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Official Citation: 2026 IHC 258764
Court / Jurisdiction: Islamabad High Court
Parties: Sardar Numan Khan vs Federal Ombudsperson etc.
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Islamabad High Court, officially reported as 2026 IHC 258764. In this matter between Sardar Numan Khan and Federal Ombudsperson etc., the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Islamabad High Court (Honourable Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas) AUTHOR JUDGE: Honourable Mr. Justice Inaam Ameen Minhas DECISION DATE: 29-APR-2026 CASE NO: Writ Petition-1331-2024 CITATION: 2026 IHC 258764 PARTIES: Sardar Numan Khan VS Federal Ombudsperson etc. LAW / SECTION: - SUBJECT: Miscelleneous, Other REMARKS: Male Shareholder file this writ against the interim order of the Ombudsman for women's property rights wherein he has been directed to pay the lady shareholders rent per their shares of inheritance. ============================================================ JUDGMENT SHEET IN THE ISLAMABAD HIGH COURT, ISLAMABAD. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
Writ Petition No.1331 of 2024 Sardar Numan Khan Versus Federal Ombudsperson for Protection against Harassment (FOSOAH) at Workplace and others
Petitioner by:- Mr. Sufyan Haider, Advocate.
Respondents by: Mr. Wasim Abid , Advocate for respondent No.1.
Sardar Nisar Ahmed, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 7. Mr. Khaliq-ur-Rehman Saifi, advocate for respondent No.8.
Dates of Hearing : 04.03.2026 and 13.04.2026
INAAM AMEEN MINHAS , J.:- Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner, Sardar Numan Khan, calls into question the legality and validity of orders dated 01.04.2024 and 18.03.2024 passed by the Federal Ombudsperson Secretariat for Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace, Islamabad (“ FOSPAH”)/respondent No.1. By virtue of th e impugned orders, respondent No.1, in purported exercise of powers under Section 5 of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 (“the Act of 2020 ”), while entertaining a complaint instituted by respondents No.2 to 7 proceeded to issue direction s requiring the tenant to deposit rental proceeds before the said forum. The impugned orders
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further went on to declare the said complainants entitled to receive rent from the property in question and, in addition thereto, purported to determine their resp ective shares in the inherited estate of their deceased father namely Sardar Jannat Hussain. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner , while assailing the impugned orders, contended that the same are wholly without lawful authority and suffer from a patent jurisdictional defect. It was argued that respondent No.1 gravely erred in assuming jurisdiction over a dispute essentially civil in nature, involving inheritance, partition of estate, determination of proprietary shares, and entitlement to rental income. Such matters, it was submitted, fall within the exclusive domain of the civil Courts and cannot be adjudicated in summary proceedings before respondent No.1 . It was further contended that the impugned orders reflect non -reading and misreading of the record and a clear misapplication of judicial mind. 3. Learned counsel further submitted that the dispute involves complex and disputed questions of fact s and law requiring recording of evidence and a full -fledged trial, which could not be undertaken in summary proceedings. By determining inheritance shares and directing payment of rental income, respondent No.1 has effectively usurped the functions of a Civil Court and exercised judicial power in a manner inconsistent with the constitutional scheme of separatio n of powers.
