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Petitioner: NOOR ELAHI VS Respondent: CHAIRMAN, WAPDA
1995 P L C (C
1995 P L C (C.S.) 1103
[Federal Service Tribunal]
Before S.M. Ishaq and Rana Rifat Saeed Members
NOOR ELAHI
Versus
THE CHAIRMAN, WAPDA and another
Appeal No. 113(R) of 1994, decided on 19th June, 1995.
(a) Allocation Rules‑‑‑-
‑‑‑‑ Rr. 14 & 19‑‑‑Retaining Government accommodation by retired civil servant beyond prescribed period‑‑‑Effect‑‑‑Civil servant despite having been retired from service retained and occupied accommodation provided to him by Government beyond prescribed period of six months‑‑‑Authority considering occupation of civil servant as unauthorized, instead of reporting to police for taking necessary action against civil servant for his‑ ejectment from accommodation, demanded from him standard rent as well as allied charges for period of his unauthorised occupation‑‑‑Civil servant who claimed that he had been retired at least four years before his actual date of retirement due to wrongly recorded date of his birth in the service record, had appealed before Appellate Authority against his undue retirement and at the same time had sought from Authority permission for retaining accommodation till decision of his appeal‑‑‑Civil servant's son who was also an employee of Authority, had also applied for allotment of disputed accommodation claiming that under R.14 of Allocation Rules, he was eligible for its allotment, but Authority did not dispose of his application‑‑‑Civil servant who remained in occupation of accommodation in hope that same would either be allotted to his son or that he himself would either be allowed to stay till disposal of his appeal regarding his premature retirement, had committed no irregularity‑‑‑Standard rent as well as allied charges should not be charged by Authority from civil servant due to peculiar circumstances of the case, but instead normal rent should be charged from him for period in question as Authority itself was responsible for not taking any appropriate action either on request of civil servant for stay in accommodation or on application of his son for allotment of accommodation.
(b) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)‑‑‑
‑‑‑S. 4‑‑‑Appeal‑‑‑Limitation‑‑‑Civil servant though had filed departmental! appeal against his grievance after several months of prescribed period of limitation, but departmental appeal was dismissed not on limitation, but was dismissed on merits‑‑‑ appeal filed before Serviced Tribunal within prescribed period of limitation rejection of department appeal, was well in time and could not be considered time‑barred.
1986 SCMR 1213 ref.
Fazal H. Chaudhry for Appellant.
Manzar Alam for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 9th May, 1994.
JUDGMENT
S.M. ISHAQ (MEMBER).‑‑‑It is the case of the appellant that while he was serving in WAPDA, a Quarter No. 723‑C, Sector G‑7/3‑1, Islamabad, was allotted to him which remained in his occupation a little more than three years after his retirement. The respondent WAPDA claiming it to. be unauthorised occupation had demanded from the appellant standard rent as well as the allied charges at the rate of Rs.1,800 and Rs.64 p.m. respectively for the period 14‑5‑1991 to 30‑6‑1993 and had also directed the D.M. (E) Operation Division No. II, Islamabad, to stop his pension till the recovery of the said rent vide letter dated 18‑10‑1992. The appellant filed a departmental appeal against this order on 21‑7‑1993 but without any success. He then filed the present appeal before this Tribunal on 21‑3‑1994.
2. The contentions raised before the Departmental Authority as well as before us are that at the time of his retirement the appellant was 56 years of age but due to wrong recording of his date of birth in the service record he stood retired at least four years before the actual date of retirement. He appealed to the Chairman, Area Electricity Board, against his retirement and at the same time he sought permission from him for retaining the said quarter till the decision of his appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant's son, who is an employee of the WAPDA, had also applied for the allotment of the said quarter under his name as under the rules he was eligible for its allotment but the respondents did not bother to dispose of his application and it was for these reasons that the quarter could not be vacated presuming that the same would be allotted to any one of them. Besides, several persons who retired before the appellant's retirement are still residing in the quarters which were allotted to them during their services without paying any standard rent. It was vociferously maintained that the Respondents had treated him discriminatively.
