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Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs Vs Province of Punjab etc. — 2026 LHC 2786

Official Citation: 2026 LHC 2786

Court / Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez)

Legal Principle & Question Decided

Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez), officially reported as 2026 LHC 2786. In this matter between the Petitioner and the Respondent, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.

Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

COURT: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez) DECISION DATE: 30-04-2026 TAGLINE: What shall be the date of determination of limits of prohibited zone(s) for considering request for grant of proprietary rights. CASE DETAILS: Land 31439/25 ============================================================ Stereo. HCJDA 38. Judgment Sheet IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT) ……………….

W.P. No.31439 of 2025

Muhammad Din (deceased) through legal heirs, etc.

Versus

Province of Punjab, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 10.02.2026. Petitioners by: Mr. Muhammad Shan Gul, M/s Barrister Muhammad Umar Riaz, Waqar A. Sheikh, Advocate, Obaid Ullah, Rana Rehan , Muhammad Amin, Ch. Abdul Majid and Mian Najam-us-Saqib, Advocates for the petitioners. Mr. Waqar A. Sheikh, Advocate for petitioner in connected petition. M/s Shaikh Zulqurnain and Amna Iqbal, Advocates for petitioners in connected petitions. M/s Waseem Ahmad Gujjar and Rana Shahzad Khalid , Advocate s for petitioner in connected petition. Ch. Haroon-ur-Rasheed, Advocate for petitioners in connected petitions. Mian Shahzad Siraj, Advocate for petitioners in connected petitions. M/s Ch. Abdul Gaffar and Ch. Muhammad Saleem Kambo, Advocates for petitioners in connected petitions. M/s Ch. Muhammad Sarwar, Usama Zubair and Hassnain Moawia, Advocates for petitioners in connected petitions. M/s Saeed -ur-Rehman and Sanobar Zaib, Advocates for petitioners in connected petition. Rao Qasim Ali Khan, Sajjad Saleem Khan, Muhammad Nadeem Beryar, Komal Tariq and Sajid Hussain Qureshi, Advocates for peti tioner in connected petition. W.P. No.31439/2025.

2 Mian Asif Mumtaz, Advocate for petitioners in connected petitions. Mr. Shabbir Hussain Chattha, Advocate for petitioners in connected petition. Mr. Tariq Hussain, Advocate for petitioner in connected petition. Mr. Najam -us-Saqib, Advocate for petitioner in connected petition. Mr. Muhammad Amin Sial and Ali Imran, Advocates for petitioner in connected petition. Malik Abbas Farooq, Advocate for petitioner in connected petition. Respondents by: Mr. Waheed Alam, Assistant Advocate General. M/s Barrister Aizaz Malik and Ahmad Nisar, Advocates for respondent No.6 in W.P. No.46623/2023. Zafar Abbas, Superintendent, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore. Dr. Muzaffar Iqbal, Assistant, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore.

ASIM HAFEEZ, J. This and connected constitutional petitions, identified in annexed Annex-A hereof, are heard and decided collectively in wake of commonality of grievance(s) against restrictive conditions and exclusions prescribed under Notification No.2107 -2019/754-CL(I) dated 13.09.2019 [published on 18.09.2019 and amended vide Notification No.2366 -2020/78-CL(1) dated 20.10.2020] (hereinafter referred as the Notification (71 of 2019) . It is pertinent to mention that petitioners, in some petitions, had asked for injunctive directions against conduct of auctions and directions for continuity of leases but scope of this judgment is limited to the extent of deciding the constitutionality of the Notification (71 of 2019). W.P. No.31439/2025.

