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Official Citation: 2026 SHC 1337
Court / Jurisdiction: Sindh High Court
Petitioner: Const. P. 66/2026 (D.B.) Sindh High Court, Karachi - Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (Petitioner)
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Sindh High Court, officially reported as 2026 SHC 1337. In this matter between Const. P. 66/2026 (D.B.) Sindh High Court, Karachi - Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (Petitioner) and the Respondent, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Sindh High Court CASE NO: Const. P. 66/2026 (D.B.) Sindh High Court, Karachi CITATION: 2026 SHC KHI 1337, 2026 SHC KHI 1338, 2026 SHC KHI 1342 PARTIES: Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (Petitioner) ORDER DATE: 18-JUN-26 BENCH: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Saleem Jessar, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Nisar Ahmed Bhanbhro(Author) A.F.R: Yes ------------------------------------------------------------ IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI
Before: Mr. Justice Muhammad Saleem Jessar. Mr. Justice Nisar Ahmed Bhanbhro.
CPD NO 66 OF 2026 Karachi Metropolitan corporation V. Federation of Pakistan & Others
CPD NO 67 OF 2026 Karachi Metropolitan corporation V. Federation of Pakistan & Others
CPD NO 1907 OF 2026 Karachi Metropolitan corporation V. Federation of Pakistan & Others
CPD NO 1996 OF 2026 Muhammad Asif & others V. Evacuee Trust Property Board & others
CPD NO 214 OF 2026 Hassan Ali & Co Cotton Pri vate Limited & others V. Federation of Pakistan & others CPD No 2005 of 2026 Sharik Bashir & others V. Evacuee Trust Property Board & others
CPD No 1371 of 2026 Kamran Zafarullah Paracha & others V. Federation of Pakistan & others
CPD No 2006 of 2026 Karachi Cotton Association & others V. Evacuee Trust Property Board & others CPD No 1904 of 2026 Karachi Cotton Association & others V. Evacuee Trust Property Board & others CPD No 472 of 2026 Karachi Cotton Association & others V. Federation of Pakistan & others
For Petitioners: Mr. Anwer Mansoor Khan, Mr. Haider Waheed, Mr. Muhammad Asad Ashfaq Tola, Mir Maula Bukhsh, Zain Azhar, Mr. Arshad M Tayyabally, Mr. Talha Javed & Zubair Hashim Advocates
For Respondents Ms. Shazia Hanjrah Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan Mr. Jawwad Dero, Advocate General Sindh along with Mr. Hakim Ali Shaikh & Sagheer Ahmed Abassi Addl. A.G. Sindh & Mr. Saifullah Assistant Advocate General Sindh M/s Muhammad Akram Tariq, Muhammad Munsif Jan, Asad Ahme d & Ubaidullah Noonari Advocate for ETPB Mr. Asif Khan Deputy Administrator ETPB Mr. Muhammad Faisal Deputy Director (law) FIA a/w Inspector Umair Shah FIA, ACC Karachi & SI Adnan Dilawar FIA, ACC Karachi
Date of Hearing: 02.06.2026 Date of judgment: 18.06.2026
JUDGMENT
Nisar Ahmed Bhanbhro J.- This common judgment will decide the fate of the captioned petitions, as they involve a common question of law and facts.
2. The controversy involved in all the captioned petitions related to a notification dated 9 th August, 1963 (impugned notification) issued by Evacuee Trust Property Board (ETPB) (Defunct Evacuee Trust Committee) inviting objections from general public regarding declaration of certain properties located in Karachi including Karachi Cotton Association (KCA) as Evacuee Trust Properties, sealing notice of Cotton Exchange Building dated 12.12.2025 and eviction notice dated 02.01.2025 followed by sealing of the Cotton Exchange Building by ETPB and Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). The Petitioners have challenged the referred controversy in these petitions claiming that KCA is not an Evacuee Trust Property, therefore, the actions by the ETPB and FIA may be declared illegal and Cotton Exchange Building (CEB) may be de -sealed and its possession restored to KCA.
