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Petitioner: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI VS Respondent: ASSOCIATION OF VICTIMS OF UPHAAR JUDGMENT
Court Name: Supreme Court of India Judge(s): K. S. Radhakrishnan, R. V. Raveendran Title:MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI vs ASSOCIATION OF VICTIMS OF UPHAAR
JUDGMENT
Reported As: 2012 SCMR 1549 Result: Order accordingly Judgment JUDGMENT ' R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.---These appeals are filed against the judgment dated 24-4-2003 of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the Uphaar Cinema tragedy. Civil Appeals Nos.7114-15 of 2003 is by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (for short `MCD'). Civil Appeal No,7116 of 2003 is by the Licensing Authority (Commissioner of Police). CA No,6748 of 2004 is by Messrs Ansal Theatre and Clubotels Pvt. Ltd., the owners of the Uphaar Cinema Theatre (for short the 'theatre owner' or 'Licensee). 2.. These appeals relate to the fire at Pharr Cinema Theatre in Green Park, South Delhi on 13-6-1997, resulting in the death of 59 patrons and injury to 103 patrons. During the matinee show of a newly released film on 13-6-1997, the patrons of the cinema hall which was full were engrossed in the film. Shortly after the interval, a transformer of Delhi Vidyut Board installed in the ground floor parking area of Pharr Cinema, caught fire. The oil from the transformer leaked and found its way to the passage outside where many cars were parked. Two cars were parked immediately adjoining the entrance of the transformer room. The burning oil spread the fire to nearby cars and from then to the other parked cars. The burning of (i) the transformer oil (ii) the diesel and petrol from the parked vehicles (iii) the upholstery material, paint and other chemicals of the vehicles and (iv) foam and other articles stored in the said parking area generated huge quantity of fumes and smoke which consisted of carbon monoxide and several poisonous gases. As the ground floor parking was covered all round by walls, and the air was blowing in from the entry and exit points, the smoke and noxious fumes/smoke could not find its way out into open atmosphere and was blown towards the staircase leading to the balcony exit. On account of the chimney effect, the smoke travelled up. Smoke also travelled to the air-conditioner ducts and was sucked in and
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released into the auditorium. The smoke and the noxious fumes stagnated in the upper reaches of the auditorium, particularly in the balcony area. By then the electricity went off and the exit signs were also not operating or visible. The patrons in the balcony who were affected by the fumes, were groping in the dark to get out. The central gangway in the balcony that led to the Entrance foyer could have been an effective and easy exit, but it was closed and bolted from outside, as that door was used only for entry into the balcony from the foyer. The patrons, therefore groped through towards the only exit situated on the left side top corner of the balcony. The staircase outside the balcony exit which was the only way out was also full of noxious fumes and smoke. They could not get out of the staircase into the foyer as the door was closed and locked. This resulted in death of 59 persons in the balcony and stairwell due to asphyxiation by inhaling the noxious fumes/smoke. 103 patrons were also injured in trying to get out. 3. First Respondent is an association of the victims of Uphaar Tragedy for short the 'Victims Association' or `Association'). The members of the Association are either those who were injured in the fire or are relatives/legal heirs of those who were killed in the fire. The Association filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court. They highlighted the shocking state of affairs existing in the cinema building at the time of the incident and the inadequate safety arrangements made by the owners. They described the several violations by the owners of the statutory obligations placed on theatre owners under law, for prevention of fire hazards in public places. They highlighted the acts of omission and commission by the public authorities concerned namely Delhi Vidyut Board (`DVB' for short), MCD Fire Force and the Licensing Authority. ' They alleged that these authorities not only failed in the discharge of their statutory obligations, but acted in a manner which was prejudicial to public interest by failing to observe the standards set under the statute and the rules framed for the purpose of preventing fire hazards; that they issued licenses and permits in complete disregard of the mandatory conditions of inspection which were required to ensure that the minimum safeguards were provided in the cinema theatre. They pointed out that most of the cinema theatres were and are being permitted to run without any proper inspection and many a time without the required licenses, permissions and clearances. They therefore, sought adequate compensation