Al Wakeelo
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Official Citation: 2025 LHC 2832
Court / Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court
Year of Decision: 2025
Decision Date: 2025-04-23
Parties: Muhammad Hafeez vs Muhammad Ramzan & 17 others
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court on 2025-04-23, officially reported as 2025 LHC 2832. In this matter between Muhammad Hafeez and Muhammad Ramzan & 17 others, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
Case cited as 2025LHC2832
Court Name: Lahore High Court Judge(s): Khalid Ishaq Title: Muhammad Hafeez vs Muhammad Ramzan & 17 others Case No.: Writ Petition No. 10459 of 2019 Date of Judgment:2025-04-23 Reported As: 2025 LHC 2832 Result: Petition Dismissed
JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT KHALID ISHAQ, J: Through this Constitutional Petition, the petitioner has called into question the Order and Decree dated 24.12.2018 (the "Impugned Decree") passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Shahkot, District Nankana Sahib ("Revisional Court"). 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this petition are that the Petitioner/Plaintiff along-with Mst. Ishrat Bibi (respondent No.16 in this petition) filed a suit for declaration and Permanent Injunction (the "Suit") challenging the registered gift deed bearing Document No. 6231 dated 03.09.1981 ("Impugned Gift Deed") executed in favour of respondent Nos. 7 to 10 by Elahi Bakhsh ("Original Owner") (maternal grand-father of the Petitioner/Plaintiff) in respect of two parcels of land[1], measuring 34- Kanals, 9-Marlas & 6-Kanals, 14- Marlas, situated in Nizampura Chak No. 38/R.B Deva Singhwala Tehsil Shahkot District Nankana-Sahib (the "Suit Property"). Plaint avers that the Original Owner was an old age bed ridden person who remained ill for a long time before his death and had lost normal prudence due to protracted illness. It was asserted by the Plaintiffs that respondent Nos. 7 to 10, in connivance with the revenue staff, got registered the Impugned Gift Deed in their favour by depriving Mst. Safia Bibi (real sister of the respondent Nos. 7 to 10) of her due legal share. Needless to add that mutation No. 957 dated 24.01.1982 was also sanctioned on the basis of Impugned Gift Deed. It was contended that above-mentioned respondent Nos. 7 to 10 further sold out the land to Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 through registered Sale Deeds bearing Document No. 2545 dated 18.03.1984 and Document No. 2544 dated 18.03.1984 ("Registered Sale Deeds"). Mutations bearing Nos. 1441 dated 24.09.1988 and 1442 dated 24.09.1984 respectively were also sanctioned on the basis of Registered Sale Deeds. As per the averments of the plaint, the
---
## Page 2
Petitioner contacted the beneficial owners/respondents for his inheritance but in vain. Contesting Defendants filed written statement and supported the Impugned Gift Deed, as well as, Registered Sale Deeds executed and registered thereafter. During the proceedings of the Suit, contesting defendants also filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("C.P.C") which was disposed of by learned Civil Judge Class-I, Shahkot ("Trial Court") vide order dated 08.07.2017 ("Trial Court Order"), erroneously treating the Suit inter-se the co-owners, completely ignoring the 3rd party rights and questions of waiver, acquiescence and limitation. Being aggrieved of the Trial Court Order, the contesting respondents preferred a Civil Revision Petition in terms of Section 115 of the C.P.C, which was allowed vide the Impugned Decree, consequently the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C being barred by limitation. Hence this Constitutional Petition. 3. Leaned counsel for the Petitioner argued that question of limitation is irrelevant in inheritance claims and if right of a legal heir is accrued, all subsequent transactions, denying that right, are liable to be cancelled. Further submits with vehemence that it was a matter of recording of evidence as limitation is a mixed question of law and facts, therefore, plaint was not liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. Placed reliance upon "Khan Muhammad through L.Rs and others v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others" (2017 SCMR 1476). 4. Conversely, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 6 has ably assisted this Court by confining his submissions to legal premise of rejection of plaint through Impugned Decree; submits that the recording of evidence was not required as the Suit was patently barred by limitation; argues that Court must put an end to litigation at the very initial stage when it becomes evident that a full- fledged trial would be a futile exercise. Further submits that limitation cannot be brushed aside in every claim based on inheritance; adds that admittedly the impugned transaction of gift and subsequent sales were never challenged by the deceased lady who remained alive till 2009 and as such, legal heirs of the said deceased cannot challenge the same. Finally submits that Mst. Safia Bibi was married in the same village where the Suit Property is situated, the plaintiffs, who are her successors, are also residing in the same village, which fact is admitted and evident from the address of the plaintiff/petitioner supplied in the plaint as well as in the Petition in hand. