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Official Citation: 2026 LHC 4955
Court / Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court
Parties: MUHAMMAD MEHBOOB vs ADJ ETC.
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court, officially reported as 2026 LHC 4955. In this matter between MUHAMMAD MEHBOOB and ADJ ETC., the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Ahmad Nadeem Arshad) DECISION DATE: 06-08-2026 CASE DETAILS: Writ Petition-Civil Proceedings-Rent 4596-26 ============================================================ Form No: HCJD/C-121
ORDER SHEET
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, BAHAWALPUR BENCH, BAHAWALPUR.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Writ Petition No.4596/2026/BWP
Muhammad Mehboob
Versus
Additional District Judge, etc.
S. No. of order/ Proceeding Date of order/ Proceeding Order with signature of Judge, and that of parties or counsel, where necessary
06.08.2026 Mr. Nadeem Akram Wahla, Advocate for the petitioner.
Through this Constitutional Petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has called in question the legality and propriety of the order dated 02.10.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge Rent/learned Rent Controller, whereby an application filed by respondent No.3 under Section 12(2), C.P.C. was allowed, the ex -parte ejectment order along with memo of costs dated 31.01.2024 was set aside and the ejectment petition was restored to its original position with a direction to the applicants therein to file an amended ejectment petition by incorporating the name of respondent No.3 in the memo of parties. The petitioner has also assailed the judgment dated 18.05.2026 passed by the learned Revisional Court, whereby the revision petition filed by the petitioner and respondent No.4 was dismissed. 2. The impugned orders have been assailed, inter alia , on the grounds that the learned Courts below misread , non-read the record and failed to appreciate the material available on record, exercised jurisdiction not vested in them, and committed material irregularity in allowing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. in proceedings governed by the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. It has further been contended that the ejectment order dated 31.01.2024 had already attained finality and had Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -2-
been executed through delivery of possession, and, therefore, the learned Rent Controller had no lawful authority to recall the same. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at the preliminary stage and have carefully examined the available record with his able assistance. 4. At the outset, it may be observed that the controversy is required to be examined in the backdrop of the limited scope of Constitutional jurisdiction as well as the nature and extent of the jurisdiction exercised by a Rent Controller while dealing with an allegation that an order of ejectment has been procured through fraud, misrepresentation and concealment of material facts. 5. The record shows that the petitioner along with respondents No.4 and 5 instituted the ejectment petition against respondent No.6 and procured a final eviction order dated 31.01.2024. However, said order was assailed by respondent No.3 through moving an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. , which was allowed on 02.10.2025 and resultantly order dated 31.01.2024 was set -aside. The order dated 02.10.2025 was challenged by the petitioner and respondent No.4 through a revision petition, dismissed on 18.05.2026 , whereas respondent No.5 did not challenge the same. Respondent No.4 has also not joined the present proceedings. Consequently, the impugned orders have attained finality to the extent of respondents No.4 and 5 . The controversy before this Court, therefore, survives only at the instance of the petitioner. 6. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner along with respondents No.4 and 5 (hereinafter referred to as the applicants) filed an ejectment petition on 31.07.2023 against respondent No.6 in respect of a property situated at Mohallah Banigran, Mouza Bahawalpur, measur ing 18 marlas. The case set -up in the ejectment petition was that respondent No.6 had obtained possession of the premises as a tenant pursuant to a tenancy/lease agreement dated 02.02.2022 at a monthly rent of Rs.5,000/- for a period of one year and had subsequently failed to pay rent and hand over possession despite demand and notice. The applicants claimed ownership over the property in different shares. According to them, the Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -3-
