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Cr.Bail 357/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Bench at Sukkur - Muhammad Yousif (Applicant) — 2025 SHC 357

Official Citation: 2025 SHC 357

Court / Jurisdiction: Sindh High Court

Petitioner: Cr.Bail 357/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Bench at Sukkur - Muhammad Yousif (Applicant)

Legal Principle & Question Decided

Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Sindh High Court, officially reported as 2025 SHC 357. In this matter between Cr.Bail 357/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Bench at Sukkur - Muhammad Yousif (Applicant) and the Respondent, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.

Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

COURT: Sindh High Court CASE NO: Cr.Bail 357/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Bench at Sukkur CITATION: 2025 SHC SUK 1623 PARTIES: Muhammad Yousif (Applicant) ORDER DATE: 22-MAY-25 BENCH: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ali Haider 'Ada'(Author) A.F.R: Yes ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 ORDERSHEET INTHEHIGHCOURTOFSINDHBENCHATSUKKUR Crl.BailApplicationNo.S-357of2025 (MuhammadYousifVs.TheState) DATEOFHEARING ORDERWITHSIGNATUREOFJUDGE Hearingofpost-arrestbail 1.Forordersonofficeobjectionsatflag‘A’ 2.Forhearingofbailapplication. O R D E R. 22-05-2025. Mr.FarooqAliHalepoto,Advocatefortheapplicant/accused. Mr.AsifZeeshanAdvocateforcomplainant. Mr.AsadullahRajper,AssistantA.G,PakistanalongwithSIMuhammad AliSawand,InvestigationOfficer,FIACCRCSukkur. SyedSardarAliShahRizvi,AdditionalP.GfortheState. **************** Ali Haider ‘Ada’, J . Through the instant bail application, the applicant/accused,MuhammadYousif,seekspost-arrestbailinCrimeNo.25of 2024,registeredatPoliceStationFIACyberCrimeReportingCentre,Sukkur,for offencespunishableunderSections20,21,and24ofthePreventionofElectronic CrimesAct,2016(PECA-2016),readwithSections383and506-BPPC.Priorto approachingthisCourt,theapplicanthadmovedabailapplicationbeforethe learnedtrialCourt,whichwasdeclinedvideorderdated27.03.2025.Thereafter, hefiledabailapplicationbeforethelearnedSessionsJudge,Sukkur,whichwas entrusted to the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Sukkur; however,thesamewasalsodeclinedvideorderdated21.04.2025.Hence,the applicanthaspreferredthepresentpost-arrestbailapplicationbeforethisCourt. 2. Succinctly,thefactsoftheprosecutioncase,assetforthintheFIRlodged on30.08.2024bythecomplainantMissHumaNoor,arethatshesubmitteda written complaint alleging that the accused, Muhammad Yousif, had been blackmailing, harassing, and threatening her by using her nude videos and obscenepictures.Itisallegedthattheaccuseddemandedmoneyand,throughhis

