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Official Citation: 2026 LHC 4397
Court / Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi)
Parties: Riaz Ahmad Khan deceased through LRs etc vs Rafique Ahmad Khan etc
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi), officially reported as 2026 LHC 4397. In this matter between Riaz Ahmad Khan deceased through LRs etc and Rafique Ahmad Khan etc, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) DECISION DATE: 30-06-2026 CASE DETAILS: Civil Revision 30580/19 ============================================================ Stereo. H C J D A-38. JUDGMENT SHEET IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Civil Revision No.30580 of 2019 Riaz Ahmad Khan (deceased) through Legal Heirs & others Versus Rafique Ahmad Khan & others J U D G M E N T Date of hearing: 30.06.2026. Petitioners by: M/s. Barrister Fasih-ur-Rehman, Malik Asif Iqbal, Ahmad Asfand Yar and Noor Dad Chaudhry, Advocates. Respondents by: Ch. Manzar Bashir, Advocate (for respondent No.1). Respondents No.2 to 4 & 6 ex parte. MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.- This consolidated judgment shall dispose of instant revision petition along with connected revision petition i.e. C.R. No.30568 of 2019 as common questions of law and facts are involved in these cases. 2. Through these civil revision petitions, petitioners have called in question the legality and propriety of the consolidated judgments and decrees dated 04.07.2013 and 16.03.2019, passed by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, respectively, whereby the suit for possession through partition instituted by respondent No.1 Rafique Ahmad Khan was concurrently decreed through a preliminary decree, a Local Commissioner was appointed for preparation of a mode of partition, whereas the connected suit for declaration, confirmation of possession, recovery of possession and consequential relief instituted by petitioners Riaz Ahmad Khan etc. was concurrently dismissed, along with two connected contempt applications. 3. Briefly stated, the dispute arises out of two cross suits instituted by the contesting parties in respect of agricultural as well as residential property situated in Chak No.220/R.B., Tehsil and District Faisalabad. The respondent Rafique Ahmad Khan instituted a suit for possession 2 C.R. No.30580 of 2019 & connected case through partition on the plea that, being a co-sharer, he was entitled to possession of the property in accordance with his share and that the petitioners were occupying land in excess of their entitlement besides retaining possession of a residential portion merely as licensees. The petitioners contested the suit and, in turn, instituted a cross suit for declaration, confirmation of possession, recovery of possession and consequential relief, asserting that the respondent was merely a benamidar and that their predecessor, late Munawar Khan, was the real purchaser of the property, which had allegedly been divided between the parties under a family arrangement dated 29.08.1983. The respondent denied the plea of benami ownership and maintained that he was the lawful owner of the property. Upon completion of trial, the learned Trial Court, vide consolidated judgment and decree dated 04.07.2013, decreed the respondent's suit for possession through partition through a preliminary decree, dismissed the petitioners' cross suit as well as two connected contempt applications, and appointed a Local Commissioner for preparation of a mode of partition. The appeals preferred by the parties were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, through the impugned consolidated judgment and decree dated 16.03.2019, thereby affirming the findings recorded by the learned trial Court. Hence, these revision petitions. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has primarily contended that the learned first Appellate Court failed to discharge its statutory obligation as the final Court of fact by merely reproducing the findings of the learned Trial Court without independently reappraising the evidence or adjudicating the grounds of appeal in terms of Order XLI Rule 31, C.P.C. He further argues that both the learned Courts below overlooked material evidence, particularly the inconsistency between the respondent's pleaded source of consideration and the chronology of the mortgage mutations relied upon by him, thereby ignoring a circumstance going to the root of the controversy. He further submits that undue reliance was placed upon revenue entries, which neither confer title nor conclusively determine ownership, especially in a 3 C.R. No.30580 of 2019 & connected case dispute founded on a plea of benami. Lastly, he contends that the learned Courts below misread and failed to read material evidence, including the agreement dated 29.08.1983, relevant admissions and the defence evidence, resulting in erroneous findings and a grave miscarriage of justice warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. 5. