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Official Citation: 2025 IHC 252061
Court / Jurisdiction: Islamabad High Court
Parties: Dr. Fowzia Siddiqui vs M/o Foreign Affairs, etc.
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Islamabad High Court, officially reported as 2025 IHC 252061. In this matter between Dr. Fowzia Siddiqui and M/o Foreign Affairs, etc., the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Islamabad High Court (Honourable Mr. Justice Arbab Muhammad Tahir, Honourable Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas, Honourable Mr. Justice Khadim Hussain Soomro, Honourable Mr. Justice Muhammad Azam Khan) AUTHOR JUDGE: Honourable Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas DECISION DATE: 03-DEC-2025 CASE NO: Writ Petition-3139-2015 CITATION: 2025 IHC 252061 PARTIES: Dr. Fowzia Siddiqui VS M/o Foreign Affairs, etc. LAW / SECTION: - SUBJECT: Miscelleneous, Other REMARKS: Seeking direction regarding updates about mental and physical health of Dr. Afia Siddiqui ============================================================ JUDGMENT SHEET ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
WRIT PETITION NO. 3139 OF 2015 Dr. Fowzia Siddiqui VERSUS The Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others
Petitioner by: Mr. Imran Shafique, Advocate along with petitioner (on video link). Respondents by: Mr. Rashid Hafeez, Additional Attorney General and Mr. Assad Burki, Legal Advisor, M/o Foreign Affairs.
Date of Hearing: 03.12.2025
INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J .- The matter before the Court arises from an extraordinary chain of events in which judicial power was asserted outside the framework through which the Constitution permits it to operate. To reach a principled determination, it is necessary to trace the fact ual sequence that gave rise to the impugned proceedings and to examine the circumstances under which a Judge, shown on leave and absent from the approved roster, proceeded to hold court, call cases, and issue directions of considerable consequence. Such a departure from established constitutional structure requires careful scrutiny, for the legitimacy of judicial acts depends not merely on the authority of the individual Judge but on the lawful existence of the Bench through which judicial power is exercise d. This Court considers the matter with full awareness that the strength and credibility of the judicial system depend upon strict observance of the Constitution and the settled procedural safeguards laid down by law. Judicial power cannot be exercised cas ually or arbitrarily; rather, it can only be invoked in the manner prescribed by law, at the proper stage, and by a person who is legally entitled to seek such relief. These safeguards are not mere technicalities but are fundamental principles meant to ens ure fairness, legality, and public confidence in the justice system. Any departure from these constitutional and procedural requirements would undermine the rule of law and weaken the very foundation of judicial authority. Accordingly, this Court is 2 W.P. No.3139/2015
bound to examine the matter within these legal limits before exercising its jurisdiction. Factual Background 2. It is appropriate, at the outset; to extract the factual background of the present issue from the order dated 21.07.2025, authored by the Honorable Mr . Justice Sardar Ejaz Ishaq Khan. The legal effect and operative status of that order will be examined at a later stage; for present purposes, the Court refers to it solely to delineate the relevant chronology and factual setting. For convenience, the orde r dated July 21, 2025 is reproduced below: - “Ever since the demolition squad was catapulted into this High Court after the 26th Constitutional Amendment, we have seen one heresy after another hurled at the edifice of justice, maiming it repeatedly, and br inging it almost to its last breaths. This is yet another instance. The heresy I speak of now is besieging the dispensation of Justice by a Judge of the High Court by the device of the ‘weekly roster’ controlled by the office of the Chief Justice. It is bo th heart -rending and amusing at the same time, a blend of paradox that this High Court has become. 2 I had passed the previous order giving the Government time to revert with its decision, while cautioning the learned AAG that inaction would leave me no choice but to proceed in contempt. The Government filed an appeal before the Supreme Court against my earlier decision permitting amendments to the petition for continuation of this case. For whatever reason, the Government’s case had not been taken up by the Supreme Court. The machinations of the executive appeared elsewhere, in the form of controlling the proceedings of this Court through its roster. The legal historians would write that now, even if he wishes to by reason of imperatives of urgent justice , a Judge is now not allowed to hold Court by the High Court establishment when he is on leave. 3 My leave was meant to start today. The roster of Judges sitting for this week therefore did not include my name. The leave schedule was announced much earlier to the date on which I had ordered to list this case today, given its importance and the need 3 W.P. No.3139/2015