2 Snap-chat and WhatsApp numbers (0332-5802768 / 0310-4899209), shared anddisseminatedherprivateandobjectionablematerialtoherfamilymembers and relatives. The complainant further stated that the accused not only threatenedherwithfurtherexposurebutalsocoercedandattemptedtoinduce herintoestablishingaphysicalrelationship.Additionally,sheclaimedthatthe accused had extorted a considerable amount of money from her under this duress.Onthebasisofherwrittencomplaint,anenquirybearingNo.137/2024 dated20.08.2024wasinitiatedatthePoliceStationFIACyberCrimeCircle, Sukkur,culminatingintheregistrationofthepresentFIR. 3. Learnedcounselfortheapplicant/accusedcontendsthattheapplicantis innocent and has been falsely implicated in the case. He submits that the allegations as narrated in the FIR are fabricated and baseless and that the applicanthasneverdisseminatedorsharedanyobsceneornudephotographsor videosofthecomplainant.Itisfurtherarguedthatthepartieshaveamicably resolvedtheirdisputeoutofCourt,andinthisregard,thecomplainanthassworn anaffidavitsupportingthegrantofbailbeforethelearnedAdditionalSessions Judge-II,Sukkur;however,thesaidaspectwasnotgivendueconsideration.The learnedcounselfurthersubmitsthattheallegedoffencesdonotfallwithinthe prohibitoryclauseofSection497,Cr.P.C,andassuch,theruleofbailbeinga right and its refusal an exception is applicable. So, the case of the applicant requiresfurtherinquirywithinthemeaningofSection497(2),Cr.P.C,entitling himtotheconcessionofpost-arrestbail.Insupportofhiscontentions,hehas placedrelianceontheorderdated02.10.2024passedbythePrincipalSeatofthis Court in Criminal Bail Application No. 2024 of 2023, the case reported as BurhanWaliandanotherv.TheState (2020P.Cr.L.J1305),andtheunreported orderdated17.03.2025passedbytheCircuitCourtatMirpurkhasinCriminal BailApplicationNo.S-40of2025.

3 4. Learnedcounselforthecomplainanthasrecordedhisnoobjectiontothe grant of bail to the applicant/accused on the ground that the parties have amicablyresolvedtheirdisputeoutsidetheCourt. 5. Duringthecourseofarguments,ithasbeenobservedthatthelearned Trial Court, i.e., Judicial Magistrate-I, Sukkur, dismissed the bail application primarilyonthegroundoflackofjurisdiction ,holdingthattheoffencesalleged fallwithintheambitofscheduledoffencesundertheAnti-Rape(Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021. The Trial Court noted that certain provisions of thePrevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA), including Section 21, Cyberstalking,havebeendeclaredasscheduledoffencesundertheAnti-Rape Act, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the Special Gender-Based Violence Courts establishedunderthesaidAct.Consequently,thematterwasconsideredoutside thejurisdictionoftheregularMagistrate’sCourt,andthebailapplicationwas dismissedaccordinglyonthepointofjurisdiction. 6. Ontheotherhand,thelearnedAssistantAttorneyGeneralfortheState hasopposedthegrantofbailtotheapplicant/accusedonthegroundthatthe alleged offence is of a serious nature and constitutes an offence against the societyatlarge.Furthermore,itissubmittedthatontheissueofjurisdiction,a letterhasbeenaddressedtotheDirectorateofLaw,FIA,seekingclarificationand directionregardingtheproperforumforadjudicationofthecase;however,the responseisstillawaited.TheInvestigationOfficer,whoispresentintheCourt, hassubmittedthatthematteriscurrentlypendingbeforethelearnedJudicial Magistrate-I, Sukkur, and has not yet been transferred to the Gender-Based Violence(GBV)Court. 7. LearnedAdditionalProsecutorGeneralfortheStatewasputonnotice regardingthequestionofjurisdictionvideorderdated16.05.2025,tosatisfythis CourtastowhethertheGender-BasedViolenceCourt,Sukkur,iscompetentto entertainmattersarisingunderthePreventionofElectronicCrimesAct,2016

