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Petitioner: FAHAD AKRAM BHATTI VS Respondent: FEDERATION OF PAKISTANHonorable Justice Khalid IshaqCh. Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan, Hassan Abdullah Niazi, Asad Manzoor Butt,Mirza Nasar Ahmad
P L D 2026 Lahore 262 Before Khalid Ishaq, J FAHAD AKRAM BHATTI and another ---Petitioners Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 3 others ---Respondents Writ Petition No. 50969 of 2025, decided on 2nd October, 2025. (a) Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act (XXXV of 1973)--- ----Ss.5A & 5B [as amended through Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils (Amendment) Act (XXIV of 2025)]---Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976, Rr.4, 6, 10-B & 175-K---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.8(2), 25, 97 & 199---Constitutional petitions---Vires of amendments enhancing eligibility criteria for membership of Provincial Bar Councils and introducing changes in election framework, challenge to---Whether amendments were discriminatory, violative of fundamental rights, and retrospective vis- -vis Bar Council Elections, 2025---Legality---Determination---Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioners, who were advocates enrolled with various Bar Associations, filed constitutional petitions challenging the amendments introduced through the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils (Amendment) Act, 2025 and the corresponding amendments in the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976, whereby changes were made to the qualifications and disqualifications for membership of Provincial and Islamabad Bar Councils, including enhancement of the eligibility threshold from five to ten years as an Advocate of the High Court, requirement of conducting thirty decided cases, additional voter membership conditions, modifications relating to right to vote, nomination, and disqualification on violation of the Code of Conduct; the amendments were enacted shortly before the Provincial Bar Council Elections, 2025---Held: The amended qualification of ten (10) years as an Advocate of High Court was in line with the earlier prescribed qualification of five (05) years---The question that as to what should have been the touchstone and length of experience was purely a matter within the legislative competence of the legislature and its wisdom in bringing about this change could not be questioned---The impugned amendment of S.5A of the Act, 1973 was not discriminatory in nature by any means---The rights claimed by the petitioners might have become vested rights being enforceable under the law once such rights were perfected by virtue of acceptance of nomination papers of the candidates or at least when the election schedule was notified---Mere claim of campaign for upcoming election did not transform a mere expectancy into a vested right in any manner---Bar Councils created and functioning under the Act, 1973 and the Rules, 1976, be it Pakistan Bar Council or Provincial Bar Councils, were performing delegated authority of the Federation to regulate the profession of law---Article 97 of the Constitution clearly purported that the power and authority to legislate viz a particular subject matter, came within the executive authority of the federation qua the same subject---The condition of continuous practice for five preceding years in such district , sought to be imposed through impugned notification, clearly amounted to contradicting, overriding and enlarging the scope of statutory provision as provided under S.5A(d) of the Act, 1973, which imposed a condition that a candidate simply needed to be a voter member of Bar Association falling in such district for a period of not less than five (05) years---Similarly, the amended clause (a) of Rule 175-K and newly inserted clause (a1) of Rule 175-K of the Rules, 1976 were also not in conformity with the definition of a voter, as couched in S.2(o) of the Act, 1973---Rules made under a parent statute could not go beyond the scope of parent statute---Amendments brought about through the Impugned Notification in R.6(1), clause (a) to R.175-K and clause (a1) to R.175-K of the Rules, 1976 were declared ultra vires---The remedy of appeal being provided before the Attorney General against the decision of Advocate General lacked the element of judicial oversight, therefore, sub-rule (5) substituted R.10-B of Rules, 1976 was declared ultra vires and the matter was referred to the Pakistan Bar Council for reconsidering the same by providing a remedy, which might have some judicial oversight---The challenge laid to the vires of the amendments brought about in the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act,1973, by virtue of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils (Amendment) Act, 2025 was dismissed and the impugned amendments thereof were declared intra vires---The alternate prayer seeking declaration that the amended provisions were retrospective in nature, therefore, the same could not be implemented for the upcoming elections of the Provincial Bar Councils was also dismissed being misconceived---Constitutional petition was disposed of, in circumstances. Election Commission of Pakistan through its Secretary v. Javaid Hashmi and others PLD 1989 SC 396 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Vires of law, challenge to---Judicial review---Scope---Power to strike down or declare void a legislative enactment---Such jurisdiction must be exercised with great care and caution, in deference to the wisdom of the legislature---Considerations approved by Supreme Court highlighted and relied upon by the High Court. Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Vires of law, challenge to---Constitutional yardsticks---(i) Abridging of fundamental rights; (ii) Competence of the legislature enacting the law; (iii) Legislation is colorable; (iv) Directly opposed to provisions of the Constitution; (v) Possibility of two constructions and consequent conclusion. Jawwad S. Khawaja v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2024 SC 337; Muhammad Azfal v. Secretary Establishment Division 2021 SCMR 1569; Sui Southern Gas Company v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 SCMR 802; Province of East Pakistan v. Siraj ul Haq Patwari PLD 1966 SC 854; Federation of Pakistan v. Shaukat Ali Mian PLD 1999 SC 1026; Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 923; MQM (Pakistan) v. Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 439; Younas Abbas v. Additional Sessions Judge, Chakwal PLD 2016 SC 581; Zafar Ali Shah v. Pervez Musharraf PLD 2000 SC 869; Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 697; Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445 and Interpretation of Statutes by (11th Edition) by N.S. Bindra | published by LexisNexis | p140. rel. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Vires of law, challenge to---Grounds that cannot be looked at while determining vires of legislative instruments highlighted---(i) Mala fides not attributable to the legislature; (ii) The law possibly or likely to be administered in a discriminatory manner is not a ground to strike down law; (iii) Wisdom or policy of the legislature not to be questioned; (iv) Reasonableness of law not to be looked at to determine its vires. Messrs Chenone Stores Ltd. through Executive Director (Finance Accounts) v. Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and 2 others 2012 PTD 1815; Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582; Mohammad Imran and others v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others 2019 SCMR 1132; Sui Southern Gas Company v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 SCMR 802; All Pakistan Newspapers Society v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 1; Muhammad Nasir Mehmood v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 SC 107; Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 697; Federation of Pakistan v. Shaukat Ali Mian PLD 1999 SC 1026; Elahi Cotton v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582; LDA v. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739; Federation of Pakistan v. Shaukat Ali Mian PLD 1999 SC 1026; Lal Muhammad v. State 1991 MLD 2622; East and West Steamship Co. v. Pakistan PLD 1958 SC 41; Muhammad Muzaffar Khan v. Muhammad Yusuf Khan PLD 1959 SC 9; Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2005 SC 719; Zaman Cement Company v. Central Board of Revenue 2002 SCMR 312; Zulfiqar Ali Babu v. Government of Punjab PLD 1997 SC 11; Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmed Khan PLD 1974 SC 151; Punjab v. Malik Khizer Hayat Tiwana PLD 1956 FC 200; Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Sadiq PLD 2007 SC 133; Anound Power Generation Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 340 and Karnataka Bank Limited's case, AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1377: 2008 AIR SCW 1021 rel. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.25---Equality of citizens---Discrimination, plea of---Reasonable classification---Principle---Scope---Reasonable classification is permissible and Art.25 of the Constitution is only attracted in an apple to apple comparison---Although Art.25 of the Constitution envisages equality amongst citizens, it also allows for differential treatment of persons who are not similarly placed by virtue of a reasonable classification---However, to justify this difference in treatment, the reasonable classification needs to be 'based on intelligible differentia, which has a rational nexus with the object being sought to be achieved---Likewise, the persons may be classified in groups and such groups may be treated differently, if there is a reasonable classification. Government of the Punjab through Chief Secretary, Lahore and others v. Ch. Abdul Sattar Hans and 29 others 2015 SCMR 915; National Commission on Status of Women through Chairperson and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Law and Justice and others PLD 2019 SC 218; Hadayat Ullah and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1691; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Communications, Islamabad and another v. Shuja Sharif and others 2023 SCMR 129; Government of