for the victims of the tragedy and punitive damages against the theatre owner, DVB, MCD, Fire Force and the Licensing Authority for showing callous disregard to their statutory obligations and to the fundamental and indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article, 21 of. The Constitution of India, of the theatre going public, in failing to provide, safe premises, free from reasonably foreseeable hazards. They claimed compensation and other reliefs as under:-- (a) award damages of Rs,11.8 crores against the respondents, jointly and severally, to the legal heirs of the victims who lost their lives (listed in Annexure B of the writ petition) through the Association with the direction to equally distribute the same to the first degree heirs of all the victims; (b) award damages of Rs,10.3 crores against the respondents, jointly and severally, to the injured (listed in Annexure C to the writ petition) to be distributed evenly or in such manner as may be considered just and proper; (c) award punitive damages of Rs,100 crores to the association for setting up and running a Centralized Accident and Trauma Services and other allied services in the city of Delhi; and to direct Union of India to create a fund for that purpose; (d) to monitor the investigation from time to time, to ensure that no person guilty of any of the offences is able to escape the clutches of law and that the investigation is carried out as expeditiously as possible in a free and fair manner; and (e) direct the Union of India to ensure that no cinema hall in the country is allowed to run without license granted after strictly observing all the mandatory conditions prescribed under the laws and to further direct them to stop the operation of all cinema halls and to permit the operation only
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after verification of the existence of a valid license/permit by the licensing authority, under the Cinematograph Act. Relevant Legal Provisions 4. The Cinematograph Act, 1952 provides for regularization of exhibition of Cinemas. Section 10 provides that a cinema theatre cannot be run without obtaining license from the Licensing Authority. Section 11 provides that the Licensing Authority shall be the District Magistrate. After the coming into force of the Commissioner of Police system in Delhi in 1978, the Commissioner of Police was notified as the. Licensing authority under the proviso to section 11 of the Act. Licenses to be granted to a cinema theatre under section 10 could be either annual or temporary. All cinema theatres in Delhi were required to get their licenses renewed annually by moving an application in writing to the licensing authority. While granting renewal, the licensing authority was required to satisfy itself that the licensee had complied with the provisions of the Cinematograph Act and the Delhi Cinematograph Rules framed thereunder. 5. When the cinema theatre was constructed in the year 1973, the Delhi Cinematograph Rules, 1953 were regulating the procedure of granting licenses, inspection and conditions of licences. After the coming into force of the Commissioner of Police system, the Delhi Cinematograph Rules, 1983 came into force. Rule 3 provides that license shall be granted in respect of a building which is permanently equipped for Cinematograph exhibition and in respect of which the requirements set forth in first schedule of the Rules were fulfilled. The first schedule to the Rules laid down the specifications with which compliance must be made before any annual license was granted in respect of any building. Besides other things, the schedule lays down specifications regarding number of persons accommodated in the cinema hall and the manner in which the seats can be provided therein. The 1953 Rules insofar as they are relevant for accommodation, sitting, the width of gangways, stairways, exits, are extracted below:-- (1) Accommodation---The total number of spectators accommodated in the building shall not exceed twenty per hundred square feet of the area available for sitting and standing or twenty per 133.5 square feet of over all area of the floor space in the auditorium. x x x (2) Seating ---(1) The seating in the building shall be arranged so that there is free excess to exits. (3) Gangway---(1) Gangway not less than forty-four inches wide shall be provided in the building as follows: (a) Down each side of the auditorium. (b) Down the centre of the seating accommodation at intervals of not more than twenty-five feet. (c) Parallel to the line of the seating so as to provide direct access to exits, provided that not more than one gangway for every ten rows shall be required. (2) All gangways, exits and the treads of steps and stairways shall be maintained with non-slippery surfaces. x x x (4) The exits and the gangways and passages leading to exits shall be kept clear of any obstruction other than rope barriers provided in accordance with sub-rule (6). On no account shall extra seats be placed in the gangways or spectators be allowed to stand in the gangways at the time of performances in such a way as to block or effectively reduce their width. x x x (4) Stairways----(1) There shall be at least two stairways each not less than four feet wide to provide access to any gallery or upper floor in the building which is intended for use by the public. (5) No stairways shall discharge into a passage or corridor against or across the direction of exit. (5) Exits:---(1) Every public portion of the building shall be provided with an ,adequate number of clearly indicated exits placed in such positions and so maintained as to afford the audience ample means of safe and speedy egress. (2) In the auditorium there shall be at least one exit from every tier, floor, or gallery for every hundred persons accommodated or part thereof:
