Case Summary & Legal Holding

This judicial decision was delivered by the SUPREME-COURT. The matter involves proceedings between Mst. PARVEEN ARA and MUHAMMAD HANIFHonorable Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar,Badar Alam, officially reported as 2025 PLD 612. The court reviewed applicable Pakistani statutes, procedural requirements, and governing case-law authorities. The full text below contains the complete facts, arguments, and legal reasoning rendered by the honorable bench.

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

P L D 2025 Supreme Court 612 Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ Mst. PARVEEN ARA---Appellant Versus MUHAMMAD HANIF and others---Respondents Civil Appeal No. 47-K of 2021, decided on 7th March, 2025. (On appeal from against order dated 07.04.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No. S-107 of 2013). (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- ----S. 15-A---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 181---Restoration of possession---Limitation---Principle of laches---Applicability---Grievance of appellant/tenant was that after seeking her ejectment from the premises on basis of personal need, the respondent/landlord did not utilize it for his bona fide personal need---Rent Controller allowed the application of appellant/tenant and ordered to restore possession to her but Lower Appellate Court and High Court declined to interfere in the ejectment order---Validity---Tenant cannot be given an unlimited period of time to apply under section 15-A of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Period of one year cannot be construed as a period of limitation for tenant to apply but such right cannot be extended indefinitely at the leisure of tenant---Such application should be preferred within a reasonable period of time and it is for Rent Controller to decide whether the application is hit by laches rather than applying limitation period as provided under residuary Article 181 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908---Supreme Court directed to restore possession of premises to appellant/tenant and set aside the orders passed by High Court and Lower Appellate Court---Appeal was allowed. Words and Phrases (West Publishing Co.) Vol. 18A, (Permanent Edition, Pages 84-85); Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, John S. James, (Volume 2, page 1172); Law Terms and Phrases (Judicially Interpreted, Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Khan Mokal) Page 416; Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon and Legal Maxims [2nd Edition, Page 942 (1986)]; Oxford. Dictionary of Law [Elizabeth A. martin 2022 Ed.], Page 328; Merriam Webster. Merriam Webster. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/good%20faith]; Legal Information Institute [Cornell Law School] [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/good faith]; Abdul Ghaffar and others v. Mst. Mumtaz PLD 1976 SC 572; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239; Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah 2001 SCMR 286; The Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1935 Bombay 35; Ali Muhammad and another v. Fazal Hussain and others 1983 SCMR 1239; Collector of Customs (Appraisement) v. Messrs Saleem Adaya, Karachi PLD 1999 Karachi 76; Haji Muhammad Ashraf v. The State and 3 others 1999 MLD 330; Haji Hussain Haji Dawood through LRs and others v. M.Y. Kherati 2002 SCMR 343; Abdul Ghaffar v Mumtaz PLD 1982 SC 88; Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540; Rahim Jan v. Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 1303; The Rule of Law. (2010 Edition); Dr. Mobashir Hassan and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 265; Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 923; Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. Mrs. Nasreen Irshad 85 others 1989 SCMR 1892 and Abdus Sattar Molla v. Crown PLD 1958 FC 145 ref. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----General and special law---Scope---Specific or detailed provisions of a legal instrument should prevail over more general or conflicting provisions---When provision of a general law and special law addresses same issue or matter, the general law is impliedly repealed to the extent that the special law applies---In determining whether a statute is special or general, the focal point of consideration should principally and fundamentally be the subject matter---In the exigency of deciphering the Legislative intent or in case of conflict, the rule of harmonious construction can be adopted to interpret both co-existing provisions in a manner that gives effect to both without rendering either ineffectual or out of order. (c) Maxim--- ----Fiat justitia ruat caelum---Meaning---Let justice be done though heavens fall. (d) Maxim--- ----Ex debito justitiae---Meaning---Doctrine of ex debito justitiae refers to remedies to which a person is entitled to as of right, as opposed to a remedy which is discretionary---Such maxim applies to remedies that a Court is bound to give when they are claimed, as