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Petitioner: FARIDUZZAFAR AND OTHERS VS Respondent: GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pakistan Judge(s): Nasim Hasan Shah, Aslam Riaz Hussain Title: FARIDUZZAFAR AND OTHERS vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER Case No.: Civil Petition No, 601 of 1976 R. F. A. No, 30 of 1975 Date of Judgment:1984-05-19 Reported As: 1984 SCMR 1167 Result: Petition dismissed
Judgment ORDER ' NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-A decree was granted against the petitioners on 17-10-1967. During the course of the execution proceedings, on 16-12-1969, the parties arrived at a compromise whereby the respondents agreed to pay the decretal amount within two months, after selling their land and the execution proceedings were stayed for a period of two months i. e. Upto 16-2-1970. The respondents, however, failed to abide by their commitment, constraining the petitioners to move for execution again. The proper application in this behalf was submitted on 2nd September, 1974. The question arose whether this application was within time? ' The learned Judge in the High Court appears to have held that the period taken in connection with the execution proceedings upto the date when the compromise was effected and two months' time granted for the satisfaction of the decree i. e. Upto 16-2-1970 need not be counted and that the time began to run only after the failure of the petitioners to satisfy the decree i. e. After 16-2- 1970. On this hypothesis the application submitted on 2nd September, 1974 being within six years was, therefore, within time. ' Sh. Abdul Rashid, learned counsel for the petitioners, attempted to argue that the period consumed in the first stage of the execution proceedings i. e. Upto 16-2-1970 could not be excluded because the execution of the decree was not stayed by the order, dated 16-12-1979. This does not appear to be a correct appreciation of the situation. In any case, such pleas cannot induce us to exercise or discretionary jurisdiction of granting leave to appeal to assist the petitioners to escape from their obligations under a decree, which they solemnly undertook to satisfy. ' This is, therefore, not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal.