Al Wakeelo
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Official Citation: 2025 SHC 3561
Court / Jurisdiction: Sindh High Court
Petitioner: Const. P. 204/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Circuit at Hyderabad - M/S International Credit Information Lt & another (Petitioner)
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Sindh High Court, officially reported as 2025 SHC 3561. In this matter between Const. P. 204/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Circuit at Hyderabad - M/S International Credit Information Lt & another (Petitioner) and the Respondent, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Sindh High Court CASE NO: Const. P. 204/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Circuit at Hyderabad CITATION: 2025 SHC HYD 3561 PARTIES: M/S International Credit Information Lt & another (Petitioner) ORDER DATE: 01-DEC-25 BENCH: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Riazat Ali Sahar(Author) A.F.R: Yes ------------------------------------------------------------ IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, CIRCUIT COURT, HYDERABAD
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 [M/s International Credit Information Limited and Another v. Abdul Wahad Khan and others]
JUDGMENT
RIAZAT ALI SAHAR, J : - The petitioners, M/s. International Credit Information Limited (a company engaged in credit information services) and its Chief Executive, have invoked this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. They assail concurrent orders passed by respondent authorities under the labour laws, whereby Respondent No.1 (Abdul Wahad Khan), a former emplo yee of the petitioner company, was held entitled to certain monetary claims. The impugned orders (by the Authority under the Sindh Payment of Wages Act, 2015 and the appellate forum) directed the petitioner s to pay Respondent No.1 arrears of salary and related compensation. The petitioners seek to have those orders declared without lawful authority, contending inter alia that Respondent No.1 was not a “workman” under the applicable statutes, that the proceedings suffered from n on-joinder of a necessary party and that the forums below lacked jurisdiction in view of the petitioners’ trans -provincial operations. Thus, petitioners seek following reliefs:
a) Call for the R & Ps of Case No. 07 of 2025 u/s. 17 of the Payment of Wages Act from the learned respondent No.3 (Labour Court) and Case No.235/2023 u/s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act from the learned respondent No.2 (Authori ty under the Payment of Wages Act);
Counsel for Petitioners: Mr. Muhammad Nishat Warsi Advocate Counsels/ Representatives for Respondents:
Miss Aisha, Advocate. Mr. Yousuf Ali Rahupoto, A.A.G. Sindh.
Date of Hearing: 01.12.2025 Date of Judgment: 01.12.2025
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 2 b) Set aside the impugned orders dated 05.05.2025 & 11.02.2025 passed by both the forums i.e. respondent Nos. 2 & 3;
c) Hold that the establishment of the petitioners is a trans-provincial Establishment;
d) Suspend the operati on of the impugned orders dated 11.02.2025 and 05.05.2025 passed by both the forums below i.e. respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in the above matter and further direct the learned Authority not to disburse the amount to the respondent No.1 so deposited by the petition ers, till final disposal of this petition;
e) Any other relief(s) which may deems fit and proper under the circumstances etc.”
2. The relevant facts, as averred by the parties, are that Respondent No.1 was engaged by the petitioner company in 2019 as a “Regional Coordinator” under a written contract. His duties involved coordinating with various bank branches (including National Bank of Pakistan, hereinafter “NBP”) for verification of credit information. It appears that his services were availed in connection with an NBP project, and he was stationed at NBP’s regional office in Hyderabad. The employment relationship turned sour in 2021. Respondent No.1 claims that he was forced out of service without due process and without payment of outstanding dues (in cluding salary for s everal months, leave encashment and other benefits). He invoked the Sindh Payment of Wages Act, 2015 (“SPWA 2015”) by filing an application under Section 15 thereof before the Authority (Respondent No.2) for recovery of unpaid wages. Th e petitioners resisted that claim on both factual and legal grounds: they maintain that Respondent No.1 had tendered a voluntary resignation (as evidenced by correspondence and WhatsApp messages) and was paid all dues; that he held a managerial position no t covered under labour laws for “workmen”; and that, in any event, the provincial law and forums were not applicable because the petitioner company operates beyond Sindh. The petition ers further objected that NBP, being the principal institution where Resp ondent No.1 was assigned, was a necessary party to the proceedings but was never impleaded.
