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Petitioner: NASRULLAH VS Respondent: THE STATE
1992 M L D 1673
1992 M L D 1673
[Lahore]
Before Khalilur Rahman Ramday, J
NASRULLAH‑‑‑Petitioner
versus
THE STATE‑‑‑Respondent
Cr. Misc. 3677‑B of 1991, decided on 27th October, 1991.
(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S.497(i), third proviso‑‑‑Grant of bail on account of delay in the conclusion of trial is statutorily regulated and it is only a delay envisaged by the third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C. which can entitle an accused person to his admission to bail.
(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S.497‑‑‑Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.324/34 [as substituted by Criminal Law (Fourth Amendment) Ordinance (XXX of 1991)]‑‑‑Bail, grant of‑‑‑Delay in the trial had not ripened into a delay envisaged by third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.‑‑‑Accused had allegedly injured the prosecution witness with a fire shot only on the demand of the latter for the adjustment of loan taken from him‑‑‑Accused was, thus, not entitled to the concession of bail‑‑‑Mere fact that according to the punishment for the offence, case of accused fell outside the prohibitory clause was not by itself sufficient for his mechanical admission to bail‑‑‑Accused was refused bail in circumstances.
(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S.497(1), prohibitory clause‑‑‑Only result of a case falling outside the prohibitory clause is that the Court is not prohibited from releasing such person on bail‑‑‑Court still has the discretion to allow or not to allow bail to such a person‑‑‑Such a discretion, no doubt, has to be exercised in consonance with the established principles of equity and justice which would mean a survey of the circumstances attending the commission of the offence in question.
Rab Nawaz Khan Niazi for Petitioner.
Sardar Khurshid for the State
ORDER
The petitioner seeks bail in a case registered against him vide F.I.R. No.67/91 of P.S. Mochh of district Mianwali for the alleged commission of an offence punishable under section 324/34, P.P.C.
2. The accusation against the petitioner is that he had fired a shot at Attar Khan P.W. with his .12 bore pistol which caused two unjuries on the person of the said Attar Khan.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in accordance with the provisions of newly‑added section 324, P.P.C., since hurt was caused in the alleged commission of the said offence, therefore, the petitioner was punishable for the hurt so caused. Adds that the causing of the hurt in question is punishable under section 337‑F (i) and (iv) to a maximum imprisonment of five years and in the circumstances the petitioner's case did not fall within the prohibitory cause. Further submits that the petitioner is in custody for the last about six months and no progress has been made in the trial against him.
4. The grant of bail on account of delays in the conclusion of trials is statutorily regulated and it is only a delay envisaged by the Third Proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. which can entitle an accused person to his admission to bail. Admittedly in the present case the said delay has not ripened into such a delay mentioned in the said provision of law.
5. The mere fact that according to the punishment for the offence in question, the case of the petitioner falls outside the prohibitory clause is not by itself sufficient for a mechancial admission of the accused person to bail. The only result of a case falling outside the prohibitory clause is that the Courts are not prohibited from releasing such persons on bail. The fact however remains that it is still within the discretion of the Court to allow or not to allow bail to such person. Needless to say that such a discretion has to be exercised in consonance with the established principles of equity and justice which would mean a survey of the circumstances attending the commission of the offence in question.
6. In the present case Khalaq Dad, the father of Nasarullah petitioner owed money to Attar Khan P.W. and it was on account of Attar Khan P.W.'s demand for the return of said money that the two exchanged hot words at which Attar Khan P.W. had given abuses to the father of the petitioner and it was to evenge this alleged insult that the petitioner fired shot at Attar Khan P.W. It thus transpires that the only fault of Attar Khan P.W. was the demand of the adjustment of the loan taken from him.
7. In view of the facts above noticed, I do not consider that the petitioner is entitled to the concession of bail:
8. Consequently, this petition is dismissed.
N.H.Q/N‑65/L. Bail refused.