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4. Conversely, learned counsel for the contesting respondents supported the impugned orders and contended that the same have been passed strictly in accordance with law and within the jurisdiction conferred upon respondent No.1 under the Act of 2020. It was argued that the said enactment is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to provide expeditious and efficacious relief to women who have been deprived of their lawful property rights, and that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson is des igned to operate as an accessible and expeditious forum for redressal of such grievances. It was further contended that the complainants, being daughters of the deceased, were unlawfully deprived of their share in the inherited estate and the rental income accruing therefrom, thereby justifying invocation of jurisdiction by respondent No.1. Learned counsel maintained that the proceedings before the Ombudsperson are summary in nature and not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure or evidence, and tha t respondent No.1 is empowered to pass appropriate orders to secure the rights of aggrieved women. It was also argued that the mere pendency of civil proceedings does not ipso facto oust the jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson where intervention is warranted to prevent continuing deprivation. 5. Heard and record perused. 6. That pivotal question which arises for determination in the lis at hand is whether respondent No.1/FOSPAH was vested with jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act of 2020 to
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entertain and adjudicate upon the complaint instituted by respondents No.2 to 7 in respect of the estate of their deceased father, particularly where the dispute, in substance and effect, pertains to determination of inheritance, partition of immovable properties, declaration of proprietary shares, and consequential entitlement to rental income arising therefrom. The resolution of this question necessarily turns upon the true scope, legislative intent, and jurisdictional contours of the statutory framework as well as the constitutional limits governing the exercise of adjudicatory authority by an executive or quasi - judicial forum. It further requires an examination of whether the assumption of jurisdiction by respondent No.1 satisfies the foundational requir ement of “jurisdictional fact” failing which the entire exercise would be rendered coram non judice and void ab initio. 7. Before embarking upon statutory interpretation, it is imperative to appreciate the factual substratum not in isolation but in its co mplete juridical context. It is an admitted position that the petitioner and respondents No.2 to 8 are real siblings inter se and that their father, Sardar Jannat Hussain (late), who owned multiple immovable properties situated within territorial limits of Islamabad, passed away on 05.10.2020. The dispute inter se the parties is not a narrow or incidental grievance but extends to the entirety of the estate of the deceased, comprising determination of legal heirs, identification and quantification of respective shares, partition of immovable properties, mutation
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of title, and apportionment of rental income accruing therefrom. The controversy is thus inherently composite, multi -faceted, and essentially civil in nature, involving competing proprietary assertions governed by personal law of inheritance and statutory civil remedies. 8. The record reveals that respondents No.2 to 7 instituted a complaint before respondent No.1 on 07.11.2023, ostensibly invoking the provisions of the 2020 Act, seeking in substance distribution, partition, and possession of the estate of the deceased. However, it is equally borne out from the record that prior thereto, the competent civil Courts had already been seized of the matter . The petitioner had instituted proceedings on 20.11 .2020 for determination of legal heirship, which culminated in a decree dated 23.06.2021 whereby all siblings were conclusively declared legal heirs of the deceased. A succession certificate dated 19.11.2020 had also been issued, reflecting the lawful enti tlement of all heirs. These determinations are not ancillary or procedural in nature; rather, they constitute foundational adjudications upon which any subsequent partition or proprietary determination must necessarily rest. 9. It further transpires from the record that respondent No.8 instituted Civil Suit No.51751 on 07.11.2023 seeking partition, declaration, permanent injunction, and recovery of his share in the estate, including mesne profits arising from rental income. The said suit was contested between the parties
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and culminated in a consolidated judgment and decree dated 05.09.2025 passed by the learned Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. 10. It is further borne out from the record that the parties have remained embroiled in prolonged, acr imonious, and parallel litigation, extending beyond civil proceedings into criminal proceedings, including registration of FIRs against each other. The multiplicity of proceedings reflects the highly contested factual matrix and underscores that the disput e is not suitable for summary determination. The nature of controversy, involving disputed questions of title, valuation, possession, and mesne profits, necessarily requires recording of evidence, cross-examination, and adjudication upon competing documentary and oral evidence, which lies exclusively within the domain of civil Courts. 11. In this backdrop, the dispute is manifestly civil in character. It pertains to enforcement of inheritance rights under personal law, partition under civil law, declaratio n of proprietary entitlements, and recovery of mesne profits, all of which are substantive civil rights enforceable through judicial adjudication. Such disputes are neither administrative grievances nor regulatory infractions but legally enforceable private rights requiring a full-fledged judicial trial. 12. At this juncture, the statutory framework governing respondent No.1 assumes decisive significance. Section 4 of the
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Act of 2020 which is relevant for the purpose is reproduced herein below:- “4. Complaint to the Ombudsman in case no proceedings in a court of law are pending.---- (1) Any woman deprived of ownership or possession of her property, by any means, may file a complaint to the Ombudsman if no proceedings in a court of law are pending regarding the property: Provided that the Ombudsman, on its own motion or on a complaint filed by any person including a non - governmental organization, may also initiate action under subsection (1) in relation to the ownership or possession of a woman's property, if no proceedings are pending in a court in respect of that property. (2) The Ombudsman shall make a preliminary assessment of the complaint filed under subsection (1) whereafter he may, if the matter requires further probe or investigation, refer the matter to the concerned Deputy Commissioner, who, after calling the record, if necessary, and issuing notices to the complainant or her adversaries, conduct a summary enquiry and submit a report within fifteen days to the Ombudsman. (3) If the matter d oes not require any detailed probe, investigation or recording of evidence, the Ombudsman may, after calling any record, if deemed necessary, pass orders under section 5. (4) The Ombudsman upon receiving the report under subsection (2), may further conduct such summary enquiry and call for such record as he may deem fit. (5) The Ombudsman after confronting the report of the concerned Deputy Commissioner and the conclusion and findings of his own enquiry, shall call upon the complainant and her adversaries t o submit objections, whereafter he may conduct a hearing and pass orders under section 5, preferably within sixty days of receipt of the complaint under subsection (1).”
