Legal Principle & Question Decided

Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Sindh High Court, officially reported as Const. P. 66/2025 (SHC). In this matter between Const. P. 66/2025 (S.B.) M/s Philips Morris (Pak)Ltd Its attorney Zahir ... and Court of the Commissioner Workmen Sindh High Court, Circuit at Hyderabad, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.

Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

COURT: Sindh High Court CASE NO: CITATION: PARTIES: ORDER DATE: BENCH: A.F.R: ------------------------------------------------------------ HIGH COURT OF SINDH, CIRCUIT COURT HYDERABAD

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 [M/s Philips Morris (Pakistan) Ltd v. Court of the Commissioner Workmen’s Compensation & Authority under Payment of Wages Act, Hyderabad and others]

Petitioner by : Mr.Kashif Hanif, Advocate

Respondent No.2 by

: Mr.Ali Akbar Memon, Advocate

Respondent No.3 by : Mr.Muhammad Idris Kalo, Advocate

Dates of Hearing : 20.02.2026 & 27.02.2026

Date of Decision : 17.03.2026

O R D E R

ARBAB ALI HAKRO, J:- The present petition calls into question the legality and jurisdictional propriety of the order dated 23.09.2024 (“impugned order”) passed by the Court of Commissioner Workmen’s Compensation & Authority under the Sindh Payment of Wages Act, 2015 (the “Act of 2 015”) at Hyderabad, whereby the Petitioner, M/s Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited , was directed to deposit a substantial amount towards the claim advanced by Respondent No.2. The Petitioner asserts that the impugned proceedings were undertaken without lawful authority, in disregard of its status as a trans-provincial entity, and in violation of the constitutional guarantees of due process. 2. The Petitioner is a public limited company duly incorporated under the laws of Pakistan and operating across multiple provinces. Respondent No.1 is the statutory authority constituted under the Act of 2015, while Respondent No.2 is an individual who claims to have rendered services as a Gardener within the premises of the Petitioner’s factory. Respondent No.3 M/s HRSG SSP (Private) Limited , is the service provider under whose employment Respondent No.2 was formally engaged.

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 2 of 16 3. The record reflects that Respondent No.2 filed an application under Section 15(2) 1 of the Act of 2015, before Respondent No.1, asserting that although the Petitioner’s factory at Kotri was closed in March , 2019 and a severance package was announced for workers, he continued to work within the premises under various contractors and was assured that he would receive a similar package upon cessation of his services. He claimed that his last engagement was with Respondent No. 3, who allegedly terminated his services on 31.08.2023. 4. Upon issuance of notice, the Petitioner entered an appearance and moved an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC seeking de letion of its name from the proceedings. The Petitioner contended that it is a trans-provincial establishment within the meaning of Section 2(xxxii) 2 of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 201 3 (“SIRA, 201 3”) and therefore, not amenable to the jurisdiction of the provincial authority. It further asserted that Respondent No.2 was never its employee and that his employment relationship existed exclusively with Respondent No.3 under a principal-to-principal service arrangement. The Petitioner maintains that although the diary sheet reflects dismissal of its application on 25.05.2024, the detailed order has not been supplied despite repeated applications for a certified copy. 5. The Petitioner avers that without addressing its jurisdictional objection and without determining the employer -employee relationship, Respondent No.1 proceeded ex parte and passed the impugned order dated 23.09.2024

1Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages or of any dues relating to provident fund or gratuity payable under any law has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner, or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or of any heirs of an employed person who has died or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under sub -section (1), may apply to su ch authority for direction under subsection(3). 2 (xxxii) “worker” and “workman” mean a person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and, for the purpose of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, re trenched, laid -off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-off, or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person who is employed mainly in managerial or administrative capacity.

