Case Summary & Legal Holding

This judicial decision was delivered by the SUPREME-COURT. The matter involves proceedings between DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER (FEMALE), CHARSADDA and SONIA BEGUMHonorable Justice Syed Mansoor Ali ShahShah Faisal Ilyas,Nemo, officially reported as 2025 PLD 720. The court reviewed applicable Pakistani statutes, procedural requirements, and governing case-law authorities. The full text below contains the complete facts, arguments, and legal reasoning rendered by the honorable bench.

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

P L D 2025 Supreme Court 720 Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, A.C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ DISTRICT EDUCATION OFFICER (FEMALE), CHARSADDA and others---Petitioners Versus SONIA BEGUM and 5 others---Respondents C.R.P. No. 5/2023 in C.P.L.A. No. 448-P/2017 and C.R.P. No. 6/2023 in C.P.L.A. No. 651-P/2019 and C.R.P. No. 7/2023 in C.P.L.A. No. 655-P/2019 and C.R.P. No. 8/2023 in C.P.L.A. No. 658-P/2019 and C.R.P. No. 9/2023 in C.P.L.A. No. 666-P/2019 and C.P.L.A No. 402-P of 2023, decided on 25th April, 2025. (Against the judgment dated 29.09.2022 passed by this Court). C.P.L.A No. 402-P of 2023 (Against the judgment dated 17.03.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 4180-P of 2022). Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ. agreeing. (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Appointment, Deputation, Posting and Transfer of Teachers, Lecturers, Instructors and Doctors) Regulatory Act (XII of 2011)--- ----S. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI & O.XXVIII, R.3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Appointment, posting and transfer---Imposing of costs---Petitioner sought review of judgment passed by Supreme Court with regard to determination of place of residence for employment purposes---Validity---Power of review, as articulated in Article 188 of the Constitution and governed by Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ('Rules') and C.P.C. is not an open invitation to revisit judgments merely on the basis of dissatisfaction with the outcome---It is a limited jurisdiction, exercised with great caution and circumspection---Conditions for filing a review petition are specifically enumerated and they do not extend to re-arguing points of law or fact that have already been conclusively determined---Petitioner did not disclose any new or important evidence nor pointed any error that was apparent on the face of record---Issues raised by petitioner were mere reiteration of arguments that had already been considered and rejected by Supreme Court---Supreme Court declined to review its earlier judgment, as there was no ground made out for review and petitions were frivolous and vexatious---Supreme Court imposed cost under Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 upon petitioner for squandering valuable time of Supreme Court---Review petition was dismissed. District Education Officer (Female) Charsadda and others v. Sonia Begum and others 2023 SCMR 217; Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119; Messrs Habib and Co. v. Muslim Commercial Bank PLD 2020 SC 227; Engineers Study Forum v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 SCMR 1961; Government of Pun jab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421; Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Mehdi Hassan v. Province of Punjab 2007 SCMR 755; Anwar Husain v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1961 Dacca 155; Ghulam Murtaza v. Abdul Salam Sheikh 2010 SCMR 1883; Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Abdul Rauf v. Qutab Khan 2006 SCMR 1574; Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty PLD 1962 SC 355; Pakistan International Airlines v. Inayat Rasool 2004 SCMR 1737; Noor Hassan Awan v. Muhammad Ashraf 2001 SCMR 367; Kalsoom Malik v. Assistant Commissioner 1996 SCMR 710; Abdul Majeed v. Chief Settlement Commissioner 1980 SCMR 504; Inter Quest Informatics Services v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2025 SCMR 257; Mukhtar Mai v. Abdul Khaliq 2019 SCMR 1302; Zakaria Ghani v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon PLD 2016 SC 229; Jamshoro Joint Venture v. Khawaja Muhammad Asif 2014 SCMR 1858; Suja A Thomas, 'Frivolous Cases' (2010) 59(2) DePaul Law Review 633; Cooter and Gell v. Hartmax Corp 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Wormer. 