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Muhammad Abid Vs The State etc — 2026 LHC 4694

Official Citation: 2026 LHC 4694

Court / Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court (Honorable Justice Abher Gul Khan)

Parties: Muhammad Abid vs The State etc

Legal Principle & Question Decided

Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court (Honorable Justice Abher Gul Khan), officially reported as 2026 LHC 4694. In this matter between Muhammad Abid and The State etc, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.

Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

COURT: Lahore High Court (Honorable Justice Abher Gul Khan) DECISION DATE: 09-07-2026 CASE DETAILS: Criminal Proceedings 30718/26 ============================================================ Form No. HCJD/C-121 ORDER SHEET IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P.No.30718 of 2026

Muhammad Abid Vs. The State & 3 others

Sr. No. of order of proceeding Date of order of proceeding Order with signature of Judge, and that of Parties of counsel, where necessary 09.07.2026 Mr. Muhammad Usman Anwar Chaudhry, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Muhammad Nasir Chohan, A dditional Advocate General Punjab with Irshad SI. Respondent No.3 in person.

The instant petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, assails the legality and validity of the order dated 31.03.2026 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Section -30, Cantt., Lahore, whereby upon receipt of the report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), Arshad Mahmood (respondent No.3) was released from case FIR No.122/2025 dated 12.01.2025 registered under Section 406 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (PPC), at Police Station Mughalpura, Lahore. 2. The facts necessary for the adjudication of the instant petition are that the aforementioned FIR was r egistered at the behest of the petitioner Muhammad Abid wherein it was alleged that Dr.Arshad Mehmood (respondent No.3) had been known t o the petitioner for a considerable period and also served as his family physician. Respondent No.3 in the presence of one Sartaj Khan obtained possession of a white - coloured Suzuki Cultus, Model 2004, bearing registration No.LZH-7592, Engine No.367996 and Chassis No.977237, from the petitioner’s showroom situated at Larex Colony as trust. Upon subsequently demanding the return of the aforesaid vehicle, respondent No.3 informed him that he had entrusted the same to one of his friends, who had failed to retu rn it. 2 W.P.No.30718 of 2026 Despite repeated demands made by the petitioner , respondent No.3 merely extended assurances that he would compensate him by paying the value of the vehicle, however, no such payment was ever made. Respondent No.3 vacated his clinic and persistently refused to give possession of the vehicle thereby rendering himself liable for the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406 of PPC. After the registration of the FIR, the matter was investigated by the investigating agency which having found respondent No.3 , prima facie , involved in the commission of the alleged offence, submitted a report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C.. Upon receipt of the said report, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Section -30, Cantt., Lahore, vide order dated 31.03.2026, released respondent No.3 from the case, hence the instant constitutional petition. 3. Arguments heard. Record perused. 4. A per usal of the record reveals that through FIR No.122/2025 the petitioner being the complainan t attributed to Arshad Mahmood (respondent No.3) the allegation that the latter had obtained possession of the vehicle from the petitioner’s showroom and had subsequently failed to return the same. The report submitted under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., a copy whereof forms part of the record, further reflects that respondent No.3 joined the investigation after securing ad interim pre-arrest bail and the said report is crystal clear of the fact that respondent No.3 was, apparently found involved in the commission of the alleged offence. Upon receipt of the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., the learned Judicial Magistrate, Section-30, Cantt., Lahore, instead of summoning respondent No.3 being accused issued notice to the petitioner, in pursuance whereof he appeared before the Court, reiterated the allegations levelled in the FIR, produced a photocopy of an affidavit purportedly executed by prosecution witness Muhammad Sartaaj and requested that respond ent No.3 be summoned to 3 W.P.No.30718 of 2026 face trial. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Section -30, Cantt., Lahore, having found no sufficient material warranting further proceedings on the basis of the report submitted under Section 173, Cr.P. C., vide order dated 31.03.2026, released respondent No.3 from the aforesaid case. In the circumstances, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant portion of the said order, which reads as under:- “Perusal of record further shows that no exact date and time of the alleged entrustment, if any, has been mentioned by the complainant in the body of First Information Report despite the facts that the vehicle in question was delivered to the accused as tr ust then why any agreement was not executed between the parties. Besides, during the course of arguments complainant also remained fail to produce a single document regarding ownership of alleged vehicle in his name which prima facie shows the mala fide of the complainant which cannot be ruled out. The prosecution also forwarded the same without any opinion in favour of the complainant while the police did not bring on record any substantive evidence against the accused. In view of the matter I find no reas on and material to proceed further with the instant challan, therefore, in these circumstances, the accused namely Arshad Mahmood s/o Zahoor Ahmad is hereby released from instant case.” (emphasis supplied)

At the very outset, it is observed that the expression “release” finds no place in the scheme of procedure provided to regulate the magisterial trial under Sections 241 to 249 -A of Cr.P.C. insofar as the termination of criminal proceedings at the pre - trial stage is c oncerned. S ubsection 3 of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers a Magistrate to discharge the accused while agreeing with the opinion of the police provided the material brought before the Court is considered insufficient to warrant further proceedings, whereas the term “release” is ordinarily employed in relation to an accused in custody who is ordered to be set at liberty. A Magistrate, upon receipt of a report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., is under a legal obligation to examine whether the material collected during investigatio n discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. In a case where the Magistrate for reasons to be recorded arrives at the conclusion 4 W.P.No.30718 of 2026 that no case is made out for summoning the accused, the course envisaged by law is to discharge the accus ed and not to release him from the case. The distinction between the expressions “discharge” and “release” is not one of mere semantic rather it strikes at the very root of the jurisdiction exercisable by a criminal court under the statutory framework of Cr.P.C. In the instant case, the investigating agency upon completion of the investigation found respondent No.3 to be , prima facie , involved in the commission of the alleged offence and accordingly submitted report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. At that junc ture, the learned Court was only required to satisfy itself as to the existence or otherwise of sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused and was not expected to undertake a meticulous appraisal of the evidence or to record findings touching upon t he merits of the controversy. The q uestions relating to the absence of a written agreement, the ownership of the vehicle, the alleged mala fides attributed to the complainant, and the evidentiary value of the material collected during investigation were all matters requiring adjudication after the parties had been afforded an opportunity to lead evidence during the course of a regular trial. The learned Judicial Magistrate, however, not only employed terminology align to the scheme of Cr.P.C. but also transgressed the limits of the jurisdiction vested with the Court by entering into disputed questions of fact and bringing the proceedings to an end at a stage when such an exercise was wholly unwarranted. The approach adopted by the learned Magi strate has caused a manifest miscarriage of justice and, therefore, cannot be permitted to stand. While holding so, reliance may be placed upon the case reported as Safdar Ali v. Zafar Iqbal and others (2002 SCMR 63) wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan h eld as under:- “It may not be out of place to mention here that learned Ilaqa Magistrate was not supposed to pass an exhaustive order for the simple reason that he was not deciding the case at all and, therefore, it was not obligatory for him to 5 W.P.No.30718 of 2026 dilate upon each and every aspect of the matter which falls within the jurisdictional domain of learned trial Court.” 5. For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is allowed and the order dated 31.03.2026 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Section -30, Cantt., Lahore, is set -aside. As a necessary corollary, the trial Court is directed to proceed with the matter strictly within the four corners of the procedure provided to regulate a trial in accordance with law.

(ABHER GUL KHAN) JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

JUDGE

The order was announced on 09.07.2026 dictated, prepared, and signed on 14.07.2026 Najum*

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