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Official Citation: 2025 IHC 236337
Court / Jurisdiction: Islamabad High Court
Parties: CM Pak Ltd. vs GOP
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Islamabad High Court, officially reported as 2025 IHC 236337. In this matter between CM Pak Ltd. and GOP, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Islamabad High Court (Honourable Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas) AUTHOR JUDGE: Honourable Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas DECISION DATE: 29-SEP-2025 CASE NO: Writ Petition-31-2014 CITATION: 2025 IHC 236337 PARTIES: CM Pak Ltd. VS GOP LAW / SECTION: under section10, 28(2), 30, 33(1), 37(2) of Competition Commission Act, 2010 SUBJECT: Miscelleneous, Other REMARKS: Competition Commission of Pakistan Case, against inquiry and show cause u/s 30 of the competition commission ============================================================ JUDGMENT SHEET ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
1. Writ Petition No. 31 of 2014
China Mobile Pakistan Limited Versus Competition Commission of Pakistan & others
2. Writ Petition No. 32 of 2014
Pakistan Telecommunication Mobile Limited Versus Competition Commission of Pakistan and others
3. Writ Petition No. 34 of 2014
Warid Telecom Limited Versus Competition Commission of Pakistan and others
4. Writ Petition No. 42 of 2014
Telenor Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited Versus Competition Commission of Pakistan and others
5. Writ Petition No. 2901 of 2014
Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited Versus Competition Commission of Pakistan and others
6. Writ Petition No. 2995 of 2014
Wi-Tribe Pakistan Limited Vs Competition Commission of Pakistan
7. Writ Petition No. 2757 of 2023
Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited Versus Federation of Pakistan and others
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
2 Petitioners by: Mr. Sabir Hussain, Advocate for the petitioner in writ petition No.31/2014.
Mr. Muhammad Ali Raza, Advocate for the petitioner in writ petition No.32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014 and 2901/2014.
Mr. Muhammad Uzair Bin Shafie, Advocate for the petitioner in writ petition 2757/2023.
M/s Rashid Hanif and Muhammad Afsad, Advocates, for the petitioner in writ petition No.2995/2014.
Respondents by: Mian Sami Uddin and Mr. Nasir Mehmood Advocates for the respondent/CCP
Mr. Muhammad Umar Khan Vardag, and Faisal Bin Khurshid Advocates for the respondent No.3/PTA along with Syeda Itrat Batool, (Law Officer), Ch. Adil Javed, Director, PTA.
Mian Muhammad Faisal Irfan, Deputy Attorney General.
Assisted by: Muhammad Fahad and Muhammad Yahya Khan Niazi, Advocates.
Date of Hearing: 08.09.2025.
INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J:- This judgment shall decide the afore-titled Writ Petitions, as these involved common questions of law and facts. 2. In the first six (06) afore-titled writ petitions, the petitioners have assailed the show cause notices (“Impugned SCNs”) issued by Competition Commission of Pakistan (“CCP”) under section 30 of Competition Commission Act, 2010 (“Act, 2010”) upon alleged violation of section 10; whereas in the last afore-titled writ petition (W.P. No 2757/2023), the petitioner has assailed the notice dated 09.05.2023 (“Impugned Notice”)
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
3 issued by CCP under section 33(1)(a) of Act, 2010 upon alleged anti- competitive behavior and misuse of dominant position. I. Factual Background 3. Brief facts in W.P. No.31 of 2014, W.P. No.32 of 2014, W.P. No.34 of 2014, and W.P. No.42 of 2014 are that CCP acting under its statutory mandate, took cognizance of the imposition of additional charges by Cellular Mobile Telecom Operators (“CMTOs”) on the recharge of balance for prepaid collections. During preliminary investigation, it was observed that such charges may constitute hidden costs, creating a misleading impression regarding the actual cost of telecommunication services. Pursuant to this, the CCP, exercising its powers under sections 28(2) and 37 of the Act, 2010 constituted an Enquiry Committee, whose Enquiry Report stated that the levy of such charges prima facie amounts to deceptive marketing practices under section 10(2)(b) of the Act, 2010. Therefore, Show Cause Notices Nos. 26/2013 in W.P. No.31/2014, 24/2013 in W.P. No. 32/2014, 25/2013 in W.P No.34/2014, and 23/2013 in W.P. No. 42/2014 all dated 19.12.2013 were issued under section 30 of the Act, 2010, requiring the undertakings to explain as to why an appropriate order/action under sections 31(b) and 38 of the Act, 2010 should not be made. 4. Facts in W.P. No. 2901 of 2014 and W.P. No. 2995 of 2014 are that CCP initiated an inquiry under section 37(2) of the Act, 2010, on a complaint by a consumer of M/s Wi-Tribe alleging that Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), including