Balochistan through Additional Chief Secretary v. Azizullah Memon and 16 others PLD 1993 SC 341; Sikandar and 2 others v. Muhammad Ayub and 2 others 1991 SCMR 1041 and Gul Zarif Khan and others v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others 2025 SCMR 415 rel. (f) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Maxim"ut res magis valeat quam pereat"---Meaning and scope---It is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void, or it is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it---The Court should, in so far as possible, avoid that construction which may ascribe or attribute unreasonableness to the will of legislature and while moving into the task of interpretation of any law or provision, the predominant objective should be that the law survives and the presumption, if any, must be in favour of its constitutionality---The Court should not adopt such interpretation which renders the statute or any of its provisions inoperative or unworkable. (g) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Prospectivity and retrospectivity of a statute---Procedural law---There can be no two views about the powers of legislature to legislate any law and to make it applicable prospectively or retrospectively or from any particular date, with clear/express intendment in this regard---However the procedural law, even though not expressly provided for, normally holds its applicability retrospectively as no one can claim vested right in the matter of procedure. Judges Pension Case [H.R.C. No.40927-S of 2012 / Constitution Petition No.127 of 2012] PLD 2013 SC 829 rel. (h) Words and phrases--- ----Vested right---Meaning and scope---Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest---A vested right is a title to the present or future enjoyment of property, or to the present or future enforcement of a demand or a legal exemption from a demand by another---The right must be immediate, absolute, complete, unconditional and independent of a contingency---Accordingly, a mere expectancy of future benefit or a contingent interest founded on the anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right---Inchoate rights, which have not been acted upon, are not vested rights---Moreover, a vested right may not arise at a time when there is no possibility of enforcing a claim under the existing law---In certain cases, a distinction is drawn between an existing right and a vested right and it is said that the rule against retrospective construction is applied only to save vested rights and not existing rights---The expression vested right means an absolute or indefeasible right---The claim based on the vested right or settled expectation to obtain sanction cannot be set up against statutory provisions---It is a right which cannot be taken away without the consent of the owner---Such rights may arise from contract or statute and from the operation of law---The right to take advantage of a statute cannot be held to be a vested right. Nabi Ahmed and another v. Home Secretary, Government of West Pakistan, Lahore and 4 others PLD 1969 SC 599 and Mian Rafi ud Din and 6 others v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and 2 others PLD 1971 SC 252 rel. Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu JT (2005) 9 SC 443 ref. (i) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Retrospectivity of a statute---The rule against retrospective construction is not applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing ---If that were not so, every statute will be presumed to apply only to persons born and things come into existence after its operation and such interpretation may well result in virtual nullification of most of the statutes---An amending Act is, therefore, not retrospective merely because it applies also to those to whom the pre-amended Act was applicable if the amended Act has operation from the date of its amendment and not from an anterior date---But this does not mean that a statute which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws or which creates a new obligation or imposes a new burden in respect of past transactions, will not be treated as retrospective. (j) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Retrospective application---Scope---There is no distinction between a retrospective legislation which affects rights and liabilities and that which does not do so---All legislations affect rights or liabilities; the words being used in their widest sense---Legislature either creates a right or takes away a right or restricts or enlarges a right or similarly affects liabilities---A statute is to be deemed to be retrospective, which takes away or impairs any vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past---According to this definition, the very meaning of a retrospective legislation is one that impairs any vested right or imposes a new obligation in relation to transactions already past---Retrospective is well defined: Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere bebet, non prateritis i.e. unless there be clear words to the contrary, statutes do not apply to a past, but to a future, state of circumstances.