distinct from those that it has discretion to grant, where it is the foremost duty of Court to do complete justice. (e) Administration of justice--- ----Continuing wrong, doctrine of---Scope---If law is violated, the wrongdoer is continuously liable for penalty envisioned under law---Quintessence of continuing wrong is an act which triggers a continuing source of injury but the Courts should not be fervent or zealous to hold continuing wrong or default unless the language of statute or its provision clearly expresses such intention of legislature, or the nature of such injury is considered continuing, or it is based on a recurring cause of action. (f) Maxim--- ----Expressio unius est exlusio alterius---Connotation---Expressio unius est exlusio alterius denotes that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other or of the alternative, keeping in mind that if a law or contract explicitly mentions one thing it is assumed that other things are not included. (g) Maxim--- ----Ex visceribus actus----Connotation---Phrase ex visceribus actus deciphers the principle that every section/clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject matter. (h) Maxim--- ----Ut res magis valeat quam pereat---Connotation---Principle of giving effect to the matter rather than having it fail. Appellant in person. Badar Alam, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Kashif Badar, Advocate for Respondents Nos. 1-3. Iftikhar Javed Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court Amicus Curiae. Date of hearing: 24th December, 2024. JUDGMENT MUHAMMAD ALI MAZHAR, J.---This Civil Appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the Order dated 07.04.2021, passed by the Sindh High Court in C.P. No. S-1074/2018. 2. The short-lived facts of the case are that the respondent No.1 filed Ejectment Application under Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 ("SRPO") in the capacity of a co-owner of a building named Krishna Mansion, constructed on Plot No. 9, SB-5, Inverity Road, Saddar, Karachi. The appellant was a tenant of Flat No. 4, 1st floor. The ejectment application was moved on the ground of personal bona fide need wherein the respondent No. 1 jotted down that he has seven family members, i.e., four sons who are major and are residing with him in the rented premises; the elder son is married, while two other sons will be married after arrangement of an accommodation for them, and since the respondent No.1 has no other property, the ejectment of the flat was sought on the basis of personal need. The ejectment application was allowed by the Vth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, South, in Rent Case No. 735/2005, which was upheld up to this Court, and as a consequence thereof, the possession of the demised premises was handed over to the landlord/ respondent No.1 on 26.11.2012 for occupation based on his personal bona fide need. 3. The appellant, being an erstwhile tenant, filed an application in Rent Case No.735/2005 for restoration of possession on the grounds as provided under Section 15-A of the SRPO. In the above application, it was vigorously pleaded that the landlord obtained the possession of the tenement for personal use but, after securing the possession of the premises, neither he nor his family members occupied it. Rather, the landlord handed over the possession of the premises to some other persons. Initially, such application was allowed ex-parte vide order date 14.01.2015, with the directions to hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the appellant/opponent within thirty days. However, when Execution Application No.14/2015 was filed, the respondent No. 1/ landlord filed an application under Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("C.P.C."), and vide order dated 25.09.2016, the ex- parte order dated 14.01.2015 was recalled and parties were directed to proceed on merits. Finally, the Rent Controller vide order dated 08.12.2017, allowed the application for restoration of possession under Section 15-A of the SRPO, with directions to the landlord to hand over the vacant peaceful possession to the opponent/appellant within the period of 30 days. The

respondent No.1 filed FRA No.623/2017 before the IXth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karachi, South which was allowed, and the order of the Rent Controller was set aside. Thereafter, the appellant challenged the said order in the Sindh High Court vide C.P. No. S-1074/2018, but it was dismissed by dint of the impugned order dated 07.04.2021. 4. The leave to appeal was granted by this Court vide order dated 21.10.2021 on the following tennis as under:-- "This petition is directed against the judgment dated 07.04.2021, rendered by learned High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P.S-1074/18, whereby Constitution Petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. 