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1985); Cropper v. Smith (1884) 25 Ch D 700 (affirmed in Prince Abdulaziz v. Apex Global Management Ltd 120141 UKSC 64); De Cruz Lee v. Lee 2015 ONSC 2012; Irmya v. Mijovick 2016 ONSC 5276; British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71; Sanford Levinson. 'Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?' (1986) 24(2) Usgoode Hall LJ 353; Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghubir Saran Charitable Trust 2012 (1) See 455; Bakht Biland Khan v. Zahid Khan PLD 2024 SC 1273; S.M. Sohail v. Sitara Kabir-ud-Din PLD 2009 SC 397; Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh PLD 2024 SC 887; National Highway Authority. Islamabad v. Messrs Sambu Construction 2023 SCMR 1103; Capital Development Authority v. Ahmed Murtaza 2023 SCMR 61; Javed Hameed v. Aman Ullah 2024 SCMR 89; Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence 2023 SCMR 960; Pirbhai v. Singh 2011 ONSC 1366; Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj (2010) 8 SCC 1; Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar 2024 1NSC 1051 and Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta (2009) 2 SCC 656 rel. (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980--- ----O.XXVIII, R.3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 35 & 35A---Costs, imposing of---Object, purpose and scope---Consistent imposition of meaningful and proportionate costs rooted in statutory authority, judicial discipline and Constitutional imperatives is essential to deter abuse of process and restore procedural integrity. Per Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J. agreeing (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Every judgement rendered by Court of law is presumed to be a solemn and conclusive determination of all points arising out of the lis---Irregularities if any which have no significant effect or impact on outcome would not be sufficient to warrant review---If incongruity or ambiguity is of such a nature as to transmute the course of action from being one in aid of justice to a process of injustice then a review decision may be instituted for redressal to demonstrate error if it is found floating conspicuously on the surface of the record---Mere desire for rehearing of the matter cannot constitute sufficient ground for the grant of review which by its very nature cannot be equated with the right or remedy of appeal---Sanctity and finality of judicial determinations must not be compromised by mere persistence of litigants or mechanical issuance of advocate certificates---Review jurisdiction is not a fall back for unsuccessful litigants to reopen a lis but a narrowly confined judicial tool intended to correct palpable and consequential mistakes. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review---Phrase error apparent on the face of record ---Scope---Orders based on an erroneous assumption of material facts or those made without adverting to a provision of law or reflecting departure from undisputed construction of law and the Constitution may amount to an error apparent on the face of the record and can be rectified. Commissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax House, Karachi v. Messrs MSC Switzerland Geneva and others 2023 SCMR 1011 = 2023 SCP 150 rel. Shah Faisal Ilyas, Addl. AG, KPK for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk and Ms. Uzma Zahoor, Research Officer, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 25th April, 2025. JUDGMENT C.R.Ps 5 to 9/2023 SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH, A.C.J.---Through the present petitions, the petitioners seek review of the judgment of this Court dated 29.02.2022. This Court upheld the judgments of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in the impugned judgment under review (reported as District Education Officer (Female) Charsadda and others v. Sonia Begum and others (2023 SCMR 217) whereby challenges brought by candidates who had been denied appointments as Primary School Teachers ("PSTs") due to discrepancies between their domicile certificates and CNIC addresses were dismissed. The Court affirmed that under Section 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Appointment, Deputation, Posting and Transfer of Teachers, Lecturers, Instructors and Doctors) Regulatory Act, 2011, it is the domicile certificate, and not the CNIC address, that determines a candidate's permanent residence for employment purposes. It further cautioned that relying solely on CNIC addresses would undermine the value of domicile certificates and unfairly disadvantage otherwise qualified applicants. Recognizing the distinction between "domicile" and "residence" and invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Court held that candidates who had successfully passed competitive examinations and possessed valid domicile certificates could not be denied appointments on technical grounds. Consequently, leave to appeal was refused. Hence, these instant review petitions. 2. At the very outset, we deem it necessary to express our concern regarding the growing trend of filing review petitions in a casual and mechanical manner, often as a veiled attempt to reargue matters already conclusively adjudicated. While the right of access to courts is a cornerstone of our constitutional framework, it is not an unqualified or limitless right. Such access must be exercised with due responsibility and in a manner that upholds the dignity and finality of judicial proceedings. When litigants such as the petitioners before us initiate repetitive and meritless petitions, or employ tactics aimed at delaying the conclusion of proceedings, they erode the integrity of the judicial process. In light of these concerns, it is necessary to restate the settled and narrow contours of the Court's review jurisdiction. Scope of Review Jurisdiction 3. It must be noted that Article 188 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("Constitution") empowers the Supreme Court to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it. Article 188 provides: Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court.