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1995 SCMR 294

Mst. AYESHA BIBI vs MUHAMMAD SAJID and another

Petitioner: Mst. AYESHA BIBI VS Respondent: MUHAMMAD SAJID and another

Court: Supreme Court of Pakistan Decision Date: 1994-12-14

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pakistan Judge(s): Ajmal Mian, Muhammad Munir Khan Title: Mst. AYESHA BIBI vs MUHAMMAD SAJID and another Case No.: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No, 734-L of 1993 Date of Judgment:1994-12-14 Reported As: 1995 SCMR 294 Result: Leave refused

Judgment ORDER ' MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, J.---This petition for leave to appeal which is directed against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 8-3-1993, rises from the acts that on 1-6-1980, Mst. Ayesha Bibi (petitioner) filed a suit for possession by pre-emption of the land measuring 40 Kanals situate in Mauza Virke Kohna, Tehsil Chunian; District Kasur, on the basis of being Yak Jaddi of the vendor and co-sharer in Mauza/estate, in the Court of Civil Judge, Chunian. The suit was resisted. The trial'Court rejected the plaint on 21-1-1992 on the grounds that the plaint did not disclose Talabs as envisaged by section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and that no decree for possession by pre- emption could be granted to a collateral of the vendor and an owner in the estate/Mauza. The appeal filed by the plaintiff against this judgment was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Chunian, on 22-7-1992. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner/plaintiff filed a Revision Petition before the High Court which was dismissed in limine on 8-3-1993. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that since the suit was filed in the year 1980, it was not possible to state Talabs/demands as envisaged by section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, in the plaint. So, the plaint could not have been rejected for want of the disclosure of Talabs in the plaint. 3. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, we feel declined to interfere with the impugned order. Be that as it may, the fact remains that there was no decree for possession by pre-emption passed in favour of the petitioner before 31st day of July, 1986 and as such it was/is not possible to decree the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff on the basis of her being collateral of the vendor and co-sharer in the estate/Mauza. This petition is liable to be dismissed on this score alone.

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