3. Mr. Haider Waheed Learned Council for Petitioner in CPD 66 of 2026 and other petitions contended that Petitioner Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) is a body corporate created under Sindh Local
Government Act, 2013. He submitted tha t initially Karachi Municipal Commission was established in year 1852, later elevated as Karachi Municipal Corporation in year 1933 and reorganized as Karachi Metropolitan Corporation in year 1976. He argued that under the provisions of Sindh Local Governm ent Ordinance 2000, (SLGO) Karachi Metropolitan Corporation was succeeded by City District Government Karachi and on repeal of SLGO in year 2011 Karachi Metropolitan Corporation was restored. He contended that KMC is owner of the land where KCA has constru cted Cotton Exchange Building. He contended that KCA is lessee of the property, which was initially leased out for a period of 99 years to one Mohammed Saleh Memon & Family who transferred its lease rights in favour of KCA through a duly registered deed da ted 22.07.1936. He next contended that on expiry of lease on 19.11.1982 it was extended for another period of 99 years until 2081. He submitted that a dispute regarding renewel fees arose between KMC and KCA, therefore KCA filed suit No 293/2006 (new numbe r 7608/2025) Re Karachi Cotton Association Limited V. City District Government Karachi, which is pending adjudication before Competent Court of law. He contended that ETPB while relying upon a notification issued in year 1963 has taken the punitive action of sealing CEB and FIA has registered an FIR No 37/2025, which prima facie are without any legal sanction and lawful authority. He contended that the impugned notification itself was bad under the law as no property can be declared as an evacuee property beyond the cut off date of January 1 st 1957 per provisions of Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Trust Property Act, 1957 (PAETP Act). He contended that KMC was neither given a notice nor heard before issuance of the impugned notification. He next contended that at no point of time the CEB has remained under the possession or control of Custodian appointed under Evacuee Laws and since 1936 CEB has remained under the possession of KCA and the same is being used as a hub of cotton trade for Pakistan, it was ne ither an abandoned nor evacuee property. He further contended that if for the sake of arguments it is believed that the KCA is an Evacuee Trust Property, even then the ETPB and FIA have no authority or powers to interfere in the affairs of KCA as on passag e of 18th amendment to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan of 1973 (the Constitution), the concurrent list stands abolished and evacuee properties became a provincial subject. He contended that provincial Assembly of Sindh has enacted Sindh Ev acuee Trust Property
(Management & Disposal) Act 2021, which excludes the operation of Federal Evacuee Trust Law in the province of Sindh. He contended that FIA issued final directions to the occupants of building through notice dated 02.01.2026 and therea fter on 04.01.2026 sealed the property by placing the logo of ETPB. He contended that Petitioner was owner of the property and no notice was issued to Petitioner before taking such adverse actions. He therefore prayed to allow the petition and set aside the impugned notification and notices dated 12.12.2025 and 02.01.2026.
4. Mr. Anwer Mansoor Khan Learned Counsel for Karachi Cotton Association (KCA) in CPD 472 of 2026 and other CPs contended that KCA is a company limited by Guarantee incorporated under the Indian Companies Act 1913 created on 20.04.1933; that on creation of Pakistan it was ratified under the Companies Ordinance 1984. He contended that KCA is a primary cotton association for whole of Pakistan and significant contributor to national economy. He contended that KCA was created in year 1933 and continues to play its role to date. He contended that at the time of its creation company had directors from British, Japan and Indian origin and on partition the Company’s legacy was continued by election of directors and induction of new members. He contended that until 1950 company’s directors were Muslims, Hindus, British and at no point of time the company was abandoned. He contended that KCA was not an evacuee company and ETPB under the garb of a notification issued in year 1963 cannot presume it an evacuee trust property as the said notification was issued beyond the cut off date viz. 01.01.1957. He contended that since 1936 till to date KCA was operating its business in Pakistan and it cannot be decl ared as an Evacuee mere for the reason that 16 of its directors left Pakistan. He contended that KCA is the owner of Cotton Exchange Building (CEB) and has rented out rooms to different business concerns that included banking companies. He contended that u nder the Evacuee Property Laws, a cut off date of 1 st January 1957 was fixed and beyond the said date no property could be declared as an Evacuee Property, while ETPB was relying upon a Gazette Notification dated 9 th August 1963, that too invites public ob jections. He contended that ETPB has failed to produce the notification whereby KCA was declared an Evacuee Trust Property. He contended that the actions of ETPB and FIA were without any legal justification thus liable to be set aside. He argued that FIA has acted with malice as ETPMD Act, 1975 did not fall under FIA