4 (PECA-2016),orwhethersuchcasesfallwithintheexclusivedomainofthe CourtsestablishedundertheAnti-Rape(InvestigationandTrial)Act,2021, (Act- 2021) which primarily deals with rape-related offences. In response, he submittedthatPECA-2016isaspeciallawwithitsownprescribedmechanismfor investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of cybercrimes. He further stated thatwhileSection21,22ofPECA2016hasbeenlistedasascheduledoffence undertheAnti-Rape(InvestigationandTrial)Act,2021,thepresentcasedoes notinvolveanyallegationofrapeorsexualassault;therefore,itfallsoutsidethe jurisdictionofCourtsconstitutedundertheAct-2021.HeemphasizedthatPECA casesareadjudicatedbydesignatedCourtsestablishedunderthesaidstatuteand donotfallwithintheambitoftheAnti-Rapeframeworkunlessaccompaniedby chargesrelatedtorapeorsexualviolence.Moreover,hepointedoutthatarecent amendment to PECA, published on 29.01.2025, introduced the Social Media Protection and Regulatory Authority and Social Media Protection Tribunals throughSection2(v)ofthePECAAmendmentAct,2025.Thesebodieshavebeen established to regulate online platforms and adjudicate disputes relating specificallytosocialmediacontent,therebyfurtherdemarcatingthescopeof PECA-relatedjurisdiction. 8. Heardtheargumentsadvancedbythelearnedcounselfortherespective partiesandhavecarefullyperusedthematerialavailableonrecord. 9. Therecordreflectsthatamobiledevicewasrecoveredfromthepossession oftheapplicant/accusedandtheforensicanalysisconfirmsthatobsceneand nude photographs and videos of the complainant were stored therein. The materialavailableonrecordestablishesthatthesaidcontentwascapturedand allegedlyusedbytheapplicanttosexuallyharassandblackmailthecomplainant intoestablishingillicitrelationswithhim,underthethreatthatotherwiseher objectionablecontentwouldbecirculatedonsocialmediaplatforms.

5 10. Thenatureoftheoffenceinquestionfallssquarelywithintherealmof cyberexploitation,whichisagrowingmenaceinmodernsociety.Therisein digitalabuse,particularlyinvolvingthemisuseofpersonalandintimatecontent, reflectsadisturbingtrendofcyberviolencethatseverelyunderminesindividual dignity and public morality. Such offences have far-reaching consequences, psychological,socialandfamilialforthevictims,especiallywomen,andoften leadtotrauma,isolation,orevenself-harm. 11. Althoughtheoffencesalleged,Sections20,offencesagainstthedignityof a natural person, Section 21, offence against modesty of natural person and minorandSection24,CyberstalkingofthePECA-2016arenotcoveredunder theprohibitoryclauseofSection497Cr.P.C.,neverthelessthegravityandsocietal impactofsuchoffencescannotbeminimized.Insuchcases,wherethedignity, privacy,andmodestyofaperson,particularlyawomanaregrosslyviolated,the grantofbailmustbeconsideredwithgreatcare,caution,andsensitivity. 12. Furthermore,therapiddigitizationofsocialinteractionthroughplatforms suchasWhatsApp,Snap-chat,andInstagramhasopenednewavenuesforabuse, making cybercrime one of the most complex challenges in Criminal Justice System.PECA-2016wasenactedspecificallytoaddresstheseemergingthreats reflectthelegislature’sintenttorigorouslycombatsuchoffences. 13. Inviewoftheabove,eventhoughthestatutorypunishmentdoesnotfall withintheprohibitoryclauseofSection497Cr.P.C.,howeverthenatureofthe allegations, the manner in which the offence was committed and its grave consequencesuponthevictim’slifeanddignity,requiretheCourttoexerciseits discretioncautiously.TheroleoftheCourtsisnotonlytobalancetherightsof theaccusedbutalsotoensureprotectionofvictimsfromrecurringharmandto upholdsocietaldecencyandconstitutionalrightstodignityandprivacyunder Article14oftheConstitutionofIslamicRepublicofPakistan,1973.

