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Official Citation: 2026 LHC 1682
Court / Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Jawad Hassan)
Parties: F.O.P vs SHEIKH RASHEED AHMED
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Jawad Hassan), officially reported as 2026 LHC 1682. In this matter between F.O.P and SHEIKH RASHEED AHMED, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Jawad Hassan) DECISION DATE: 05-03-2026 CASE DETAILS: ICA (Writ)-ICA Criminal 76-25 ============================================================ Stereo HCJ DA 38
JUDGMENT SHEET IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, RAWALP IND I BENCH, RAWA LPIND I JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Intra Court Appeal No.76 of 2025
Federation of Pakistan V/S Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed
J U D G M E N T
Dates of hearing 26.02.2026, 05.03.2026 & 12.03.2026 Appellant(s) by Barrister Haseeb Shakoor P aracha, Additional Attorney General with Malik Zaheer Arshad and Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney Generals. Mr. Muhammad Irshad, Assistant Advocate General. Respondent(s) by Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed with Sardar Abdul Raziq Khan, ASC , Sh. Ahsan -ud- Din, ASC and Sardar Shahbaz Khan, Abdul Samad Abbasi, Advocates.
JAWAD HASSAN, J. This judgment is intended to deal with and interpret the scope, object, and legal implications of Section 28 -A of the Anti -Terrorism Act, 1997 (the “Act”), a provision which occupies significant importance within the statutory framework designed to combat acts of terrorism while simultaneously safeguarding the fundamental rights and procedural protections guaranteed under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the “Constitution”). I. OVERTURE 2. The controversy raised in the instant matter necessitates a careful and purposive construction of the Section 28-A of the “Act” in order to determine its true legislative intent, the extent of its application and the manner in which it is to be harmonized with other allied provisions of the statute as well as the broader I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 2 constitutional scheme. It is well settled that in interpreting special laws enacted to address extraordinary situations, the Court is required to strike a delicate balance between the imperatives of public safety, effective law enforcement and the preserva tion of due process, fairness, and rule of law. This judgment shall, therefore, undertake a comprehensive examination of Section 28 - A of the “Act” under which the Respondent ’s name was ordered to be placed in Provincial National Identification List (the “PNIL”) by the Federal Investigation Agency ( the “FIA”) on the direction of Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Rawalpindi (the “ATC”). 3. This Intra Court Appeal was filed under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 (the “Ordinance”) by the Appellant challenging the validity of impugned order dated 31.10.2025 (the “impugned order”) passed in Writ Petition No.3343 of 2025 by the learned Single Judge whereby the constitutional petition filed by the Respondent was allowed and he was granted permission to go to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for performance of Umrah with the following observations: “Learned Additional Attorney General while submitting report on behalf of the respondents submits that learned Anti Terrorism Court Rawalpindi had issued general order for impounding of passports relating to the persons facing trial under Section 28 -A ATA, 1997 but at present respondents have no objection on going of the petitioner to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to perform Umrah”.
