The record placed before this Court shows that the learned District Court, Ballinasloe, Ireland, had assumed jurisdiction and passed orders qua fixation of the maintenance payable towards the Respondent No. 2/Minor by the Petitioner/Defendant, which the latter has been complying with by making regular payments pursuant thereto, with proofs placed on record. In such circumstances, the Courts in Pakistan must act in accordance with judicial propriety and restraint to prevent contradictory or duplicative commands being issued against the same person on the same obligation, particularly where the P a g e | 11 W.P No.5459/2025
foreign court’s orders are being complied with, and the receiving party is not shown to be left remediless. Thus, where a competent foreign court has already assumed jurisdiction of the same dispute between the same parties, passed effective orders on the same obligation, and those orders are being complied with, judicial propriety requires the Family Courts in Pakistan to avoid parallel cognizance that would produce overlapping or competing obligations for the same liability and the same period. 14. The question is not of a theoretical power to entertain proceedings, but of the orderly administration of justice. Courts in Pakistan must guard against a scenario where one party is permitted to litigate the same claim twice, thereby exposing the other to multiple coercive mechanisms and inconsistent commands. It is pertinent to note that the Petitioner/Defendant had also filed an application seeking dismissal of the suit at the very outset, inter alia, on the ground that parallel proceedings before the competent Court in Ireland had already determined the minor’s maintenance, pursuant to which the Respondent No. 2/Plaintiff No. 2 was receiving maintenance. The Petitioner/Defendant further invoked the bar of res judicata by placing reliance on Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The said application, however, was dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide Order dated 02.10.2025, observing that the controversy embodied in the framed issues required adjudication in accordance with law at the appropriate stage. For the purpose of examining whether the bar of res judicata is attracted in the present matter, it is appropriate to reproduce Section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, herein below for ready reference: - “17. Provisions of Evidence Act and Code of Civil Procedure not to apply — (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (P.O. No. 10 of 1984)], and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, except sections 10 and 11, shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court in respect of Part 1 of Schedule. P a g e | 12 W.P No.5459/2025
(2) Sections 8 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873, shall apply to all proceedings before the Family Courts.” “Section 11. Res judicata — No Court shall try suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.” 15. Bare reading of the above provisions would disclose that Section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, expressly carves out an exception to the general exclusion of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by providing that, notwithstanding the non-applicability of the CPC to Family Court proceedings, Sections 10 and 11 CPC shall continue to apply. The legislative intent is unambiguous in this regard. While the Family Courts are designed to proceed expeditiously and free from technicalities of the CPC, the principles of res sub- judice and res judicata are preserved to prevent multiplicity of litigation, inconsistent adjudications, and re-agitation of settled disputes. Consequently, where the statutory ingredients of Section 11 CPC are satisfied, a Family Court is not only empowered, but obliged to give effect to the bar of res judicata, so that the same parties are not permitted to litigate the same matter repeatedly under the guise of fresh proceedings. In this regard, reliance is placed on the case titled “Dr. Ayesha Sabir Versus Fida Ul Haq Yasir and 3 Others” (2009…
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