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Initializing Secure Chambers
Petitioner: Messrs ASHRAF SUGAR MILLS LTD and another VS Respondent: GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pakistan Judge(s): Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Faqir Muhammad Khokhar, Shakirullah Jan Title:Messrs ASHRAF SUGAR MILLS LTD and another vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
and others Case No.: Civil Appeals Nos.822 to 825 of 2003 Date of Judgment:2006-02-22 Reported As: 2007 PTD 2303 Result: Appeal dismissed Judgment ORDER ' IFIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAT. IHDRY, The listed appeals are by the leave of the Court, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 31-1-2002. 2. Learned counsel while narrating the facts of the cases, pointed out that the Government had specified the period of crushing of 160 days by the Notification No,S.R.O. 823(I)/1991 dated 28th of 1991 for the Province of Punjab. According to him, the Provincial Government had discriminated to the appellants because in the other provinces no such limitation for crushing period has 'been imposed. When we called upon him to explain as to whether the Government in exercise of powers conferred upon it under section 12-A of Central Excise Act, 1944, is not competent to fix the crushing period. He could not answer satisfactorily except saying that on account of some unavoidable circumstances at times it becomes impossible for the appellants to crush the sugarcane during the period of 160 days. It may be noted that the learned High Court after having taken into consideration arguments of parties observed as follows:- "16. We, therefore, hold that for the purpose of the said proviso in the said S.R.O. No,505(I)/90 dated 7-6-1990, crushing period will mean a period starting from 30th of November and ending on 30th June the next following year. However, we find that the respondent-Department is treating the said crushing season to mean 160 days which is less than the period of the crushing as held by us. The petitioners shall, therefore, be entitled to the benefit of the said departmental interpretation." 3. Thus we are of the opinion that as the government is competent to fix the crushing period therefore, the High Court under these B circumstances had rightly dismissed the petition holding
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that notification S.R.O. To be valid and order being unexceptionable, admits no interference. Appeals are dismissed.