6 14. Inthiscontext,relianceisplaceduponthefollowingcaselaws,whichis fortifiedbyauthoritativelegalverdictsandistobefollowedaccordingly. (a). 2020 P Cr. L J 1652 [Islamabad] IMRAN KHAN Vs The STATE and another “9.The case record produced by FIA shows that petitioner, during investigation, admitted receiving, transmitting, sharing, uploading derogatory and indecorous, fabricated photos of the complainant and his family members including female members for the purposes of defaming them. Data of facebook and whatsapp collected from cell phones of the accused/petitioner and other co- accused was retrieved and also sent for forensic analysis and examination. In addition, information in respect of facebook URLs created and operated by all the accused were also obtained by the facebook authorities. All the information/data of conversation at whatsapp, forensic examination report of the cell phones and information and verification of URL and IDs received from facebook authority prima facie constitute sufficient incriminating material against the accused/petitioner shows existence of reasonable grounds of the accused/petitioner's involvement in the alleged offence and disentitle him for the concession of bail. Learned Counsel for the Complainant also informed the Court that Awais Khan was released on bail, vide order dated 20.03.2020, passed by the Hon'ble Islamabad High Court, on the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, however, after setting aside of the said order by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 07.04.2020, he is now absconder. Moreover, the other co- accused have also been declared proclaimed offenders. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that offence in the present case do not fall within the prohibitory clause has no force as the law has also been settled in this regard that mere fact that the offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C., does not mean that the offence becomes bailable, as it is also well settled that the concession of bail cannot be claimed as a right. The concession of bail is legally allowable where nature of offence is not heinous and against the society; where there is no possibility of repetitionofoffence;wherethereareprimafacieevidenceoffakeand frivolous involvement of the petitioner; where there is no chance of abscondence; when there is no chance of tampering with evidence of prosecution and that petitioner is not a habitual offender has no previous criminal history and that the concession of bail will not be misused by the Petitioner. All these possibilities are taken into consideration while considering the present petition for grant of bail after arrest. Regarding accepting/refusing of bail involving similar offence as in the instant case, the Hon'ble Sindh High Court in case titled Farhan Kamrani v. The State (2018 YLR 329) on the arguments that offence being out of the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C., hasheldasunder:- "9. Although, the offence under section 21 of the Act does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. being punishable up to five (05) years, but in such like cases the grant of bail is not a right of the accused but a concession and since the accused is prima facie involved in a case of superimposing a photograph of the face of a woman over sexually explicit image, he is not entitled to the concession of bail simply for the reason that he is connected with such offence, which seriously affect the whole society. The accused has apparently gone to grotesque lengths to humiliate the complainant online, which may cause a detrimental effect on her. It may be

7 observed that the impact of uploading on internet the superimposed porn photographs of a woman is more than the shame and shock that one might feel when she discovers herself to be the victim of this crime. The immediate real time effect is the social stigmatization of the victim by blaming her for the pictures and questioning her character. This may lead to depression, social alienation and in some extreme cases suicide attempts by the victim who cannot handle the pressure of dealing with such targeted vengeance. Under the circumstances, the accused is not entitled to the concession of bail; therefore,thisapplicationisdismissed,accordingly". (b). 2018 P Cr. L J 1667 [Lahore] MUHAMMAD ASHRAF Vs The STATEandanother “3.The petitioner unmistakably figures with the prosecutrix in thestillsgeneratedbytheInvestigatingOfficerfromthemediumsecured during investigation and as such argument that these have been manipulated to frame him in the crime is preposterous to say the least; forthefamily,itistooheavyapricetofootandfornoapparentpurpose buttoincuradisgustinglyperennialembarrassment.Prosecutrix'snave volitional intimacy cannot be pleaded as a defence for a most grievous misconduct based upon a criminal betrayal resulting into unmitigated intrusionintoawoman'sprivacy.Similarly,petitionercannotclaimbail as of right merely on the ground that offences complained do not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It is by now well settled that in appropriate cases bail can be justifiably declined in offences falling outside the prohibition; in the present case, it can be withheld without being unconscionable. Crl. Misc. No. 220033-B of 2018 fails; petition dismissed.Needless to observe that observations recorded hereinabove being tentative/issue specific shall not impact upon the fate of the case, to be decided by the learnedtrialCourtonthestrengthofevidence.Bailrefused.” (c).2018YLR329[Sindh]FARHANKAMRANIVsTheSTATE. “9.Although, the offence under section 21 of the Act does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. being punishable up to five (05) years, but in such like cases the grant of bail is not a right of the accusedbutaconcessionandsincetheaccusedisprimafacieinvolvedin a case of superimposing a photograph of the face of a woman over sexually explicit image, he is not entitled to the concession of bail simply for the reason that he is connected with such offence, which seriously affect the whole society. The accused has apparently gone to grotesque lengths to humiliate the complainant online, which may cause a detrimental effect on her. It may be observed that the impact of uploading on internet the superimposed porn photographs of a woman ismorethantheshameandshockthatonemightfeelwhenshediscovers herselftobethevictimofthiscrime.Theimmediaterealtimeeffectisthe social stigmatization of the victim by blaming her for the pictures and questioninghercharacter.Thismayleadtodepression,socialalienation and in some extreme cases suicide attempts by the victim who cannot handle the pressure of dealing with such targeted vengeance. Under the circumstances, the accused is not entitled to the concession of bail; therefore,thisapplicationisdismissed,accordingly.” (d). 2024 P Cr. L J 1462 [Islamabad] MUHAMMAD HASEEB Vs TheSTATEand another “8.Asfarastheargumentregardinggrantofbailinthecasesnot falling under the prohibitory clause is concerned, it is held by this

