Al Wakeelo
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Petitioner: CH. MUHAMMAD SAEED VS Respondent: AZAD GOVERNMENT OF STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
URDU TYPING
URDU TYPING
1990 P L C (C.S.) 354
[Service Tribunal Azad J & K]
Before Raja Muhammad Ashraf Kayani, Member
Ch. MUHAMMAD SAEED
versus
AZAD GOVERNMENT OF STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR and others
Service Appeal No. 461 of 1989, decided on 16th December, 1989.
Azad Jammu and Kashmir Service Tribunals Act (XXII of 1975)‑‑
‑‑‑S. 4(1), proviso (a)‑‑‑Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1982‑‑‑Appeal‑‑‑Limitation‑‑‑Appellant, after availing departmental remedy, preferred review petition against impugned order and had not invoked jurisdiction of Service Tribunal within next thirty days after elapse of waiting period of ninety days from filing of review petition‑‑‑Last date to file appeal before Tribunal fell on 8‑11‑1989 but it was filed with Tribunal on 21‑11‑1989‑‑ Appeal as such was filed beyond period of limitation and no reasons stated for donation of delay‑‑‑Appeal was not admitted for regular hearing and dismissed as time‑barred.
Ch. Muhammad Hussain for Appellant.
The instant appeal has been directed against the Order No. SF/F‑319 16/2897/89, dated 15‑6‑1989, whereby the following opinion of the Law Department was communicated to Chief Conservator of Forests:‑‑ URDU TYPING 2. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant filed a review petition on 11‑7‑1989 and after awaiting the result of the said petition for the prescribed period of ninety days, he decided to invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal on 21‑11‑1989 under section 4 of Service Tribunals Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to be as the Act) as amended upto date.
3. I have heard the preliminary arguments and perused the record. The departmental remedy was availed of by the appellant against the impugned order on 11‑7‑1989 while the present appeal was preferred by him on 21‑11‑1989. The learned counsel for the appellant was asked to justify the delay of thirteen days in filing the instant appeal. He cited P L D 1984 S C (AJ&K) 9, wherein it was held that "count for the start of waiting period of ninety days would be from the date when the period allowed for filing review petition ended and not the date when it was so filed". But section 4 of the Act has since been amended. The relevant part of the substituted section 4 reads as under:‑‑
Appeal to Tribunals.‑‑(1) Any Civil Servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority, in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service, may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him, or within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, which ever is later, prefer appeal to the Tribunal:
Provided that
(a) Where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental authority provided under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976 or any rules against any such order no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal unless the aggrieved civil servants has preferred an appeal or application for review or representation to such departmental authority and a peri8od of ninety das has elapsed from the date on which such appeal application or representation was so preferred.
It would appear that in the closing part of the foregoing proviso the words "to be preferred" have been substituted by the words "was so preferred". Under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1982, the period provided for availing of the departmental remedy is sixty days. The appellant has preferred the review petition against the impugned order on 11‑7‑1989, whereas he should have invoked the jurisdiction of this Tribunal within next thirty days after the elapse of waiting period of ninety days from the filing of review petition. The last date to file the present appeal fell on 8‑11‑1989 but it was filed with this Tribunal on 21‑11‑1989. Hence the instant appeal has been filed beyond the period of limitation and there being no reasons for condonation of its delay, the same cannot be admitted for regular hearing.
4. For the foregoing reasons the appeal being time‑barred is dismissed in limine.
M.Y.H./86/Sr. A
Appeal dismissed