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the cases reported as "Agha Syed Mushtaque Ali Shah v Mst. Bibi Gul Jan and others" (2016 SCMR 910), "Noor Din and another v Additional District Judge, Lahore and others" (2014 SCMR 513), "Mst. Grana through Legal Heirs and others v Sahib Kamala Bibi and others" (PLD 2014 SC 167), "Lal Khan through Legal Heirs v Muhammad Yousaf through Legal Heirs" (PLD 2011 SC 657), "Muhammad Rustam and another v Mst. Makhan Jan and others" (2013 SCMR 299), "Muhammad Raz Khan v Government of N.-W.F.P and another" (PLD 1997 SC 397) and "Pakistan Agricultural Storage & Services Corporation Ltd v Mian Abdul Latif and others" (NLR 2008 Civil 578). 5. Arguments heard. Record perused. 6. It is pertinent to mention here that Safia Bibi died on 01.12.2009. It is also admitted that she never challenged the Impugned Gift Deed in her lifetime, although she remained alive for 28 years after the Impugned Gift Deed but did not come forward to impugn the same. It is worth mentioning here that Impugned Gift Deed is a registered document on the basis of which Mutation No. 957 dated 24.01.1982 was sanctioned in favour of respondent Nos. 7 to 10, who are real brothers of Mst. Safia Bibi. It is also noteworthy that aforementioned respondents/brothers of Mst. Safia Bibi further alienated the Suit Property in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 6 through Registered Sale Deeds/ Mutations and since then the said purchasers are in cultivating possession of the Suit Property. The Impugned Gift Deed was challenged by the Petitioner/Plaintiff on 24.11.2015, after 34 years of the Impugned Gift Deed and 06 years after the death of Mst. Safia Bibi. At the outset I will discuss as to what right vests in the Petitioner/Plaintiff when no such right was claimed by Mst. Safia Bibi within
---
## Page 3
her lifetime and whether the most important question of limitation involved in this case can conveniently be brushed aside, ignored or condoned on simple claim of inheritance. It needs to be appreciated that the present petitioner/plaintiff has not inherited anything qua his claim on the basis of his relationship with his deceased mother Mst. Safia Bibi as she did not leave behind any inheritance with respect to the Suit Property. Not only the Impugned Gift Deed was not challenged within her lifetime, the subsequent transactions of sales to 3rd parties, evidenced by registered instruments were not challenged either. The law has been well settled that if a predecessor has not challenged a transaction in his/her lifetime, which transaction purports to deprive the predecessor of his/her share and 3rd party rights have been created, simple claim on the basis of inheritance will not absolve the question of limitation.[2] A careful perusal of the law laid down by the Apex Court clearly leads to an ineluctable conclusion that the question of limitation cannot be dubbed irrelevant in every claim of inheritance. Based on a thorough analysis of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the settled legal position emerges that only in the cases of exceptional facts, the question of limitation has not been treated as a statutory bar against the claims of inheritance. Those exceptional cases may be summed up in the following terms: i. Cases filed by female heirs, within their lifetime, claiming fraud and misrepresentation played against them qua the immoveable property left behind by their predecessor in interest; ii. Cases where it is pleaded and proved that the deprived female heir(s) were being paid some proportionate share from the income/lease of the immoveable property in question; iii. Cases where a co-sharer has successfully pleaded and proved that the rival heir or co-sharer was in deemed possession of immoveable property on behalf of all other heirs/siblings; iv. Cases where no third-party rights have been created in the immoveable property, which is/was subject matter of undisputed inheritance; v. Cases where the elements of acquiescence and waiver are absent on the part of the claimant legal heir or his/her predecessor in interest. Muhammad Rustam's case[3] relates to plea of inheritance agitated by a successor through predecessor, whose predecessor never agitated his right of inheritance during his lifetime. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has held: "11. Atta Muhammad was deprived of right to inherit the property as a consequence of mutation in dispute but he did not challenge the same during his lifetime. The petitioners claimed the property through Atta Muhammad as his heirs who filed the suit as late in 1979 about nine years after the sanction of mutation which had already been given effect to in the record of rights. The petitioner, therefore, had no locus standi to challenge the mutation independently, for Atta Muhammad through whom the claimed inheritance himself had not challenged the same during his lifetime." 