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 3
3. The Authority under SPWA 2015 (Respondent No.2) after inquiry allowed Respondent No.1’s claim, holding that his resignation was coerced and ineffective and that th e petitioners had withheld his lawful wages. Relief was granted to him in the form of the due wages plus compensation (apparently equal to the unpaid amount, as permitted by the statute). The petitioners’ appeal was dismissed by the appellate forum (Respondent No.3, a Labour Court), which concurred with the Authority on all material findings. Aggrieved, the petitioners have now approached this Court.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned orders are ultra vires and liable to be set aside on multiple grounds. First, it is argued that Respondent No.1 did not fall within the definition of “workman” or “worker” under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 or the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015, and thus he could not avail remedies under laws meant for workmen. In this regard, counsel emphasizes that Respondent No.1 served in a supervisory/managerial capacity (as a Regional Coordinator liaising with bank management) rather than performing clerical or manual tasks; hence , he was part of management staff, not a workman. Reliance is placed on Abdul Razzaq v. Ihsan Sons Ltd. (1992 PLC 424) and Syed Matloob Hassan v. Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. (1992 SCMR 227), among others, which underscore that the nature of duties – not the job title – is determinative of workman status. It is contended that under these precedents a person mainly entrusted with oversight, coordination and representing the employer cannot be termed a “workman”.
5. Second, the petitioners’ counsel submits that the entire proceedings were not maintainable for non -joinder of a necessary party. The work assigned to Respondent No.1 was in furtherance of a contract between the petitioner company and NBP (a federally chartered bank) and the claim of wages is effectively linked to
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 4 payments that NBP was to make to the petitioner company. Since any adjudication of wage claims would inevitably involve NBP’s role (either as the source of funds or as a joint employer in substance) , NBP was a necessary party to the dispute. Notwithstanding, neither the Authority nor the appellate forum impleaded NBP, nor did Respondent No.1 make any effort to join NBP under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”) . It is urged that in the absence of a necessary party, a valid a djudication cannot be rendered, a defect that goes to the root of jurisdiction . The learned counsel invokes the principle that non-joinder of a necessary party is fatal and analogizes that the claim petition ought to have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11, CPC as barred by law due to such defect.
6. Third, the petitioners assail the appreciation of evidence by the forums below as perverse and flawed. It is argued that Respondent No.1’s evidence was self -serving a nd ri ddled with inconsistencies, for instance, bank statements produced by him allegedly did not show any unpaid credited salary; WhatsApp message transcripts were selective and out of context; and certificates or affidavits he relied on were either procur ed from colleagues long after the fact or otherwise of suspect probative value. The Authority and Labour Court (respondents 2 and 3) are said to have ignored material evidence favoring the petitioners, such as: (i) the resignation letter dated 05 .08.2021 b earing Respondent No.1’s signature and its acceptance on 16 .08.2021; (ii) record of payment of all salaries up to the resignation date; and (iii) an affidavit from the Regional Manager of NBP affirming that Respondent No.1 had ceased working after tenderin g resignation. The petitioners contend that, had the evidence been read properly, it would become clear that Respondent No.1 left employment voluntarily and was paid in full, and that his later claim of constructive dismissal and wage deprivation was a false afterthought. They allege Respondent No.1 of approaching the labour forum with unclean hands and even forging certain documents. On
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 5 this premise, the petitioners invoke the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus , submitting that if a part of Respondent No.1’s story is found false, his entire claim should be disbelieved. It is pointed out that the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan has recently re - emphasized that deliberately false testimony or evidence by a litigant taints the rest of that party’s case.
