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Petitioner: THE STATE VS Respondent: SAID AKBAR
P L D 1956 (W
P L D 1956 (W. P.) Peshawar 110
Before Habibullah Khan and Muhammad Shafi, JJ
THE STATE‑Petitioner
Versus
SAID AKBAR and others‑Respondents
Criminal Reference No. 121 of 1955, decided on 12th June, 1956, from order of Muhammad Zaman Khan, Magistrate of the 1st Class, Peshawar, dated 28th June 1955, convicting the accused under section 13, Gambling Act to a fine of Rs. 40 each only, and reported by the District Magistrate, Peshawar for the enhancement of penalty.
(a) Interpretation of Statutes‑General principles.
General principles to be kept in view in interpreting statutes are that the interpretation should be natural, appropriate and simple and should give the words their ordinary meaning, it should be consistent with the intention of the Legislature; it‑should help the administration of justice as far as reason ably possible ; and it should not be perverse so as to offend against common‑sense. An interpretation would be regarded as perverse if it unduly stretches the meaning to an extent that leads to ridiculous consequences.
(b) Public Gambling Act (III of 1867), S. 13 (as amended by S. 13 of Public Gambling (N. W. F. P. Amendment) Act (V of 1947)‑Makes imposition of fine and imprisonment obligatory.
Section 13 of the Public Gambling (N: W. F. P. Amend ment) Act (V of 1947), in so far as it amends section 13 of the Public Gambling Act (III of 1867) makes provision for a heavier punishment than the one provided by the latter Act. Under the latter Act, the maximum punishment provided for the offence was a fine not exceeding Rs. 50 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, section 13 of the Amendment Act provides imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding three years and fine not exceeding five hundred rupees. The amended section thus makes imposition of fine in addition to a sentence of imprisonment obligatory.
Where, therefore, a person convicted under the amended section 13 of the Public Gambling Act, 1867 was awarded only a fine of Rs. 40 ox in default three months' R. I. by the trying Magistrate.
Held, that the sentence was illegal. It was obligatory on the Magistrate to award a sentence of both imprisonment and fine. A sentence of imprisonment was added by the High Court to the sentence of fine.
Nemo for Petitioner.
Naqashband for Respondent.
JUDGMENT
HABIBULLAH KHAN, J.‑One Said Akbar has been awarded a fine of Rs. 40 or in default three months' R. I. under section 13 of the Public Gambling (N. W. F. P. Amend ment) Act, 1946, and the District Magistrate has made a reference for the enhancement of the penalty. The case raises an important question of interpretation of the amended section 13. As no published authority on the point was brought to our notice, it was referred to a Division Bench.
The question that arises for determination is as to what the words "shall be liable to imprisonment" mean. According to the learned counsel for the respondent the words do not make it obligatory on a Court to award substantive imprison ment and give it complete discretion in the matter. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate‑General is of the view that the Court has no discretion, whatsoever, and it must sentence the offender to some term of imprisonment, however, small it may be.
We have first to consider the manner in which law has to be interpreted. It is unnecessary to stress the obvious rule that Courts cannot interpret law arbitrarily. They must follow certain principles, which are laid down from time to time by the highest judicial authorities. According to them, among others, the interpretation should be natural, appropriate and simple and give the words their ordinary meaning; it should be consistent with the intention of the Legislature; it should help the administration of justice as far as reasonably possible; and it would not be perverse as to offend against common sense. The interpretation would be regarded perverse if it unduly stretches the meaning to an extent that leads to ridiculous consequences and legal chaos.
Before we proceed to discuss the main question, we would like to reproduce the relevant portions of section 13 of the old Public Gambling Act (III of 1867) and the amend ed corresponding section of the new Public Gambling (N: W. F. P. Amendment) Act, 1946, and place them side by side for comparison. The old section 13 says,.‑‑
"such persons when apprehended . . . . . . and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty rupees or to imprisonment . . . . . . for any term not exceeding one calendar month."
The amended section provides that
" . . . . . . shall be liable to imprisonment of either descrip tion . . . . . for a term not exceeding three years and to a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees."
It will not be disputed that the words "shall be liable to a fine" or the words "shall be liable to imprisonment" can bear two possible constructions, namely, (1) that the imposition of fine 'or imprisonment is discretionary, and the Court may or may not award them, and (2) that their imposition is obligatory and the Court must award fine or imprisonment as the case may be.
Assuming for a moment that the words "shall be liable to fine or imprisonment" give discretion to the Court, we wish to examine the question by taking an extreme illustration. An accused person is convicted under section 13 of the old Act, but the Court does not award any fine or imprisonment. An objection is raised to the legality of the order, and it is contended that the Court was bound to impose either fine or imprisonment. In reply an argument is advanced on behalf of the accused person that since the words "shall be liable to a fine . . . . . . or to imprisonment . . . . . ." vest complete dis cretion in the Court, the latter was not bound to award either fine or imprisonment. Should such an argument prevail? The answer cannot be in doubt, because the obvious result would be that the offenders, who are convicted, will go scot‑free for all intents and purposes. We cannot imagine that the inten tion of the legislature was to secure the conviction of guilty persons, but at the same time, to give complete discretion to Courts to punish or not to punish them.
Again as already pointed out above, section 13 was amended in 1946. The amended section provides that" shall be liable to imprisonment . . . . . for a term not exceeding three years and to a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees". Supposing an accused person is convicted under the new amended section, but the Court again does not award impri sonment or fine on the ground that the words "shall be liable" do not make it obligatory on it to impose any imprisonment or fine. It may well be argued in support of the order that the words "shall be liable to imprisonment . . . . . for a term not exceeding three years and to a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees" give discretion to the Court and the imposi tion of punishment is not compulsory. Would such an argu ment be accepted as correct ? If so, then the result would be that even under the amended section Courts will be free to impose or not to impose imprisonment and fine. It is not difficult to visualize the consequences.
It is quite obvious that the legislature in amending section 13 had a certain definite intention, and this intention cannot be any other than that of providing for a heavier punishment for the offence of gambling. Any other interpre tation would surely lead to ridiculous consequences because in that case, the very object of the amendment would be defeated and a situation will be created, never contemplated by the Legislature.
The amended section, itself, clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature. Whereas under the old section the maxi mum punishment provided for the offence was a fine not exceeding Rs. 50, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding one calendar month, the amended section provides imprison ment of either description as defined in the Penal Code for a term not exceeding three years and to a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees. Again, the word "arid" in the amended section is very significant. While in the old section it was provided that the offender shall be liable to a fine or imprison ment, the amended section provides imprisonment and fine both.
Thus, after having fully considered every aspect of the matter, we feel no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that under the old section the Court was bound to impose either fine, or imprisonment up to the extent indicated therein, but under the amended section, it is obligatory on it to award imprisonment and also fine, though it has complete discretion as to the term of imprisonment and the amount of fine.
Consequently, we accept the reference and enhance the punishment of Said Akbar respondent to three months' R. I. in addition to the fine of Rs. 40, or in default further three months' R. I. already awarded by the trial Court.
Orders announced.
A. B./A. H.
Sentence added.