7. Similarly, while dealing with the often-argued ground that the limitation does not come in the way of claims based on inheritance, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mst. Grana[4] case had considered the landmark judgment on the subject in Ghulam Ali's case[5], and enunciated the law in the following clear terms: "6. It appears that in a suit which involves some element of inheritance the Courts are generally quick to declare that the law of limitation would not be attracted. It is not in all cases of inheritance that the question of limitation becomes irrelevant. Even in Ghulam Ali's case the Court recognized that there could be exceptional circumstances wherein a suit based on inheritance, issue of limitation may become relevant. This Court recently in some cases had invoked the principle of time limitation and acquiescence of the plaintiff material in suits of inheritance. In Mst. Phaphan v. Muhammad Bakhsh (2005 SCMR 1278) a suit for declaration and possession was filed in the year 1983 by the plaintiff/petitioner claiming to be the owner of the inherited property. The suit was held to be barred by time wherein mutations of the year 1959 and 1967 were challenged in the year 1983 when the plea of the defendants was that the plaintiffs had alienated
---
## Page 4
the property of her own free-will. The plaintiff's plea of being pardanashin lady and reliance on the case of Ghulam Ali was not accepted as the plaintiff was found to have remained in deep slumber for 24 years despite the fact that the physical possession of the land was passed on to the defendant. Recently in the case of Lal Khan v Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 2011 SC 657) this Court had set aside the concurrent findings of the three Courts and dismissed the suit filed on 13.05.1970, where the plaintiff had challenged inheritance mutation of 13.02.1947; the Court held it to be barred by time. The rationale of the law of limitation has been reiterated in Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh (2007 SCMR 1446) where the concurrent findings of the three Courts were set aside and the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs in the year 1988 questioning the inheritance mutation of 1942 was declared to be barred by time. The Court held:-- "The law of limitation provides an element of certainty in the conduct of human affairs. Statutes of limitation and prescription are, thus, statutes of peace and repose. In order to avoid the difficulty and errors that necessarily result from lapse of time, the presumption of coincidence of fact and right is rightly accepted as final after a certain number of years. Whoever wishes to dispute this presumption must do so, within that period; otherwise his rights if any, will be forfeited as a penalty for his neglect. In other words the law of limitation is a law which is designed to impose quietus on legal dissensions and conflicts. It requires that persons must come to Court and take recourse to legal remedies with due diligence. There have been cases where even to claim inheritance law of limitation was applied." The Court found that real dispute was whether a particular person was or not a legal heir of one, Mst. Khairan, whose inheritance mutation was attested in favour of appellant, Atta Muhammad. 7. It emerges from the afore discussed case-law that the law of limitation is not entirely to be ignored or brushed aside whenever property is claimed on the basis of inheritance. The conduct of such claimant may become relevant and material when the bar of time limitation is pleaded by the adversary. A defendant may show that the plaintiff by her or his act, overt or implicit, had demonstrated acquiescence in the defendant's title to the suit properly thereby allowing him to deal with it as exclusive owner, for instance regularly and openly disposing of parts of the property or developing it at his own expense over a period of time within the knowledge of the plaintiff. When in such circumstances the defendant/heirs transfers the property for valuable consideration the transferee is entitled to believe that the transferor had a valid title to transfer. It may be reiterated that in Ghulam Ali's case the question of interest protection of transferees from a legal heir in a suit of inheritance was left open as the transferees were not impleaded as defendants. That is not the case here. The very facts of this case would demonstrate that the plaintiff had acquiesced in the various transfers made of the suit property from time to time." [Emphasis Supplied] 8. Likewise, in the case of Atta Muhammad[6], it is held: "8. The findings of the learned two Courts is that the plaintiffs were out of possession and they have not been able to establish receipt of rent and profits from the land, although the appellant claimed to the contrary. This was the second misrepresentation which disentitled the plaintiffs to any relief in equitable jurisdiction. The learned two Courts held that the suit was barred by time but the learned High Court, by making a sweeping statement, that there is no limitation in the cases of inheritance has, in fact, rewritten the law of limitation. It was not a case of inheritance between the co-sharers because the plaintiffs case was that the appellant was a stranger. As the mutation of inheritance of the estate of Mst. Khairan in 1942 is concerned, there was absolutely no justification, factual or legal, to overlook the delay of 46 years in filing the suit. This delay of 46 years adversely reflected on the bona fides of the claim of the respondents. The learned High Court observed that on account of river action the land suffered erosion but was reclaimed 10/12