2. The short lived facts of the present lis are that Respondent No.1 filed an application under Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 ('SRPO'), for the eviction of the petitioner on the ground that he has four sons, all are major and residing with him in his house at Karachi and the marriage of elder son has taken place on 27.05.2005 and the marriage of the remaining sons will be arranged shortly, therefore, he requires the subject premises for his personal bona fide use as well as for use of his sons, who wish to live separately after their marriages. From the record, it appears that in the earlier round of litigation, the ejectment was allowed and it was challenged up to the level of this Court but ultimately the petitioner handed over the possession of the premises to the respondent on 26.11.2012. The petitioner in the Rent Case No.735/2005 filed an application on 17.12.2013 for restoration of the possession on the ground that neither the respondent nor his family members have occupied the premises, which was got vacated for personal bona fide need. This application was allowed by the Rent Controller but in appeal the order of the Rent Controller was reversed, which was also maintained by the High Court in Constitution Petition. 3. During the proceedings, it was pleaded by Respondent No.1 that the premises was not relet but it was handed over to his employees. Whereas in the rent application, Respondent No.1 pleaded that the premises was required for his personal bona fide need. The learned Appellate Court in FRA as well as the learned Judge in the High Court observed that the application was, moved after 17 months but much emphasis was made that the property was not relet but it was in use of landlord's employees. In tandem, we cannot lose sight of the niceties of Section 15-A of the SRPO, which explicate that if the landlord, who has obtained the possession of the building under Clause (vii) of Section 15 of the SRPO, relets the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession, he shall be punishable with fine which shall not exceed one year's rent of the building of the premises, and the tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building or the premises. It is clear that Section 15-A of the SRPO has two limbs. One is obviously debars landlord from re-letting the premises to anybody; and the second limb is that the landlord cannot put the premises in possession or in use of a person other than personal use but here throughout the proceedings we have observed that the Appellate Court as well as the High Court have made much emphasis that the premises in question was not relet but it was in use of the employee of Respondent No.1 but the effect of not occupying the premises for personal use has not been taken into consideration by the lower fora in terms of section 15-A of the SRPO. 4. In order to examine the above aspect of the matter, we grant leave to appeal. As a short question is involved, office is directed to fix the appeal within a period of three months after completing the codal formalities" 5. The appellant appeared in person and relied on the grounds. transliterated in the memorandum of appeal stating that the possession was obtained through fraud and restoration was rightly allowed by the Rent Controller in terms of Section 15-A of the SRPO. It was further averred that as a tenant, she produced evidence before the Rent Controller to demonstrate that the landlord, after obtaining possession, handed over the premises to some other persons. The findings recorded by the Rent Controller were based on sound and cogent reasons, which were reversed by the appellate Court without appreciation of evidence. The High Court also misinterpreted Section 15-A of the SRPO and went on to hold that no case of reletting was made out, instead of appreciating the facts as to why the landlord did not occupy the premises within one year, hence he utterly violated Section 15-A of the SRPO. 6. Mr. Iftikhar Javaid Qazi, learned amicus curiae, argued that while deciding an application under Section 15-A of the SRPO, it has to be seen first what the landlord actually pleaded in the ejectment application. It was further avowed that Section 15-A can be invoked against the landlord who, after obtaining possession of the premises, either relets the same to any person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within a period of one year from the date of obtaining the possession. If any such misuse is brought to the knowledge of the Rent Controller, then in terms of Section 15-A of the SRPO, two reliefs can be granted to the tenant simultaneously, i.e., the fine not exceeding one year's rent of the premises payable immediately before the premises gets vacated and the restoration of possession to the tenant. He further argued that the words used in the said provision, "puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession," apparently indicate that such application can be filed after expiry of one year and not within one year from the date of eviction of a tenant, and according to him, the limitation for filing an application for restoration of possession is regulated under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ("Limitation Act"). It was further contended that Section 15-A of the SRPO provides protection to the tenants