13. A plain but meaningful reading of the aforesaid provision demonstrates that the jurisdiction of respondent No.1 is strictly conditional and circumscribed. The legislative phrase “if no proceedings in a court of law are pending” constitutes an express jurisdictional bar. It is trite law that where jurisdiction
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is conditioned upon exist ence or non -existence of a jurisdictional fact, the authority must first objectively satisfy itself of such condition precedent. In the absence thereof, any assumption of jurisdiction is legally unsustainable and renders all consequential proceedings void ab initio. 14. The legislative intent underlying the provision is manifestly to avoid parallel proceedings, conflicting determinations, and jurisdictional overlap between civil Courts and the Ombudsman. The statute does not create concurrent jurisdiction; rather, it establishes a residual and supplementary remedial mechanism, intended to operate only in circumstances where no civil adjudication is pending. Any broader interpretation would defeat the legislative purpose and result in unconstitutional encroachment upon judicial domain. 15. In the present case, not only were the proceedings already pending before the competent civil Courts, but a part thereof had also culminated in binding adjudications in respect of legal heirship and allied civil rights, wh ile certain other proceedings were still actively sub judice at the time when respondents No.2 to 7 chose to institute the complaint before respondent No.1. Instead of properly subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction of the competent civil Court and/or t he Rent Controller, as the case may be, the said respondents No.2 to 7, by-passed the due process of law and adopted a selective and expedient course by invoking the jurisdiction of respondent No.1. In doing so, they sought to circumvent the ordinary
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judicial forums and opted for what appeared to be a more convenient and less onerous route, thereby undermining the statutory scheme governing adjudication of civil rights inter se the parties. 16. Additionally, reliance is placed on Section 3 of the Act of 2020, which expressly provides that, in addition to the powers, functions and authority conferred under the said Act and the rules framed thereunder, the Ombudsman shall, for the purposes of the Act, exercise the same powers, functions and authority as are vested in the Ombudsman under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 (“the Act of 2010” ). The relevant statutory incorporation is thus clear and unequivocal, and for ease of reference the said provision is reproduced as follows: “Section 3. Powers of the Ombudsman. — In addition to the powers, functions and authority under this Act and the rules made hereunder, the Ombudsman, for the purpose of this Act, shall have the same powers, functions and authority as are vested in the Ombudsman for the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 (IV of 2010).” 17. Furthermore, the powers of the Ombudsman under the 2010 Act are, in turn, delineated in Section 10 thereof, which is also reproduced in extenso for ready reference:
“Section 10. Powers of the Ombudsman. — (1) The Ombudsman shall, for the purposes of this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:
(i) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
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(ii) compelling the production of evidence; (iii) receiving evidence on affidavits; (iv) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; (v) entering any premises for the purpose of making any inspection or investigation where the Ombudsman has reason to believe that any information relevant to the case may be found; and (vi) having the same powers as the High Court to punish any person for its contempt.
(2) The Ombudsman, while making a decision on the complaint, may impose any of the minor or major penalties specified in sub-section (4) of Section 4.”
