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Petitioner: MUHAMMAD PARVEZ VS Respondent: MUHAMMAD YUSUF
1988 S C M R 2099
1988 S C M R 2099
Present: Muhammad Afzal Zullah, Javid Iqba1 and Saad Saood Jan, JJ
MUHAMMAD PARVEZ‑‑Petitioner
versus
MUHAMMAD YUSUF and another‑‑Respondents
Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No.602 of 1984, decided on 8th May, 1988.
(On appeal from the order dated 24‑3‑1984 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, passed in Writ Petition No.1147 of 1984).
West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)‑‑
‑‑‑S.5 it Sched.‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts.185(3) & 199‑ Dissolution of marriage‑‑ Khula' decree passed by Trial Court challenged by husband on ground that there was no specific finding that parties would not be able to keep limits of Allah which was an essential ingredient of such a decree‑‑Finding of fact on issue reached by Trial Court affirmed by High Court‑‑Discussion by Trial Court showing that it was fully conversant with rule that Khula' decree could be granted when it was found that parties would not be able to keep limits of Allah‑‑High Court also examined arguments of counsel for petitioner regarding Khula' from that angle and came to the same conclusion as reached by the Trial Court‑‑Held, no interference was called for with findings of fact challenged by petitioner in Constitu tional jurisdiction of High Court and they were unexceptionable whether looked at from point of legality or propriety‑‑Leave to appeal refused.
Abdul Waheed Butt, Advocate Supreme Court and S. Abid Nawaz, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th May, 1988.
ORDER
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑Leave to appeal has been sought by a husband in a family dispute from judgment dated 24‑3‑1984 of the Lahore High Court, whereby his constitutional petition, challenging the grant of decree for dissolution of marriage in favour of respondent No.2, was dismissed.
2 The learned counsel has contended that the Khula' decree should have been set aside by the High Court, because there was no specific finding that the parties would not be able to keep the limits of Allah, which is an essential ingredient of such a decree.
3. Issue No.4‑A in this case reads as follows: "4‑A Whether plaintiff is entitled for Khula' divorce, if so, on what terms? OPP
The discussion by the learned Trial Judge on this issue shows that he was fully conversant with the rule that Khula' decree can be granted when it is found that the parties would not be able to keep the limits of Allah. Not only this, the learned Judge in the High Court also examined the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding Khula' from that angle and came to the same conclusion as reached by the learned Trial Judge. That being so, we do not find any justification for interference with the findings of fact challenged by the petitioner in the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. They are unexceptional whether looked at from then point of legality or propriety. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refuse and the petition is accordingly dismissed.
M . Y . H . / M‑558 / S Petition dismissed.