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Official Citation: 2025 IHC 210575
Court / Jurisdiction: Islamabad High Court
Parties: Muhammad Shahzad vs Government of Pakistan and others
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Islamabad High Court, officially reported as 2025 IHC 210575. In this matter between Muhammad Shahzad and Government of Pakistan and others, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Islamabad High Court (Honourable Mr. Justice Babar Sattar) AUTHOR JUDGE: Honourable Mr. Justice Babar Sattar DECISION DATE: 20-MAR-2025 CASE NO: Intra Court Appeal-408-2023 CITATION: 2025 IHC 210575 PARTIES: Muhammad Shahzad VS Government of Pakistan and others LAW / SECTION: - SUBJECT: Writ, REMARKS: ICA in W.P. 1314/2023 Misc. Other (SB), [ Muhammad Shahzad -VS-GOP etc. ], [The petitioner is in Dubai; He seeks the removal of his name from the blacklist for purpose of renewing his license. ] ============================================================ 1 Intra Court Appeal No. 408/2023 Muhammad Shahzad Versus Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and others I N D E X
1. Opinion of Hon'ble Justice Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, J. Page 2 to 09 2. Opinion of Hon'ble Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, J. Page 10 to 16 3. Opinion of Referee Judge Page 17 to 47 (Hon ble Justice Babar Sattar J.) 1 JUDGMENT SHEET IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
I.C.A. no. 408 of 2023 Muhammad Shahzad versus Government of Pakistan and others
Appellant by: Mr. Ali Nawaz Kharal, Advocate Respondents by: Malik Shoukat Nawaz Awan, AAG Date of Hearing: 17.01.2024
Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan, J: This intra -court appeal is from the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Chambers dismissing the appellant‟s writ petition for a direction to the respondents, the Ministry of Interior and the Directorate of Immigration and Passports , to renew his passport. The Federal Investigation Agency was also added as a respondent at a later stage when the comments of the first two respondents were filed disclosing the existence of FIRs by the FIA against the petitioner, which were stated as the cause for placing his passport on the passport control list. 2 By way of brief background, the petitioner , ordinarily resident in UAE, holds a UAE Resident ID and owns a company in the UAE which, the petitio n claimed, employ s 200 plus workers. When the petitioner turned up at the Pakistan Embassy in early 202 3 for renewal of his Pakistani passport, he was unable to do so, and on repeat inquiries was informed that his passport was placed on a control list. N o written notice or order was ever served on him stating the reasons for placing his name on the passport control list. The memo of writ petition averred that the petitioner risked losing his UAE residency and the company‟s license and, resultantly, his b usiness that he set up in the UAE if his passport was not renewed. 3 The judgment under appeal concluded with detailed reasoning and citation of case law that the act of the respondents in placing the petitioner‟s passport on the control list was illegal. That part of the judgment was never appealed from by the respondents and it has therefore attained finality. 2
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4 The appeal is from the latter part of the impugned judgment where, despite finding the act of the respondents as patently illegal, the learne d Judge in Chambers declined to extend the relief sought by holding that the writ jurisdiction was discretionary that could not be exercised in favour of the petitioner for he was a proclaimed offender in 11 FIRs registered against him under the Emigration Ordinance, 1979, for an unlawful attempt to enable the complainants to emigrate from Pakistan in violation of sections 17 and 22 of the Emigration Ordinance. The first sentence of paragraph 27 of the judgment under appeal says it all: To summarize the above discussion, if it was a case of mere pendency of criminal cases, the Petitioner would have a good case for seeking removal of his name from the PCL and direction to the Respondents to renew his passport. 5 The judgment under appeal cited Mohammad Has eeb Fatani vs Federation of Pakistan 1 as the authority for the principle that abscondence of a person disentitled him to ask for any2 relief that was discretionary. Haseeb Fatani was a case of removal of the petitioner‟s name, while still in Pakistan, from the Exit Control List, which is an important distinguishing feature from the matrix of facts under consideration in this appeal as will become clear later in this judgment. 6 Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the discretionary relief has been improperly withheld in the specific circumstances of this case. He submitted that his client had no knowledge of the FIRs in which he was declared a proclaimed offender, and he had the knowledge of only those FIRs in which he duly appeared in 2022 while visiting Pakistan and, based on his confessional statement and the complainant resiling from his complaint, was awarded only a token sentence until the rising of the court wi th fines of Rs 15,000/- and 25,000/- which he paid. 7 Learned counsel‟s submission remains that his client had no knowledge of the other FIRs cited in the respondents‟ reply in the writ petition at all material times before their disclosure in the reply . Learned counsel takes issue with the wording of paragraph 28 of the impugned judgment observing that the