18. A careful conjoint reading of Section 3 of the Act of 2020 and Section 10 of the 2010 Act makes it abundantly clear that the legislature has merely clothed the Ombudsman with certain procedural and facilitative powers of a civil court, primarily intended to aid inquiry, fact -finding, and administrative determination. These powers, though couched in civil court terminology, remain essentially ancillary in character and do not convert the forum into a plenary adjudicatory body competent to finally determine complex civil rights inter se private parties. 19. The jurisprudential distinction between “inquiry” and “adjudication” is well -settled: inquiry is essentially investigative and fact -oriented, aimed at ascertaining whether a grievance warrants administrative intervention, whereas adjudication involves a bi nding and determinative pronouncement on contested civil rights, carrying enforceable legal consequences. The mere conferment of limited procedural powers —such as summoning witnesses, receiving evidence, or issuing
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commissions—does not alter the fundamenta l character of the forum or elevate it to the status of a civil or constitutional court. 20. In the instant case, respondent No.1 has crossed the constitutional boundary by determining inheritance shares, directing distribution of rental income, and issui ng coercive directions affecting proprietary rights of private individuals. Such determinations are final in effect, coercive in consequence, and judicial in character, thereby amounting to an impermissible assumption of judicial power. 21. The constituti onal implications of such exercise are significant. Article 175 of the Constitution vests judicial authority exclusively in the judiciary, while Article 10A guarantees the fundamental right to fair trial and due process. Any adjudication of civil rights by an executive forum, absent constitutional sanction, constitutes a violation of these guarantees and offends the doctrine of separation of powers, which is a basic feature of the constitutional framework. It is a settled principle of constitutional jurispr udence that judicial power cannot be exercised by executive or quasi -executive authorities unless expressly authori zed by the Constitution. Any such exercise beyond statutory limits is ultra vires , void, and non est in the eyes of law. Jurisdiction cannot be assumed by consent, acquiescence, or implication where the statute expressly conditions its existence. 22. It is further material that the subject matter is comprehensively governed by a complete code of civil remedies
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under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, and the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005. These enactments collectively constitute an exhaustive legal framework for adjudication of disputes relating to inheritance, possession, partition, tenancy, and recovery of mesne profits. Where such a complete judicial mechanism exists, parallel adjudication by an executive forum is not only unwarranted but constitutionally impermissible. 23. The i mpugned exercise by respondent No.1 therefore constitutes not a mere irregularity but a fundamental jurisdictional defect going to the root of authority. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity in law, incapable of ratification or validation, and liable to be disregarded ex debito justitiae. 24. This Court, upon a careful and comprehensive appraisal of the factual matrix as well as the applicable statutory and constitutional framework, is of the considered view that respondent No.1 lacked jurisdiction ab initio to entertain, proceed with, or adjudicate upon the complaint filed by respondents No.2 to 7, inasmuch as the controversy involved intricate and seriously disputed questions of fact and law relating to inheritance, title, and proprietary rights, the determination whereof required a full -fledged ju dicial scrutiny through competent adjudicatory proceedings, which lay wholly beyond the mandate and jurisdiction of respondent No.1. It is further observed that the jurisdiction of respondent No.1 could
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only have been lawfully invoked in cases where the ri ght of inheritance was undisputed and the respective shares in the property were admitted, in which eventuality it could merely have facilitated distribution of such admitted shares amongst legal heirs. However, in the present case, the very entitlement, extent of shares, and ownership rights were under serious contest, thereby vitiating the assumption of jurisdiction at the threshold. Consequently, the impugned orders are afflicted with a patent and incurable jurisdictional defect, suffer from complete lac k of jurisdiction, and are, therefore, coram non judice, void ab initio and non est in the eyes of law, having no legal sanctity whatsoever and are liable to be set aside in their entirety. 25. In sequel to the foregoing discussion and having regard to the reasons articulated hereinabove, the present writ petition is allowed. Consequently, the impugned orders dated 01.04.2024 and 18.03.2024 passed by respondent No.1 are hereby declared to be with out lawful authority and of no legal effect whatsoever and are accordingly set aside.
(INAAM AMEEN MINHAS) JUDGE
Announced in an open Court on 29.04.2026.
JUDGE Approved for reporting
Sanaullah*