7. Fourth, and importantly, the petitioners assert that they are a trans-provincial establishment (with business offices and clientele in multiple provinces), so the application of provincial labour law, specifically the S indh Payment of Wages Act, 2015, to their enterprise was misplaced and unlawful. Learned counsel refers to the definition of “trans -provincial” under the federal Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (“IRA 2012”), which includes any establishment having branches in more than one province. It is argued that such establishments fall under the exclusive domain of federal labour laws and fora. In particular, Section 33 of IRA 2012 provides a remedy for individual grievances of workers of trans -provincial organizations, to be adjudicated by the National Industrial Relations Commission (“NIRC”). The petitioners maintain that Respondent No.1, if he were a worker, should have approached the NIRC for his claims, rather than a provincial Authority. They cite a recent judgment o f the Lahore High Court (June 2022) which involved employees of a trans - provincial bank (Bank of Punjab) who had filed for overtime wages under the (now repealed) Payment of Wages Act, 1936; the High Court set aside the provincial Authority’s order on the ground that the claim ought to have been brought before the NIRC. Likewise, reference is made to Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. v. Member NIRC (2014 SCMR 535) and Sui Southern Gas Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 802), where the august Su preme Court held that once an employer is established to be trans - provincial, the jurisdiction of the NIRC is overriding and exclusive, superseding provincial labour courts for all labour matters. On the strength of these authorities, the petitioners argue that the proceedings under SPWA 2015 were coram non judice . They also
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 6 highlight Section 1(4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance 1968, which (by reference) excludes establishments run by the federal government or across provinces from the provincial Standing Orders regime Thus, the petitioners contend that Sindh’s labour laws could not validly apply to their establishment or to Respondent No.1’s employment, especially given the involvement of a federal entity (NBP) in the work.
8. In rebuttal, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1 (employee) supports the findings of the forums below and submits that no interference is warranted. He argues that the definition of “workman” under the Sindh Standing Orders Act, 2015 (Section 2(1)(n)) is broad enough to cover Respondent No.1. That definition includes “any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward” , and while it excludes those employed mainly in managerial or administrative capacity, Resp ondent No.1’s actual job tasks were not managerial . Learned counsel emphasizes that mere nomenclature (such as “Coordinator” or “Manager”) is not conclusive, and that one must look at the nature of duties actually performed. She points out that Respondent No.1 had no hiring/firing authority, no decision-making power over company policy and essentially acted as a field worker liaising between the petitioner company and bank officials. The fact that he followed the instructions of both the company’s directors and the bank’s managers demonstrates his subordinate role. Thus, she insists Respondent No.1 was a workman or at least a “person employed” within the meaning of SPWA 2015, entitled to invoke that law. The counsel cites Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Faz al Begg (1992 SCMR 2166) and Mustehkum Cement Ltd. v. Abdul Rashid (1998 SCMR 1618), where employees with titles like “Assistant Manager” were still treated as workmen since they had no managerial powers in substance. she also relies on the principle that absence of hire -and-fire power is indicative of non - managerial status. According to Respondent No.1’s counsel, the petitioners are trying to evade labour laws by giving inflated
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 7 designations to a worker who, in truth, was performing operational duties.
9. On the non-joinder issue, Respondent No.1’s counsel contends that NBP was not a necessary party at all. The wage claim was straightforwardly between the petitioner company (as employer) and Respondent No.1 (as employee). NBP was neither his employer nor directly liable to pay his salary, it only had a contract with the petitioner company. The learned counsel submits that an employer cannot escape liability towards its employee by pointing to a third - party contract. In any case, if the petitioners believed NBP was indispensable for adjudication, they ought to have applied to implead NBP at the initial stage; having failed to do so, they cannot at writ stage seek dismissal on that account. She cites the principle that no suit or proceeding shall fail merely because of misjoinder or non - joinder of parties if, in the absence of such party, the matter can be adjudicated on merits between those already on record (Order I Rule 9, CPC). Here, the Authority and Labour Court were fully able to decide the wage dispute bet ween the petitioners and Respondent No.1 without NBP’s presence, as it involved examining the letter of appointment, resignation and salary records, all within the petitioners’ own domain. Thus, the non -impleading of NBP did not prejudice the adjudication of the core issues and the petitioners’ objection is an afterthought.