schedule, therefore, FIR under FIA Act cannot be registered. He argued that FIA intended to occupy the building for establishment of its own office which established mala fides and ulterior mot ives and stes at naught all the actions taken by FIA. He contended that KCA was a hub of cotton business in country and abroad and by sealing the Cotton Exchange Building FIA & ETPB have caused loss of billions of Rupees to national exchequer. He contended that bias, malice and ulterior motives of the Respondents were evident from their actions. He placed reliance upon the case of All Pakistan Newspapers Society and others V. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2012 SC 1), Asif Ali Zardari and another V. The State (PLD 2001 SC 568), Suo Moto Case No 04 of 2010 (PLD 2012 SC 553), The University of Dacca through its Vice Chancellor and the Registrar University of Dacca V. Zakir Ahmed (PLD 1965 SC 90), Pakistan Muslim League (N) through Khawaja Muhammad Asif MNA and others V. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior and others (PLD 2007 SC 642), District and Sessions Judge (Authority) Jhang and others V. Ghulam Shabbir (2026 SCMR 357), Ch. Muhammad Ashraf Gujjar and others V. Malik Riaz H ussain and others (2013 SCMR 161), Sh. Riaz ul Haq and another V. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and others (PLD 2013 SC 501), Central Government through Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board and others V. Member (Judicial - IV) Board of Reve nue Punjab, Lahore and others (PLD 2026 FCC 19), Sardar Balbir Singh Jaggi V. The Evacuee Trust Properties Board and 3 others (1995 CLC 941), Adamjee Insurance Company Limited V. Assistant Director Economic Enquiry Wing (1989 P.Cr.L.J 1921), Zafar Iqbal an d 3 others V. Ghulam Abid and 2 others (1995 MLD 1285), Adamjee Insurance Company Limited through Attorney Syed Ziauddin Ahmed (2004 CLD 246), Hamza Khalid V. The State and another (2024 PCrLJ 422) and Mst Azra Sultana V. Ghulam Asghar Jatoi and others (2 011 PCrLJ 434). He lastly prayed to allow this petition, set aside the impugned notices and quash the FIR.
5. Mr Arshad Tayyabali Learned Counsel for the Petitioners in CPD No 214 of 2026 and other CPs contended that Petitioners are lawful tenants of KCA and have remained in continuous and peaceful possession of offices in Cotton Exchange Building. He contended that impugned sealing and ejectment actions were taken by referring to an order dated 31.03.2021 passed by Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan in S.M. C No
01 of 2014 but Cotton Exchange Building was not mentioned in the said order. He contended that no property can be declared an evacuee property beyond the cut off date of 01.01.1957 in terms of section 3 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Proper ty Act, 1957. He further contended that proceedings to declare KCA as an evacuee trust property were initiated in year 1963 that were legally impermissible. He contended that property is owned by KMC and ETPB has never challenged such lease. He contended that impugned action was taken after about 63 years of notification issued by ETPB and 5 years after the judgment of Honorable Supreme Court as such was barred by limitation. He contended that after the passage of 18th amendment concurrent list did not exist and Evacuee Property was not listed in Federal List, therefore, ETPB and FIA had lacked jurisdiction to interfere in the instant matter. He contended that Cotton Exchange Building was a landmark heritage and hub of cotton trade nearly for a century, the refore, impugned actions offended the fundamental rights of Petitioners guaranteed under articles 4, 9, 10-A, 18 and 24 of the Constitution. He placed reliance upon the case of Mst. Rehmat Bibi and others V. Punnu Khan and others (1986 SCMR 962), Premier C loth Mills Ltd. Lyallpur V. The Sales Tax Officer Investigation Circle II, Lahore and another (1972 SCMR 257), Dr Mrs. Nasim Qureshi V. Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, Karachi and another (1987 CLC 213), Muhammad Akram V. Mst. Zainab Bibi (2007 SCMR 1086), Regional Police Officer Dera Ghazi Khan Region and others V. Riaz Hussain Bukhari (2024 SCMR 1021), Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue Corporate Tax Office -FBR through Assistant Commissioner V. Federal Secretary / Revisional Authority Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony Islamabad and others (2025 CLC 1875), Evacuee Trust Property Board Government of Pakistan through Assistant Administrator V. Wahabuddin and others (2024 YLR 657), Mirza Muhammad Sharif and 2 others V. Mst. Nawab bibi and 4 others (1993 SCMR 462) and Messrs Mega Steel Mills Private Limited V. Government of Punjab through Secretary Environmental Protection Department, Punjab, Lahore and 6 others (2016 CLC 1095). He lastly prayed to allow this petition.