---The Supreme Court shall have power, subject to the provisions of any Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and of any rules made by the Supreme Court, to review any judgment pronounced or any order made by it. The aforesaid provision empowers the Supreme Court to review its judgment under Article 188 of the Constitution, subject to the provisions of any Act of Parliament, and of any rules made by this Court. The procedure governing the exercise of review jurisdiction is further elaborated in the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ("Rules"). Order XXVI, Rule 1 of the Rules stipulates that a review petition may be filed on grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("C.P.C."), which provides that a review may be sought where there is (1) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of, or could not be produced by, the third party seeking review at the time when the decree was passed or order made; (2) some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (3) any other sufficient reason.1 4. The term "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record" cannot be defined with precision or exhaustiveness, and there would always remain an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature.2 It is to be determined in each case on the basis of its own peculiar facts. Such an error may involve a question of law or fact; however, the critical condition is that it must be self-evident, immediately apparent, and not require extensive discussion or reasoning.3 If an error is not self-evident and its detection demands prolonged debate or analysis, it cannot be classified as an error apparent on the face of the record. A decision, order, or judgment cannot be corrected simply because it is erroneous in law, or because a different view could have been taken by the court or tribunal on a point of law or fact.4 It is important to note that a party filing a review petition cannot be allowed to repeat previously overruled arguments in an attempt to reopen the conclusions reached in the judgment.5 It is well established law that the power of review should not be confused with the appellate power, which permits a superior court to correct errors made by a subordinate court.6 Review proceedings are distinct from appeals and must be strictly confined to the scope and parameters outlined in Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. 5. In view of the aforesaid, the upshot of the discussion is that the power of review, as articulated in Article 188 of the Constitution and governed by the Rules and the C.P.C., is not an open invitation to revisit judgments merely on the basis of dissatisfaction with the outcome. It is a limited jurisdiction, exercised with great caution and circumspection. The conditions for filing a review petition are specifically enumerated, and they do not extend to re-arguing points of law or fact that have already been conclusively determined. 6. We have heard the learned Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at some length, gone through the impugned judgment, record of the case and the law on the subject. It becomes evident that these petitions seek to rehear matters already settled in the judgment under review. These petitions do not disclose any new or important evidence, nor do they point to any error that is apparent on the face of the record. In fact, the issues raised in the review petitions appear to be a mere reiteration of arguments that have already been considered and rejected by this Court. Therefore, we find that there is no ground made out for the review of the impugned judgment and are of the view that the present petitions are completely frivolous and vexatious. Frivolity of the Petitions 7. Frivolous claims serve no purpose other than to waste the Court's time and resources. The repeated filing of such petitions, especially when the issues have already been conclusively settled, clutters the judicial process with baseless assertions. This compels the Court to divert its valuable time and attention to matters devoid of merit. Frivolous litigation is costly not only for the judicial system but also for litigants.7 Such cases consume limited court resources and require parties to expend substantial time and financial resources defending unwarranted claims. This imposes an undue burden on both the judiciary and the litigants, leading to avoidable expenses and procedural delays. Moreover, frivolous litigation delays justice for deserving litigants by diverting the Court's focus from meritorious cases8, thereby disrupting the efficient administration of justice and impeding the timely resolution of genuine disputes. 