---
## Page 5
years preceding 1988 could hardly be accepted in view of the absence of the pleadings. What happened in 1942 when the mutation was attested could hardly be properly and justly inquired into after 46 years." [Emphasis Supplied] The above judgments have consistently been approved and followed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In Salamat Ali's case[7], the true import and exceptions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, read with Order VI Rule 4 C.P.C has authoritatively been settled in the following terms: "20. We find that all the three courts have failed to notice the exception provided in section 18 of the Limitation Act 1908 ("Limitation Act"), according to which the benefit of postponing the commencement of the period of limitation provided to an injuriously affected person is not applicable against a bona fide purchaser. The section reads:-- 18. Effect of fraud. Where any person having a right to institute a suit or make an application has, by means of fraud, been kept from the knowledge of such right or of the title on which it is founded, or where any document necessary to establish such right has been fraudulently concealed from him, the time limited for instituting a suit or making an application-- (a) against the person guilty of the fraud or accessory thereto, or (b) against any person claiming through him otherwise than in good faith and for a valuable consideration, shall be computed from the time when the fraud first became known to the person injuriously affected thereby, or, in the case of the concealed document, when he first had the means of producing it or compelling its production. (Emphasis added) Before we consider and explain the exception provided in the above provision, it would be pertinent to understand the true purport of the general rule encompassed in the section. In essence, this provision is a safeguard against fraud committed to conceal from a person his right to sue. It postpones the commencement of the period of limitation to the date when the fraud first became known to the "person injuriously affected". Such injuriously affected person can, therefore, institute a suit within the limitation period specified for such suit in the First Schedule ("Schedule") to the Limitation Act, but computing it from the date when he first had knowledge of the fraud, whereby he was kept from knowledge of his right to institute the suit. 21. We, however, must appreciate that the "fraud" envisaged in this provision of the law only relates to concealing, not creating, the right to sue and thus, affects only the limitation period and has nothing to do with the cause of action and the relief prayed. It is also needless to mention that, a plaintiff who wants to avail the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act, must assert the commission of such fraud by the defendant in the plaint, and should also give the particulars thereof, and the date of knowledge as required under Rule 4 of Order VI of the C.P.C., and then prove the same through positive evidence. 22. . . . . . . . 23. . . . . . . . 24. . . . . . . . 25. . . . . . . . 26. . . . . . . . 27. In an inheritance case, like the present one, a wrong mutation in the revenue record, as to inheritance rights does not affect the proprietary rights of a legal heir in the property, as the devolution of the ownership of the property on legal heirs takes place under the Islamic law, through inheritance immediately, without any formality including sanction of inheritance mutation. Therefore, a wrong mutation is a mere "apprehended or threatened denial" of right, not necessitating for the person aggrieved thereby to institute the suit. The position is, however, different when the co-sharer in possession of the joint property, on the basis of a wrong
---
## Page 6
inheritance mutation, sells the joint property, or any part thereof exceeding his share, claiming him to be the exclusive owner thereof and transfers possession of the sold land to a third person, the purchaser. In such a circumstance, the co-sharer by his said act "actually denies" the rights of the other co-sharer, who is only in constructive possession of the same, and ousts him from such constructive possession also by transferring the possession of the sold land to a third person, the purchaser. In such circumstances, the right to sue accrues to the aggrieved co-sharer from the date of such sale, and transfer of actual possession of the sold land to the third person, the purchaser." [Emphasis Supplied] 9. For the cases, where the element of acquiescence and waiver is depicted from the facts of the