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Petitioner: MANZOOR HUSSAIN SHAH VS Respondent: MUHAMMAD HAYATHonorable Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah
1988 S C M R 1946
1988 S C M R 1946
Present: Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Saad Saood Jan, JJ
MANZOOR HUSSAIN SHAH‑‑Petitioner
versus
MUHAMMAD HAYAT‑‑Respondent
Civil Petitions Nos.786 and 787 of 1984, decided on 7th June, 1988.
(Against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 17‑4‑1984 in Civil Revision No.647‑D of 1984).
Punjab Pre‑emption Act (I of 1913)‑‑
‑‑‑S.15‑‑Pre‑emption‑‑Annulment of sale‑‑Petitioner obtained a pre emption decree while vendor obtained a decree against vendee in a separate suit for declaration resulting in annulment thereof and there was then left nothing for petitioner to pre‑empt‑‑ Decree passed in favour of vendor in declaratory suit was upheld throughout and was result of a full-fledged contest between vendor and petitioner who was also a party to that second suit‑‑Question of declaration regarding annulment of sale, held, stood concluded by finding of fact‑ Interference declined with impugned judgment which upheld annulment.
Malik Talib Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court and
Sh.Salahuddin, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner. Rao Hamid Mukhtar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.l and 2.
Ch.Qamaruddin Khan Meo, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.3 and 4.
Date of hearing: 7th June, 1988.
ORDER
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑Leave to appeal has been sought by a pre‑emptor against the dismissal of his Revision petitions. There are two separate rounds of litigation involved in these cases. In one, the petitioner succeeded in obtaining a pre‑emption decree. In the other, the vendor succeeded in obtaining a decree against the vendee in a suit for declaration resulting in the annulment of the same. The vendee had, according to the learned counsel, conceded the vendor's claim, in this second litigation. This very circumstance as he stated, has been responsible for the petitioner's failure upto the High Court. Obviously, the sale having been annulled, there was nothing left for the petitioner to pre‑empt. The main argument, as noted above, of the learned counsel, is that he having succeeded in the pre‑emption suit, this success could not have been set at naught by a consent decree passed in favour of the vendor, whereby the vendee sought clearly to avoid the effect of the pre‑emption decree.
On face, the argument of the learned counsel looks attractive but after hearing him at some length. We find no force in it. The decree passed in favour of the vendor in the declaratory suit, has been upheld throughout. It would not be correct to say that the same was the result of the consent expressed by the vendee; but, as admitted by the learned counsel, it was the result of a full-fledged contest between the vendor and the present petitioner who also, was a party to that second suit. The question of declaration regarding annulment of sale now stands concluded by the findings of fact.
No justification has been found to interfere with the impugned judgment. Leave to appeal, therefore, is refused in both the petitioners.
M.Y.H./M‑550/S Leave refused