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Petitioner: HABIB BANK LTD. VS Respondent: ALI MOHTARAM NAQVI
1988 C L C 466
1988 C L C 466
[Karachi]
Before Ajmal Mian and Sajjad Ali Shah, JJ
HABIB BANK LTD‑‑Appellant
versus
ALI MOHTARAM NAQVI‑‑Respondent
High Court Appeal No.66 of 1987, decided on 10th August, 1987.
Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑
‑‑5. 10‑‑Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979), Ss. 7 & 12 (1), proviso‑‑Stay of suit where prior suit between same parties was pending in Court‑‑Validity of‑‑Appeal against order for stay of suit‑‑Maintainability of‑‑Appeal against such order of stay of suit, held, was not competent as per provisions of proviso to S.12 (1) of Banking Companies Ordinance (XIX of 1979).
G . H . Malik for Appellant. A.A. Mu hammadally, A . A . ‑G . for Respondent.
ORDER
AJMAL MIAN, J:‑‑This appeal is directed against the order dated 1‑1‑1987 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Suit No. 986 of 1985 filed by the present appellant under section 7 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, for the recovery of Rs.30,63,764.13, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the respondent's application under section 10, C.P.C and stayed the above
I suit on the ground that a prior suit between the same parties covering substantially the same issue was pending.
The office has raised an objection as to the maintainability of the above appeal in view of proviso to subsection (1) of section 12 of the Ordinance which provides as follows:
"Provided that no appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Special Court."
Mr. G.H. Malik learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently urged that the order under appeal is in fact a final order as far as appellant is concerned inasmuch as if the respondent's suit would be decreed, there would be no question of proceeding with the appellant's suit and in that event section 11, C.P.C.would be attracted to. The above contention seems to be somewhat ingenious but the fact remains that the order under appeal has not disposed of the entire case of the appellant. It is an admitted position that even after the grant of the stay under section 10 appellant can file any application for interlocutory relief like an application for attachment before judgment or for an injunction, etc. We may also observe that it will also be open to the appellant to apply at a subsequent stage on a reasonable ground for recalling of the order if the case so warrants. We, are, therefore, of the view that the office objection is to be sustanied. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine as being incompetent.
H.B.T./H‑71/K Appeal dismissed.