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Petitioner: EHSAN ELLA HI VS Respondent: AKHTAR ALI And Other
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pakistan Judge(s): Mian Burhanuddin Khan, Saad Saood Jan Title: EHSAN ELLA HI vs AKHTAR ALI And Other Case No.: Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No.25 of 1980 R.S.A. No. 284 of 1979 Date of Judgment:1987-02-07 Reported As: 1987 SCMR 692(2) Result: Petition dismissed
JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT SAAD SAOOD JAN J.--This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court which reversed the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Gujrat and restored those of the trial Court, dismissing the suit for pre-emption filed by the petitioner. 2. The property in dispute falls within the limits of Kharian Town. The trial Court found that it had lost its character as agricultural land and that it was now urban immovable property. This finding was reversed by the Additional District Judge. On re-appraisal of the evidence the High Court set-aside the findings of the Additional District Judge and restored that of the trial Court. We find no reason to interfere with the findings of the High Court in this regard. The petitioner led no evidence at the trial to indicate that the right of pre-emption existed in that part of Kharian Town where the land in dispute was located when the Pre-emption Act, 1913, came into force. That being so, in view of the provisions of section 7, Pre-emption Act, the petitioner could not claim a superior right of pre- emption for himself. 3. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the right of pre-emption was part of the Islamic Law and wherever the Muslims lived in Pakistan the custom of pre-emption should be presumed to exist. Even if the proposition canvassed on behalf of the petitioner is assumed to be correct, although we make no comments on it, still he cannot succeed in his claim of superior right. It is to be noticed that in his plaint the petitioner had founded his preferential right solely on the ground that he was the son of the vendor. Now, section 16 of the Pre-emption Act, enumerates the persons in whom the right of pre-emption vests in respect of urban immovable property. A son, or, for that
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matter a collateral of the vendor, is not mentioned therein. We would accordingly reject the contention of the petitioner. 4.This petition is without any merit and is hereby dismissed