the petitioners i.e. PTCL and Wi-Tribe Pakistan Limited, misrepresented their internet packages as unlimited while imposing usage limits. During the enquiry, advertisements of the petitioners’ EVO services were examined, which were marketed as unlimited but subject to a fair usage policy i.e. when the users reached to a certain threshold of data usage it reduces the speed of the internet services. The Enquiry Committee, vide its report dated 04.04.2014, found prima facie that such representations amount to deceptive marketing practices under section 10 of the Act, 2010. Consequently, Show Cause Notices Nos. 06/2014 in W.P. No. 2901/2014, and 03/2014 in W.P. No. 2995/2014 both dated 22.05.2014 were issued to the
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
4 petitioners, requiring them to explain their position before any determination under sections 31 and 38 of the Act, 2010. 5. Facts in W.P. No. 2757 of 2023 are that CCP initiated an enquiry against the petitioner on a complaint filed under section 37(2) of the Act, 2010, by Cyber Internet Services (Pvt.) Limited alleging discriminatory pricing in the Fixed Local Loop (“FLL”) services market. CCP vide its letter dated 05.04.2019 called upon the petitioner to furnish certain information regarding the discriminatory prices in FLL services. The petitioner furnished detailed responses providing relevant information regarding the Universal Access Number (UAN) and Toll-Free Number (TFN) services, clarifying that these are value-added corporate services not intended for the general consumer market, however the CCP sought additional information, which was refused by the petitioner on the ground that CCP lacks the adequate authority to requisition such confidential and classified information. Consequently, CCP issued Enquiry Notice under section 33(1)(a) of the Act, 2010, dated 05.09.2023, requiring the petitioner to appear before it on 13.09.2023. II. Submissions of the Petitioners’ 6. The learned counsels for the petitioners contended that under section 4(m) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996, (“Act, 1996”), Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (“PTA”) being specialised authority has the powers to regulate competition in the telecommunication sector and protect consumer rights, whereas CCP, being a general competition regulator, cannot usurp or override the powers of a sector-specific statutory body, particularly where the subject matter relates to consumer protection and pricing of services, and therefore the Impugned SCNs and Impugned Notice have been issued with malafide and are without lawful authority and coram- non-judice. The learned counsels for the petitioners further contended that the allegations in the Impugned SCNs and Impugned Notice are false, frivolous, and based on lack of understanding of the specialized mechanics of charges in the telecom sector. They also submitted that the operational charges levied are not hidden or misleading but represent legitimate costs of doing business, including administrative, distribution, and account-maintenance expenses,
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
5 which cannot feasibly be absorbed into call charges and without appreciating these distinctions, the CCP has wrongly assumed its jurisdiction by attempting to dictate the mechanics of cost recovery, which amounts to tariff fixation, a function under the exclusive domain of sectoral regulator; and allowing CCP to proceed with the Impugned SCNs and Impugned Notice would amount to double jeopardy, as proceedings regarding similar deductions and consumer complaints are already pending before PTA; and lastly prayed that the Impugned SCNs and Impugned Notice be declared void, without jurisdiction, and of no legal effect. III. Submissions of CCP 7. The learned counsel for CCP contended that CCP is the sole statutory authority empowered under the Act, 2010 to enforce prohibitions on anti- competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, deceptive marketing practices, and mergers and acquisitions which substantially lessen competition across all sectors of the economy to protect the welfare of consumers; and that section 59 of the Act, 2010 has overriding effect, ensuring that the Commission’s mandate is not curtailed by any sectoral legislation. The learned counsel for CCP further contended that the issuance of Impugned SCNs under section 30 and Impugned Notice under section 33 of the Act, 2010 is not an adverse order rather an initial procedural step, affording the petitioners due process and opportunity of hearing before any determination is made; and all the petitions are premature as alternate statutory remedies are available under the Act, 2010; therefore the petitions are not maintainable in constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, as it is an attempt to evade lawful scrutiny of business practices that may adversely affect consumers, hence, liable to be dismissed. IV. Submissions of PTA 8. The learned counsel for PTA submitted that PTA is vested with regulatory powers under the Act, 1996 to oversee and monitor the telecom sector, including licensing of operators, quality of service, protection of consumer rights, and maintain healthy and fair competition in telecom sector
