Legal Principle & Question Decided

Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Sindh High Court, officially reported as 2025 SHC 1424. In this matter between Cr.Bail 1424/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Circuit at Hyderabad - Sadam Hussain @ Sadam @ Kalu (Applicant) and the Respondent, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.

Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

COURT: Sindh High Court CASE NO: Cr.Bail 1424/2025 (S.B.) Sindh High Court, Circuit at Hyderabad CITATION: 2026 SHC HYD 667 PARTIES: Sadam Hussain @ Sadam @ Kalu (Applicant) ORDER DATE: 27-FEB-26 BENCH: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Riazat Ali Sahar(Author) A.F.R: Yes ------------------------------------------------------------ IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, CIRCUIT COURT, HYDERBABD

Criminal Bail Application No. S-1424 of 2025 [Sadam Hussain @ Sadam @ Kalu v. The State]

Before: JUSTICE RIAZAT ALI SAHAR

O R D E R

RIAZAT ALI SAHAR, J. - Through this instant bail application filed under Section 498 Cr.P.C., the applicant/accused se eks the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail in connection with Crime No.147 of 2025 registered at Police Station B-Section Nawa bshah for the alleged offences under Sections 302, 337 -A(ii), 337-L(ii), 337-A(i), 147, 148 and 504 P.P.C.

2. The brief facts of the case, as set forth in the FIR, are that the complainant Viky son of Mohan Lal Souchi lodged the present FIR on 21- 05-2025 at Police Station B-Section Nawabshah allegin g therein that the accused persons, namely Sultan and Feroze sons of Khalil Makrani, along with the present applicant Sadam Hus sain alias Kalu Makrani and co-accused Roshan Makrani and three unk nown persons, due to previous dispute with the complainant party, came in front of the

Applicant/Accused:

Through Mr. Waheed Ahmed Awan, Advocate

Complainant:

The State:

Through Mr. Zafar Ali Vighio, Advocate.

Ms. Rameshan Oad, DPG, Sindh along with SIP / SHO Rasheed Ahmed Memon PS B-Section Nawabshah District Shaheed Benazirabad

Date of Hearing:

27.02.2026

Date of Judgement:

27.02.2026

2 complainant ’s house on 20- 05-2025 at about 08:00 a.m. while armed with bricks and stones. It was alleged that upon th eir arrival they started abusing the complainant party and thereafte r Sultan and Feroze Makrani allegedly caused brick and stone blo ws to Mohan Lal, the father of the complainant, on his head and othe r parts of the body, while the present applicant and co-accused Roshan a llegedly caused brick blows to injured Sooraj on different parts of his body. On raising cries, other relatives and persons from the localit y arrived at the scene and rescued the injured persons, who were then take n to hospital for treatment. Subsequently, Mohan Lal succumbed to the injuries during treatment whereafter Section 302 P.P.C. was added in the case and investigation was carried out by the police. 3. Conversely, the learned Deputy Prosecutor General opposed the grant of pre-arrest bail to the applicant/accus ed and contended that the applicant has been nominated in the FIR with a specific role of causing brick blows to the injured person during th e occurrence and his presence at the scene of crime is clearly established from the contents of the FIR as well as the statements of the prosecutio n witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is further contended t hat the offence subsequently assumed the character of a capital offence as the injured Mohan Lal succumbed to the injuries during treatmen t, whereafter Section 302 P.P.C. was incorporated in the case. Le arned DPG argued that the applicant has failed to establish any mala fide on the part of the complainant or the police, which is a necessary requirement for the extraordinary relief of pre -arrest bail, and that the case against the applicant does not fall within the ambit of further enquiry at this stage. He therefore prayed that the instant bail applicati on may be dismissed in the interest of justice. 4. Heard and record perused. The principal question requiring tentative examination in the instant matter is whether, in the peculiar facts of the case, the applicant has been able to m ake out a case for confirmation of the extraordinary relief of pre -arrest bail by showing that his arrest would not advance the cause of just ice and that the accusation, to the extent of his role, calls for de eper probe within the contemplation of section 497(2), Cr.P.C. The settled rule is that bail

3 before arrest is not to be granted in a routine man ner; nevertheless, where the attending circumstances disclose over-imp lication, doubtful attribution, delayed reporting, or such features fr om which mala fide may reasonably be inferred, the Court is not powerl ess to protect liberty. In Khalil Ahmed Soomro and others v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 730) , the Honourable Supreme Court held that, at the pr e- arrest bail stage, mala fide need not always be pro ved through direct evidence and may legitimately be deduced from the facts and circumstances of the case. Likewise, in Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique and another (PLD 2009 SC 427), it was reiterated that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary relief, yet it remains available where the material does not furnish reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty, or where the process of law appears to have been set in motion for an oblique purpose. More recently, the superior Courts have also emphasised that reluctance in pre -arrest bail matters must not eclipse the accused ’s right to liberty and fair trial, and the Court must still examine whether sufficient inc riminating material exists against the person seeking such relief. 5. In the present case, the FIR itself, on its plain reading, attributes the fatal assault upon deceased Mohan Lal to co - accused Sultan and Feroze, who are alleged to have caused brick and stone blows to him on the head and other parts of the body, whereas the allegation against the present ap plicant is materially different and distinctly confined to causing brick blows, jointly with co-accused Roshan, to injured S ooraj. Thus, no specific injury, much less the fatal injury, has been assigned to the applicant in respect of the deceased. Whether, despite such separate attribution, the applicant can ultimately be roped in with the aid of unlawful assembly or common object is a matt er requiring evidence a nd deeper appreciation at trial. At the bail stage, the Court is concerned only with a tentative view of the availab le material and not with conducting a miniature trial. The Supreme Cour t has consistently held that deeper appreciation of evidence is to be avoided at bail stage, and any infirmity creating a reasonable doubt must tilt in favour of the accused.