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 3 of 16 directing the Petitioner alone to deposit Rs.4,249,220/ -. It is alleged that the order is non -speaking, devoid of reas ons, and passed in disregard of the statutory framework governing special tribunals and the constitutional guarantees under Articles 10A and 18 of the Constitution. It is further asserted that execution proceedings have been initiated pursuant to the impugned order, including issuance of summons and warrants against the Petitioner’s Human Resource Manager, thereby exposing the Petitioner to imminent coercive action. Aggrieved by what it terms as an unlawful assumption of jurisdiction, non-consideration of material facts and violation of constitutional safeguards, the Petitioner has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the entire proceedings before Respondent No.1 stand vitiated for want o f jurisdiction. It was argued that the Petitioner is a trans-provincial entity within the meaning of Section 2(xxxii) of the SIRA, 201 3, having establishments in more than one province and therefore cannot be subjected to provincial labour legislation, including the Act of 2015. Reliance was placed on the case law reported as authoritative pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Sindh High Court, including 2015 PLC 1 , 2024 SCMR 298 , 2023 SCMR 1267, 2011 SCMR 1813, 1999 SCMR 1881, and 2020 CLD 1026, to contend that provincial fora lack territorial competence to adjudicate matters concerning trans -provincial establishments. Learned counsel further argued that the Petitioner had moved an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC seeking deletion of its name on the ground that Respondent No.2 was never its employee and was, in fact, engaged by Respondent No.3 under a principal-to-principal service arrangement. It was emphasised that although the diary sheet dated 25.05.2024 records the dismissal of the sa id application with "detailed reasons on a separate sheet," no such order exists on record, nor has any certified copy been supplied, despite repeated applications. This omission, counsel argued, renders the subsequent proceedings coram non judice and tain ted with mala fide. It was further

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 4 of 16 contended that Respondent No.1 proceeded ex parte without affording the Petitioner a meaningful opportunity of hearing, despite the Petitioner having entered an appearance and filed its objections. The impugned order was assailed as a non -speaking order, devoid of reasoning, and passed in disregard of the mandatory procedural safeguards under the Sindh Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 2020 (the “ Rules, 2020 "), as well as the constitutional guarantee of fair trial under Article 10A. Learned counsel submitted that the Commissioner failed to appreciate that Respondent No.2’s claim pertained to alleged severance package and service dues, matters which do not fall within the narrow statutory scope of “wages” under the Act of 2015. It was argued that the Commissioner assumed jurisdiction over a claim that was not maintainable before him, thereby acting in excess of authority. Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned order imposes liability solely upon the Petitioner while completely ignoring the role and responsibility of Respondent No.3, the actual employer of Respondent No.2. The omission to adjudicate upon the status and liability of Respondent No.3, despite its presence in the proceedings, was argued to be indicative of bias and arbitrary exercise of power. It was lastly argued that the initiation of execution proceedings, including the issuance of summons and warrants against the Petitioner's Human Resource Manager, is unlawful and coercive, particularly when the foundational order itself is without jurisdiction. Counsel urged that the Petitioner has no adequate alternate remedy, as the impugned order is a nullity and can be challenged directly under Article 199 of the Constitution. 7. Learned counsel for Responden t No.2 supported the impugned order and submitted that Respondent No.1 acted strictly within the statutory framework of the Act of 2015. It was argued that Respondent No.2 had been performing duties within the premises of the Petitioner’s factory since 201 2 and remained under the supervision and control of the Petitioner’s administrative staff, thereby establishing an employer –employee relationship for the purposes of the Act. Counsel contended that the Petitioner remained

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 5 of 16 absent on multiple dates despite r epeated notices, publication and pasting of summons at the factory gate. The Commissioner, therefore, rightly proceeded ex parte in accordance with Rule 8 of the Sindh Payment of W ages (Procedure) Rules, 2020. It was argued that the Petitioner cannot now c laim a violation of natural justice when its own conduct led to the closure of its side. Learned counsel submitted that the Petitioner’s plea of being a trans-provincial entity is misconceived, as the Act of 2015 applies to all establishments operating within the territorial limits of Sindh. He further argued that specialised wage -related claims fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, irrespective of the employer’s trans-provincial status. It was further argued that Respondent No.2 had produced documentary evidence, including SESSI and EOBI cards, appointment letters from various contractors and proof of continued service within the Petitioner’s premises. The Commissioner, after evaluating the material, rightly concluded that Respondent No.2 was entitled to the claimed dues and compensation. 8. Learned counsel for Respondent No.3 submitted that Respondent No.2 was engaged by Respondent No.3 under a lawful employment contract and that Respondent No. 3 fulfilled all obligations arising therefrom. It was argued that Respondent No.3 acted merely as a service provider and that Respondent No.2’s duties were performed within the premises of the Petitioner under the Petitioner’s supervision. Counsel contende d that any claim relating to a severance package or alleged assurances was exclusively between Respondent No.2 and the Petitioner, as Respondent No.3 neither announced nor administered any such package. Respondent No.3, therefore, bears no liability for th e amounts claimed by Respondent No.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the Commissioner failed to appreciate the contractual arrangement between the Petitioner and Respondent No.3 and proceeded to impose liability solely on the Petitioner without det ermining the respective obligations of the parties. It was argued that Respondent No.3