Mir Ahmad Nawaz Khan Bughti v. Superintendent, District Jail PLD 1966 SC 357 rel. (k) Words and phrases--- ----Vested rights---Distinction and gradation of rights---Past and closed transaction, doctrine of---Scope---While every past and closed transaction is normally based on or comprises of a vested right, every vested right is not necessarily a past and closed transaction---Indeed, if rights were required to be placed in ascending order, the 'scale' could be said to comprise of a 'bare' right, a vested right and a past and closed transaction ---Ordinarily, a right can be regarded as progressing from a 'bare' right to become a vested right and then perhaps even a past and closed transaction ---Of course, some rights only become vested rights, and do not go beyond to become past and closed transactions---Others may vest immediately, as soon as they arise or accrue, and then may (or may not) become past and closed transactions---Some rights (in rare and unusual situations) may even become past and closed transactions once they accrue, i.e., progress to that category straight from being 'bare' rights. Messrs Al Samrez Enterprise v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1986 SCMR 1917; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Messrs Mekotex PLD 2024 SC 1168 and Molasses Trading and Export (Pvt) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1993 SCMR 1905 rel. (l) Precedent--- ----A case is only authority for what it actually decides and cannot be cited as precedent for a proposition that may be inferred from it. Syed Hammad Nabi and others v. Inspector General of Police Punjab, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 584; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 and Sindh High Court Bar Association through its Secretary and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others PLD 2009 SC 879 rel. Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495 ref. (m) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Delegated legislation---Scope---Delegated legislation is secondary legislation; it is a law made by a person or body other than the legislature but with legislature s authority. Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 ref. (n) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Rules travelling beyond the parent statute, vires of---Legality---Rules made under an Act or Statute are subservient to the parent Act and such rules cannot contradict, override, add to the clear provision of the parent Statute---Any rule which is inconsistent or travels beyond the scope of parent statute, is ultra vires the parent statute---The rules made under a parent statute cannot go beyond the scope of said statute nor can they enlarge the scope of statutory provisions therein as the power of rule-making is an incidental power that must follow and not run parallel to the parent statute. Sindh High Court Bar Association through its Secretary and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others PLD 2009 SC 879; Farrukh Raza Sheikh v. The Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and others 2022 SCMR 1787; Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTO, Islamabad v. Messrs Pakistan LNG Limited, Islamabad 2025 SCP 267; Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority v. Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others PLD 2023 SC 378; Jurists Foundation through Chairman v. Federal Government through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others PLD 2020 SC 1; Suo Motu Case No.13 of 2009 PLD 2011 SC 619; Suo Motu Case No.11 of 2011 PLD 2014 SC 389; Mian Zaiuddin v. Punjab Local Government and others 1985 SCMR 365 --- PLD 1995 SC 423 and Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186 rel. Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan, Hassan Abdullah Niazi, Asad Manzoor Butt, Fahad Akram Bhatti, Muhammad Ishnaq, Ch. Amir Ahmed Rasool, Asif Siddique Chaudhary, Rana Ashfaq Ahmad Shafi, Mian Sardar Ali Gehlan, Adnan Ahmad Ch., Ch. Umar Latif, Ch. Hussain Arshad, Munir Ahmad Malik, Wajahat Ali, Mian Affan Asad Taj, Rana Ishfaq, Ahmed Shafi, Mujahid Iqbal Dasti, Zarish Fatima, Muqadas Tahira, Rao Abdul Jabbar Khan, Syed Khaliq ur Rehman Ansari and Mazhar Hussain Tahir for Petitioners. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Additional Attorney General assisted by Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General and Shakeel Ahmad Pasha, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No. 1/Federation of Pakistan. Muhammad Osman Khan and Imran Khan, Assistant Advocate Generals, Punjab for Respondent No. 2/Province of Punjab. Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon and Tahir Nasar Ullah Warraich for Respondent No. 3/Pakistan Bar Council. Javed Imran Ranjha for Respondent No. 4/Punjab Bar Council. Dates of hearing: 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 29th, 30th September and 2nd October, 2025. JUDGMENT KHALID ISHAQ, J.