petitioner and respondent No.4 were owners of 5 marlas each, whereas the remaining portion was claimed by respondent No.5 and her husband. Despite service, publication and opportunities, respondent No.6 did not appear before the learned Rent Controller was proceeded against ex-parte on 07.10.2023. The petitioner and the applicants produced their evidence, including respondent No.4 as AW -1, his affidavit as Exh.A -1, Ghulam Nabi and Muhammad Mushtaq as attesting witnesses of rent agreement as AW-2 and AW-3 along with their affidavits as Exh.A -4 and Exh.A-5, the tenancy agreement as Exh.A-2 and copy of the record of rights for the year 2019 -20 as Exh.A -3. On the basis of the ex -parte evidence, the learned Rent Controller allowed the ejectment petition and passed the final eviction order along with memo of costs dated 31.01.2024. In execution of the said order, possession of the disputed premises was delivered to the applicants. 7. The controversy, however, did not end with the delivery of possession. Respondent No.3 thereafter approached the learned Rent Controller through an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., asserting that the ejectment order had been procured by misdescription and concealment of the identity and ownership of the property. He maintained that the premises from which possession had been obtained did not belong to the applicants but formed part of property owned by him and situated in Khata Nos.36/32 and 38/34. He relied upon registered sale deed No.780 dated 19.03.1986 and asserted that the question of his title had already been adjudicated in his favour up to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The applicants contested the application and maintained that the disputed premises belonged to them and that possession had lawfully been delivered in execution of the ejectment order. Respondent No.6, who had remained absent throughout the original ejectment proceedings, also appeared at that stage and submitted a written reply supporting the applicants. 8. During the proceedings, it became apparent that the real controversy between the parties was not merely one of tenancy but concerned the identity and demarcation of the property in respect Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -4-
whereof the ejectment order had been obtained and executed. The parties, therefore, expressed consensus that the question of demarcation be determined through a Local Commission. Consequently, vide order dated 02.10.2024, the learned Rent Controller appointed the Tehsildar, Saddar, Bahawalpur, as Local Commission with directions to demarcate the disputed property and submit his report. The Local Commission conducted demarcation proceedings in the presence of the parties. The parties agreed to have the property identified through Global Positioning System (GPS). Muhammad Waseem son of Sanaullah, an expert in GPS technology, carried out the demarcation in the presence of the parties and prepared a site plan. The relevant portion of the said report is as under:- "فریقین کا موقف سماعت کیا گیا۔ اور ہر دو فریقین کی طرف سے پیش کردہ ررڈ ملاحظہ کیا گیا۔ بعد ہذا ملاحظہ ریکارڈ و سماعت موقف یہ یقین کیا جانا ضروری پایا گیا کہ پلاٹ متدعویہ کس نمبر خسرہ میں واقع ہےاس پر ہر دو فریقین نے حسب رضامندی طے کیا کہ GPSمشین کے ذریعے پیمائش کرائی جائے۔ حسب رضامندی فریقین محمد وسیم ولد ثناء اللہ GPS مشین(Global Positioning System) کے ماہر کو بلایا گیا۔ نے بذریعہ GPSمشین بموجود موقع مرتب کیا ۔ جس پر عیاں ہ ُوا کہ پلاٹ متدعویہ برقبہ 13.4 M) نمبر مستطیل144/4 کی لہ 21 میں واقع ہے (نقشہ مرتبہ لف ہذا پر مدعی فریدالدین کے زیر قبضہ پلاٹ و مکان کی پیمائش بذریعہ فیتہ کرائی گئی۔ اور نقشہ موقع مرتب کیا گیا جو کہ لف ہذا ہے۔ " According to the report, the property actually found on the spot measured approximately 13.4 marlas and was situated in Rectangle No.144/4, Killa No.21. The report thus materially differed from the description and extent of the property given in the ejectment proceedings. The Local Commission further recorded that the land so identified was not comprised in the ownership of the applicants in the manner asserted by them. The report also referred to the relevant revenue record and concluded that although the identified land did not stand recorded in the name of respondent No.3 in the manner alleged by him, the same was traceable to the ownership of his mother, Mst. Manzoor Masood, and had subsequently come into the possession of respondent No.3 through Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -5-
private partition and before delivery of possession to the applicants through warrant of possession it was in the possession of respondent No.3. The Local Commission supported its conclusions through revenue material, site plan and the result of the physical demarcation. The relevant part of the said conclusion is as under:- "(1) پلاٹ متدعویہ منتقل شدہ بروے ورانٹ قبضہ بحق مدعا علہ م 13.4 M مدعی فریدا اراضی میں شامل نہ ہے۔ البتہ مدعی کی والدہ مسماۃ منظور مسعود وغیرہ کی ملکیتی اراضی میں موجود ہے۔ جبکہ منتقلی بذریعہ ورانٹ قبضہ سے قبل یہ متدعویہ ٹکڑا اراضی برقبہ 13.4 M بطور تقسیم خانگی مدعی فریدا مقبوضہ تھا۔ (2) مدعی کے زیر قبضہ اراضی بصورت پلاٹ تعمیرات اور خالی پلاٹ4K-14Mہے۔ جبکہ مدعی اپنا ، اپنی والدہ، خالہ ، خالو سمیت کل رقبہ تعدادی 7K-16Mکا استحقاق رکھتا ہے۔ ا ہے۔