for swift dispensation of justice in this and the other cases that I ordered for listing today. On Thursday or perhaps Friday, I was informed through my PS by th e Office that the cause list will not be issued unless the roster of the sitting Judges for this week was amended with the leave of the Chief Justice. That seemed to me a trivial matter and I asked my PS to move an application accordingly. I was informed o n Saturday that the application was duly moved but the file remained on the table of the Chief Justice, who did not find even 30 seconds to sign it. Whether that was by design or oversight, I cannot say for sure, but given the manner in which the roster of Judges has been used as a tool for the desired outcome in specific cases, and given the Government’s stiff opposition to do what is right and to stand by the daughter of the nation at the critical juncture of the Motion before a US Court, I may be forgive n for thinking that it was the former. The correct legal position is that the Office cannot use the shoulder of the Chief Justice in the exercise of administrative powers to obstruct judicial proceedings ordered by a Judge in an ongoing case. 4 The motivation of a Judge to hold Court on a day on which he is ‘officially’ on leave would spell out whether the reason to hold Court was any ulterior motive or the dispensation of justice. I trust that all right-thinking men and women would agree with me that today my decision to hold Court was solely and exclusively for the purposes of dispensation of justice. Gone are the days when a Judge could pass an order even while playing Golf or dining with his family if the exigency so required. The ceremony of robes and a Courtroom — or the menial triviality of a cause list as in this case — were never the indispensable prerequisites for him to carry out judicial business. 5 This is yet another instance of the reproachable use of the administrative power to shackle the exe rcise of independent judicial authority, with the likely motivation to pend (until my leave ends) the Government’s response with reasons as to why it would not sign the amicus brief. However, the imperatives of justice shall not be defeated by such petty m eans. To the extent I can, I will exercise my judicial authority to the end of upholding the dignity of the High Court and the justice it dispenses. 4 W.P. No.3139/2015
6 Therefore, as the Government has not reverted with the reasons despite being directed to do so, it is in contempt, leaving me with no option but to issue a notice of contempt to the Federal Government. 7 Office is directed to initiate a contempt petition accordingly, in which all the members of the Federal Government will be respondents. The replies of all th e Ministers, including the Prime Minister, shall be filed within two weeks from today. 8 Relist on 01.09.2025.” 3. Paragraph 3 of the referenced order makes clear that the leave schedule of the Honourable Judge had been publicly announced well in advance. In pursuance of that schedule, the name of the Honourable Judge was accordingly excluded from the roster for the we ek commencing July 21, 2025 , which roster was prepared by the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) in accordance with established administrative practice and subsequently approved by the Honourable Chief Justice. Additionally, the previously notified roster governi ng the summer recess expressly designated July 21, 2025, as a vacation day for the said Judge. The order further reflects that a note was later transmitted by the Private Secretary to the Honourable Judge, indicating the Judge’s potential availability on J uly 21; nevertheless, the formal roster, excluding the Judge in conformity with the announced leave schedule , was duly issued under the authority of the Honourable Chief Justice. The expression “who did not find even 30 seconds to sign it” unmistakably ind icates that the Honourable Judge was fully aware that the note transmitted to the Chief Justice was still under consideration and had not received approval. It also reflects his awareness that, in accordance with the previously announced leave schedule, hi s name had not been included in the roster issued by the Chief Justice. Notwithstanding this clear state of affairs and despite knowing that no administrative order had been issued to alter or override the approved roster, the Honourable Judge proceeded to hold court, hear cases, and issue orders. Furthermore, paragraph 7 of the said order records that the Honourable Judge directed the Office to prepare a contempt petition, to implead all members of the Federal Government as respondents therein, and to reli st the matter for hearing on 01.09.2025. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice, whereupon his Lordship was pleased to assign the case to our learned brother Hon’ble Mr Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas (Bench -IX), which on the succeeding date i.e. 01.09.2025 pass the following order:- 5 W.P. No.3139/2015
“Before entrustment of the instant case to this bench, on the last date of hearing, the earlier bench vide order dated 21.07.2025 raised the issue of roster of the sitting of the Judges by the Hon’ble Chief Justice. This bench vides reported order dated 10.04.2025 (citation awaited) passed in Objection case No.6580/2025 in Writ Petition No.1053/2025 has already given its view that according to the Rules, the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) prepares a roster fo r sitting of judges singly or the benches, which is to be approved by the Chief Justice, who is the Master of the Roster. 2. In view of the above, propriety demands that the instant matter may be heard by a larger bench of this Court. The office is direct ed to place the file before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders.” 4. Pursuant thereto, the Hon’ble Chief Justice was pleased to constitute the present Larger Bench to hear and decide the matter. The foundational questions arising from the situ ation created by the order dated 21.07.2025 require comprehensive examination and determination so that the issues occasioned thereby may be conclusively resolved. Accordingly, the following questions merit consideration: 1. Whether a Bench exists in law by virtue of its Judges or only upon approval of the roster by the Chief Justice? and 2. Whether a Judge can self-assign a case? 3. And whether the Chief Justice is legally obliged to obtain the consent of any Bench before consolidating identical petitions and reallocating them for hearing? 5. Each question requires separate and considered analysis, to which we now turn. Whether a Bench exists in law by virtue of its Judges or only upon approval of the roster by the Chief Justice? 6. In examining the issue presented, it becomes necessary to consider the combined operation of Articles 175(2) and 202 of the Constitution. Read together, these provisions define both the source and the structural limits of the High Court's judicial authority. 6 W.P. No.3139/2015
