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Petitioner: MESSRS REHMANIA GLASS BANGLE INDUSTRIES, HYDERABAD VS Respondent: BABOO
1988 P L C 301
1988 P L C 301
[Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind]
Present: Ali Namaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal
Messrs REHMANIA GLASS BANGLE INDUSTRIES, HYDERABAD
Versus
BABOO Appeal No. HYD‑260 of 1986, heard on 3rd November, 1987.
Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑
‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 38(3)‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and' Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑‑Grievance petition‑‑Termination of services‑‑Documentary evidence comprising Attendance and Wage Registers produced by appellant establishment clearly establishing that respondent‑workman was appointed on purely temporary basis and his services were terminated during probationary period‑‑Respondent‑workman nowhere pleading that he was a permanent workman under provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 or that Ordinance VI of 1968 was applicable to appellant‑establishment and that the impugned order was void ab initio or illegal‑‑Termination of services of respondent‑workman being a temporary employee, held, must prevail‑‑Appeal was accepted, impugned order was set as aside and grievance petition was dismissed.
1980 P L C 79; 1975 P L C 80 and 1981 P L C 676 rel.
Abdul Ghani Khan for Appellant. Bashir Awan for Respondent.
DECISION This is an appeal filed by the appellant‑establishment against an impugned order dated 12‑8‑1986, passed by the Sind Labour Court No.VI, Hyderabad, who had allowed the grievance petition of the respondent directing his re‑instatement in service with full back benefits, under section 25‑A, I.R.0.1969.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent claimed to be a permanent employee of the respondent‑establishment and on 10‑11‑1984, a lay‑off was declared by it so the respondent submitted an application to the Additional Director (Labour), Hyderabad on 10‑12‑1984. The respondent further claimed that in a meeting held in the Labour Directorate on 19‑1‑1985, it was discussed by the appellant establishment that the services of the respondent had already been terminated, therefore, on 3‑2‑1985, submitted a grievance notice and thereafter the grievance petition before the learned Labour Court.
3. The appellant establishment resisted the petition mainly on the ground that as the respondent was appointed as a temporary worker on 9‑10‑1984, therefore, his services were terminated on 7‑11‑1984. So, the respondent could not maintain his grievance petition which was liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties filed their affidavits‑in‑evidence and they were duly cross‑examined. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.
5. I have heard both the parties at length and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. There is an admitted position on the record of the learned Labour Court that the documentary evidence comprising of attendance and wage registers was not considered by the learned Labour Court as from it, it was clearly established that the respondent was appointed purely on temporary basis and his services were terminated during the probationary period. It was also argued that the respondent had nowhere pleaded that he' was a permanent workman under the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 or even the said Ordinance was applicable to it and that the impugned order was void ab initio, illegal, incorrect, mala fide and in violation of well recognized principles, thus, was liable to be set aside. I see much force in the contentions of the appellant -establishment. Reliance is placed on the cases reported in 1980 PLC at page 79, 1975 P L C page 80 and 1981 P L C at page 676. All these authorities are relevant and applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In view of this factual and legal position of the case, I would not upheld any of the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent. Therefore, in my opinion the termination of the services of the respondent being a temporary, must prevail and his grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969 before the learned Labour Court was liable to be dismissed.
6. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would set aside the impugned order and would allow the present appeal. The result would be that the grievance petition of the respondent under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, is hereby dismissed. The amount of back benefits deposited by the appellant before this Tribunal be return to the appellant‑establishment forthwith.
S. Q. /1048/Lb.S Appeal allowed.