3 2. By way of background , the Notification (71 of 2019) was issued in exercise of powers under section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912 (Act, 1912), which contained statement of conditions for grant of proprietary rights with respect to the state land(s), subject to the exclusions of such leased land(s), referred to as the prohibited zone(s) for the purposes of this judgment. For clarity, the prohibited zone(s) is th at area, defined under Clause 3(c) of the Notification (71 of 2019) , which is statedly not available f or g rant of proprietary rights . A declaratory judgment is sought for declaration that limits / boundaries of the prohibited zone(s) , as prescribed in the Notification (71 of 2019), are incorrect, contrary to the law and judicial pronouncements. Issue of interpretation / reading of the Notification (71 of 2019) came up before this court earlier, where petitioner (s) remained unsuccessful. Litigation went to Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan and I take up the matter from the passing of order of 25.08.2022, paragraph 7(c) whereof is relevant and reproduced hereunder:- “The petitioners, who are in occupation of land which falls within the prohibited zone, claim that at the time of original grant of cultivation rights under a Government scheme, the land did not f all within the prohibited zone. At that time, the scheme provided a criteria on the basis of which the Petitioners were considered for proprietary rights and that they had moved applications under the relevant notifications seeking proprietary rights. Thes e applications are still pending and have not been considered by the competent authority. In the meantime the impugned Notification was issued whereby this fact has not been considered. Given that these petitioners moved the applications under a relevant Government scheme, seeking proprietary rights at the time when the land did not fall within the prohibited zone, they W.P. No.31439/2025.

4 claim that their matter should be heard. During the course of arguments, these, Petitioners were confronted with the fact that they have no t challenged the vires of the Notification and have not challenged the subsequent inclusion of the land in the prohibited zone. Hence, their argument that their land cannot be included in the prohibited zone and that the change in boundaries is illegal was never raised before the High Court. Consequently , the Petitioners falling in this category opted to withdraw their Petitions in order to make a fresh challenge with respect to their proprietary rights and the change in boundaries for the prohibited zone. Consequently, Civil Petitions No.66 -L, 67 -L, 119 -L of 2022, 1413-L, 1467-L, 1458-L of 2021, 4369 to 4376 of 2021, 4693, 4695, 4741, 4742, 5023, 5860, 5861, 6341. 6366, 6377 of 2021, 367, 530 of 2022 and 733 -L of 2022 are dismissed as withdrawn”. [Emphasis supplied] 3. Constitutionality / vires of the Notification (71 of 2019) are assailed on inter alia following grounds / legal principles, those are doctrine(s) of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation; element of retrospectivity of Notification (71 of 2019); exercise of unstructured and arbitrary discretion, having discriminatory implications / consequences. 4. Before elucidating legal arguments, it is essential to contextualize the factual basis for questioning the legality of the Notification ( 71 of 2019) . Petitioner(s) claimed that land(s) leased were outside the then prohibited zone(s) and now said area comes within the limits of prohibited zone(s) in terms of revision of Municipal limits, which are expended under the Notification (71 of 2019) . Petitioner(s) claim that status of the land, as existing and declared at the time of lease, must be acknowledged and applied for the purposes of ascertaining their eligibility for grant of proprietary rights. Grievance arose when determination of the lim its of prohibited zone(s) has been linked with the date of exercise of option. W.P. No.31439/2025.

5 Petitioner’s Arguments: 5. Primary ground for challenging legality of the Notification (71 of 2019) is that limits / boundaries of the prohibited zone(s) were revised with ret rospective effect in terms of C lauses 3(c) and 3(k) and such effect cannot be extended to the Notification (71 of 2019) , which , policy decision, would be effective and operate prospectively , therefore, lease (s) outside the prohibited zone( s), cannot be construed within the prohibited zone(s) by virtue of the Notification (71 of 2019). It is emphasized that land was leased outside the limits of the prohibited zone(s) and if those land(s) have attained proximity, with passage of time, with the boundaries of t he prohibited zone(s) , petitioners cannot be discriminated by denying right to seek proprietary rights. Submit that terminus a qu o for determining the limits / boundaries of the prohibited zone(s) shall be the status of the land(s) at the time of grant of lease(s) and not the time of opting for the option. Add that the Notification (71 of 2019) manifest unreasonable and unstructured exercise of Executive’s discretion and that conflicts with the mandate of Articles 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Rep ublic of Pakistan 1973 . Further submit that Notification (71 of 2019) violates principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. It is argued that Clauses 3(j) and 3(k) of the Notification (71 of 2019) contradicts each other, whereby petitioner(s) are excluded from seeking proprietary rights through giving retrospective effect to W.P. No.31439/2025.