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' Provided further that an exit on or by way of stage or platform shall not be reckoned as one of exits required by this rule. (3) Every exit from the auditorium shall provide a clear opening space of not less than seven feet high and five feet wide. (4) Exits from the auditorium shall be suitably spaced along both sides and along the back thereof and shall deliver into two or more different thorough fares or open space from which there are at all times free means of rapid dispersal , (5) Every passage or corridor leading from an exit in the auditorium to a final place or exit from the building shall be of such width as will in the opinion of the licensing authority enable the persons who are likely to use it in an emergency to leave the building without danger of crowding or congestion. At no point shall any such passage or corridor be less than five feet wide and it shall not diminish in width in the direction of the final place of exit. (6) The combined width of the final place of exit from the building shall be such that there are at least five feet of exit width for every hundred persons that can be accommodated in the building. (7) All exit doors shall open outwards and shall be so fitted that when opened they do not obstruct any gangway, passage, corridor, stairway or landing. (8) All exit doors and doors through which the public have to pass on the way to the open air shall be available for exit during the whole time that the public are in the building and during such time shall not be locked or bolted. (9) All exits from the auditorium and all doors or openings (other than the main Entrance) intended for egress from the building shall be clearly indicated by the word "EXIT" in block letters, which shall not be less than seven inches high and shall be so displayed as to be clearly visible in the light as well as in the dark. (10) All other doors of openings shall be so constructed as to be clearly distinguishable from exits. They may be indicated by the words "NO THOROUGHFARE" arranged as in the figure below, but no notice bearing the words "NO EXIT" shall be used in any part of the building. (6) Parking Arrangements---(1) Such arrangements shall be made for the parking of motor cars and other vehicles in the vicinity of the buildings as the licensing authority may require. (2) No vehicle shall be parked or allowed to stand in such a way as to obstruct exits or impede the rapid dispersal of persons accommodated, in the event of fire or panic. (7) Fire Precautions---(1) Fire extinguishing appliances suitable to the character of the building and of a patron, class and capacity approved by the licensing authority shall be provided as prescribed by him; these appliances shall be disposed to his satisfaction so as to be readily available for use in case of fire in any part of the building. (2) There shall always be sufficient means of dealing with the fire readily available within the enclosure and these shall include a damp blanket, a portals Chemical tire extinguisher and two buckets of dry sand. (3) All fire extinguishing appliances shall at all times be maintained in proper working order and available for instant use, and all Chemical fire extinguishers shall be capable of withstanding a pressure of not less than 250 lbs. Square inch. (4) During an exhibition all fire extinguishing appliances shall be. In charge of some person or persons specially appointed for this purpose. Such persons need not be employed exclusively in looking after the fire appliances but they must not be given any other work during an exhibition which would take them away from the building or otherwise prevent them from being immediately available in case of danger or alarm of fire. (Emphasis supplied) INQU IRY REPORTS 6. Immediately after the incident, the Lt. Governor constituted an enquiry committee under Mr. Naresh Kumar (DC, South) to investigate into the incident. He secured several reports and in turn