who have been ordered to be evicted on the false ground of personal need. It was further argued that the implementation and interpretation of such provision requires strict application in order to safeguard and protect the rights of a tenant who was evicted on the false ground of personal need. 7. Mr. Badar Alam, the learned counsel for the respondents Nos.1 to 3, in prologue argued that the perusal of the leave granting order shows that the date of handing over possession of the subject flat by the appellant is correctly mentioned as 26.11.2012. However, the date of filing of the application under Section- 15-A of the SRPO for restoration of possession of the subject flat is mistakenly mentioned as 17.12.2013, whereas the correct date is 04.01.2014, which was the date of presentation of the said application. The learned counsel referred to the leave granting order wherein it was observed that Section 15-A of the SRPO has two limbs. The learned counsel averred that one limb obviously debars the landlord from reletting the premises to anybody, and the second limb emphasizes that the landlord cannot put the premises to any use except personal use. According to the learned counsel, throughout the proceedings the appellate Court as well as the High Court both placed much emphasis on the fact that the premises in question was not relet but was in use by the employee of respondent No. 1. However, the effect of not occupying the premises for personal use has not been taken into consideration by the lower fora in terms of Section 15-A of the SRPO, which cannot be considered here. 8. It was further averred that the reason for not occupying the subject flat for personal use by the respondent No.1 has been taken into consideration by the appellate Court in the order dated 21.04.2018, passed in FRA No.623/2017, wherein it was specifically noted that, as per the bailiff's report, the premises was in a dilapidated condition and required renovation, but the appellant/ex-tenant never refuted this fact in the evidence. He placed much emphasis on the bailiff's report submitted in Execution No.68/2011 (Rent Case No.735/2005), which depicts that the ex-tenant had removed all the doors and windows, and even took away water closet and water taps from the subject flat. Therefore, in such circumstances, the respondent/landlord could not be penalized on the ground that he did not use the premises for his personal use within twelve months of taking over possession, when the appellant/ex-tenant made it impossible for occupation for personal use. However, in order to save the premises from the hands of the ex-tenant, the landlord handed over the same to their employee Shahzad and his wife Zahida till the time they renovate the same. 9. In support of his contention, the learned counsel referred to Section 182 of the Contract Act, 1872, which provides that an "Agent" is a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third person. He also cited Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition, p. 1368) wherein "Servant" has been defined as an employee; one employed to perform service in the master's affairs, whose physical conduct in performance of the service is controlled or subject to the right to control by the master. It was further contended a public notice was published by the Sindh Building Control Authority (SBCA) in Daily Jang on 27.07.2012, whereby 17 buildings were declared to be in a dilapidated condition, and at Serial No.15 of the notice, the building constructed on Plot No.9, SB-5, Inverity Road, Saddar, Karachi, is included, which also provided reasonable ground to the landlord for not occupying the premises, which is declared dangerous and not fit for habitation. 10. Heard the arguments. The learned amicus curiae and learned counsel for the respondents both argued that the question of law involved herein is a case of first impression. The application and implication of Section 15-A of the SRPO has not been addressed by this Court earlier and there is no existing precedent of this Court for guidance or to shape the development of the law. We have also conducted diligent research to ascertain if any dictum has been laid down by this Court in the context of the aforesaid section of law. To come to the point, the underlying principle of promulgating the SRPO, in our considered view, was to standardise and align the statutory relationship between landlords and tenants with certain rights and obligations, aiming to protect their best interests. Certain efficacious and constructive provisions in respect of rented premise within urban areas have been incorporated. According to clause (g) of Section 2 (Definitions Clause) of the SRPO, the terminology "personal use" is defined as under:-- (g) "personal use" means the use of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter" [emphasis Applied] 11. The ejectment application can be filed by the landlord under Section 15 of the SRPO, which provides in subsection (1) that where a landlord seeks to evict the tenant otherwise than in accordance with Section 14, he shall make such application to the