1 2021 CLC 1222 2 Not emphasised in the judgment, but emphasised here due to reasons that will become apparent later in this judgment. 3
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petitioner did not deny prior knowledge of the FIRs, and submits that the respondents had not placed any order of proclamation nor any summonses or notices on record to demonstrate service on the petitioner qua accused nor of publication of the notice of proclamation. This is a correct submission, and we should like to think that, in order to demonstrate that the abscondence was willful and not accide ntal as claimed by the petitioner, the respondents were under a duty to place the relevant orders and notices along with proof of service if the ground of willful abscondence as the basis for opposing the discretionary relief was raised. We say, with much respect, that the impugned judgment proceeds solely on the basis of the petitioner being a proclaimed offender without adverting to his plea with reference to the record that the proclamation was carried out behind his back without proper notice , and dism issed the petition applying the principle, in its broadest formulation, that a fugitive was not entitled to apply for discretionary relief. 8 Tracing the lineage of th is principle leads to the earliest decision in our jurisdiction appearing to be Chan Shah vs The Crown.3 The appellant before the Supreme Court was already convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Lahore High Court , and the principle was applied to a convict seeking to file an appeal. No reason was placed before the Supreme Court in Chan Shah for the convict ‟s absence from the Supreme Court . This was not a case of a mere accused or a proclaimed offender. 9 The next case is Gul Hassan and another vs The State,4 which was also a case of a convict decamping from police custody while in transit to district jail after his conviction by the court but , before absconding, executing a power of attorney in favor of a person for the purposes of filing the appeal . This too was a case of purposeful and deliberate escape from law after conviction and it was in this context that the Supreme Court observed that a decamping prisoner forfeited his right of audience. Again, the law report does not indicate that any reason was proffered to the court for the prisoner‟s absence. Again, this was not a case of a mere proclaimed offender who was not a convict.
3 PLD 1956 Federal Court 43 4 PLD 1969 SC 89 4
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10 Then comes Hayat Bakhsh and others vs The State,5 which was also a case of an absconding convict. 11 The application of the principle under consideration in a case other than a criminal appeal is found in Haseeb Fatani (supra), that led to the dismissal of a writ petition filed by an accused for removal of his name from the Exit Control List. As noted above, the judgment under appeal relies on that judgment. The petitioner therein was a proclaimed offender with decrees already passed against him by the Banking Courts in loan default cases and with evidence on record that the petitioner therein had fled to Canada to evade the satisfaction of the decrees, leading to the State Bank recommending placing his name on the ECL. The petitioner visited Pakistan and, on finding that his name was on the ECL, filed the writ petition for removal of his name. A Division Bench of the Sind High Court declined to exercise judicial discretion in his favor in the context where the High C ourt after the hearing was of the opinion that “…there was every likelihood that petitioner would leave the country if his name was ordered to be removed from Exit Control List”. Again, no reason was given before the Division Bench by the petitioner for his inability to surrender before the trial court. More to the point, the law report expressly records at paragraph 13 that the petitioner had knowledge of the criminal proceedings filed against him incidental to the recovery suits filed under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. 12 In an erudite judgment scanning the case law and the principles derived therefrom, a Division Bench of the Islamabad High Court distilled the principles from the case law on the subject in Raheem Ullah Khan vs The State.6 Authoring the judgment, Hon‟ble Mr. Justice Babar Sattar summarized the principles as follows: 5. In view of the law laid down by the august Supreme Court the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement under Pakistani law can be summarized as follows: 1. Under Pakistani law, the only statutory bar to absconder's recourse to courts for enforcement of rights is stipulated under Order XXIII Rule 8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980.