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 6 of 16 cannot be saddled with any responsibility in the absence of findings establishing breach of its contractual or statutory duties. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have minutely examined the entire record. 10. Before entering upon the merits, it is appropriate to address the aspect of laches, as the respondents have urged that the petitioner approached this Court belatedly. The impugned orde r was passed on 23.09.2024, whereas the present petition was instituted on 14.02.2025. Likewise, the petitioner's application under Order I Rule 10 CPC was dismissed on 25.05.2024, and admittedly, no challenge was brought against that order at the relevant time. On a superficial view, this chronology may suggest some degree of delay; however, the doctrine of laches is not to be applied mechanically or as a rigid bar. The superior courts have consistently held that where the impugned action is alleged to be without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or in derogation of express statutory limitations, the mere passage of time does not clothe an otherwise void order with legality. The petitioner has explained that despite repeated applications, the certified copy of the order dated 25.05.2024 was never supplied to him, and the record placed before this Court corroborates that the Authority did not furnish the said order despite multiple requests. The petitioner's grievance, therefore, cannot be characterised as a calculated or deliberate abandonment of rights; rather, it reflects the practical difficulty of challenging an order whose reasons were withheld from him. More importantly , the impugned order dated 23.09.2024, on its face, raises serious jurisdictional conce rns, and once a jurisdictional defect is established, the principle of laches recedes into the background. It is now a settled exposition of law that a void order neither matures into validity by efflux of time nor becomes immune from judicial scrutiny mer ely because the aggrieved party did not immediately invoke constitutional jurisdiction. In this backdrop, while the petitioner may not have acted with ideal promptitude, the delay is neither inordinate nor of such a

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 7 of 16 nature as to defeat the exercise of this Court's constitutional powers, particularly when the impugned order is shown to be without lawful authority. I, therefore, proceed to examine the merits without allowing the plea of laches to operate as a bar. 11. The lis at hand, though procedurally emanating from proceedings under Section 15 of the Act of 2015, in substance requires a close dissection of (i) the true nature of the relationship between the applicant Imdad Ali and the various entities arrayed as res pondents, particularly petitioner Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited and HRSG SSP (Pvt.) Ltd.; (ii) the precise ambit of "wages" and "dues" cognisable by the Authority under the Act of 2015 and the Rules, 2020; (iii) the effect of the chain of contractual ar rangements and the statutory definitions under the Sindh Payment of Wages Act, 2015 and the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013; and (iv) the plea of a “package” allegedly promised to the applicant on parity with one Mr. Dilshad Ahmed, a process operator of Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited, whose full and final settlement is on record. 12. The factual substratum is largely undisputed in its broad contours. The applicant asserts that he was initially appointed as “Gardener” in the Administration Department on 06.08.2012 and that, though his work was routed through different contractors, he in reality served the respondent No.2 mill (Philip Morris’ Kotri factory) on a regular and permanent basis. In his own application under section 15(2) of the Act of 2015, he avers that “the above ‘Employee Person’ was appointed by the Respondent No.1 as ‘Gar dener’ in the Admn Department on 6.08.2012. The respondent No.2 handed over to the applicant to the contractor namely M/s MOP Cleaning Co; in the Mills where the Admn; Department get worked from him." This narrative is important because it reveals, at once , the applicant's acknowledgement of a triangular arrangement: the factory as principal and successive contractors as immediate employers.

