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Petitioner: NAZIR BEGUM and 5 others VS Respondent: FAZAL DAD and 2 others
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pakistan Judge(s): Shafi-ur-Rehman, Saad Saood Jan Title: NAZIR BEGUM and 5 others vs FAZAL DAD and 2 others Case No.:Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No,559-L of 1992 Civil Revision No,
2069 of 1989 Date of Judgment:1993-07-20 Reported As: 1994 SCMR 1879 Result: Leave granted Judgment ORDER ' SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.---By a registered deed dated 29-4-1968 respondent No,1 purchased 61 Kanals and 18 Marlas of agricultural land situate in Chak Aggo of Tehsil Gujranwala for a sum of Rs,23,250. On 26-4-1969 Khan Muhammad Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, brought a suit for pre-emption, claiming that not only he was a collateral of the vendors but also a co-sharer in the Khata of which the land in dispute formed a part. The suit was decreed ex parte on 10-9-1969. Subsequently, the ex parte decree was set aside. On 31-7-1988 the trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that no decree could be passed in favour of the pre-emptors after 31-7-1986 as ruled in the cases of Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Said Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360) and Sardar All y. Muhammad All (PLD 1988 SC 287). The petitioners filed an appeal before the District Judge, Gujranwala, and a revision petition before the High Court but these were dismissed. They now seek leave to appeal from this Court: 2. In support of this petition it is contended that after their suit has once been decreed, even though ex parte, there was no bar to a decree being passed in favour even after 31-7-1986. In support of this contention reliance is being placed upon two judgments of this Court reported as Bahadur Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf (1992 SCM R 2117) and Ghulam Rasool v. Faiz Bakhsh (1992 SCM R 1328). 3. The contention raised in support of this petition needs examination. Leave to appeal is granted. The interim order already made to continue during the pendency of the appeal.