5 1981 SCMR 1 6 2023 YLR 1246 5
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2. Unlike the U.S Courts and courts of other foreign jurisdictions, in Pakistan, in view of Article 175(2), the courts do not claim any inherent powers and instead rely on the powers conferred under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code ("C.P.C.") and section 561 -A of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code ("Cr.P.C") in relation to the treatment meted out to fugitives and absconders. 3. Perusal of Pakistani jurisprudence reveals that our superior courts have recog nized the doctrine of fugitive disentitlement to the extent of criminal appeals or related criminal matters. The honourable superior courts have refused to hear appeals filed by absconders in criminal matters on the basis of following equitable principles: … 13 We conclude on the basis of the scan of the judgments that in all the cases where this principle was applied , no reason , let alone a good one, was cited before the respective Courts for the accused not surrendering before the relevant Court. None o f the judgments reviewed which are binding on this Division Bench lay down an absolute rule without admitting any exceptions. Perhaps this may be a case of first impression where the exception is expressly pleaded, and therefore merits judicial consideration. 14 The exception pleaded is that under the laws of the UAE, the petitioner would be exposed to criminal proceedings in the UAE, apart from losing his residency ID and registration of his company that provides employment to over 200 workers if he were to leave the UAE for surrender before the trial Court in Pakistan without first renewing his residency ID and his company‟s license . This averment made in ground „N‟ of the memo of appeal and elaborated during oral submissions has not been den ied by the prosecution for want of knowledge of the applicable legal framework in the UAE and, therefore, for being made with the support of an affidavit, is to be given credence when not rebutted by the respondents. So, the claimed exception to the rule can be labelled as a potential risk to the liberty of the appellant and potential loss of livelihood, both being fundamental rights of the petitioner qua a citizen of Pakistan. 15 It is to be remembered that section 87 CrPC requires that a proclamation is to be issued only after the court issuing the proclamation has satisfied itself after taking evidence that the accused has absconded. 6
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16 It is settled law that the expression „ abscondance‟ of necessity entails intentional and willful avoidance of the process and concealing oneself from the reach of law. The Supreme Court in Bacha S aid vs The State7 held that an absconder means a person who is intentionally evading and avoiding service of notice, summons , or warrants issued to him and intentionally makes himself inaccessible to the process of Law. But from the mere fact that a person is absent it should not be readily assumed without due enquiry and notice that he is an absconder. The appellant‟s case all along has been that he had no knowledge of the other FIRs against him and by extension was unaware of any proclamation issued against him. As the respondents and the FIA have not bothered to place on record copies of the record of proceedings relating to proclamation to establish the FIA ‟s stance that the appellant was aware of the other FIRs, we would give the benefit of doubt to the appellant that he was not so aware for the aforesaid reasons and also for the reasons stated below. 