3. The learned counsel for the Respondents resisting the appeal contended that rule 19 of the Allocation Rules provides that if the Government accommodation is occupied or retained unauthorisedly beyond the prescribed period of six months by a F.G.S. the Estate Office shall charge standard rent or 11.25% of the emoluments, whichever is more. The appellant retired from service on 14‑5‑1991 but he unauthorizedly occupied the accommodation till 30‑6‑1993 and as such the Respondent‑WAPDA was justified in charging standard rent from the appellant.
4. We have heard both the parties and perused the record. It appears that the appellant had been raising hue and cry against his retirement and at the same time he had been requesting the concerned authorities for the retention of the accommodation till the decision of his appeal but no action seems to have been taken in this regard. The other lacuna noticed by us is that the Respondent‑WAPDA did not dispose of the application of the appellant's son who was eligible for the allotment of the quarter under rule 14 of the said Rules. For the sake of facility it would be advantageous to reproduce below A the said rule
"(14) In the event of allottee's death or retirement, allotment of accommodation may be transferred to one of the serving members of his family if such member is otherwise eligible for accommodation from Estate Office pool or becomes eligible within six months of the event and where the accommodation is of a class or category higher than his entitlement, he shall be allotted the first available accommodation in that class or category as the case may be, shall not be dislodged and shall be charged normal rent till such time as the alternative accommodation of his entitlement has been made available to him:"
4. A bare reading of the above shows that accommodation is transferable to one of the serving members of an allottee of Government accommodation provided he is eligible. There is nothing on record to show that the respondent‑WAPDA had taken any action on the application of the appellant's son who is also serving in that Organization and was eligible. According to the appellant, he remained in occupation of the quarter in the hope that, it would either be allotted to his son or that he himself would be allowed to stay till the disposal of his appeal regarding premature retirement and that as soon as it was allotted to one Muhammad Zafar he vacated it without any hesitation or without any delay and, therefore, he committed no irregularity and that the standard rent should not be charged from him due to peculiar circumstances of the case. We find substance in these submissions as, in our view, the Respondents should not charge standard rent from the appellant at this stage after a lapse of three years, as such an action, delayed inordinately whether advertently or inadvertently, would only mean a substantial slash in his pension benefits. We, therefore, direct that the normal rent should be charged for the period in question as the Respondents were responsible for not taking any appropriate action either on the appellant's request for stay or on the application of his son for allotment of the quarter nor any proceedings were initiated to eject the appellant from the quarter through Police. Had the Authorities been serious about the vacation of the quarter, the matter should have been reported to Police for taking necessary action but, it seems, it was not done, and instead correspondence was exchanged between the appellant and the Authority which was apparently nothing but mere an eye wash exercise. Connivance in this case, thus, cannot be ruled out.
5. An objection with regard to the limitation was also raised on behalf of the responded‑WAPDA. It was contended that the impugned order for he recovering the standard rent was passed on 18‑10‑1992 and the appellant filed departmental appeal against that order on 21‑7‑1993 which was rejected on 20‑2‑1994. It was maintained that, under the law, only 30 days were available to the appellant for filing a departmental appeal but he filed the appeal after several months of the, prescribed period of limitation and as such, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. It is evident that the appellant filed a belated departmental appeal and he had to explain each and every day's f delay but in the case reported as 1986 SCMR 1213 the Honourable Supreme Court has held that when the departmental appeal is not dismissed on limitation but is dismissed on merits, the appeal to the Tribunal could be filed within 30 days from the date of the rejection on merits. In the instant case, the departmental appeal was rejected on 20‑2‑1994 and thereafter the appellant approached this Tribunal well in time on 21‑3‑1994. The objection is therefore revelled.
6. In the result the appeal succeeds only to the extent indicated above with no order as to casts.
H.B.T./1071/Sr.F Order accordingly.