Article 175 (2) 7. Article 175(2) articulates the foundational rule that no court may exercise any jurisdiction except such as is conferred by the Constitution or by or under law. This clause cannot be interpreted through a narrow or literal lens. Its true import becomes evident when its language is effectively inverted: “ a court possesses only such jurisdiction as the Constitution or law affirmatively confers ”. This principle governs not only the allocation of subject -matter jurisdiction among various courts, but also the internal distribution and activation of jurisdiction within a particular court. Judicial authority within the High Court, therefore, does not attach to a Judge as an individual. It attaches to the institution itself and becomes exercis able only when the Judge sits as part of a Bench that has been validly constituted in accordance with law. 8. Article 175(2) imposes an absolute constitutional limitation: no court and no Judge may exercise judicial authority unless the law has unmistakab ly vested that jurisdiction in the forum that purports to act. Jurisdiction cannot be presumed, inferred from convenience, or assumed at will; it must exist as a matter of legal conferment. Where a Bench has not been lawfully conferred jurisdiction through the procedure prescribed by the Constitution and the relevant statutes, it cannot be regarded as a valid forum for the exercise of judicial power. Such a Bench exists outside the constitutional scheme governing the administration of justice. Consequently, any act on its part, whether to assemble, take up cases, hear parties, or pass orders, amounts to an assumption of authority that the Constitution does not permit. Acts performed in the absence of lawful jurisdiction are not curable defects or mere procedural irregularities; rather, they strike at the root of the matter. Any orders so passed have no legal force or effect, as they originate from a body that never acquired lawful seisin of the case and, therefore, lacked the competence to adjudicate upon it in the first place. 9. Before moving forward, we understand that it is necessary to examine the word “Jurisdiction” used in article 175(2). 10. “Jurisdiction” is one of the most fundamental concepts in judicial power and legal adjudication. In its classic al sense, jurisdiction refers to a court’s or judicial forum's authority to hear, entertain, and decide a case . It is not an abstract or moral quality; it is a legal condition precedent to the validity of any judicial act. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to state with precision what the law means when it 7 W.P. No.3139/2015
refers to “jurisdiction” and to distinguish it from the broader and more abstract notion of “judicial power.” Although the Constitution establishes the judicial organ s of the State, its function extends far beyond their mere creation. The Constitution and the laws validly made under it may prescribe the categories of matters upon which the judicial power may be exercised; the manner, form, and stages of its exercise; t he territorial limits within which a Court shall function and to which its writs shall run; and the persons or classes of persons over whom the Court’s adjudicatory authority shall extend. It may confer appellate, revisional, or original jurisdiction, or r estrict a particular Court to a narrow field such as cassation, constitutional adjudication, or administrative review. 11. These structural prescriptions collectively constitute what, in legal parlance, is termed the jurisdiction of a Court. Jurisdiction i s not an abstract idea; it is a juridical configuration that defines the precise subject -matter, the geographical sphere, the persons, and the procedural modes in respect of which a Court is authorised to exercise the judicial power vested in it. It is the refore the legal authority of a Court to entertain, hear, and determine a given lis; and it also embodies the conditions under which that authority may be invoked and the manner in which it may be exercised. 12. Judicial power, by contrast, denotes the inh erent authority of the judicial branch as one of the coordinate organs of the State, the power to ascertain facts, interpret law, apply legal norms, resolve disputes, and render binding judgments. But this judicial power, however expansive in the abstract, cannot be exercised in the absence of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the operational gateway through which judicial power passes before it may be exerted in any concrete case. It is thus jurisdiction, not the mere existence of judicial power that transform s a Judge or a Bench from a constitutional office -holder into a legally empowered adjudicatory forum in a particular matter. 13. In doctrinal terms, then, jurisdiction is the right and authority to adjudicate a specific subject -matter in a particular case , as well as the authority to deploy the judicial power of the State in the mode and manner prescribed by law. Without jurisdiction, judicial power remains dormant and cannot be validly invoked. Any act undertaken without jurisdiction, regardless of the qua lifications of the Judge or the apparent justice of the outcome, is a legal nullity, a decision rendered coram non judice. Hon’ble Supreme Court in its Judgment passed in SMC 4/2021, held that, on the constitutional plane, “Jurisdiction” as used in Article 175(2) refers to or indicates 8 W.P. No.3139/2015