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has supported the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below, contending that the petitioners merely seek a fresh reappraisal of evidence, which falls outside the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. He argues that the petitioners failed to establish the plea of benami, whereas the respondent's ownership has consistently remained reflected in the revenue record and the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are neither perverse nor unsupported by the evidence. He further submits that mere brevity or adoption of the learned Trial Court's reasoning by the learned first Appellate Court does not, by itself, vitiate the impugned judgment so long as the ultimate conclusions are legally sustainable. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have carefully examined the record made available. 7. A perusal of the impugned appellate judgment reveals that substantial portions of the trial Court's findings have been reproduced almost verbatim, followed by a cursory affirmation that the findings were based on proper appreciation of evidence. This Court is of the considered view that the learned first Appellate Court failed to discharge the obligation cast upon it by Order XLI Rule 31, C.P.C. In Bashir Ahmed v. Mst. Taja Begum and others (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 906), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that section 96 CPC not only empowers but requires the reappraising of the evidence and to reach its own conclusion which may be different from the one arrived at by the trial Court. Relevant extract is provided below: “5. Section 96, C.P.C. in relevant part provides as under:- "96. Appeal from original decree.---(1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court." 4 C.R. No.30580 of 2019 & connected case This provision enables the appellate Court to take a second look at all legal and factual aspects of a case brought it by a party aggrieved of the judgment of a trial Court. The appellate Court not only can but is required to reappraise the evidence and to thereby reach its own conclusion which may be different from the one arrived at by the trial Court.” No independent appraisal of the oral or documentary evidence, or meaningful consideration of the material grounds urged in appeal, is discernible from the impugned judgment. Consequently, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy, this Court finds that the impugned appellate judgment cannot be sustained and the matter is liable to be remanded for a fresh decision in accordance with law. 8. The memorandum of appeal preferred by the present petitioners had raised several specific grounds challenging the appreciation of evidence by the learned Trial Court. Whether those grounds ultimately merit acceptance or rejection is not the immediate concern before this Court. What assumes significance is that the learned Appellate Court was under a legal obligation to consider each material contention independently and record its own reasons while affirming or reversing the findings of the learned trial Court. The impugned appellate judgment, however, reflects no such independent exercise. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has argued that even if the appellate judgment is brief, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are otherwise well reasoned and, therefore, no interference is warranted. This contention, attractive though it appears at first glance, cannot be accepted in the peculiar facts of the present case. The question is not whether the learned Trial Court has recorded elaborate findings. The real question is whether the litigants have received the independent appellate scrutiny guaranteed by law. The statutory right of first appeal cannot be defeated merely because the Trial Court has written a detailed judgment. The legislature has consciously provided two stages of factual adjudication, and the first Appellate Court cannot abdicate its own responsibility by simply adopting the reasoning of the Trial Court without independent 5 C.R. No.30580 of 2019 & connected case examination. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pakistan Refinery Ltd., Karachi v. Barrett Hodgson Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others (2019 SCMR 1726), has elaborated the duty of first Appellate Court while deciding the first appeal. Relevant extract is provided below: “7. ….. Similarly, a judgment delivered by the first court of appeal and final court of fact would not be a judgment if it does not conform to the requirements of Rule 31 Order XLI of the C.P.C. The rationale or raison d'etre behind these provisions is that not only the party loosing the case but the next higher forum may also understand what weighed with the court in deciding the lis against it. Such exercise cannot be dispensed with even in the cases of affirmative judgments otherwise who would know that arguments addressed were accepted or rejected with due application of mind. …..” 10. One of the principal contentions urged before the learned Appellate Court related to the respondent's pleaded source of consideration. According to the respondent, the suit property had been purchased after arranging finances by mortgaging his property situated at Samundri. Reliance was placed upon mortgage mutations dated 10.08.1964, whereas the sale mutation evidencing purchase of the disputed property was stated to have been sanctioned on 06.07.1964. It has been argued that this apparent chronology was never examined by either of the learned Courts below. 