8 Court in a case titled as "Irfan Sarwar v. The State" (2022 P.Cr.LJNote71),that: "with regard to the contention that the bail should always be granted in cases not falling within the domain of prohibition clause of proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. it is observed that it is not a rule of universal application. Each case has to be seen through itsownfactsandcircumstances". The same principle has been laid down in a case titled as "Afzaal Ahmedv.TheState",2003SCMR573whichstatesthat: "The mere fact that an offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C. did not mean that such an offence had become a bailable offence. The discretion still remained with the competent Court to consider whether a person accused of such an offence did or did not deserve the grant of bail in accordance with established norms governing the exercise of suchapower. It has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case titled as "Muhammad Siddique v. Imtiaz Begum and others",2002SCMR442that: "none can claim bail as of right in non-bailable offences even though the same do not fall under the prohibitory clause 497 Cr.P.C". On the same subject the guidance has also been taken from the law laid down in a case titled as "Haji Muhammad Nazir and others v. The State", 2008 SCMR 807 wherein, it has been held that: "It is true that offences for which petitioners have been charged entails punishment not more than five years, which also falls within the category of non-bailable offence, therefore, they are not entitled as a matter of right for release on bail, notwithstanding the fact that their case is covered under the non- prohibitory clause as defined under section 497, Cr.P.C. as it has been held in the case of Muhammad Siddique (ibid). As far as principle of law being relied upon by the learned counsel from the judgment in the case of Tariq Bashir (ibid) that the grant of bail in offence punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years is a rule and refusal is exception would not help to the petitioners in viewofexceptionalandextraordinarycircumstancesofthecase". In different cases under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 where the offences not falling under prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C, bail after arrest has been rejected by this Court vide judgment reported as 2020 PCr.LJ 1652 as well as by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Lahore in cases reported as 2018 PCr.LJ 408 and 2018 PCr.LJ 1667 and the Hon'ble Sindh High Courtinacasereportedas2018YLR329.” (e). 2023 P Cr. L J 496 [Peshawar (Abbottabad Bench)] FAKHAR ZAMAN Vs The STATE and another “5.It is a general rule that when offences are punishable with less than 10 years of imprisonment ordinary, bails are granted however, in appropriate cases, it is never compulsion over the court to grant bail as a rule and may depart from this rule to denyanyfavortothepetitionerwherethecomplainantishelpless has been victimized due to her nude images and videos and blackmailed her financially to get illegitimate demand as in the