6. Mr. Jawwad Dero, Learned Advocate General Sindh supported the stance of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and other petitioners and contended that the land of Cotton Exchange Building Karachi was
undisputedly owned by KMC. He contended that Cotton Exchange Building at the time of partition in 1947 was neither left abandoned or vacant by its lawful owners therefore cannot be declared as an Evacuee Property. He contended that in terms of sections 3 and 8 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management & Disposal) Act , 1975, KCA was never declared evacuee trust property prior to a cut off date of 1 st January 1957. He contended that under the constitutional command there were three lists under the Constitution of 1956 viz. Federal Legislative List (FLL), Concurrent Legi slative List (CLL) and Provincial Legislative List (PLL) and evacuee property was part of FLL at entry No 10. He further contended that 1973 Constitution contained two lists FLL and CLL and evacuee property was entered at entry No 36 of CLL, upon passage of 18th amendment CLL stood abolished therefore Evacuee Property became a provincial subject. He contended that Provincial Assembly of Sindh has enacted The Sindh Evacuee Trust Properties (Management & Disposal) Act 2021 and Sindh ETPB has been establishe d to look after the evacuee trust properties. He contended that notification dated 09.08.1963 was flawed and cannot be relied upon as the same only invited public objections and did not declare KCA as Evacuee Trust Property. He prayed to allow the petition s.
7. Ms. Shazia Hanjrah Learned Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan assisted by Learned Counsel for ETPB and FIA contended that Petitions are not maintainable as they seek adjudication of a factual controversy which cannot be undertaken under writ jurisdic tion of this Court. She contended that KCA relied upon a title document leased by KMC which is under inquiry and the initial probe has unearthed that the said lease deed is forged document, and result of fraud. She contended that fraud vitiates all the sol emn acts. She contended that KCA had filed CPD No 6048 of 2025 on the same subject matter, which was latter withdrawn without any permission to file fresh, therefore, second petition on behalf of KCA was not maintainable. She contended that Gazette Notific ation dated 9 th August 1963 has been challenged after almost six decades time and no explanation to such delayed litigation has been furnished. She contended that prior to partition KCA had 318 members of whom 306 were Hindus and they migrated from Pakista n post partition developments, therefore KCA collapsed. She further contended that KCA was an evacuee as contemplated under section 2(b) of the Pakistan (Protection of Evacuee
Property) Ordinance 1948. She contended that post 18 th amendment in the constitution the status of ETPB has remained unchanged as the Honorable Supreme Court in SMC No 01 of 2014 has assigned the task of recovery of evacuee trust properties to ETPB and has directed FIA for its assistance. She contended that post partition KCA collaps ed and for many years its elections were not held and present KCA was a new body. She further contended that since very lease documents of property were found forged therefore FIA recorded FIR. She rebutted vehemently the allegations of mala fides against FIA and contended that FIA was directed by Honorable Supreme Court to assist ETPB and FIA had got no personal interest in the property. She placed reliance upon the case of Karachi Panjrapur Association reported as PLD 1957 SC 83. she prayed to dismiss the petition.
8. Heard arguments of the parties at length and perused the material made available before us on record.
9. Firstly, we will take up the issue of maintainability of the Petitions. Learned Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan and Counsels for ETPB and FIA have argued that petition suffered from laches as the notification dating back to year 1963 is under challeng e, petition involved factual controversy and jurisdiction of this Court to entertain petition against ETPB was barred under section 14 of the ETPMD Act and alternate remedy before ETP Board was available, therefore writ under article 199 of the Constitution cannot be maintained.
10. As regards laches, suffice it to say, that the KCA and other Petitioners have challenged three different actions by the Respondents that include impugned notification dated 09.08.1963, eviction notice dated 12.12.2025 and sealing order dated 02.01.2026. It is an undisputed fact that KCA is in possession of the CEB and using it as Cotton Exchange for trade and business of Cotton in Pakistan and abroad. Prima facie a public notice was given for information to all interested parties through Gazette notification dated 9 th August, 1963 but no material has been placed on record to say that pursuant to said public notice an order under any of the Evacuee Laws was passed to declare KCA as an evacuee trust. The Petitioners got knowledge of impugned action when notices dated 12.12.2025 for eviction and sealing order dated 02.01.2026 were issued.