6 latter clause. Reasoning of the judgments cited, their relevance, application and distinctive features thereof , in the context of facts therein, are discussed in latter part of decision. Respondents’ submissions: 6. Learned Law Officer , assisted by the officers / department’s representatives , submits that distinction between conditions of the policies dealing with grant of lease (s), under temporary cultivation lease sche me(s) and grant of proprietary rights, is downplayed by the petitioner(s), while failing to appreciate the text of Notification (71 of 2019) . Adds that before adjudging question of vires of the Notification (71 of 2019) it is imperative to appreciate that subject matter instrument is not a one-off policy decision but , on comparison with previously issued policies, a consistent pattern is evide nt, where drawing of Municipal limits formed part and parcel of every policy – explains that for instance Notif ication dated 3 rd September 1979 excluded lands within 10 -Miles of the radius, which is by and large equivalent thereof when compared with the Municipal limits defined, under the Notification, which extends limits to 20-Kilometer. On the question of prospectivity, it is claimed that da te of determination of the limits is from the date of submission of application and no application would be accepted after closing of the window. Explains that every policy, dealing with the grant of proprietary rights, carries a terminus a quo point, which is the date of determination of the limits of prohibited zone(s). Further submits that no policy was referred W.P. No.31439/2025.

7 where status of the land, at the time for grant of temporary lease, was treated as conclusive and final determination of the limits when question of determination of limits of prohibited zone(s) arose, for grant of proprietary rights. Submits that judgments cited were handed down in context of peculiar facts of each case and ratio settled therein have had no application to cases at hand, which referred cases deal with the rights claimed by displaced persons. Adds that decision in the case of Province of Punjab through District Collector, Vehari V. Ghulam Muhammad (1994 SCMR 975 ) is distinguishable and in support of submissions, learned Law Officer makes reference to the decision in case of Commissioner Multan Division, Multan and others V. Muhammad Hussain and others (2015 SCMR 58). 7. On query, learned Law Officer explained that the Notification (71 of 2019) had not preju diced any right previously accrued to any lessee under any previous policy for grant of proprietary rights and if any of the petitioners had applied for grant thereof, under the terms of any previous policy and eligibility criterion was met, said petitione r may pursue application, if any filed within terminus a quo point prescribed under that particular policy. Analysis: 8. Heard. Record perused and citations examined. W.P. No.31439/2025.

8 9. Resolution of the controversy hinges on reading of the statement of conditions of the Notification (71 of 2019), which, along with clauses under challenge, are reproduced hereunder; In exercise of the powers conferred under section 10 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act, 1912 (V of 1912), Governor of the Punjab is pleased to issue the following Statements of the Conditions for grant of proprietary rights in State land leased out under different temporary cultivation lease schemes promulgated from time to time in the Province of the Punjab with immediate effect: 1. General.- (l) The Government has decided to grant proprietary rights in State land to those l essees who are cultivating it under a Temporary Cultivation Lease Scheme for at least five years continuously regardless of the original terms and conditions for the lease and fulfill the conditions mentioned herein, provided that no lessee shall be entitl ed as a matter of right to purchase of proprietary rights. (2) All grants under these Statements of the Conditions shall be subject to the provisions of the Act and to: (a) the General Colony Conditions of 1938 published vide Punjab Government Notification No.5792-C, dated 29.06.1938 and Notification No.2664-C, dated 22.09.1944; (b) the Statements of the Conditions as appearing hereinafter; and (c) Such instructions as may be issued by the Government for carrying out the purposes of this Notification.

3. Exceptions and reservations .- The following categories of the State land shall be excluded from every grant of proprietary rights to be conferred under the following conditions: (a) land already reserved under any other scheme including permanent grants or schemes and service grants; (b) reserved charagah or charagah baqaya in colony chaks; (c) lands lying inside municipal limits and within prohibited zone which shall be upto: (i). Metropolitan or Municipal Corporation 20-KM (ii) Municipal Committees 10-KM (iii) Town Committees 06-KM (iv) Railway Station 02-KM (v) Motorway 02-KM (d) in case of Cantonment Board contiguous to a local council, the limits or prohibited zone shall tally with the limits prescribed for the local council to which it is adjacent; (e) the existing limits of prohibited zones shall remain applicable even if the status or nomenclature of the local bodies is changed; W.P. No.31439/2025.