11. Without expressing any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of the petitioners' contention, it may safely be observed that such a plea, having been specifically raised before the learned Appellate Court and being directly relevant to the respondent's pleaded source of consideration, deserved independent consideration and an appropriate finding. The impugned appellate judgment is conspicuously silent on this aspect. 12. The petitioners had also urged before the learned Appellate Court that the learned Trial Court had attached decisive importance to the revenue entries standing in the respondent's name without examining the legal effect of such entries in the context of the petitioners' plea of benami. It was further contended that the learned Trial Court had misread the pleadings of the petitioners while 6 C.R. No.30580 of 2019 & connected case recording findings regarding alleged contradictions in their case; that the agreement dated 29.08.1983 (Ex.P-6) had been misconstrued; that certain admissions allegedly emerging from the respondent's own evidence had escaped notice; and that some of the petitioners' witnesses had been discarded on legally untenable considerations. Whether these submissions are ultimately sustainable is again a matter to be examined by the appellate Court itself. However, none of these contentions received any independent treatment in the impugned judgment. 13. It may be clarified that this Court has deliberately refrained from examining the correctness of the respective findings recorded by the learned Trial Court on the aforesaid questions. Any detailed discussion by this Court on the evidentiary value of the agreement dated 29.08.1983, the plea of benami, the source of consideration, the effect of the revenue entries, the appreciation of oral testimony, or the alleged contradictions emerging from the pleadings, would inevitably prejudice either side when the appeals are heard afresh. 14. A first appeal is a valuable statutory right, and the first Appellate Court is under a legal obligation, in terms of Order XLI Rule 31, C.P.C., to independently formulate the points for determination, reappraise the evidence, consider the material contentions raised before it, and record its own findings supported by reasons. Mere concurrence with the trial Court or mechanical reproduction of its reasoning cannot substitute the independent judicial scrutiny mandated by law. It is equally well settled that where the first Appellate Court fails to discharge the duty cast upon it under Order XLI Rule 31, C.P.C., the resulting judgment suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. Such failure strikes at the legality of the appellate process itself rather than the correctness of any individual finding of fact. Consequently, remand to the first Appellate Court is the appropriate course so that the valuable statutory right of appeal may receive meaningful adjudication. Reliance in this regard is placed upon Muhammad Dawood v. Mst. Sakeena Farooque alias Aziza and others (2025 SCMR 1229). At the same time, this Court 7 C.R. No.30580 of 2019 & connected case refrains from expressing any opinion on the merits of the rival claims, as the issues relating to ownership, the plea of benami, the effect of Ex.P-6, and other factual controversies fall within the exclusive domain of the first Appellate Court as the final Court of fact. 15. For the foregoing reasons, both these civil revision petitions are allowed. The consolidated judgment and decree dated 16.03.2019 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, is hereby set aside. Consequently, both appeals shall stand restored to their original numbers and shall be deemed to be pending before the learned lower Appellate Court. The learned lower Appellate Court shall rehear both appeals afresh after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all concerned and shall decide the same strictly in accordance with law by independently reappraising the entire oral and documentary evidence available on the record, examining all material grounds urged by the parties, and recording its own findings supported by reasons in conformity with the mandate of Order XLI Rule 31, C.P.C. It is clarified, in unequivocal terms, that this Court has not expressed any opinion whatsoever on the merits of the respective claims of the parties, and every question of fact and law shall remain open for determination by the learned appellate Court uninfluenced by any observation contained in this judgment except to the extent of the procedural infirmity noticed herein. Since the litigation pertains to proceedings instituted long ago and has remained pending for a considerable period, the learned lower Appellate Court shall make an endeavour to decide both appeals expeditiously, preferably within three (03) months from the date the parties appear before it. The parties, through their learned counsel, are directed to appear before the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, on 18.07.2026. (Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge APPROVED FOR REPORTING Judge *A.H.S.*