Controller. Subsection (2) envisages that the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises within such period as may be specified in the order, if he is satisfied that the landlord has made out the case of eviction against the tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in subsection (2) of Section 15 of the SRPO. Since, in the present context, the ejectment was sought on the ground of personal use, the relevant clause is reproduced as under: - "(vii) the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children". [Emphasis Applied] 12. If we conscientiously explore the definition of personal use in juxtaposition with the condition of ejectment sought to be achieved on the foothold of clause (viii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the SRPO, it undoubtedly resonates that the landlord has to prove that he/she required the premises in good faith for his/her own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his/her spouse or any of his children. Unambiguously, the initial burden of proof that the premises is required in good faith shall be on the landlord, and once this burden is discharged, then the onus to prove the contrary is shifted on the tenant. The expression "good faith", a significant legal catchword, especially in the present controversy, has been defined in different law lexicons as under: 1. Words and Phrases (West Publishing Co.) Vol. 18A, (Permanent Edition, Pages 84-85) "Good faith" means something beyond honest endeavor. Generally speaking, "good faith" means being faithful to one's duty or obligation. Good faith, in the popular sense, is used to denote the actual existing state of the mind, without regard to what it should be from given standards of law or reason. Good faith is one form of credibility, it means that motive that actuated conduct in question was in fact what actor ascribes to it, that is, that what he gives as his motive was in truth his motive. Good faith is a concrete quality, descriptive of the motivating purpose of one's act or conduct when challenged or called in question. 2. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, John S. James, (Volume 2, page 1172) A thing is done "in good faith," "when it is, in fact, done honestly, whether it be done negligently or not." 3. Law Terms and Phrases (Judicially Interpreted, Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Khan Mokal) Page 416. The expression "good faith" has been defined in Sec. 52 of Penal Code. It provides that "Nothing is said to be done or believed without due care and attention". This is a negative definition but it indicates that an act is said to be done in good faith when it is done with due care and attention. Indeed, it does not require logical infallibility. 4. Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon and Legal Maxims [2nd Edition, Page 942 (1986)] Good faith contemplates an honest effort to ascertain the facts upon which exercise of the power must rest. It must therefore be summed up as an honest determination from ascertained facts. 'Good faith' precludes pretence or deceit and also negligence and recklessness. A lack of diligence, which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise, is, in law, a want of good faith. Once this is shown, good faith does not require a sound judgment. 5. Oxford. Dictionary of Law (Elizabeth A. martin 2022 Ed.), Page 328. Good Faith: Honesty. An act carried out in good faith (bona fide) is one carried out honestly. 6. Merriam Webster. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/good%20faith] Good faith: Honesty or lawfulness of purpose 7. LexisNexis [https://www.lexisnexis.co.uk/legal/glossary/good-faith] Good faith definition: An overarching concept for being open and honest in negotiations that goes beyond the idea of not deceiving the other party. There is no particular definition of 'good faith' in English law but it has been described as 'In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems out-side the common law world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not simply mean that they should not deceive each other...; its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as 'playing fair,' coming clean' or 'putting one's cards face upwards on the table'. It is in essence a 'principle of fair and open dealing..." 8. Legal Information Institute [Cornell Law School] [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/good faith] Good faith is a. broad term that's used to encompass honest dealing. Depending on the exact setting, good faith may require an honest belief or purpose, faithful performance of duties, observance of fair dealing standards, or an absence of fraudulent intent. 13. It is unequivocally clear from unembellished reading of the above provisions that the ejectment…

Read the unabridged text and precedent citation network on Al Wakeelo Legal Research Platform.

Related Legal Research & Directories

• Browse all judgments from SUPREME-COURT
• Search Pakistani statutes: Constitution of Pakistan 1973, PPC, CrPC, CPC & Family Laws
• Analyze this case with Al Wakeelo AI Legal Assistant