9 (f) land transferred to other departments of the Punjab Government or Federal Government; (g) all rivers and streams with their beds and banks; (h) all water courses and drains or channels, and all existing or proposed public thoroughfares and existing gra veyards; (i) the prohibited zone nearest to the leased State land, shall be applicable for grant of proprietary rights irrespective of the district boundaries; (j) only those lessees shall be eligible who obtained lease of State land under the Temporary Cultivation Lease Scheme falling outside prohibited zone; and (k) the limits of prohib ited zone at the time of filing of applications, within stipulated period as mentioned in these terms and conditions, shall be applicable. [Emphasis supplied] 10. The Notification (71 of 2019) falls within the province of the Provincial Government, issued in exercise of powers under section 10 of the Act 1912 . Exercise of authority manifests no illegality, defect or shortcoming to the extent of conferment of power and exe rcise thereof. Constitutionality of the Notification (71 of 2019) is assailed on certain legal principles, accompanied with the claim of discriminatory dispensation of the policy. In light of the submissions made following issues require adjudication; a) Whether doctrine of promissory estoppel is attracted; b) If any legal benefit / concession is claimable under the principle of legitimate expectation; c) If any vested / enforceable entitlement is made out for grant of proprietary rights; d) Whether eff ect of the Notification (71 of 2019) is prospective or retrospective; e) Whether the Notification (71 of 2019) in its application was discriminatory and discriminates between similarly placed persons; f) Whether ratio of the judgments cited are attracted to the facts of the case; W.P. No.31439/2025.

10 g) Is restrictive conditions and land qualification in terms of the Notification (71 of 2019) are intra vires or ultra vires. Whether doctrine of promissory estoppel is attracted 11. To substantiate application of doctrine of prom issory estoppel it is imperative to show any promise made or representation conveyed, while making grant of lease, initial or renewal thereof, that, firstly, whether proprietary rights would be per se offered and conveyed pursuant to the grant of lease of land(s), and secondly, whether the limits qua the status of the land, identified at the tim e of lease, initial or renewed, would remain constant / unaltered throughout, and thirdly, what right was extended to the lease holder, pursuant to temporary lease, to claim declaration against the Government to plead alleged vested right and seek determination of the limits of prohibited zone(s) from the time of grant of lease. Where is the promise made? In absence of any promise made, and none demonstrated; no ques tion of reliance thereupon and incidence of alleged sufferance / disadvantage arose. Per se grant of l ease of land within or outside prohibited zone(s) would not extend any alleged right to the petitioners to object to the statement of conditions, whereby proprietary rights are offered, subject to the conditions, outside the prohibited zone(s) , limits wher eof are determinable at terminus a quo date. None of the petitioners had referred to terms and conditions of lease(s) to meet requirements for seeking ben efit of doctrine of promissory estoppel. It is an absolute prerogative of the Government to prescribe conditions for grant of proprietary rights and W.P. No.31439/2025.

11 introduce certain exclusions, qua the status of the land. Hence, plea of attracting doctrine of promissory estoppel is flawed and merits dismissal. If any legal benefit / concession is claimable under the principle of legitimate expectation 12. Principle of legitimate expectation is applicable upon meeting two primary conditions; firstly, past practice(s) of th e public authority and secondly an explicit representation. These requirements are conspicuous by their absence. No explicit representation is shown on the part of the Government that lease(s) of land(s), under temporary cultivation lease scheme, would guarantee that status of the land, as existing at the time of grant of lease, would not be altered. In the first instance, how come a lessee(s) to whom land(s) was leased land(s) under temporary cultivation lease scheme, could claim of declaration beyond the terms of lease and timeframe therein. For the sake of elaboration; Irrespective of the status o f land, subject matter of lease, under what authority of law or the terms of grant, lessee(s) can claim a right on the pretext that since land leased held a p articular status, at the time of grant of lease, therefore such status should continue for the purposes of determining the status of leased land(s) at the time of considering request for grant of proprietary rights. Status of the petitioner(s) cannot be co mpared with the schemes introduced for the purposes of adjusting the persons, displaced from their lands due to some project or public work(s). In absence of any W.P. No.31439/2025.

12 past practice or representation explicitly made, principle of legitimate expectation is not available. If any vested / enforceable entitlement is made out for grant of proprietary rights 13. No legal / enforceable right is shown in the first place. Petitioners are lessee(s), who held land(s) under temporary cultivation lease scheme. It wa s not explained that what enforceable right is available to such lessee(s). Acknowledgement of an y alleged right, beyond the terms of grant, is an egregious error. Failing to convince regarding applicability of doctrine(s) of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, no question of any vested / enforceable right arises, let alone enforcement thereof. Whether effect of the Notification (71 of 2019) is prospective or retrospective 14. In absence of any legally enforceable right question of applicability of the Notification (71 of 2019) either prospectively or retrospectively loses its significanc e. When no representation was made that status of the land, at the time of lease, where lease was granted under temporary cultivation lease scheme(s), would co ntinue to be so irrespective of the declaration of limits of prohibited zone(s), petitioner(s) ca nnot attribute retrospectivity to the statement of conditions under the Notification (71 of 2019) . Status of the land is ever changing and it is an extreme abs urdness to plead perpetuity qua status thereof. There is another perspective. Question of retrospectivity wo uld arise if any person / lessee , who meets W.P. No.31439/2025.