8. It is pertinent to highlight that over 2.2 million cases are currently pending before courts across Pakistan, including approximately 56,635 cases before this Court alone.9 A proportion of these consist of review petition.10 Frivolous, vexatious, and speculative litigation contributes substantially to this backlog, artificially inflating dockets and obstructing the expeditious adjudication of legitimate claims. The misuse of judicial processes not only squanders finite judicial resources but also undermines public confidence in the justice system. Frivolous and vexatious litigation has become a serious menace, choking and clogging the judicial machinery. Resources, both human and material that ought to be deployed toward resolving genuine disputes are instead wasted on these baseless claims.11 This form of litigation must be unequivocally discouraged and systematically eliminated. As Justice Bowen famously remarked, "I have found in my experience that there is one panacea which heals every sore in litigation and that is costs."12 The imposition of costs, as authorized under Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of the Rules13, serves as a critical deterrent against the abuse of judicial process. It reinforces judicial discipline, promotes expeditious adjudication, and protects the integrity of the legal system. By ensuring that only bona fide claims occupy the Court's time, cost sanctions not only preserve judicial resources but also enhance broader access to justice. Imposition of Costs 9. The imposition of costs functions as a crucial corrective mechanism within the justice system, simultaneously deterring meritless claims and preserving court access for genuine litigants.14 As Professor Sanford Levinson has aptly observed, cost sanctions serve as an economic check on frivolous litigation, discouraging litigants from misusing judicial processes for vexatious purposes.15 Any meaningful reform aimed at reducing case pendency, promoting alternative dispute resolution, or streamlining civil justice will be ineffective without robust and enforceable provisions on the imposition of costs.16 This Court has consistently emphasized that frivolous litigation results in an unjustified waste of judicial time perpetuated in part by the absence of meaningful financial repercussions for filing baseless claims.17 Such litigation not only delays the resolution of valid disputes but also misappropriates public resources, including funds, facilities, and manpower. These are financed by taxpayers and must be judiciously utilized.18 Cost sanctions in frivolous and vexatious matters are thus essential to fulfilling the constitutional mandate of a fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ("Constitution"). Failure to impose costs effectively denies genuine claimants access to justice under Article 9 and impairs the constitutional goal of expeditious justice outlined in Article 37(d) of the Constitution. In recognition of this, the Supreme Court has consistently directed all tiers of the judiciary to impose appropriate costs to check the abuse of process, prevent unwarranted adjournments, curb procedural delinquency, and preserve the judiciary's efficiency and integrity.19 10. The legal framework governing the imposition of costs in Pakistan is rooted in both statutory law and procedural rules. In addition to Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of the Rules, Section 35 of the C.P.C. empowers courts to determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid. Section 35-A further authorizes compensatory costs against parties who raise false or vexatious claims or defences. More recently, the Costs of Litigation Act, 2017 enacted for the Islamabad Capital Territory has fortified the cost regime by mandating the imposition of compensatory, special, and adjournment costs. This transforms cost sanctions from a discretionary tool into a mandatory judicial duty. Although this statute currently applies only in the Islamabad Capital Territory, it offers a viable legislative model for adoption across provinces to standardize and strengthen deterrence against frivolous litigation nationwide. 11. One of the central challenges in curbing frivolous litigation is the absence of a universally accepted definition of a "frivolous suit." As Professor Suja A. Thomas has observed that there is considerable disagreement about what exactly qualifies as frivolous.20 In this context, courts may consider a set of non-exhaustive factors to assess whether a case is frivolous. These inter alia include: (i) Conduct of the parties: Any behaviour that unnecessarily prolongs or delays the proceedings21, (ii) Margin of success or failure: Whether the claim was reasonably arguable or plainly untenable from the outset22, (iii) Falsehood or fraud: If a party or its witnesses lied under oath or submitted forged or fabricated document23, (iv) Compliance with legal obligations: Whether the party has scrupulously complied with the Code of Civil Procedure, the Evidence Act, and other applicable substantive or procedural laws24, (v) Unnecessary denials: If a party refused to admit facts or documents that ought reasonably to have been admitted25, and (vi) Violation of court processes: Failure by a party or its legal representative to comply with