---This judgment shall decide the captioned constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the Constitution ), as well as the following petitions: i. W.P. No. 50975 of 2025 ii. W.P. No. 56585 of 2025 iii. W.P. No. 51397 of 2025 iv. W.P. No. 52807 of 2025 v. W.P. No. 44189 of 2025 2. The Petitioners have called into question the vires of amendments made in Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 (the Act, 1973 ) by virtue of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils (Amendment) Act, 2025, enacted on 29.08.2025 (the Amendment Act ), as well as, the amendments brought about in Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 (the Rules, 1976 ) through Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils (Amendment) Rules, 2025, as amended vide Pakistan Bar Council s Notification No.1581/PBC/SEC/2025 dated 08.09.2025 (the Amended Rules ). The Amendment Act and the Amended Rules, shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as the Impugned Amendments , where the context so requires. 3. Though multiple challenges have been raised by way of the petitions at hand, however, in essence, the Petitioners have argued that the Impugned Amendments: i. are discriminatory in nature, hence violative of Article 25 of the Constitution; ii. cannot be applied to the Provincial Bar Councils Election, 2025, as the same have neither been enacted with retrospective effect nor any such intendment exists; iii. if applied retrospectively would destroy the vested rights of the petitioners and all other equally placed persons, therefore, the alleged retrospective application is sought to be declared illegal and unlawful; iv. violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners and thus, the same are sought to be declared ultra vires for being ex facie arbitrary, against the principles of fairness and reasonableness; v. have been brought about in negation of the democratic principles and rights and amounts to disenfranchise the petitioners as well as their voters/supporters; vi. are devoid of any rational basis, having been promulgated during the currency of the election year; 4. In a nub, the main thrust of the challenge is directed against the amendments of Sections 5A, 5B of the Act, 1973 and Rules 4, 6, 10-B and 175-K of the Rules, 1976. For the sake of clarity, the relevant provisions under challenge, in pre and post amended form, are reproduced herein below:
The Act, 1973
PRE AMENDMENT
POST AMENDMENT
5A. Qualifications for membership of a Provincial Bar Council [and Islamabad Bar Council].--A person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of a Provincial Bar Council [and Islamabad Bar Council] if he:- (a) is on the roll of advocates of High Court maintained by the Provincial Bar Council [and Islamabad Bar Council], [for not less than five years} and] (b) has, on the day of filing of the nomination paper, been an advocate for not less than [fifteen] years; and (c) has cleared all the dues payable by him to the Provincial Bar Council [and Islamabad Bar Council][;] [Provided that for the first election of Islamabad Bar Council, the qualification required for a candidate for Punjab Bar Council shall apply to the candidate to be elected for Islamabad Bar Council.]
5A. Qualifications for membership of a Provincial Bar Council and the Islamabad Bar Council. A person shall be qualified to be elected as a member of a Provincial Bar Council and the Islamabad Bar Council if he, (a) is on the roll of advocates of High Court maintained by the concerned Provincial Bar Council and Islamabad Bar Council for not less than ten years; (b) has, on the day of filing of the nomination paper, been an advocate for not less than fifteen years, and has individually conducted not less than thirty decided cases; (c) has cleared all the dues payable by him to the Provincial Bar Council and Islamabad Bar Council; and (d) has been a voter member of a Bar Association falling in the district, or districts in the case of Karachi, from where he is a candidate for a period of not less than five years.
5B. Disqualifications for membership of a Provincial Bar Council [and Islamabad Bar Council].--A person shall be disqualified to be elected as a member of a Provincial Bar Council [and Islamabad Bar Council] if he (a) was dismissed or removed from the service of Government or of a public statutory corporation; or (b) has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude; or (c) has been found guilty of professional misconduct; or (d) has been declared a tout; or (e) is an undischarged insolvent.
5B. Disqualifications for membership of a Provincial Bar Council and the Islamabad Bar Council. A person shall be disqualified to be elected as a member of a Provincial Bar Council and the Islamabad Bar Council if he. (a) was dismissed or removed from the service of Government or of a public statutory corporation; or (b) has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than…
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