9 case in hand. Complainant is stated to have been put under extortion of sending her images and nude videos to her husband. Thus while reliance is placed on the dictums referred by the learned counsel for the complainant and especially when this court is of the opinion that the petitioner has sexually harassed the complainant, who is a married woman while her husband is abroaddoinglabourforearninglivelihoodforthefamily.” (f). 2022 P Cr. L J Note 71 [Islamabad] IRFAN SARWAR Vs The STATE “6.As far as the argument regarding the grant of bail in the cases not falling under the prohibitory clause is concerned. It is clarified, that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has held in "2009 SCMR 174 titled as Shameel Ahmed v. The State", that "with regard to the contention that the bail should always be granted in cases not falling within the domain of prohibition clause of proviso to section 497, Cr.P.C. it is observed that it is not a rule of universal application. Each case has to been seen through its own facts and circumstances". The same principle has been laid down in "2003 SCMR 573 titled as Afzaal Ahmed v. The State" which states that "The mere fact that an offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C. did not mean that such an offence had become a bailable offence. The discretion still remained with the competent Court to consider whether a person accused of such an offence did or did not deserve the grant of bail in accordance with established norms governing the exercise of such a power. It has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in "2002 SCMR 442 titled as Muhammad Siddique v. Imtiaz Begum and others" that "none can claim bail as of right in non-bailable offences even though the same do not fall under the prohibitory clause 497, Cr.P.C. On the same subject the guidance has also been taken from the law laid down in "2008 SCMR 807 titled as Haji Muhammad Nazir and others v. The State", wherein, it has been held that "It is true that offences for which petitioners have been charged entails punishment not more than five years, which also falls within the category of non-bailable offence, therefore, they are not entitled as a matter of right for release on hail, notwithstanding the fact that their case is covered under the non-prohibitory clause as defined under section 497, Cr.P.C. as it has been held in the case of Muhammad Siddique (ibid). As far as principle of law being relied upon by the learned counsel from the judgment in the case of Tariq Bashir (ibid) that the grant of bail in offence punishable with imprisonment for less than ten years is a rule and refusal is exception would not help to the petitioners in view of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case". In different cases under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 where the offences not falling under prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. the bail after arrest has been rejected by this Court vide judgment reported as 2020 PCr.LJ 1652 as well as by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Lahore vide cases reported as "2018 PCr.LJ 408 and 2018 PCr.LJ 1667 and the Hon'ble Sindh High Court vide casereportedas2018YLR329".” (g). 2021 P Cr. L J 119 [Sindh] SALEEM KHALID Vs. The STATE---Respondent “12.At bail stage only tentative assessment of record is permitted and deeper appreciation of evidence/material is not permitted. The offences charged (Sections 20, 21 and 24 of P.E.C.A) do not

10 fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. being punishable up to five (05) years, but in such like cases where dignity and modesty of a person is at stakes, the discretion for grant of bail has to be exercised cautiously specially when the offence seriously affect the whole society and the impact is devastating not only for the complainant but to his/her family which may ruin the future life of the victim. I am of the opinion that if the husband wanted to divorce the complainant as elaborated in ground (l) he could have done so without making any video, he did not have to make videos of her to prove her infidelity by making her obscene videos. The applicant not only made the videos but admittedly forwarded on whatsapp to the in- laws to prove his case and justifying the reason for divorce and byadmittingthefactthattheapplicantdidmakeobscenevideoof his wife with another person and posted it on social media (whatsapp), to me takes the case out of the ambit of further enquiry. Hence, prima facie prosecution has sufficient material against the accused to connect him with the commission of allegedoffence.I,therefore,dismisstheinstantbailapplication.” (h). 2020 P Cr. L J 705 [Peshawar (D.I. Khan Bench)] MUHAMMAD USMAN Vs. The STATE and another 4.Perusal of the record reveals that objectionable pictures which were uploaded through a cell phone on whatsapp were recovered from possession of the petitioner which stigmatized the honour of not only the complainant but her whole family. The petitioner also committed the offence of blackmailing by intentionally and publicly exhibiting, displaying and transmitting the nude photographs for the purpose of some illegitimate demands. The petitioner, in his statement, also did not deny the commission of offence. The offence is of moral turpitude which badly affects the society at large. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the offence with which the petitioner is charged does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. and in…

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