کے لف ھذ 3)مدعا علہ م 36میں رقبہ تعدادی 10M)کے مالکان اراضی ہیں۔ اور مدعاعلہ م کی یہ ارا مستطیل نمبر 125/13کی لہ 6(ذ2M)و145/1کی لہ 1 قبہبر2K-10M، و کی لہ نمبر 10 قبہبر1K-8Mمیں واقع ہے۔ مدعاعلہ م نے قبضہ موقع خلاف ریکارڈ 39 نمبر مستطیل میں 144/4کی لہ 21 قبہبر من4K-7Mمیں سے حاصل کیا ہے۔حا صل کردہ قبضہ والے کھاتہ 39 میں مدعا علہ م مالکان اراضی نہ ہیں۔ " Thus, the report was not a mere opinion on a disputed question of law; rather, it furnished objective material concerning the identity, location, measurement and revenue particulars of the premises from which possession had been obtained through execution of the ejectment order. 9. The applicants submitted objections to the report of the Local Commission on 03.06.2025. The learned Rent Controller considered the objections and rejected them vide order dated 11.09.2025. Significantly, the said order was not independently assailed before the competent forum and, therefore, the findings recorded therein attained Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -6-
finality. The consequence is that the report of the Local Commission, having been accepted after consideration of the objections of the parties, constituted an important piece of the record while determining the application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. 10. The learned Rent Controller, after examining the entire matter, allowed the application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., set aside the ejectment order dated 31.01.2024 and restored the ejectment proceedings with a direction to the applicants to amend the ejectment petition by bringing the necessary party on record. The revisional Court, upon reappraisal of the material, maintained the order of the learned Rent Controller. 11. The petitioner has primarily questioned the maintainability of the application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. on the ground that the ejectment proceedings were governed by the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (the “Act”) and that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, stood excluded by virtue of Section 34 thereof. The objection, however, is misconceived. 12. Section 26 of the Act confers certain powers of a Civil Court upon the Rent Controller, whereas Section 31 provides that an order passed under the Act shall be executed as a decree of a Civil Court and, for that purpose, the Rent Controller may exercise any or all of the powers of a Civil Court. Section 34, no doubt, excludes the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to proceedings under the Act, except to the extent otherwise expressly provided. These provisions, however, are required to be read harmoniously and not in isolation. The expression “any or all of the powers of a Civil Court” employed in Section 31 is of considerable significance and cannot be rendered redundant. 13. The question, therefore, is not whether the provisions of Section 12(2), C.P.C. are attracted to rent proceedings by their own force, but whether the Rent Controller possesses the jurisdiction to recall an order which is alleged to have been obtained from it through fraud, Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -7-
misrepresentation or concealment of material facts. The answer to this question is in the affirmative. 14. The foundational principle in this regard was recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others” (PLD 1975 SC 331), wherein it was held that judicial or quasi -judicial authorities possess inherent power to recall an order obtained by fraud. The principle is rooted in the maxim that fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings and that no person can be permitted to retain an advantage obtained by practising fraud upon a Court or Tribunal. The Supreme Court further recognized that, in this respect, no distinction can ordinarily be drawn between a Court of general jurisdiction and a Tribunal exercising limited jurisdiction, because the effect of fraud upon the judicial process remains the same. 15. The same principle was subsequently considered in “Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another ” (1992 SCMR 1908). While examining an analogous rent -law framework, the Hon ’ble Supreme Court held that, even where the provisions of the C.P.C. are not applicable to rent proceedings by their own force, the Rent Controller, being a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, may invoke the general principles embodied in Section 12(2), C.P.C. to recall an order obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The Court emphasized that Section 12(2), C.P.C. is itself a recognition of the broader and well -settled principle that every Court or Tribunal has jurisdiction to rescind or recall a void order obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. It was held as under:- “Whether an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. would be competent under the provisions of the Ordinance is a matter which does not present much difficulty even if the provisions of C.P.C. are not applicable by their own force. As expressed by me in Civil Appeal No.29 -K of 1987, Ismail v Subedar Gul Inayat Shah, the Rent Controller, as a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction is, on the general principles recognized in our jurisprudence, competent to recall or review an order obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. In that case this aspect of the matter was expressed by me in the following words: Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -8-