court rules, practice directions, or lawful court orders.26 12. In various jurisdictions, including the United States27, lawyers are ethically and procedurally obligated to certify, before filing a case, that the action is not initiated for improper purposes such as to harass, delay, or increase litigation costs unnecessarily. They must also certify that the claims, defences, and legal contentions are warranted by existing law and that factual contentions are supported by evidence. Courts have the discretion to penalize not only litigants but also legal representatives who violate these duties. This reinforces professional accountability and deters frivolous litigation. In Pakistan, a similar obligation exists specifically in the context of review petitions. Under the Rules, it is mandatory that the Advocate signing the review application briefly state the precise grounds on which the review is sought.28 Furthermore, the Advocate must provide a reasoned certificate affirming that, in their professional opinion, the case warrants review. This safeguard ensures the limited jurisdiction of review is not misused, thereby conserving judicial time for matters of genuine substance. 13. Another significant obstacle in addressing frivolous litigation is the difficulty in determining what constitutes "reasonable" litigation costs. As emphasized by Sir Rupert Jackson and the Manitoba Law Reform Commission, cost regimes should be proportionate, comprehensible, and flexible enough to deliver justice in individual cases.29 Token or nominal costs fail to deter luxury or baseless litigation. The Supreme Court of India has advocated for the imposition of punitive, rather than merely compensatory costs to effectively discourage frivolous claims.30 Courts must therefore impose costs that are realistic and proportionate not only to disincentivize meritless litigation but also to encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, all while safeguarding access to justice for those with legitimate grievances. 14. The consistent imposition of meaningful and proportionate costs rooted in statutory authority, judicial discipline, and constitutional imperatives is essential to deter abuse of process and restore procedural integrity. It is imperative that courts across all tiers actively embrace cost sanctions as a necessary tool for judicial economy, procedural fairness, and the delivery of timely and effective justice. Only by weeding out vexatious and baseless claims can the judiciary ensure that its limited resources are directed toward those causes that truly deserve legal redress. 15. In view of the aforesaid, these civil review petitions are accordingly dismissed, with costs of Rs. 100,000/- (Rupees One Hundred Thousand only) imposed under Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, for being frivolous and for having squandered the valuable time of the Court. The costs shall be deposited within fifteen (15) days with any charitable institution recognized under the Thirteenth Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Proof of such deposit must be placed on the record of this case. In the event of non-compliance, the office shall place the matter before the appropriate Bench for further orders. C.P.L.A No. 402-P/2023 16. This petition is barred by limitation, having been filed with a delay of thirteen (13) days. The application for condonation of delay (C.M.A. No. 600-P/2023) fails to disclose any sufficient cause warranting condonation and is, therefore, dismissed. Even otherwise, the petition seeks to agitate the same issue which has already been conclusively adjudicated in District Education Officer (Female) Charsadda and others v. Sonia Begum and others (2023 SCMR 217). We see no justification to depart from the earlier view taken by this Court. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed both on the ground of limitation and on merits. Sd/- Acting Chief Justice Sd/- Judge I have appended my Additional Sd/- Judge ADDITIONAL NOTE MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J.---The judgment authored by one of us, which has been sought to be reviewed [District Education Officer (Female) Charsadda and others v. Sonia Begum and others (2023 SCMR 217)] resonates that all the questions raised by the parties, both for and against, were properly discussed and answered in extenso. Since no plausible or reasonable ground, including any error apparent on the face of the record, was accentuated, therefore, all review petitions were dismissed with cost by means of the judgment authored by my learned brother, Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah. As the filing of review petitions has become an increasing trend, often resorted to as a matter of course rather than as a means to correct errors apparent on the face of the record as a legal necessity or propriety, I also feel it is my utmost responsibility to contribute an additional note on this crucial issue. 2. No doubt, this Court has been conferred the powers to review its judgment under Article 188 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan…

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