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
6 under sections 4(1)(d), 4(1)(m) and 6(e) of PTA, 1996. The learned counsel explained that mechanisms such as Significant Market Player (“SMP”) ensures that competition is preserved and that no CTMO abuses its position to the detriment of consumers. The learned counsel further submitted that superior Courts have recognized the concurrent jurisdiction of PTA and CCP, whereby CCP remains competent to inquire into competition-related issues in the telecom sector and PTA continues to exercise its regulatory functions as well as maintain healthy competition. 9. In all the afore-titled writ petitions the genesis of dispute emanates from the CCP’s statutory mandate to curb deceptive marketing, anti-competitive behaviour and protect consumers from such practices. Even though the facts in afore-titled writ petitions are distinct in nature, the jurisdictional issues raised by the parties therein are substantially identical and need not to be reiterated separately for the sake of brevity. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. V. Questions for Determination 11. The crux of the dispute lies in question of jurisdiction, as stance of the petitioners is that matters of competition in the telecom sector fall exclusively within the domain of PTA, whereas CCP, as a market regulator, asserts an overriding and broader mandate to examine such matters across every sector/industry. The controversy is narrowed down to the following two questions for determination by this Court:- I. Whether the CCP possesses jurisdiction under the Act, 2010 to inquire into alleged deceptive marketing practices in the telecom sector, or whether the PTA, being the sectoral regulator under the Act, 1996, has exclusive jurisdiction in such matters, or both statutory bodies exercise concurrent jurisdiction? II. Whether the issuance of Impugned SCNs and Impugned Notice by CCP constitutes an adverse order amenable to constitutional jurisdiction
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
7 under Article 199 of the Constitution, or whether the availability of statutory remedies renders the present petitions premature and not maintainable? A. Legislative Object, Scope, and Remedial Mechanism under the Act, 2010 and the Act, 1996 12. To address the first question, it is necessary to examine the purpose, object, scope and remedial portion of the Act, 1996 and Act, 2010. The Act, 1996 was enacted to regulate and develop the telecommunication sector, and PTA an independent regulator was established to regulate the telecom sector, including consumer protection and fair competition among licensees. On the other hand, the Act, 2010 confers on CCP a mandate to oversee competition and consumer protection on a uniform basis across all industries/sectors. These two statutes therefore reflect distinct legislative schemes, one sector- specific and the other cross-sectoral, each with provisions that may potentially intersect in matters such as fair competition and deceptive marketing within the telecom industry. 13. It is manifest that the controversy arises from the apparent conflict between the overriding clauses contained in both enactments based on which the parties claim to have exclusive jurisdiction of either statutory body. Before embarking upon the discussion on the meaning and scope of overriding provisions in both enactments it would be expedient to understand the legislative policy in promulgating the Act, 2010. The preamble to the Act sets out its objective and provides for free competition in all spheres of commercial and economic activity to enhance economic efficiency and to protect consumers from anti-competitive forces and provide for establishment of the CCP to maintain and enhance competition and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The preamble to a statute is though not an operational part of the enactment but it provides the purpose and intent of the legislature, which necessitated the legislation on the subject; therefore, it holds a pivotal role for the purposes of interpretation in order to dissect the true purpose and intent of the law. Free and fair competition is based on quality, price, and service rather than unfair practices. When competitors can
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
