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Petitioner: PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. VS Respondent: SINDH LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNALHonorable Justice HAMID ALI MIRZAG.M. Dastagir
2003 P L C (C
2003 P L C (C.S.) 943
[Supreme Court of Pakistan]
Present: Syed Deedar Hussain Shah and Hamid Ali Mirza, JJ
PAKISTAN STEEL MILLS CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD.
Versus
SINDH LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and 10 others
(On appeal from the judgment, dated 7-12-2000 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal in Appeal No.434(K)(CE) of 2000).
(a) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---
----S. 2-A---Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal under S.2-A of Service Tribunals Act, 1973---Scope---Condonation of delay---Insertion of S.2-A in Service Tribunals Act, 1973, being procedural in nature, was retrospective in operation---Service Tribunal was competent to consider application for condonation of delay on showing sufficient cause in just and proper cases.
Muhammad Afzal v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and 2 others 1999 SCMR 92; Syed Aftab Ahmed and others v. K.E.S.C. and others 1999 SCMR 197; Qaisar Amin and others v. President of U.B.L. and others 2000 SCMR 174 and Malik Mumtaz Ahmed and others v. Federal Service Tribunal and others 2000 SCMR 832 ref.
(b) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)-----
--Ss. 2-A, 4 & 6---Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 212(3)---Dismissal of appeal by Service Tribunal as barred by time---Abatement of proceedings before High Court ---Extending period of limitation---Employees filed Constitutional petitions before High Court against order, dated 25-2-1991, passed by Authorities which abated on 11-4-2000, after insertion of S.2-A in Service Tribunals Act. 1973---Employees instead of filing appeals before Service Tribunal within 30 days, filed the same on 12-6-2000. and Service Tribunal dismissed the same being barred by .limitation---Validity-- Provision of S.2-A of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 was inserted And was made effective from 10-6-1997 and in view of S.6 of Service Tribunals Act, 1973. in case of abatement of proceedings before any Court the appeal before the Service Tribunal was to be preferred within 90 days---Employees filed Constitutional petition in the year 1991, which remained pending and it stood automatically abated on the insertion of S.2-A in Service Tribunals Act, 1973 i.e. 10-6-1997 but the formal order of abatement was passed on 11-4-2000, which did not extend the period of limitation prescribed under law---Supreme Court declined to interfere with the judgment passed by Service Tribunal---Leave to appeal was refused.
Muhammad Afzal v. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation and 2 others 1999 SCMR 92; Syed Aftab Ahmed and others v. K.E.S.C. and others 1999 SCMR 197; Qaisar Amin and others v. President of U.B.L. and others 2000 SCMR 174; Muhammad Yaqub v. Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. and others 2000 SCMR 830; Malik Mumtaz Ahmed and others v. Federal Service Tribunal and others 2000 SCMR 832 and Imtiaz Butt and others v. Chairman, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi 2000 SCMR 944 ref.
G.M. Dastagir, Advocate Supreme Court and Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.
Nemo for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 18th June, 2001.
JUDGMENT
HAMID ALI MIRZA, J.---This civil petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment dated 7-12-2000 in Appeal No.434(K)/(CE)/2000 (Pakistan Steel Mills Ltd., Karachi, v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and 10 others) whereby appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed as time-barred.
The facts of the case need not be reproduced as the only contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that learned Federal Service Tribunal has erred in dismissing their petitioner as barred by time considering that delay, if any, could have been condoned under the law. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon (i) Muhammad Afzal v. Karachi, Electric Supply Corporation and 2 others (1999 SCMR 92), (ii) Syed Aftab Ahmed and others v. K.E.S.C. and others (1999 SCMR 197), (iii) Qaisar Amin and others v. President of U.B.L. and others (2000 SCMR 174), (vi) Muhammad Yaqub v. Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. and others (2000 SCMR 830), (v) Malik Mumtaz Ahmed and others v. Federal Service Tribunal and others (2000 SCMR 832) and (vi) Imtiaz Butt and others v. Chairman, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi. (2000 SCMR 944) in support of his contention.
We do not find substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
The learned Tribunal in para-3 of the impugned order has observed:--
"(3) Admittedly the order which has been assailed before this Tribunal is, dated 25-2-1991 against which the appellant approached the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh by filing Civil Petition No- D-648 of 1991 which abated on 11-42000. In all fairness the insertion was made effective from 16-6-1997, the date on which such type of matters automatically stood abated. In any case, if order of abatement was passed earlier or was passed later on, then too, the appellants should have filed appeals within 90 days. which was to be reckoned from 10-6-1997. In case the order was passed on 11-4-2000, as in the instant appeal then too, the appellant should have filed appeal within 30 clays but this was not done and the appeal was filed on 12-6-2000. No doubt, the appellant would take benefit of receiving the copy of which, according to the stamp, was applied on 2-6-2000 and the same was supplied on 7-6-2000, but it is worthy to note that the order was passed in open Court on 11-4-2000 when the counsel for the appellant was in attendance. The appellant's counsel or the appellant should have been vigilant in filing the appeal well in time and in case the counsel for the appellant has taken the support of the authorities cited above, we are of the view that the said authorities are of no help to him because he was not pursuing the matter before wrong forum but had bona fidely tiled C.P. before the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh as at that time it was the only remedy available to the appellant. No doubt, there was confusion for some short time but the position had become clear after the decision of august Supreme Court in reported authority appearing in 1999 SCMR 197."
Section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act reads as follows:--
"(6) Abatement of suits and other proceedings.---All suits, appeals or applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of this Act shall abate forthwith:
Provided that any party to such a suit, appeal or application may, within ninety days of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, prefer an appeal to it in respect of any such matter which is in issue in such suit, appeal or application."
There is no cavil with the law laid down by this Court in (i) Muhammad Afzal's case and (ii) Malik Mumtaz Ahmed's case (supra) that insertion of section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 was procedural in the nature therefore, it was retrospective in operation, so also Service Tribunal would be competent to consider application for condonation of delay on showing sufficient cause in just and proper cases as held by this Court in (i) Aftab Ahmed, (ii) Qasir Amin and (iii) Muhammad Yaqub cases (supra). In the instant case the learned Service Tribunal has examined the grounds of delay in filing the appeal but the grounds were neither sufficient nor just for the condonation of delay, therefore, no exception could be taken to the finding arrived at by the learned Tribunal.
Admittedly section 2-A of Service Tribunal was inserted and was made effective from 10-6-1997 and in view of section 6 of Service Tribunals Act in case of abatement of proceedings before any Court the appeal before the concerned Service Tribunal was to be preferred within 90 days but in the instant case Constitutional petition was filed in 1991 which remained pending and it stood automatically abated on the assertion of section 2-A of the said Act i.e. 10-6-1997 but the formal order of abatement was passed on 11-4-2000 which would not extend the period of limitation prescribed under law. In the circumstances his petition has no merit hence leave to appeal is refused and petition is dismissed.
M.H./P-70/S Petition dismissed