17 The FIRs in which t he petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender were registered in 2020, 2021 and 2022 under the Emigration Ordinance, alleging that the petitioner obtained money from the complainants for their work visas abroad but did not provide them the visas. All t he FIRs were registered by the FIA . It is an admitted fact that the petitioner appeared before the trial court in April 2022 in 3 FIRs registered in 2018 by the FIA under the Emigration Ordinance, made a confessional statement, and was convicted by the trial Court with a token sentence vide order dated 04.07.2022 in view of the complainant resiling from the complaint, which presumably happened because the appellant returned the money he took from the complainant. So, the petitioner was very much present i n Pakistan in April 2022 and attended trial with FIA prosecuting, and no good reason has been given by the FIA or the respondents before this Court as to why he was not arrested in those FIRs in which he was declared a proclaimed offender . The only logica l course would be to accept the categorical averment of the appellant that he was never aware of those other FIRs in which he was declared a proclaimed offender and only became aware when the respondents‟ reply was filed in the instant writ petition giving the reason for the blacklisting of the appellant‟s passport due to the existence of those FIRs. It is to be recalled that the impugned judgment under
7 PLD 1978 SC 102 7
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appeal does not advert to the dates of the proclamations against the petitioner, nor whether summons or notices were duly served on the petitioner, for he was resident in the UAE all along and only came to Pakistan to face the trial in the 3 FIRs in which he was convicted with a token sentence. 18 Should the law take a dogmatic approach for an inflexible application of the rule under consideration, or should it take a pr agmatic approach to administer justice tempered with mercy, while balancing the interests of a n accused with that of the State? We would not wish to be labelled as blindfolded Judge who insist ed on the petitioner surrendering before the trial court at the risk of losing the means of his livelihood and facing criminal proceedings in the UAE, when the objective of proclamation under section 87 CrPC, namely, ensuring the presence of the accused to join the investigation and to face trial , can equally well be achieved by passing appropriate orders to achieve both ends. 19 Justice is always sacrificed when a rule of law is applied dogmatically and without adverting to the exceptions or without attention to the reason underlying that rule. Reason is the soul of the law , and what is inconsistent with reason of the law is not permitted in law. The reason for the rule under consideration was given in Chan Shah as that one who seeks the aid of justice must not be a fugitive from the justice itself. But what if keeping away from the process of j ustice can be explained which explanation on a balance of probabilities does not appear implausible? And, we hasten to add, that t he rule under cons ideration would also be applicable with less force in proceedings which do not arise out of the case in which the petitioner is a proclaimed offender – this appears to us to be the unstated explanation for the observation of the Supreme Court in Mian Muham mad Shahbaz Sharif vs Federation of Pakistan8 that an absconder does not lose all his rights. Would the rule be still insisted upon in its full severity if, say, a proclaimed offender was grievously injured in an accident abroad but needed an insurance ce rtificate from Pakistan which the insurance company was refusing to issue but which the petitioner desperately require d to pay for medical services in the country where he resides? Or where a proclaimed offender was in prison abroad but needed his birth c ertificate and other credentials for parole abroad which the Pakistani
8 PLD 2004 SC 583 8
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authorities were refusing to issue? For those who would answer that, yes, the rule would still be applied with full severity, we would respond without hesitation: have a heart! 20 It appears to us that justice would fail with an inflexible application of this rule admitting of no exceptions when the ultimate objective of this rule can well be achieved by appropriate orders passed by the Court . We would therefore allow this appeal and order the respondents to renew the petitioner‟s passport subject to the following conditions: i) The appellant w ill deposit cash surety with th e Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court in the cumulative sum that is alleged to have been taken by him from all the complainants in the pending FIRs, liable to forfeiture if he does not surrender before the trial court within one month of the date of renewal of his passport, and ii) Should the appellant not surrender before the trial court within 1 month from the date of renewal of his passport, his passport will be liable to confiscation/inactivation under Rule 23(6)(b) of the Passport Rules, 2021, and this judgment shall constitute „good evidence‟ for such confiscation/inactivation in terms of the said rule.
(Mohsin Akhtar Kayani) (Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan) Judge Judge
Imran 9 شیٹ خدوٌٹ اعلام آثبد ہبئی کوسٹ اعلام آثبد خوڈیشل ڈیپبسٹوٌٹ
اًٹزا کورٹ اپیل ًوجزی 408/2023 محمد شہشاد ثٌبم گورًوٌٹ آف پبکستبى وغیزٍ
هسٹز علی ًواس کھزل ایڈووکیٹ ثجبًت اپیل کٌٌذٍ: هلک شوکت ًواس اعواى، اسسٹٌٹ اٹبرًی جٌزل
ثجبًت جواة دہٌذٍ/هذعب علیہ: 17.01.2024 سوبعت تبریخ
هسغي اختش کیبًی خح:۔
هٌذسخہ ثبلا اپیل ثٌبساضی زکن هوسخہ 26.10.2023خبسی شذٍ سٹ ًوجشی 1314/2023 ہوبسے عبهٌے پیش کی گئی خظ هیں تفظیلی گضاسشبت عٌٌے کے ثؼذ فیظلہ ثشادسم خح هستشم عشداس اػدبص اعسبق خبى ًے لکھب خظ کو هدھے پڑھٌے کب ششف زبطل ہوا خظ هیں اپیل کٌٌذٍ کی اپیل کو هٌظوس کشتے ہوئے اعے هولغ دیب گیب کہ وٍ ًمذ شوسٹی ڈپٹی سخغٹشاس خوڈیشل کے پبط اپٌے توبم دسج شذٍ فوخذاسی همذهبت هیں غیش لبًوًی زبطل کشدٍ سلن کے ثشاثش خوغ کشوائے خظ کے ثؼذ اط کے پبعپوسٹ کی تدذیذو اخشاء کی اخبصت دی خبئے گی ًیض کہ یہ وٍ دو هبٍ کے اًذس پبکغتبى واپظ آکش خي همذهبت هیں ػذالتی هفشوس ہے کب عبهٌب کشے تبہن هیں هٌذسخہ ثبلا فیظلے عے اختلاف کشتب ہوں خظ کی وخوہبت دسج ریل ہیں:۔ 2۔ همذهہ کے هتؼلك توبم زمبئك ثشادسم هستشم خح عشداس اػدبص اعسبق خبى کے فیظلہ هیں دسج ہیں۔ اط لئے دُہشاًے عے اختٌبة کشتب ہوں۔ اپیل ہزا کے عبتھ لف شذٍ سیکبسڈ اط ثبت کی غوبصی کشتب ہے کہ اپیل کٌٌذٍ اط ولت هٌذسخہ ریل همذهبت هیں ػذالتی هفشوس ہے خظ کی تفظیل کچھ یوں ہے۔ Description S.No. F.I.R No.664/18 dated 10.08.2018, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 1 F.I.R No.665/18 dated 10.08.2018, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 2 F.I.R No.344/2020 dated 19.05.2020, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 3 F.I.R No.365/20 dated 04.06.2020, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 4 10