II. NARRATION OF RELEVANT FACTS 4. The factual matrix leading to the filing of the instant appeal reveals that earlier the name of the Respondent had been placed on the Exit Control List (the “ ECL”) by the concerned authorities , wherefrom he assailed the said action by filing Writ Petition No.542 of 2024 before this Court. The said writ petition was I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 3 allowed vide order dated 06.03.2024 with a direction to the concerned authorities to remove the name of the Respondent from the “ECL”. In compliance of the directions so issued, the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, vide letter dated 15.03.2024, deleted the name of the Respondent from the “ECL”. Subsequently, the “ATC” issued a communication dated 31.10.2024 regarding impounding of pa ssports of accused persons facing trial under Section 28-A of the “Act”, addressed to the Director General, Federal Investigation Agency, Islamabad as well as the Director General, Immigration and Passports Headquarters, Islamabad, requiring that under -trial accused persons must seek prior permission of the Court before undertaking travel abroad. It is further borne out from the record that the Respondent, who was facing trial in case F.I.R. No.708/23 dated 09.05.2023 registered at Police Station R.A. Bazar, Rawalpindi, subsequently moved an application before the “ATC” seeking permission to perform Umrah, which was allowed vide order dated 22.01.2025. Consequent up on the grant of such permission, the Respondent also sought exemption from personal appearance, which too was allowed and he was permitted to travel abroad for the performance of Umrah from 04.03.2025 to 14.03.2025. However, at a later stage, when the Resp ondent was in the process of completing his travel documentation and arrangements for the aforesaid religious journey, it transpired to him that his name ha s been placed in the “PNIL”. Feeling aggrieved of such action, the Respondent once again invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by filing Writ Petition No.3343 of 2025, which culminated in the passing of the “impugned order”. III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT 5. Learned Additional Attorney General inter alia argued that the name of the Respondent was placed in the “PNIL” pursuant to order passed by the “ATC”; that writ petition before the learned I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 4 Single Judge in Chamber was not maintainable as the Respondent had the remedy to move application before the “ATC” under the “Act” for the purpose of seeking permission to go abroad ; that learned Single Judge in Chamber has not considered the provisions of the “Act” and granted permission to the Respondent to travel abroad; that learned Single Judge in Chamber has not considered that the Respondent, without first removing his name from the “PNIL” could not be permitted to go abroad until he obtains order from the “ATC” as mandated under Section 28-A of the “Act”; that the ord er passed by the “ATC” under the “Act” has never been challenged by the Respondent rather he opted to invoke constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the “Constitution”; that there exist no approval of the Federal Government qua grant of permission to the Respondent whereas such permission was granted to the Respondent by the “ATC” vide order dated 27.02.2025 upon moving an application before it. IV. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 6. Sardar Abdul Raziq Khan, ASC lear ned counsel for the Respondent, on the contrary, supported the “impugned order” with hilt. He argues that Respondent is respectable citizen of Pakistan and has consistently been performing Umrah for many decades which reflects remarkable continuity of fait h, discipline and personal devotion and such longstanding spiritual commitment demonstrates not only religious attachment but also a pattern of lawful and transparent movement abroad, especially when, throughout these decades, accountability bodies like NAB or other relevant authorities never found it necessary to impose any travel restrictions upon him . He strenuously argued that this uninterrupted history of compliance and cooperation with the law creates a legitimate expectation that his bona fide religious obligations would continue to be respected and facilitated. He added that sudden refusal to allow him to travel abroad, therefore, I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 5 appears inconsistent with past practice and may be perceived as undermining the principles of fairness and proport ionality and infringed fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 10 -A and 15 of the “Constitution”. Sh. Ahsan-ud-Din, ASC argued that the appeal in hand is not maintainable in terms of Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) the “CPC” as it was filed against a consent order. 7. We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record made available. V. DETERMINATION BY THE COURT (i) Sequence of Events Leading to the “impugned order” 8. There is no dispute that the name of the Respondent had earlier been placed on the “ECL” on the recommendation of the authorities of National Accountability Bureau. However, the said name was subsequently removed from the “ECL” by the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan vide letter dated 15.03.2024, in compliance of the order dated 06.03.2024 passed by this Court in W.P.No.542 of 2024. Thereafter, the “ATC” issued a communication dated 31.10.2024 to the Federal Investigation Agency, Islamabad, as well as to the Directorate General of Immigration and Passports, Headquarters Islamabad, regarding the impounding of passports of accused persons facing trial under Section 28 -A of the “Act”. Through the said communication it was directed that if any such accused person intended to travel abroad using his passport, he must first obtain permission from the concerned Court. Admittedly, the Respondent thereafter moved an application before the “ATC” seeking permission to travel abroad for the purpose of performing Umrah. The said application was allowed vide order dated 22.01.2025. Subsequently, another application seeking exemption from personal appearance was also allowed and he was granted permission to travel abroad for the performance of Umrah from 04.03.2025 to 14.03.2025. Later, it I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 6 transpired to the Respondent that his name had been placed in the “PNIL”. Consequently, the Respondent approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.3343 of 2025, which ultimately culminated in the passing of the “impugned order ” with the following observation: “In view of above, without touching the merits of the case, this petition is allowed and the petitioner is granted permission to go Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to perform Umrah”.