10. Respondent No.1’s counsel further defends the findings on evidence as well -founded. She submits that both forums below assessed the evidence in detail: they found Respondent No.1’s testimony credible and supported by documents, whereas the petitioners’ version was disbelieved for containing contradictions. For instance, the petitioners alleged that Respondent No.1 resigned voluntarily on 05 .08.2021, yet it emerged that after purportedly accepting the resignation on 16 .08.2021, the petitioners themselves revoked that resignation via letter dated 10 .09.2021 (directing Respondent No.1 to continue working during an in quiry). This revocation letter, issued by the petitioners, was produced by
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 8 Respondent No.1 and was duly considered by the forums below. It flatly undermines the petitioners’ stance that the employment had ended in August 2021. Respondent No.1 continued working into late 2021, but was then stopped from work without formal terminati on, which is why he sought legal remedy. His bank statements corroborated non-payment of salary for October –December 2021 and half of January 2022. The WhatsApp messages on record, read as a whole, showed Respondent No.1 repeatedly asking the petitioner’s management about pending salary and being assured “it will be sorted soon”, belying the petitioners’ claim that nothing was due. The learned counsel submits that both labour forums applied their judicial mind to the evidence , they did not rely on any singl e piece in isolation, but on the cumulative effect. Therefore, their findings cannot be termed perverse or grossly mis -reading of evidence warranting writ interference. She reminds that Article 199 is not meant for re -appraising facts unless there is juris dictional error or complete misapplication of law, which is not the case here.
11. As to the jurisdictional argument about trans - provincial establishment, Respondent No.1’s counsel acknowledges that the petitioner company may have operations beyond Sindh. However, he submits that the relief claimed by Respondent No.1 pertained to work done by him within Sindh (Hyderabad) and thus the provincial law was rightly invoked . He refers to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Payment of Wages Act, 2013 and a judgment of Peshawar Hi gh Court on analogous issue. In “Zahid Mehmood v. FAST Educational Academy” (PHC judgment 2019 & reaffirmed in 2024) , it was held that an employee of a trans-provincial organization can approach the provincial Wage Authority where the branch is situated, b ecause the applicable payment-of-wages law in the province is not superseded by industrial relations laws. The High Court noted that neither the provincial Industrial Relations Act nor the IRA 2012 explicitly oust the jurisdiction of the Wage Authority for trans-provincial employments The scheme of labour legislation is such that the NIRC deals
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 9 with industrial disputes (e.g. wrongful dismissal, CBA matters) for trans-provincial establishments, but does not necessarily bar statutory wage claims , which are a distinct cause of action for recovery of dues. The learned counsel argues that SPWA 2015 provides a complete mechanism for recovery of wages to “all persons employed in any factory, industry or commercial establishment” in Sindh, without carving out an exc eption for trans - provincial entities. Thus, according to him, the Authority had jurisdiction to entertain Respondent No.1’s claim since the work was performed in Sindh and the non -payment occurred here. In any case, Respondent No.1 notes that the petitione rs never raised any objection on this ground before the Authority or Labour Court; by submitting to those forums, the petitioners acquiesced to jurisdiction and cannot approbate and reprobate.
12. Having heard the learned counsel and perused the record, this Court now distills the key issues requiring determination: (i) Whether Respondent No.1 falls within the definition of a “workman” (or a person entitled to invoke the Standing Orders and labour protections) under the Standing Orders Ordinance 1968 and the Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 – and the legal implications thereof on his entitlement to use the labour forums. (ii) Whether the non-impleading of National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) as a party rendered the proceedings defective for want of a necessary party under Order I Rule 10, CPC. (iii) Whether the findings of the respondent authorities on the facts and evidence, particularly regarding the circumstances of Respondent No.1’s separation from service and the a lleged dues, are sustainable in law, or were arrived at by misreading or ignoring material evidence.
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 10 (iv) Whether the petitioner company is a trans-provincial establishment, and if so, whether the application of the Sindh Payment of Wages Act, 2015 (and recourse to provincial forums) was lawful or without jurisdiction in view of federal legislation.