"There cannot be any doubt that section 12(2), C.P.C. is in recognition of the well -settled principle that every Court or Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to rescind or recall a void order passed by itself. In the Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331, it was held that the preponderance of judicial authority supports the proposition that every authority, Tribunal or Court has power to even suo motu recall or review an order obtained from it by fraud, on the general principles that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings, and no party should be allowed to take advantage of his own fraud. On this principles in that case the Court held that there can be no distinction between the powers available in this behalf to a Court of general jurisdiction and a Court or Tribunal of a special or limited jurisdiction, for in either case the effect of fraud is the same and the duty to undo that effect must lie on the authority on which fraud is practised. Therefore, on the rule that the equitable principles of C.P.C. can be invoked by the Rent Controller and that fraud vitiates the proceedings of a Court or a Tribunal, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the Rent Controller under the Rented Premises Ordinance has the power to set aside any orde r which has been secured by practising fraud or misrepresentation upon him."
16. The statutory position under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 was subsequently examined by th is Court in “Ghulam Ali v. Rana Babar Khan and 3 others ” (PLD 2023 Lahore 507 ). This Court specifically considered the interplay between Sections 26, 31 and 34 of the Act and held that the exclusion contained in Section 34 does not preclude the Rent Tribunal from entertaining an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. where an order passed under the Act is challenged on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation. Th is Court, relying upon the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that where the Rent Tribunal can invoke the provisions of the C.P.C. in the execution of its order under Section 31 of the Act, an aggrieved person can challenge an order obtained through fraud by invoking Section 12(2), C.P.C., and the exclusion contained in Sections 26 and 34 does not operate as an absolute bar. The exact wording is as under:- Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -9-
“In view of the above it is held that since the Rent Tribunal in view of section 31 of the Act can exercise/invoke the provisions of C.P.C. and exercise the jurisdiction accordingly, thus, where a person is aggrieved of an order passed by a Tribunal under the Act on the basis of fraud he can challenge the same through an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. and ouster as contained in sections 26 and 34 of the Act will not apply.”
The above authorities, read chronologically, demonstrate a consistent legal principle: fraud or material misrepresentation cannot be permitted to sanctify an otherwise vulnerable judicial order; the power to undo such an order is inherent in the judicial function; and, in the context of rent proceedings, the statutory exclusion of the C.P.C. does not prevent the Rent Tribunal from exercising such jurisdiction where the challenge is genuinely directed against an order allegedly procured through fraud, misrepresentation or concealment. 17. Thus, the principle that fraud vitiates judicial proceedings does not depend upon the technical applicability of Section 12(2), C.P.C. in a particular statutory proceeding. Where an order is alleged to have been procured by practising fraud upon the forum itself, the authority which passed the order cannot be rendered powerless merely because it is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. 18. The principle was also applied by th is Court in “Allah Ditta and another v. Bashir Ahmed alias Faqiria ” (PLD 1995 Lahore 76 ), wherein the exceptional circumstances in which, after allowing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., the Court may decline to remand the matter for a fresh trial were recognized. Thereafter, in “Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq v. Elahi Bakhsh and 2 others ” (2006 SCMR 12 ), the Hon ’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the normal consequence of allowing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. is restoration or remand of the matter for decision on merits. At the same time, the Court recognized that, in exceptional circumstances, where the material brought on record during the proceedings under Section 12(2) demonstrates that no useful purpose would be served by remanding the matter, the Court may adopt an Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -10-
appropriate course instead of ordering a de novo trial. The observation made therein is as under:- “This is correct that in the normal circumstances if a decree is set aside under section 12(2), C.P.C.. the case is remanded to the trial Court for decision of the suit on merits in accordance with law brought on record by the parties in the proceedings under section 12(2), but in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidence brought on record by the parties in the proceedings under section 12(2), C.P.C., no useful purpose would be served in remanding the case to the trial Court.”