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F.I.R No.368/20 dated 05.06.2020, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 5 F.I.R No.469/20 dated 08.10.2020, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 6 F.I.R No.178/2021 dated 14.10.2021, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 7 F.I.R No.172/2021 dated 04.10.2021P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 8 F.I.R No.81/21 dated 28.04.2021, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 9 F.I.R No.82/2022 dated 12.04.2022, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 10 F.I.R No.80/2022 dated 11.04.2022, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 11 F.I.R No.663/18 dated 10.08.2018, P.S F.I.A AHTC, Lahore under Section 17/22 of the Emigration Ordinance, 1979. 12
3۔ اُوپش دی گئی تفظیلات ثزسیؼہ خظ هوسخہ 21.10.2022 ڈائشیکٹش/فوکل پشعي ڈائشیکٹشیٹ خٌشل اهیگشیشي ایٌڈ پبعپوسٹ ہیڈ کواسٹش اعلام آثبد ایف ائی اے سیکبسڈ پش هوخود ہیں۔ دسج ثبلا تفظیلات ثش سیکبسڈ عے ظبہش ہوتب ہے کہ اپیل کٌٌذٍ هختلف افشاد کو غیش هلکی هلاصهت کب خھبًغہ دے کش اى عے لاکھوں سوپے وطول کشًے کے ثؼذ ًہ تو اًہیں کغی لغن کی هلاصهت دلوا عکب ہے اوس ًہ ہی ایغے کغی هلک کب ویضا ثوطبثك وػذٍ فشاہن کش عکب ہے هلضم ہزا کے پبط صیش دفؼہ 12 اهیگشیشي آسڈیٌٌظ1979 کے هطبثك غیش هلکی هلاصهت پشهوٹ کشًے کب لائغٌظ ثھی هوخودًہ ہےخظ کے تست ایغب کوئی کبسوثبس کیب خب عکے۔
4۔ هضیذثشاں سیکبسڈ پش هوخود اعپیشل کوسٹ وى لاہوس کب فیظلہ همذهہ ًوجش 18/663 هوسخہ10.08.2018، پولیظ اعٹیشي F.I.A AHTC لاہوس صیش دفؼہ 17/22، اهیگشیشي آسڈیٌٌظ1979 اوس فیظلہ هوسخہ04.07.2022 اوس همذهہ ًوجش 18/665 هوسخہ10.08.2018، پولیظ اعٹیشي F.I.A AHTC لاہوس صیش دفؼہ 17/22، اهیگشیشي آسڈیٌٌظ1979 اوس فیظلہ هوسخہ04.07.2022 اط ثبت کی تظذیك کشتب ہے کہ هلضم ہزا کو الجبل خشم پش عضا ثوطبثك لبًوى ہوئی تھی خظ پشاپیل کٌٌذٍ ًے عضائے لیذ گضاسی اوس خشهبًہ ادا کیب تھب۔ 5۔ ػلاوٍ اصیں ػذالت کے سیکبسڈ پش هتفشق دسخواعت داخل کشًے کے ثؼذ هتفشق دسخواعت اػتشاع هیں اط ثبت کب الشاس کیب ہے کہ وٍ عضا هکول کشًے کے ثؼذ لبًوًی طوس پش پبعپوسٹ کے اخشاءکب زمذاس ہو گیب یہ توبم والؼبت اپیل کٌٌذٍ کے عبثمہ اوس هوخودٍ کشداس کی واضر ًشبًذہی کشتے ہیں خظ هیں وٍ دو همذهبت هیں 11
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عضا یبفتہ ہوًے کے ثؼذ اط هلک عے ثبہش چلا خبتب ہے اوس اعی دوساى دیگش همذهبت هیں هلضم گشداًب خبتب ہے اوس وٍ توبم همذهبت ػذالت هیں اعی هلضم کی ػذم زبضشی کی وخہ عے صیش التوا ء ہیں۔ 6۔ اعلام آثبد ػذالت ػبلیہ کے عٌگل ثٌچ ًے سٹ پٹیشي ًوجشی 1314/2023کی عوبػت کے دوساى اپیل کٌٌذٍ هلضم کے کشداس کی تفظیل عے ًشبًذہی کشتے ہوئے اط ثبت کب رکش کیب ہے کہ اپیل کٌٌذٍ ایک هفشوس ہے اوس اط ضوي هیں ػذالتی ًظبئش ایغے شخض کو کغی لغن کی هشاػبت دیٌے عے گشیضاں ہے۔ ػذالت ػظوی ًے (ثبچب سیذ ثٌبم سزکبرPLD 1978 SC 102 (هیں اطول کی وضبزت کی ہے کہ خو شخض ًیتب و ػولا ػذالت کی عوبػت کے دوساى پیش ًہ ہو اوس توبم ػذالتی کبسوائی کو ثبلائے طبق سکھے ایغے شخض کو کغی ثھی طوس پش طشف غیش زبضشی ثوخہ لاػلوی کب فبئذٍ ًہیں دیب خب عکتب۔ اعی طشذ (چي شبٍ ثٌبم کزاوى)PLD 19 56 Federal Court 43 ،(گل حسي وغیزٍ ثٌبم سزکبر) PLD 1969 SC 89 ، (حیبت ثخش وغیزٍ ثٌبم سزکبر 1981 SCMR 1،(رحین اللہ خبى ثٌبم سزکبر)2023 YLR 1246 هیں ثھی وضبزت کی گئی ہے کہػذالتی زکن اوس عوبػت کی ثےتولیشی کشًے والا شخض کغی ثھی طشذ غیش هؼوولی فبئذے کے زظول کب اہل ًہ ہے۔ ػشف ػبم هیں ػذالت ػظوی کے توبم فیظلہ خبت اط ثبت کب تؼیي کشتے ہیں کہ هفشوس کب ػذالت هیں ثبلواعطہ کغی ثھی طشیمے عے پیش ہوًے یب کبسسوائی هیں ثغیش خود پیش ہوئے زظہ لیٌب ثبصو هوٌوع ہے اوس ایغے شخض کو کغی ثھی لغن کی ػذالتی کبسوائی هیں ػذالت عٌٌے کی هدبص ًہ ہے اوس ػبم اططلاذ هیں شٌوائی کب زك زبطل ًہیں ہوتب۔ اط کی هضیذ هثبلیں ) اول گل ثٌبم سوار خبى وغیزٍ) PLD 1985 SC 402،(گل حسي وغیزٍ ثٌبم سزکبر) PLD 1969 SC 89) (سیذ محمد ثٌبم محمد سزاج الذیي 2014 MLD 437 ، (رخسبًہ ثی ثی ثٌبم فیڈریشي آف پبکستبى) PLD 2023 Lahore…
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