case, though the claim was based on inheritance, the argument of brushing aside the limitation on the basis of inheritance claim was not entertained, the reliance may be placed on Syed Kausar Ali Shah's[8] case, the relevant paragraph whereof is reproduced herein below: "10. In our opinion there is a clear distinction between (a) cases in which an heir alleges that his/her rights to inheritance have been disregarded and his/her share not mentioned in the inheritance mutation, and (b) those cases in which such an heir sits idly by, does not challenge mutation entries of long standing, or acquiesces, and only comes forward when third party rights in the subject land have been created. To succeed in respect of the latter (b) category cases an heir must demonstrate that he/she was not aware of having been deprived, give cogent reasons for not challenging the property record of long standing, and show complicity between the buyer and the seller (the ostensible owner) or that the buyer knew of such heir's interest yet proceeded to acquire the land. If these two categories are kept in mind, then the judgments of this court, respectively relied by both sides, which are apparently at variance, become reconcilable." [Emphasis Supplied] Similarly in the case of "Mst. Faheeman Begum (Deceased) through L.Rs and others v Islam-Ud- Din (Deceased) through L.Rs and others" (2023 SCMR 1402), lack of challenge by the donor within her life time was declared fatal by the Supreme Court and bar of limitation was accordingly applied. The principle is also followed in plethora of other judgments[9]. 10. In various claims of inheritance brought by female legal heirs against their brothers/male heirs, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has authoritatively held that the question of limitation cannot be ignored in every such case and such question of limitation is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Saadat Khan's case[10], it was held: "9. We may say at the very outset that in view of the provisions of the residuary Article 120 of Schedule-I to the Limitation Act 1908, there can hardly be any suit to which the bar of limitation does not apply. As per the said Article a suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule, the period of limitation for that suit is six years from the time when the right to sue accrues. No specific Article of Schedule-I to the Limitation Act provides a period of limitation for a suit instituted by a person, under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, for declaration of his ownership rights to any property against a person denying his said rights; therefore, the residuary Article 120 applies to such suit. A suit instituted by a female legal heir for declaration of her ownership rights as to the property left by her deceased father in his inheritance, against her brother who denies her rights is thus governed by the provisions of Article 120. To decide whether such a suit is barred by limitation, the six-year period of limitation provided by Article 120 is to be counted from the time when the right to sue for declaration accrues as provided therein. The question, when the right to sue for declaration has accrued in a case, depends upon the facts and circumstances of that case, as it accrues when the defendant denies (actually) or is interested to deny (threatens) the rights of the plaintiff as per Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The actual denial of rights gives rise to a compulsory cause of action and
---
## Page 7
obligates the plaintiff to institute the suit for declaration of his rights, if he wants to do so, within the prescribed period of limitation; while in case of a threatened denial of rights, it is the option of the plaintiff to institute such a suit on a particular threat. On the actual denial of rights, the cause of action and the consequent right to sue matures for instituting the suit for declaration; whereas every threatened denial of rights gives rise to a fresh cause of action, and thus a fresh right to sue accrues on such a denial. This Court has, therefore, decided the question of limitation in the cases relied upon by the High Court and referred to by the counsel for the petitioners, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case." 11. The above makes it abundantly clear that neither the question of limitation may be ignored in every claim based on purported rights of inheritance nor it is permissible for the litigants to lay a statute barred challenge by couching the relief in the form of an inheritance claim. Indeed, there are few judgments by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the first blush wherefrom may lead to an inference otherwise, however, appreciating the facts of all such cases in true perspective will predominantly lead to the conclusion that all such cases fall in the exceptions formulated above. For instance, In Shabla's case[11], it was held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that in a case where a female is deprived of her share in the immoveable…
Read the unabridged text and precedent citation network on Al Wakeelo Legal Research Platform.