ii. Pathology of Section 28-A of the “Act” 9. For the first time, the “ATC” vide its communication dated 31.10.2024 issued directions to the Director General, Federal Investigation Agency, Islamabad, as well as to the Director General, Immigration and Passports, Headquarters Islamabad concerning the impounding of passports of accused persons facing trial under Section 28-A of the “Act” with clear stipulations that any under -trial accused intending to travel abroad shall obtain prior permission from the concerned Court before undertaking such travel. Pertinently, the order of the “ATC” qua impounding of passport s was issued under Section 28 -A of the “Act” which reads as under: “28-A. Impounding of passp ort of person charge-sheeted under the Act . Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the passport of a person, who is accused of an offence under this Act, shall be deemed to have been impounded for such period as the Court may deem fit”.
It is manifest from above provision of law that the legislature, by employing a non -obstante clause, has conferred overriding effect upon this provision vis -a-vis all other laws for the time being in force. The moment an accused is charge -sheeted under the “Act”, his passport stands deemed to be impounded not I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 7 by virtue of any executive fiat but by operation of law itself. The Court, however, retains discretion to determine the duration of such impou nding, thereby ensuring judicial oversight and proportionality. The measure is preventive in nature, intended to secure the presence of the accused during trial and to prevent evasion of process, rather than punitive. Any request for temporary release of p assport must, therefore, be considered by the Court on the touchstone of necessity, bona fides and adequate safeguards, so that the balance between the fundamental right of movement and the imperative of effective criminal justice is duly maintained. 10. Now the pivotal question which arises for determination in the present matter is whether the High Court or any other Court, other than the “ATC”, can grant permission to an accused person facing trial under Section 28-A of the “Act” to travel abroad without obtaining prior permission from the trial Court, even on the basis of consent of the Respondents. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to examine the scope and effect of Section 28-A of the “Act”. The said provision unequivocally provides that the passport of a person accused of an offence under the “Act” shall be deemed to have been impounded for such period as the Court may deem fit. The term ‘Court’ is defined under Section 2(e) of the “Act” which means an Anti-terrorism Court established under section 13 of the “Act”. The language employed under Section 28-A of the “Act” is mandatory in nature and creates a legal presumption that once a person is charge -sheeted for an offence under the “Act”, h is passport stands impounded by operation of law. The purpose behind incorporating such provision is to ensure the presence of the accused during trial proceedings and to prevent the possibility of the accused absconding from the jurisdiction of the Court . It is also pertinent to observe that the expression ‘the Court’ used in Section 28-A of the “Act” refers to I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 8 the Court before which the proceedings under the “Act” are pending, which in the present case is the “ATC”. The legislative intent clearly manifests that the discretion regarding the impounding of the passport and the grant of permission to travel abroad rests exclusively with the Court conducting the proceedings. Consequently, the authority to regulate the us e of the passport, including temporary permission for travelling abroad, lies within the domain of the “ATC” seized of the matter . The argument of learned counsel for the Respondent that such permission can be granted by another forum merely on the basis of consent of the Appellant/concerned authorities is devoid of any legal substance. Consent of the parties cannot override a statutory mandate; where the legislature has vested a specific power in a particular Court, such power cannot be exercised by any ot her forum in circumvention of the statutory framework. Acceptance of such a proposition would defeat the very object of Section 28-A and would render the statutory safeguard nugatory. It is well-settled that although the High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, possesses wide powers but such jurisdiction is ordinarily invoked to ensure that subordinate Courts act within the bounds of law and do not exercise powers arbitrarily or without jurisdiction. However, the High Court does not ordinarily substitute itself for a trial Court in matters where the statute has specifically conferred discretion upon that Court, particularly in procedural matters relating to conduct of the trial and regulation of the accused’s presence before it. Therefore, in circumstances where an accused person facing trial under the “Act” seeks permission to travel abroad, the appropriate and lawful course is to approach the “ATC” concerned. That Court, being fully cognizant of the stage of trial, the conduct of the accused, and the overall circumstances of the case, is best place to determine whether such permission should be granted and under I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 9 what conditions as in the case in hand, the Respondent himself filed an application seeking permission to perform Umrah that was allowed in terms of order dated 22.01.2025 and second application for the said purpose was also allowed vide order dated 27.02.2025 passed by the “ATC” with clear cut period from 04.03.2025 to 14.03.2025. 