8 compete freely on a level playing field, economies are more likely to thrive. On the other hand, unfair competition is using illegal, deceptive, and fraudulent selling practices that harm consumers or other businesses to gain a competitive advantage in the market. The competition law regulates the conduct and organization of businesses in order to promote competition and prevent anti-competitive behaviuor; therefore, CCP exercised its statutory mandate and issued Impugned SCNs under section 30, and Impugned Notice under section 33 of the Act, 2010 on the premise of alleged deceptive marketing, anti-competitive conduct and abuse of dominant position. 14. On the other hand, the preamble of the Act, 1996 reflects that the Act was enacted as a reformatory measure, designed primarily to restructure the telecommunication industry in Pakistan through the establishment of regulatory and institutional bodies such as the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, the Frequency Allocation Board, the National Telecommunication Corporation, and the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust. The preamble further underscores two cardinal purposes: first, to regulate and oversee the telecommunication industry in a structured and coordinated manner; and second, to facilitate the transfer of telecommunication services from the public to the private sector, thereby promoting liberalization and efficiency. Matters incidental or connected therewith are also brought within its domain, thus indicating that the Act, 1996 is sector-specific, regulatory in nature, and primarily concerned with governance, regulation, and transition of the telecommunication sector and certain incidental provisions relating to fair competition and consumer rights protection therewith. Now, it will be relevant to reproduce the overriding provisions in both laws herein as under:- Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 Competition Act, 2010 Section 58. Ordinance to override other laws. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Telegraph Act, 1885 (XIII of 1885), the Section 59. Act to override other laws. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
9 Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 (XVII of 1933), or any other law containing any provision inconsistent to this Act. contained in any other law for the time being in force.”
15. The above referred provisions clearly reflect that overriding clause of the Act, 1996 is sector specific inasmuch it refers expressly to the Telegraph Act 1885, the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1933, and “any other law” inconsistent with the Act, 1996, whereas the overriding clause of Act, 2010 is more broader and general i.e. it applies over “anything contrary in any other law for the time being in force.” 16. This Court observes that both enactments show a clear distinction in their treatment of competition matters. Although sections 4(m) and 6(e) of the Act, 1996 refer to regulation of competition and protection of consumer rights, the statute neither defines anti-competitive practices nor provides any substantive mechanism for their enforcement. Its penal provisions, including sections 23 and 31, are confined to contraventions of its own Act, rules, or regulations, and remain silent on competition-specific breaches, rendering PTA’s role incidental and ancillary. On other hand, the Act, 2010 was introduced with the express object of regulating competition across all sectors. It prohibits anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and deceptive marketing practices, and establishes a detailed remedial mechanism and framework. B. Interpretative Principles on Conflicting Statutes 17. The foremost principle is the doctrine of lex specialis derogat legi generali, namely, that a special law prevails over a general law. Jurisprudentially and in practice, this principle postulates that where two enactments govern the similar situation, the statute dealing with a particular subject-matter (lex specialis) overrides the statute which addresses the subject in more general terms (lex generalis). The Act, 2010, being a comprehensive law within its purpose, scope, object and remedial portion on competition,
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
10 constitutes lex specialis governing all competition-related matters across all sectors. 18. The second principle is lex posterior derogat priori i.e. law later in time prevails; this principle states that a later enactment with a non obstante clause can override prior one, unless legislature clearly intended otherwise. The interpretative rule consistently expounded by the superior Courts of Pakistan is that, where there exists overriding clauses between two special enactments, the later statute shall prevail over the prior one. In the case of Syed Mushahid Shah vs. FIA, (2017 SCMR 1218), the Honourable Supreme Court held that:- “Thus, when there are two special laws both of which contain overriding clauses, in the case of conflict between the two laws generally the statute later in time will prevail over the statute prior in time. However, we are of the opinion that this presumption is not automatic: instead a host of other factors including the object, purpose and policy of both statutes and the legislature's intention, as expressed by the language employed therein, need to be considered in order to determine which of the two special laws is to prevail.” 