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 8 of 16 13. The documentary record, however, demonstrates that the applicant’s formal engagements were consistently with cont ractors and not with Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited. An appointment letter dated 1 st October 2014 issued by “Modern Services Co.” appoints him as “Sweeper” with a monthly salary of Rs.10,500/ -, stating: "On behalf of (Modern Services Co.), We hereby info rm you that you are appointed as Sweeper in our organisation. Detail as follows… Monthly Salary: Rs. 10,500/ -.” Likewise, a subsequent letter dated 5 th December 2016 from Pakistan Facilities Management (Pvt.) Ltd. appoints him as “Gardener” with a fixed sa lary of Rs.14,000/- per month, expressly stipulating a probationary period and that “service rules of the company will be applicable to this appointment.” These documents, emanating from independent contractors, militate against any direct contract of employment between the applicant and Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited. 14. The last in this chain is the employment contract dated 01.05.2020 executed by HRSG SSP (Pvt.) Ltd. with the applicant, appointing him as “Gardner” with effect from 01.05.2020 (F/N). Cl ause 2 of that contract is particularly telling: “The Contract assigned to you, essentially exists only for the duration of HRSG contract with the client organisation." The salary is fixed at Rs.17,500/- per month, with a detailed break -up of basic, house rent and utilities allowance. The termination clause (10.3) further provides: “Your employment contract will be terminated on completion of contract assignment and or on the expiry of HRSG agreement with the client organisation. You shall not be entitled to any notice or compensation in lieu thereof on the said termination or expiry of agreement between HRSG and the client organisation." This clause, read with the rest of the contract, clearly delineates the applicant as an employee of HRSG SSP (Pvt.) Ltd., whose engagement is co-terminous with HRSG’s service contract with Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited. 15. The existence and nature of that service contract is independently corroborated by the “Amendment No.1 to Contract” between Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited and HRSG SSP, which describes the “Nature of contract”

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 9 of 16 as “Janitorial and other Services” and, in its Schedule, specifically lists “Gardening Se rvices, Kotri” with a gross total and service charges. The Schedule shows, inter alia, “Gardening Service s, Kotri-27733-1803” and “Sweeping Services , Kotri-27733-1803,” thereby confirming that gardening services at Kotri were outsourced to HRSG SSP under a commercial contract. The applicant’s own HRSG employment contract, coupled with this amending agreement, leaves little room to doubt that he was deployed at Kotri as part of HRSG’s contractual obligations to Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited. 16. The applicant’s claim, however, is not for unpaid monthly wages under his HRSG contract. He candidly admits that upon oral termination on 31.08.2023 by HRSG SSP, he was paid wages through cheque No.000015868 dated 28.08.2023. His grievance is that he was d enied a "package" allegedly promised to him on parity with the package paid to other workers when the factory was closed on 04.03.2019. He pleads that the Factory Manager, Mr Zia Karim, told him at the time of cheque distribution that his duty was essentia l and that when he would leave his job or be terminated, his entire package would be paid to him like other workers later on. He further narrates that he approached the Admin Manager at Karachi, who initially asked him to come on 26.09.2023 for approval fr om the competent authority, but later refused to pay the package. 17. The “package” which the applicant claims is meticulously quantified in paragraph 11 of his application. He seeks, inter alia, gratuity, leave encashment, notice pay, difference of wages, bonus, outplacement support, ex-gratia (1.5 “YOS” Gross Pay including COD and merit increase), “extra component,” ration, Ramzan package, discretionary Eid bonuses, vocational allowance and an “expiry component,” aggregating to Rs.21,24,610/ -. The template for this claim is the full and final settlement of one Dilshad Ahmed, a process operator of Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited, whose settlement statement is on record. That statement, issued by Philip Morris (Pakistan) Limited, shows “Company Discretionar y Allowances” including outplacement

C.P No.S-66 of 2025 10 of 16 support, ex gratia (1.5 YOS Gross Pay), “extra component,” health insurance compensation, ration, Ramzan package, discretionary Eid bonuses, vocational allowance, additional monthly salary up to December 2019 and so on, culminating in a total of Rs.1,797,036.33. It also contains a comprehensive release and discharge clause, under which said Dilshad Ahmed acknowledges that the company has “cleared off my outstanding dues payable to me, whether under law or otherwise, incl uding ex gratia and accordingly all obligations of the Company to me stand duly discharged.” 18. The first and central question is whether the Authority under the Act of 2015 had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a claim of this nature. Section 2(m) 3 of the Act of 2015 defines “wages” as “all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied were fulfilled, be payable… and includes any bonus or other additional remu neration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include… any gratuity payable on discharge.” Section 15(1) 4 of the Act of 2015, empowers the Authority to hear and decide “all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or non-payment of dues relating to provident fund or gratuity payable under any law or delay in the payment of wages.” The jurisdiction is thus

3 "wages" means all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied were fulfilled, be payable whether conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature afor esaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include: - (a) the value of any house accommodation, supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity, or of any service excluded by general or special order of Government; (b) any contribution paid by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund; (c) any travelling allowance or the value of travelling concession; (d) any sum paid to the person employed to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment; or (e) any gratuity payable on discharge 4 15.(1) Government may, by notification in the official Gazette appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any Officer of Directorate of Labour not below the rank of Grade-18 to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or non -payment of…

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