13 eligibility criterion, and land also falls outside the prohibited zone(s), successfully secure proprieta ry rights and conclusiveness thereof is acknowledged upon conveyance deed in favour of the acquirer of propr ietary rights. The Government cannot, subsequently, alters the limits of such land, in respect whereof proprietary rights are granted. There is no c avil that petitioner, being lessee(s) under temporary cultivation lease scheme, are aware of their entitlement and contractual rights but same still ventured to assert alleged rights, purpose whereof is to prolong possession / cultivation of the land – a classic case of grabbing / illegal enrichment at the expenses of Government’s resources. Determination of t he limits and extent thereof, qua land(s) within prohibited zone(s), is from terminus a quo date, which makes the application of the statement of cond itions of the Notification (7 1 of 2019) prospective for all intent and purposes. Clause 3(j) defines eligibility of the leased land(s) available for grant of proprietary rights under the Notification (71 of 2019) and c lause 3 (k) prescribes criterion for determining the limits / boundaries of the prohibited zone(s), at the time of exercising the option . This po sition is explained with an illustration. If grant of proprietary rights has been offered under a policy of 2001 [Notification No.1997 - 2001/1174-CLI d ated 9 th July 2001] and any person, who fulfills all the conditions prescribed therein, has applied for th e grant of rights within time -window pointed [in said policy terminus a quo date was 31.12.2001], his alleged entitlement is not prejudiced by the Notification (7 1 of 2019) . The W.P. No.31439/2025.

14 Notification (7 1 of 2019) has neither substituted nor repealed any previous policy. Whether the Notification (71 of 2019) in its application was discriminatory and discriminates between similarly placed persons 15. There appears no discrimination. Lease holders of land(s) leased, under the temporary cultivation lease sche me(s), and falling outside the prohibited zone(s) are eligible, subject to the conditions prescribed, for seeking proprietary rights, which determination i s prospective and limits qua status of the land are determinable at terminus a quo date. And on the c ontrary, persons having lease of the land(s), under the temporary cultivation lease scheme(s), and falling within prohibited zone(s), according to the crit erion prescribed under the Notification (7 0 of 2019) , are not eligible – one class of lessee(s) are d istinct from other class and involving distinct categories of leased land(s). Hence, e lement(s) of alleged discrimination, unreasonableness and unstructure d discretion are conspicuously missing. Whether ratio of the judgments cited are attracted to the facts of the case; (A) Member, Board of revenue, Punjab and others V. Sheraz Khan (PLD 2024 Supreme Court 1235). Judgment is distinguishable, wherein q uestion of entitlement for proprietary rights was decided qua displaced persons – Tarbela Dam Ouste e Scheme. Land was allotted to displaced person pursuant to a scheme – facts whereof cannot be compared with the lessee(s) under temporary cultivation W.P. No.31439/2025.

15 lease scheme, which is transitory and extends no entitlement on the pattern of displaced persons. (B) Province of Punjab through Secretary Colonies, Board of Revenue, Lahore and others (2012 SCMR 1007). Case relates to allotment of subject land under Army Welfare Scheme [rehabilitation of serving/retired Defence Personnel], wherein allotment was recorded thr ough sale deed. In said circumstances, Patta Malkiyat was sought to be issued, whereafter plea was raised that no proprietary rights could be conferred withi n ‘prohibited zone ’. Court observed that status of the land at the time of allotment was outside prohibited zone. Court further observed that terms of allotment contained expression ‘assign’ which implies that allottee had right to assign it, which is akin to acknowledgment of proprietorship. Principle that determination of the limits of prohibited zone would be the time of allotment is not attracted to this case. No allotment was made in cases at hand and status of the petitioner(s) is admitted ly as lessee (s), under the temporary cultivation lease…

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