The Supreme Court revisited this exceptional principle in “Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman” (2015 SCMR 1708), observing that dismissal of the original proceedings while allowing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. is permissible only in rare and special circumstances. Thus, the ordinary rule remains restoration for adjudication on merits, whereas departure from that rule requires circumstances of an exceptional nature. The relevant portion is as under:-
“This is an acknowledgment that only in very rare and special circumstnaces can the suit also be dismissed by the court while it accepts an application under section 12(2) ibid. This exception was resorted to in the judgment of the Lahore High Court report as Allah Ditta and another v. Bashir Ahmed alias Faqiria (PLD 1995 Lah. 76).”
19. It is, however, equally important to maintain a distinction between an ordinary challenge to the correctness of an ejectment order and a challenge founded upon fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction. Section 12(2), C.P.C. cannot be employed as a substitute for an appeal or revision, nor can a party circumvent the ordinary statutory remedies by merely attaching the label of “fraud” to a challenge on the merits. The jurisdiction under Section 12(2), C.P.C. is attracted where the validity of the judgment, decree or order is assailed on the specific grounds contemplated by the provision. Conversely, where a person who claims an independent interest in the very premises in respect of which an order of ejectment has been obtained asserts that the order was procured by concealing the true identity of the property, misrepresenting its Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -11-
ownership or materially misstating the premises before the Court, the matter assumes a different character. In such circumstances, the Court or Tribunal cannot remain powerless merely because the impugned order has subsequently been executed. 20. The principle that fraud vitiates judicial proceedings is concerned with the integrity of the judicial process itself. No party can be permitted to retain the benefit of an order obtained by practising fraud upon the Court or by suppressing facts which go to the root of the adjudication. 21. Tested on the above principles, the present case cannot be characterized as a mere dispute regarding the ownership of the premises. The ejectment petition was instituted in respect of property described as measuring 18 marlas . The tenancy document relied upon by the applicants did not contain a sufficiently precise description enabling the premises to be conclusively identified. The lease agreement dated 02.02.2022 was admittedly executed on plain paper. 22. More significantly, the record of rights produced as Exh.A-3 did not, on its face, substantiate the entire ownership claim advanced by the applicants. It was asserted that the petitioner and respondent No.4 were owners of 5 marlas each, whereas the remaining portion was claimed by respondent No.5 and her husband. However, the documentary material produced before the learned Rent Controller did not satisfactorily establish the alleged ownership of respondent No.5 and her husband over the remaining portion. 23. The discrepancy, therefore, was not confined to the quantum of ownership. It extended to the very identity and location of the premises which were subjected to the process of the Rent Controller. 24. This aspect acquired decisive significance from the report of the Local Commission. The Local Commission was appointed with the consent of the parties vide order dated 02.10.2024 to determine the actual location and demarcation of the disputed premises. With the concurrence of the parties, the property was identified through GPS technology and a site plan was prepared. Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -12-
25. The report found that the property actually existing at the spot measured approximately 13.4 marlas and was situated in Rectangle No.144/4, Killa No.21. The Commission further found, on the basis of the revenue record and physical demarcation, that the property delivered through the warrant of possession did not fall within the ownership of the applicants in the manner asserted by them. It further…
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