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Petitioner: NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN VS Respondent: ABDUL LATIF
1988 M L D 868
1988 M L D 868
[Karachi]
Before Ajmal Mian and Abdul Rasool Agha, JJ
NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN--Appellant
versus
ABDUL LATIF and another--Respondents
Appeals Nos.26 to 36 of 1985, decided on 29th March, 1988.
Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979)----
----Ss. 4, 7 & 12--Suits riled by plaintiff-Bank for recovery of loans were dismissed on ground of limitation--Bank filed appeals against those judgments/decrees and contended that in view of S. 4 of Ordinance (XIX of 1979), period of limitation stood extended--Bank's plea about extension of period of limitation was accepted by High Court in appeal--Case was remanded with direction to decide question of limitation in accordance with finding of High Court.
Sher Ali for Appellant.
Jai Jai Vishino for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 29th March, 1988.
JUDGMENT
AJMAL MIAN, J.-- By this common judgment we intend to dispose of above eleven appeals as they are directed against the judgments/decrees dated 31-10 1984 dismissing the suits of the appellants on the ground of limitation.
It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants before the learned Presiding Officer, Special Court (Banking) for Sind at Karachi that in view of section 4 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 the period of limitation stood extended. However, the above argument did not find favour with the learned Presiding Officer. The above question was the subject matter of a number of High Court Appeals namely, H.C.A. Nos. 9/1.983, 33/1984, 36/1984, 46/1984, 40/1984 and 41/1984. There was difference of view between the two learned Judges of A Division Bench on the above question. The view taken by Nasir Aslam Zahid, J. was that because of the above section 4 of the Ordinance the limitation period stood extended whereas the view found favour with Syed Ally Madad Shah, J. (as he then was) was that the above section 4 has not extended the limitation. The matter was referred to a learned third Judge of this Court, Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui, J. who by judgment dated 25-2-1988 agreed with the view of Nasir Aslam Zahid, J.
In view of the majority judgment in the aforesaid appeals, we allow the present appeals and set aside the judgments decrees in appeals but remand the case to the Special Court with the direction to decide the question of limitation the light of the above majority judgment and, thereafter, to proceed with the suits in case it finds that the suits were within time in terms of the above majority judgment. The above eleven appeals stand disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.
H.B.T./N-123/K Order remanded.