Laches per se were not in any way an absolute bar to non-suit party, in the present cases doctrine of laches would not be applicable as all along si x decades KCA remained in possession of property and acted independently and was never ever taken over by the Custodian appointed under any of the Evacuee law, coupled with the subsequent actions taken in December 2025 and January 2026, it can be safely he ld that Petition did not suffer from laches and was filed within time.
11. Second objection that the jurisdiction of civil Court has been ousted under section 14 of the ETPMD Ac t and for adjudication of the matters concerning the disposal and management of E vacuee Trust Properties an officer was appointed under the Act.. To resolve a dispute arising regarding the status of any property as Evacuee Trust Property, the Chairman ETPB has been conferred exclusive jurisdiction under section 14 of the ETPMD Act, whi ch reads as under: 14. Bar of jurisdiction. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Federal Government or an officer appointed under this Act is empowered under this Act to determine, and no injunction, process or order shall be granted or issued by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act
12. Careful examination of record revealed that no material was made available before the Court to evin ce that KCA was made part of the Trust Pool under any of the Evacuee Law in force prior to the promulgation of ETPMD, Act. The Respondents have not placed on record any material to elicit that any proceedings were conducted to declare KCA as trust property or KCA & Cotton Exchange Building was kept under Trust Pool. Contrary, the Petitioners have placed on record registered lease deed of year 1933 to demonstrate that property was purchased by KCA. In the given circumstances, it was incumbent upon the ETPB to first decide the question as to whether the property subject matter of the present petition was evacuee trust property or not. L earned Counsel for the Respondents No 1 & 2 when confronted, frankly conceded to the fact that no proceedings under section 8 of the ETPMD, Act ever took place after
issuance of Gazette Notification dated 09.08.1963 or if any proceedings had taken place the same were not in their knowledge.
13. Counsel for ETPB and FIA have also attacked upon the jurisdiction of this Court to ente rtain the petition on the ground that the same involved factual controversy as to the title in property. The Writ jurisdiction of this Court is an extraordinary remedy and cannot be invoked as panacea for all grievances, particularly when an equally efficacious, alternative, and adequate statutory remedy existed. The doctrine of exception of remedies operates as jurisdictional bar precluding litigant from resorting to Constitutional remedies under Article -199 of the Constitution without first availing remed y under a statutory mechanism expressly provided by the law. The underlying rational of this doctrine is to prevent litigants from circumventing established statutory frameworks thereby ensuring that the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court is not diluted into an ordinary appellate forum. The theory of an alternative remedy under Article -199 of the Constitution hinges upon two core considerations viz -a-viz substantive sufficiency and comparative efficacy. A remedy cannot be deemed adequate if i t fails to provide relief matching the nature and extent of the grievance. The doctrine of exception in constitutional intervention remains permissible in two scenarios, firstly; for the structural absence or substantive nullity of alternative remedies and secondly; the extraordinary circumstances where normally adequate remedies prove insufficient due to case specific factors. The exception doctrine operates as narrowly tailored, requiring compelling justification to prevent abuse while ensuring access to justice when statutory channel fundamentally fails. Where the statutory procedure of obtaining relief proves unduly cumbersome, or where the attendant delay and expense would either render the alternative remedy in-efficacious or defeat its very purpose th en exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article -199 of the Constitution can be invoked. Since the Respondent ETP denied the ownership right of Petitioners on the ground that it was an evacuee trust property without its determination as required und er the law, the same might result in dispossession of the Petitioners, thus no adequate remedy would be available to the Petitioners to challenge the actions which posed potential threat to their rights and interests. The Petitioners had no other forum to challenge the sealing of CEB, FIR and eviction notices, hence, the proper forum available with the petitioners was to invoke the writ
jurisdiction of this Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Dr. Sher Afgan Niazi v. Ali Habib reporte d as 2011 SCMR 1813 has laid down similar principles enumerated herein above to invoke writ jurisdiction of this Court and has held that If there is such other remedy, but there is something so special in the circumstances of a given case that the other re medy which generally adequate, to the relief required for that category of grievance, is not adequate to the relief that is essential in the very special category to which that case belongs, the Court should give the required relief under Article 199. If the procedure for obtaining the relief by some other proceedings is too cumbersome or the relief cannot be obtained without delay and expense, or the delay would make the grant of the relief meaningless the High court should not hesitate to issue a writ if the party applying for it is found entitled to it, simply because the party could have chosen another course to obtain the relief which is due…
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