that part of the judicial power that is allocated to a particular court. The operative part of the order is reproduced as under: - “18. While the Constitution does not, as such, use the term “judicial power” it does say some thing, in Article 175, of the judicial branch in general terms. Clause (1) provides that there shall be a Supreme Court, a High Court for each Province and for the Islamabad Capital Territory and “such other courts as may be established by law”. Clause (2) provides as follows: “No court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law.” Cast though it is in negative terms, this provision ought not, in our view, be read in minimalist and literalist t erms notwithstanding, with respect, some observations in the case law that might suggest otherwise. For one thing, this may seriously jeopardize or compromise the independence of the judiciary and result in a substantial erosion (and even denial) of access to justice. Further, such an approach would, among other consequences, divest the courts of jurisdiction that is recognized as inherent. To take but one example, it is well established that s. 151 CPC does not invest the court with any powers but only sav es its inherent powers. A literal and minimalist reading of Article 175(2) may cast doubt on this (and equivalent) provisions, which would clearly be incorrect. In our view, the conferring of jurisdiction on courts by the Constitution and the law (and sinc e the law must ultimately find repose in the Constitution, the former in particular) does not mean only such as is expressly so conferred. It includes also, but is not limited to, all such jurisdiction as by intendment or necessary implication (especially including, on the constitutional plane, such as may be required to give full expression to constitutional provisions and principles) must be held to vest or inhere in courts of law. Perhaps a better appreciation of Article 175(2) can be obtained by inverti ng its language: “all courts shall have only such jurisdiction as is or may be conferred on them by the Constitution or by or under any law”. When so viewed, it becomes clearer that Article 175 does tell us, albeit indirectly, something about the “judicial power” of the State. On a combined reading of clauses (1) and (2) it can be concluded that, by application of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judicial power does vest in the judiciary but that the actual allocation of this power among the various components of the judicial branch (i.e., the jurisdiction of a particular court) is to be as is conferred (either directly or otherwise) by the 9 W.P. No.3139/2015
Constitution or law. Clause (3), in requiring the separation of the judiciary from the executive, provides fur ther confirmation that the judicial power vests in the judicial branch. We pause here to note the Constitution also recognizes, in addition to Courts of law, the existence and jurisdiction of what are called Administrative Courts and Tribunals. This is not only under Articles 212 and 225 but also in terms of entry No. 14 of the Federal Legislative List (and corresponding legislative competence that, though not enumerated, is available also to the Provinces). Quite how the Constitution seeks to establish and balance the interaction and interplay between Court on the one hand and Tribunals on the other in relation to judicial power is a matter not before us and hence outside the scope of what is said here. 19. The distinction between judicial power on the one hand and jurisdiction on the other was also noted in Ziaur Rehman in the following terms by the learned Chief Justice, who gave the judgment of the Court (pp. 69–70, emphasis in original): “……I should make it clear that I am making a distinction between ‘judicial power’ and ‘jurisdiction’. In a system where there is a trichotomy of sovereign powers, then ex necessitate rei from the very nature of things the judicial power must be vested in the judiciary. But what is this judicial power. ‘Judicial Power’ has been defined in the Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. XVI, Paragraph 144, as follows: ‘The judiciary or judicial department is an independent branch of Government, and in that branch thereof which is intended to interpret, construe, and apply the law, or that d epartment of Government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is, and its construction, so far as it is written law.’ This power, it is said, is inherent in the judiciary by reason of the system of division of powers itself under which, as Chief Justice Marshall put it, “the Legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes, the law.” Thus, the determination of what the existing law is in relation to something already done or happened is the function of the judiciary whi le the pre -determination of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future cases falling under its provisions is the function of the Legislature.” 10 W.P. No.3139/2015
It may well be asked at this stage as to what is meant by “jurisdiction”? How does it differ from “judicial power”? Apart from setting up the organs the Constitution may well provide for a great many other things, such as, the subjects in respect of which that power may be exercised and the manner of the exercise of that power. Thus it may provide that the Courts set up will exercise revisional or appellate powers or only act as a Court of [Cassation] or only decide constitutional issues. It may demarcate t he territories in which a particular Court shall function and over which its Writs shall run. It may specify the persons in respect of whom the judicial power to hear and determine will be exercisable. These are all matters which are commonly comprised in what is called the jurisdiction of the Court. It expresses the concept of the particular res or subject matter over which the judicial power is to be exercised and the manner of its exercise. Jurisdiction is, therefore, a right to adjudicate concerning a particular subject -matter in a given case, as also the authority to exercise in a particular manner the judicial power vested in the Court. 20. Thus, on the constitutional plane, “jurisdiction” as used in Article 175(2) refers to or indicates that part of the judicial power that is allocated to a particular court. 14. In the context of the present case, the…
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