11. In view of the foregoing, it is held that t he authority to permit an accused person, whose passport is deemed to be impounded under Section 28-A of the “Act” to travel abroad primarily rests with the “ATC” seized of the Court. No other Court can ordinarily grant such permission merely on the basis of consent of the Respondents, particularly when the matter falls within the statutory domain of the trial Court. Any departure from this principle would be contrary to the scheme and intent of the law. Accordingly, the proposition that permission for trav elling abroad may be granted by any Court other than the “ATC” is not legally sustainable and this aspect of the matter has totally been ignored by learned Single Judge in Chamber, while passing the “impugned order”. iii. Estoppel against challenge of consent order 12. Learned counsel for the Respondent contended that the present appeal is not maintainable on the ground that the “impugned order ” was passed with the consent of the Appellant/concerned authorities . For ease of reference, the relevant portion of the impugned order reads as follows: “Learned Additional Attorney General while submitting report on behalf of the respondents submits that learned Anti Terrorism Court Rawalpindi had issued general order for impounding of passports relating to the pe rsons facing trial under Section 28 -A ATA, 1997 but at present respondents have no objection on going of the petitioner to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to perform Umrah”. I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 10
A careful perusal of the above observations reflects that the “impugned order ” was passed primarily on the basis of the statement given by the learned Additional Attorney General on behalf of the Federal Authorities. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the Respondent has stated that the Appellant is bound by the statem ent of No Objection made before this Court showing no objection to the respondent's travel abroad for the purpose of performing Umrah and has placed reliance on judgments reported as “JDW SUGAR MILLS LTD . and others versus PROVINCE OF PUNJAB and others” (PLD 2017 Lahore 68) and “MUBASHAR JAVED and others versus PROVINCE OF PUNJAB and others” (PLD 2022 Lahore 817 ) and argued that a party who succeeds upon a particular assertion before a Court of competent jurisdiction is thereafter estopped from resiling from that position. The controversy in hand also brings into focus the applicability and scope of the doctrine of judicial estoppel , which is founded upon the salutary principle that a litigant who has, with full knowledge and free will, adopted a particu lar stance before a Court of law and has secured an order on the basis thereof, cannot subsequently be permitted to assume a contradictory position to the prejudice of the opposite party or to the detriment of the sanctity of judicial proceedings. This doc trine, rooted in considerations of fairness, consistency and finality, operates as a restraint against approbation and reprobation in the course of litigation and thus bears directly upon the question of maintainability of the present appeal. This doctrine is a shield forged in equity to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings; it presupposes that the party making the earlier representation possessed both the consciousness of its significance and the authority to bind the party in whose name it was ut tered. Where a counsel or representative of the State makes a concession that I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 11 travels beyond the bounds of their lawful mandate, or where the concession is inconsistent with a subsisting statutory or judicial command, equity cannot be pressed into service to perpetuate what the law itself prohibits. It is an equally well -settled principle of jurisprudence, affirmed by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in "UNIVERSITY OF MALAKAND through Registrar and others versus DR. ALAM ZEB and others” (2021 SCMR 678), wherein it has held that there is no estoppel against law, and a statutory obligation cannot be rendered nugatory by reason of a concession inadvertently or unauthorisedly made in the course of litigation. Guidance can also be sought from “Mst. HASEENA BIBI versus ABDUL HALEEM and others” (PLD 2024 Supreme Court 291) and “BAHADUR KHAN and other versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary M/o Finance , Islamabad and others” (2017 SCMR 2066) . In the instant matter, the placement of the Respondent's name on the “PNIL” was not the product of any discretionary or individualized administrative order susceptible of being waived by a courtroom concession; rather, it flowed from a general order of the “ATC” dated 31.10.2024 (Page 32 of this appeal), which is a command of a judicial forum clothed with the authority of law. It is trite law that no officer of the State, howsoever senior, may by his unilateral statement before a Court dispense with the operation of a subsisting judicial order ; to hold otherwise would permit an individual act of indiscretion to override the solemn mandate of a court of competent jurisdiction. The representative appearing on behalf of the Appellant/State was neither authorized to waive the application of the ATC's general order nor possessed the legal competence to do so, and no estoppel can arise from a statement made in excess of authority. 13. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that the doctrine of judicial estoppel, though a salutary principle of procedural fairness upon which this Court would ordinarily act I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 12 without hesitation, has no application to the facts presently before it. The statement attributed to the appellant’s representative must be understood in its proper context . It was, at best, an informal expression of non-opposition made without appreciation of the legal framework governing the “PNIL”, and cannot, as a matter of law or equity, be construed as a binding concession extinguishing the operation of the ATC's general order. Estoppel being an equitable doctrine, a court of equity must be equally alive to the equitable proposition that no party ought to be bound by a representation that was neither authorised nor legally competent to be made. The argument of the learned counsel for the Respondent on this point is therefore repelled. iv. Vagueness in the relief claimed in writ petition 14. When confronted to latter qua the maintainability of writ petition in the light of 26 th Amendment to the “Constitution” and the dictum laid down by this Court in the case of “KAKAKHAIL TRADERS versus PROVINCE OF PUNJAB and others” (PLD 2025 Lahore 630) , learned counsel for the Respondent was unable to satisfy the Court. We have noted that the Respondent filed writ petition with a vague and unclear prayer and without challenging any specific order. The prayer clause reads as under: “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that this writ petition be allowed, the impugned orders/actions of the respondents placing the name of the petitioner in the “Provisional National Identification List (PNIL) or stop list be declared as illegal, unlawful, without lawful authority, violative of Article 2 -A, 4, 9, 10A, 15 and 20 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 as well as Article 12(4) of International Covenant on civil and political rights adopted by United Nations General Assembly and I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 13 consequently, the same be set aside and respondents be directed to remove the name of the petitioner from PNIL/ECL or stop list etc and the petitioner be allowed to travel abroad without any hindrance and restraints”.
15. The prayer reproduced hereinabove reflects that the Respondent had sought a declaration that the alleged action of the Appellant in placing his name on the “PNIL” be declared illegal and that the Appellant be directed to remove his name therefrom. However, a careful reading of the said prayer reveals that the Respondent has not specifically challenged any particular order, notification, or communication issued by a competent authority whereby his name was placed on the “PNIL” or any other travel restriction list. It is a settled principle of constitutional jurisprudence that in proceedings before the High Court under Article 199 of the “Constitution”, a petitioner is required to specifically assail a definite order or action of a public authority so that the Court may examine the legality, propriety, and jurisdiction of such order. In the absence of a specific order being placed on record and challenged before the Cou rt, the relief sought becomes vague and incapable of judicial determination. In the present case, the Respondent has made a generalized prayer only seeking the declaration of illegality of the alleged placement of his name in the “PNIL”, while simultaneously invoking alleged violations of Articles 2-A, 4, 9, 10 -A, 15 and 20 of the “Constitution” as well as Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Notwithstanding the constitutional and international provisions referred to in the writ petition , the foundational requirement remains that the Respondent must identify and challenge the specific order, directive, or administrative action forming the basis of his gri evance. As mandated by Article 199(1)(1A) of the I.C.A.No.76 of 2025 14 “Constitution”, introduced…
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