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Petitioner: MUHAMMAD ASLAM VS Respondent: PUNJAB SMALL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION
2002 P L C (C
2002 P L C (C.S.) 750
[Lahore High Court]
Before Ch. Ijaz Ahmad, J
MUHAMMAD ASLAM
versus
PUNJAB SMALL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION and others
Writ Petition No. 18346 of of 2000, decided on 15th September. 2000
Punjab Small Industries Corporation Act (XV of 1973)‑‑‑
‑‑‑‑S. 15‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199‑‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑‑Maintainability‑‑‑Suspension of employee of Corporation‑‑ Validity‑‑‑Employee had challenged his suspension contending that order had been passed by incompetent Authority‑‑‑Suspension being temporary deprivation of one's office or position, employee was well within his right to raise all legal and factual objections before the Competent Authority and Authority was duty‑bound to consider the objections at the time of passing final order against him ‑‑‑Suspension was not a penalty and the punishment, if any, was to be imposed on the suspended employee only after the completion of the inquiry and on the basis of the result of the inquiry.
Mian Munawar‑ud‑Din's case PLD 1979 Note 80 at p.56: M.S. Khawaja's case PLD 1966 Lah. 1006; Mian Muhammad Hayat's case PLD 1964 SC 324: W.P No.4162 of 1987; M. Nauman's case PLD 1964 Dacca 671; Mosharuff Hussain's case PLD 1968 Dacca 133; Muhammad Haroon's case PLD 1978 Lah. 1108; Mian Muhammad Hayat's case PLD 1964 SC 321: Sayed Zameer‑ud‑Din's case 1977 PLC (C.S.) 702; Akhtar Ali's case PLD 1992 Lah. 127; Abdul Karim's case 1986 CLC 1942 and Ghulam Dastagir Bari's case PLD 1987 Lah. 39 ref.
Syed Najaf Hussain Shah for Petitioner.
M.N. Baig for Respondents.
ORDER
Petitioner has challenged the vires of the impugned suspension order, dated 12‑8‑2000 through this Constitutional petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that impugned order is passed by the incompetent authority as the competent authority in case of the petitioner is M.D. whereas the impugned order has been passed by the Board. Therefore, same is not sustainable in the eves of law. He further submits that competent authority constituted a committee to take action against the officer/official which contained specific clause 8(2) that action be taken against any officer/official after providing him personal hearing which was duly endorsed in case of petitioner by respondent No. 1 as is evident from clause 10 as is evident from Annexure‑L attached with the petition. He further submits that respondent mentioned the name of the petitioner alongwith others in the list of the' Department of the petitioner against whom the action have to be taken but the respondents did not take action against the officer who is the nearest relation of the Secretary Industries. Therefore, action of the respondents is hit by Antic of the Constitution. He further submits that respondents are duty bound‑To‑act in accordance with law without fear, favour and nepotism as is envisaged by Article 4 of the Constitution. In support of his mentions he relied upon the following judgments:‑‑
PLD 1979 Note 80 at p.56 (Mian Munawar‑ud‑Din's case).
PLD 1966 Lahore 1006 (M.S. Khawaja's case).
PLD 1964 SC 324 (Mian Muhammad Hayat's case).
Unreported judgment of this Court in W.P. No.4162 of 1987; decided on 28‑3‑1993.
2. Learned Legal Advisor of the respondents entered appearance at preliminary stage and raised a preliminary objection that the impugned order is not penalty and is not a final order. Therefore, writ petition is not maintainable. He further submits that Board has delegated its power to the M.D. by virtue of section 15 of the Punjab Small Industries Corporation Act, 1973. He further submits that Board has all the powers to pass the impugned order being competent authority as all the powers of administration and management vested with the Board by virtue of section 4 of the aforesaid Act.
3. I have given my anxious consideration to the contention of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record myself. It is admitted fact that petitioner has challenged the vires of the impugned order of suspension which is not a final order and the petitioner is well within his' right to raise all legal and factual objections before the competent authority. In case the petitioner raises the aforesaid objections before the competent authority, then the competent authority is duty bound to consider the objections at the time of passing the final order against the petitioner. It is settled proposition of law that suspension means temporary deprivation of one's office or position. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by the law laid down by the superior Courts in the following judgment:‑‑
PLD 1964 Dacca 671 (M.Nauman's case).
PLD 1968 Dacca 133 (Moshantff Hussain's case).
PLD 1978 Lahore 1108 (Muhammad Haroon's case).
PLD 1964 SC 321 (Mian Muhammad Hayat's case).
1977 PLC (C.S.) 702 (Sayed Zameer‑ud‑Din's case).
It is also settled principle of law that suspension is not penalty as pe principle laid down by the superior Ccurts in the following judgments: ‑‑
PLD 1966 Lahore 1006 (M.S. Khawaja's case).
PLD 1992 Lahore 127 (Akhtar Ali's case).
PLD 1964 SC 321 (Mian Muhammad Hayat's case).
It is observed in the aforesaid judgments that during the period of interim suspension, the person suspended continues to hold office and is given pay or substance allowance during that period, though he is debarred from only performing the function of that office. Thus, legally speaking he remains the holder of his office and is not punished in any way till the completion of the inquiry. The punishment, if any, is imposed on him only after the completion of the inquiry and on the basis of the result of the inquiry. In this view of the matter, the order of suspension, pending departmental inquiry is not a punishment. This brings the case in the area that no final order had been passed by the respondent against the petitioner. Therefore, writ petition is premature and is not maintainable as per principle laid down, in 1986 CLC 1942 (Abdul Kanm's case) PLD 1987 Lahore 39 (Ghulam Dastagir Bari's case).
In view of what has been discussed above, the writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid terms.
H.B.T./M‑1000/L Petition not sustainable.