13. The first question goes to the competency of Respondent No.1 to invoke the labour/industrial jurisdiction. The Standing O rders Ordinance, 1968 (federal), which remained applicable to commercial establishments until provinces lik e Sindh enacted their own laws, defines “workman” in broad terms as “any person employed in any industr ial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward” . The Sindh Terms of Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 2015 (hereinafter “Sindh Standing Orders Act 2015”) similarly uses the term “worker” or “workm an” to cover employees engaged in technical, operational or clerical roles, excluding those employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. The rationale behind this exclusion, consistently reflected in industrial laws , is that management perso nnel are not intended to avail the special protections designed for rank -and-file workers (such as protections against unjust termination under Standing Order 12 or access to labour courts for grievance). Therefore, determining whether an employee is a workman or manager is pivotal.
14. The test for determining workman status is well - settled in our jurisprudence. It does not hinge on the job title or how the employment contract is styled, but on the substance of the employee’s functions. This principle was enunciated as far back as PLD 1986 SC 103 (Bashir A. Malik case) and reiterated in 1992 PLC 424 (Abdul Razzaq case) and a line of later authorities. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in Abdul Razzaq’s case approvingly quoted the rule that: “the nature of the w ork actually performed by the employee is the essential consideration, not his designation. If the main features of his job are manual or clerical, he is a workman; if
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 11 they are supervisory or managerial, he is not.” Minor or incidental supervisory tasks do not strip a person of workman status, but conversely, if the core duties are managerial, the person remains outside the ambit even if he occasionally does clerical work.
15. In the present case, Respondent No.1’s appointment letter (available on record) desi gnated him as “Regional Coordinator”. The petitioners assert that this title and his responsibilities (liaising with bank branches, coordinating credit data) made him part of management. However, mere use of the term “Coordinator” or even “Manager” is not decisive. As the Supreme Court observed in Syed Matloob Hassan v. Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., 1992 SCMR 227, even a Senior Sales Representative or field officer with a fancy title will not be deemed managerial if his role is essentially to carry out the e mployer’s business at the operational level. In that case, the Court considered the definitions in both the 1969 Industrial Relations Ordinance and the 1968 Standing Orders Ordinance and concluded that the sales representative, who did not have authority t o make policy, hire or fire staff, or make final decisions , was a “workman” , despite supervising some sales activities. Likewise, in Aurangzaib v. Medipak (Pvt) Ltd (2007 SCMR 472) , an employee titled Senior Sales Manager was held to fall under “workman” because the nature of his work was essentially selling and meeting targets, not managing the enterprise. On the other hand, in MCB Ltd. v. Shahid Mumtaz (2011 SCMR 1475) and a host of banking sector cases, branch managers and operations managers were held not to be workmen because they were entrusted with running the br anch, supervising staff and wielding significant discretion in administrative matters.
16. The facts at hand indicate that Respondent No.1 had no staff under his command. He worked largely on hi s own, reporting to the petitioners’ head office and coordinating with bank officers as an intermediary. He neither formulated policies nor supervised other employees of the company. There is also no evidence that he had any
C.P No. S-204 of 2025 12 power to sanction leave, initia te disciplinary action, or represent the company in a decision -making capacity. Importantly, the petitioners themselves entrusted the ultimate decision -making to their other officials: e.g. when Respondent No.1’s resignation was tendered, it had to be acce pted by the Regional Business Head and approved by higher management, reflecting that Respondent No.1 was not part of that top management tier. All this strongly suggests that Respondent No.1 was a “worker” in the contemplation of the Standing Orders and l abour laws . The absence of hiring/firing authority, as correctly pointed out by his counsel, is a telling factor (though not the sole test) , one noted by this Court in similar contexts [Sindh Club versus Syed Muhammad Taqi Naqvi and 2 others ; C. P. No.D -5661 of 2024] .The petitioners argue that Respondent No.1 dealt with NBP’s senior management regularly, implying a managerial stature. The Court is not persuaded that this makes him management; rather, it shows he was a conduit performing tasks assigned by h is employer in collaboration with the client (NBP).…
Read the unabridged text and precedent citation network on Al Wakeelo Legal Research Platform.