4 6. Another circumstance of significance is that, according to the defence as well as the contents of the applicat ion, co-accused Roshan, to whom an identical and joint role has been attributed regarding injuries to Sooraj, has already been gran ted pre- arrest bail by the learned Court below. The rule of consistency, though not absolute, cannot lightly be ignored wher e the role attributed to two accused persons flows from the same set of a llegations and no distinguishing feature of substance has been shown by the prosecution. At least tentatively, the case of the present appli cant appears to stand on the same footing as that of the said co-accused in so far as the injuries to Sooraj are concerned. In such a situati on, denial of the same relief to the present applicant would require stron g differentiating material, which has not been pointed out before this Court. 7. It is also not without relevance that the occurre nce is stated to have taken place on 20- 05-2025 at about 08:00 a.m., whereas the FIR came to be lodged on 21- 05-2025 at 11:00 p.m. Such delay, though not always fatal, assumes importance in a case of this nature where multiple accused have been nominated from the opposite side and the prosecution version itself suggests previous animosity between the parties. The law does recognise that unexplained or insufficiently explained delay in setting the criminal law into motion may provide room for consultation, deliberation and embellishme nt. In Mazhar Ali v. The State (2025 SCMR 318), the Supreme Court treated belated reporting as a circumstance capable of creating doubt at the bail stage. Here too, the delay is a circumstance which, when r ead with the prior dispute and the wide net cast in the FIR, cannot be brushed aside altogether for purposes of tentative assessment. 8. The defence has further pointed out that the statements of the prosecution witnesses under section 161, Cr.P.C . were recorded with delay. Without making any conclusive observation on the evidentiary worth of such statements, it may sa fely be observed that delayed recording of witness statements is also a recognised factor which may, depending on the facts of each case, dim inish the spontaneity and confidence otherwise attached to the prosecution version. When this feature is examined alongside the delay ed FIR, the

5 admitted background of strained relations, the separate and non -fatal role assigned to the applicant, and the grant of ba il to the similarly placed co-accused, the matter, at least tentatively , travels into the area of further enquiry. 9. There is yet another aspect. The record shows tha t the applicant had earlier approached the learned Sessio ns Court, had been granted interim protection, and after recall thereo f approached this Court. During the subsistence of interim relief bef ore this Court, no allegation has been brought to notice that he misused the concession, attempted to abscond, tampered with evidence, or endeavoured to influence witnesses. The challan has already been s ubmitted and section 302, P.P.C. was added later on account of the death of Mohan Lal. Thus, the investigative stage, in all material particulars, appears to have substantially matured, and no persuasive groun d has been shown as to why custodial arrest of the applicant is now indispensable, particularly when his nominated role does not directly relate to the fatal injuries. The object of pre-arrest bail is not to o bstruct lawful investigation; however, once the Court finds that the accusation against the applicant is not free from doubt and that his a rrest would serve more as humiliation than investigative necessity, j udicial protection may legitimately be extended. Kamran Attaullah and another v. The State (2021 SCMR 449) reiterates that pre-arrest bail re mains exceptional and cannot be granted mechanically, but that principle cuts both ways: where the material itself does not furni sh strong reasonable grounds against the applicant, the Court must not s acrifice liberty at the altar of mere allegation. 10. As to the contention of the learned D.P.G. that n o mala fide has been specifically established, suffice it to ob serve that mala fide is seldom available in the form of direct proof. It is commonly inferred from surrounding features. In the present case, the admitted previous dispute, the delayed FIR, the delayed statements under section 161, Cr.P.C., the distinct and non -fatal role assigned to the applicant, and the concession already extended to the co-accused w ith identical attribution, collectively furnish sufficient indica tions to tentatively infer that the case of the present applicant is not one o f straight and

6 unimpeachable involvement so as to disentitle him from the protective relief of pre-arrest bail. The principle laid down in Khalil Ahmed Soomro squarely applies that where the net appears to hav e been thrown wider and exaggeration or over-implication i s prima facie discernible, such factors may themselves constitute the element of mala fide for purposes of section 498, Cr.P.C. 11. Needless to add, the heinousness of the offence by itself is not an absolute bar where the role of a particular accused is distinguishable and the material against him requires further scrutiny. The Court is not, at this stage, to pronounce upon guilt or innocence with finality. It is enough if, on a tentative asse ssment, reasonable doubt emerges regarding the precise extent of the a pplicant ’s culpability. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where the case calls for further enquiry, the benefit thereof must go to the accused even at the bail stage. 12. For the foregoing reasons, this Court was satisfi ed that the applicant had succeeded in making out a case for co nfirmation of interim pre -arrest bail. Consequently, vide short order dated 27.02.2026, the interim pre -arrest bail earlier granted to the applicant was confirmed on the same terms and conditions, and the above are my reasons. 13. It is clarified that the observations made herein are purely tentative in nature and shall not prejudice either side at the trial.

JUDGE Approved for Reporting Muhammad Danish

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