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submitted an exhaustive report on the calamity. When the investigation was transferred to CBI on 26-7-1997, they also secured several reports. The court appointed Commissioners also gave a report. These reports, enumerated below, were considered by the High Court:-- (i) Report dated 16-6-1997 issued by Delhi Fire Service. (ii) Report dated 25-6-1997 of Mr. K. L. Grover, Electrical Inspector (Labour Department) submitted to Mr. Naresh Kumar. (iii) Report dated 25-6-1997 submitted by Mr.R.K. Bhattacharya, Executive Engineer (Building) South Zone, MCD to Mr. Naresh Kumar. (iv) Report dated 26-6-1997 submitted by the Fire Research Laboratory, Central Building Research Institute to Mr. Naresh Kumar. (v) Report dated 27-6-1997 and 11-8-1997 of Central Forensic Science Laboratory to Station House Officer. (vi) Report dated 29-6-1997 by Mr.K.V. Singh, Eicecutive Engineer (Electrical) PWD, to Mr. Naresh Kumar. (vii) Report dated 2-7-1997 by Mr. M.L. Kothari, Electrical Deptt., IIT affirming the observations of Mr. K.V. Singh. (viii) Panchnama dated 2-8-1997 prepared by Sr. Engineer, PWD. (ix) Inspection-cum-Scrutiny Report dated 11-8-1997 by Eng. Deptt. Of MCD. (x) Toxicology Report dated 18-9-1997 by AIIMS. (xi) Joint Inspection Report dated 7-10-1997 by Representative of Licensing Authority, MCD, Delhi Fire Service, Electrical Inspector and General Manager of Uphaar Cinema. (xii) Naresh Kumar Report. (xiii) Court Commissioner's Report dated 30-11-2000. Decision of High Court 7. The High Court after exhaustive consideration of the material including the aforesaid reports, recorded statements and other material, allowed the writ petition by order dated 24-4-2003. In the said order, the High Court identified the causes that led to the calamity and persons responsible therefor. It held the theatre owner, DVB, MCD and the Licensing Authority responsible for the fire tragedy. It exonerated the Delhi Fire Force. We summarise below the acts/omissions attributed to each of them by the High Court. Acts/omissions by DVB 8. DVB violated several provisions of the Electricity Act and the Rules. It had not obtained the approval of the Electrical Inspector for installation of the transformer as required under the Rules. The Rules required that the floor of the transformer room should be at a higher level than the surrounding areas and there should be a channel for draining of oil with a pit so that any leaking oil would not spread outside, increasing the fire hazard, and also to ensure that water did not enter the transformer. The transformer had to be checked periodically and subjected to regular maintenance and should have appropriate covers. The connecting of wires should be by crimping and not by hammering. The negligence on the part of DVB in maintaining the transformers and repairs led to the root cause of the incident, namely the starting of the fire. Acts/Omissions of owner 9. Though the starting of the fire in the transformer happened due to the negligence of DVB, but if the owner had taken the necessary usual precautions and security measures expected of a theatre owner, even if the transformer had caught fire, it would not have spread to nearby cars or other stored articles nor would the balcony and staircases become a death trap on account of the fumes. The following acts/omissions were attributed to the theatre owner:-- (i) Parapet wall: The owner had violated the municipal bye-laws by making several unauthorised alterations in the structure which all contributed to the incident. In particular, the violation by the owner in raising a parapet wall which was shown to be of three feet height in the sanctioned plan
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till the roof level had disastrous effect when the fire broke out The stilt floor plan (sanctioned in 1972) showed that what was sanctioned was a three feet high parapet wall along the ramp which was situated to the rear of the transformer room. If the said parapet wall had been constructed only to a height of three feet as shown in the sanctioned plan, the entire space above it would have been open and in the event of any fire in the transformer room or anywhere in the stilt floor, the fumes/smoke could have dispersed into the atmosphere. But at some point of time in or around 1973, the Licensee had raised the said three feet wall upto the ceiling height of twelve feet with the result the stilt floor (parking area) stood converted into a totally enclosed area. But for the construction of the parapet wall to ceiling height, the fumes/smoke from the transformer room and from the parking area where the cars were burning, would have gone out of the stilt floor into the open atmosphere. The unauthorized raising of this wall prevented the smoke from getting dispersed and forced it to seek a way ,up through the stairwell causing the chimney effect and also entered the balcony through the air conditioning system resulting in the concentration of the smoke in the balcony area of the theatre and the stairwell itself, thereby playing a major role in spreading the fire/smoke to balcony area and stairwell. The Court found that the apparent intention of raising the height of the wall from three to twelve feet was to use the area between the wall and the transformer room for commercial purposes. (ii) Closing one exit in balcony and reducing the width of gangways: Making alterations in the balcony, contrary to the Cinematograph Rules by closing the gangway/aisle on one side and closing/blocking one of the exits by 'construction pf an owner's box in front of the right side exit (The details of these alterations are given in paras 11 to 14 below). The said acts impeded the free and quick exit of the occupants of balcony as everyone had to use the exit on the left side. The delay made them victims of asphyxiation due to the poisonous/noxious gases. (iii) Illegal parking in stilt floor: The stilt floor where the three electrical rooms (generator room, HT room and LT room) were situated, had an earmarked parking space for 15 cars. The sanctioned plan clearly contemplated a passage way for movement of cars of a width of about 16 ft. The sanctioned plan required that the area in front of the three electrical rooms should be left free as a part of that passage way and no parking was contemplated in front of the said three rooms. However the Licensee was permitting the patrons to park their cars in a haphazard manner, particularly in the central passage. Instead of restricting the cars to be parked in that floor to 15 and leaving the central passage, in particular the passage in front of the three electrical rooms free for maneuvering the cars, the owner permitted the entire passage to be used for parking the vehicles, thereby increasing the parking capacity from 15 to 35. This made exiting of vehicles difficult and until and unless the vehicles in the passage were removed, other parked vehicles could not get out. It also made it difficult for any patrons to use the said area as an exit in an emergency. Parking of vehicles in front of the three electrical rooms increased the fire hazard. If the passageway between two parked row of cars in the stilt floor had been kept free of parking as per the sanctioned plan and consequently if no cars had been parked in front of the transformer room, the fire in the transformer room would not have spread to the cars and the entire calamity could have been avoided. On that day, a contessa car parked next to the transformer room in the passageway first caught fire. (Though the sanctioned parking plan showed that the stilt floor was to be used for parking only fifteen cars with a middle passageway of fifteen feet width left free for movement of cars), the parking area was used for parking as many as 35 cars. As the parking area was overcrowded with haphazardly parked cars, the entire passageway meant for movement of cars was blocked. Not following the provisions of Electricity Act and Electricity Rules in regard to the construction of the transformer room with required safeguard and permitting haphazard parking of large number of vehicles, particularly near the transformer room started the fire and spread it.
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(iv) If the owners had not unjustly and by misrepresenting the facts, obtained an interim stay in the year 1983 which continued up to the date of the incident and as a consequence though the irregularities and violations of safety measures had been noticed and brought to its notice, they had not rectified them and the continued violations resulted in the incident. Acts/omissions of MCD 10. The sanctioned plan. Issued in 1972 to the Licensee was for construction of a three feet high parapet wall. Though the, Licensee raised the said wall up to ceiling height of 12 feet in violation of the Rules, the MCD failed to point out this violation between 1994 to 1997 and take action against the theatre owners. MCD was required to give a NOC after inspecting the building, certifying that there was no violation of the building bye-laws or unauthorized construction, every year, from the year 1994 so that licence should be renewed. MCD failed to make such inspections. On the other hand it gave a NOC for grant of licence in the year 1996. Acts/omissions of the Licensing Authority 11. The licensing authority owed a duty to ensure that the cinema theatre complied with all the requirements of the Cinematograph Act and Rules and to obtain the necessary NOCs from MCD, Fire Force and Electrical Inspector. If there was any violation, it ought not to have renewed, the licence. The Licensing Authority failed to note the violations/deviations and take remedial action. Even though a stay order had been issued by the High Court on 28-6-1983, in a writ petition challenging the suspension of licences, the said stay order did not come in the way of the Licensing Authority making appropriate inspections and if necessary to take action to suspend the, licence or seek modification of the interim order. The Licensing Authority did not discharge its statutory functions and went on issuing temporary permits for periods of two months each, for a period of more than 13 years when the Rules clearly contemplated that the temporary permits could not be renewed for a period of more than six months. Conclusion of High Court Closing of one Balcony Exit and narrowing of gangway 12.…
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