19. Further reliance is placed on Messrs Federal Bank for Cooperatives, Islamabad vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad (2021 PTD 1203, Islamabad), Muhammad Ghias vs. Market Committee Kamalia, (PLD 1982 Lahore 710), and Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited (SNGPL) vs Director (Legal), President Secretariat (Public), (PLD 2018 Islamabad 51). In Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited supra this Court held that:- “18. In view above discussion on two special laws, it can safely be concluded that when two special laws deal with similar situation, then question of jurisdiction has to be seen in the light of its nature, object, scope and remedial portion provided therein in ordinary meaning which is called as literal approach of reading a statute to understand its true legislative intent. It is also settled proposition of law that special statute prevails over general statute and similarly, general provisions and special provisions in same statute would have different effect, when the plain and simple meaning of a provision of law is clearly understandable without any ambiguity then nothing is to be presumed or imported from outside. Reliance is placed upon 2014 SCMR 671 (The State v. Syed Ali Baqar Naqvi and others). Even otherwise, the Courts have to decide any question in
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
11 accordance with law and every citizen has right to be dealt in accordance with law under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. It is also settled proposition of law that in construing and interpreting a special law, the Court has to look at the reasons and background, which influenced the mind of the legislature in enacting the special law and the history of events, which had occurred preceding the enactment of the special law. Similarly, in construing and interpreting Statute, the fundamental principle is to discover the true intent of the legislature enacting a particular law to meet a particular situation and to confront a specific emerging threat or situation. Reliance is placed upon 2017 5CMR 1572 (Waris Ali and 5 others v. The State).” 20. Another well-settled canon of interpretation, albeit distinct in its application, is the principle of harmonious construction. This principle requires that when two statutes or provisions appear to overlap, the Court must strive to give effect to both by reconciling their language and purpose in a manner that allows them to operate concurrently without displacing the jurisdiction of the other. Thus, in the present case PTA regulates technical and operational matters and has a role in curbing unfair practices within the telecom sector, CCP retains its mandate to address deceptive marketing and anti-competitive conduct. Neither authority can wholly exclude the other, rather, the concurrent roles of both CCP and PTA must be exercised within their statutory limitations, ensuring that the objectives of both laws are preserved. Unless there exists a clear and irreconcilable conflict, the Courts must lean in favour of a harmonious interpretation to avoid overlap, redundancy, thereby allowing each law to operate effectively within its occupied field. 21. In the case of Messrs Federal Bank for Cooperatives, Islamabad vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies Zone, Islamabad (2021 PTD 1203, Islamabad), a division bench of this Court, while construing the meaning of seemingly conflicting provisions between special laws, formulated the following principles of interpretation:- i. While applying seemingly conflicting provisions of two statutes a court must seek to interpret them in a manner that affords harmonious construction and prevents the emergence of a conflict between their provisions. It is to be assumed that in the event the
Writ Petition Nos.31/2014, 32/2014, 34/2014, 42/2014, 2901/2014, 2995/2014, & 2757/2023.
12 legislature wished to override an existing law it would do so explicitly and thus the doctrine of implied repeal is not to be readily or mechanically invoked. ii. Special law prevails over general law. And in a conflict between two special laws the one later in time will ordinarily prevail for being an embodiment of the latest expression of the legislature intent. But, as aforesaid, this principle is not to be mechanically applied as being aware of an earlier special law, the legislature could override the same through explicit language in a subsequent special law if it is so…
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