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Petitioner: NAZIR BEGUM VS Respondent: NAZAR MUHAMMAD
1988 C L C 1629
1988 C L C 1629
[Lahore]
Before Muhammad Akram, J
Mst. NAZIR BEGUM‑‑.appellant
versus
NAZAR MUHAMMAD‑‑Respondent
Regular Second Appeal No.973 of 1970, decided on 26th May, 1972.
West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)‑‑
‑‑‑S. 14‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1962), Art. 102‑‑Second appeal against finding of Family Court‑‑Competency of‑‑Treating second appeals as revisions by High Court not contemplated by law‑‑High Court exercises supervisory powers of control over Family Court‑‑Such power of supervision and control is for making and keeping administration of justice pure and not to help any particular party‑ Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 does not provide for any relief which could be granted under it, nor does it refer to qualification which could entitle any person for getting relief under it‑‑Section 14 of West Pakistan Family Courts Act intends to confer finality do the decree and to stop all controversies regarding subsistence of marital ties between parties‑‑Second appeals against findings of Family Court being not competent were dismissed in circumstances.
Mst. Gaman v. Taj Din P L D 1968 Lah 1338; Karim Bakhsh v. Mst. Mubarik Jan P L D 1970 Pesh. 169 rel.
Major Waheed‑ud‑Din Virk for Appellant. Hassan Ahmad Khan for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 25th May, 1972.
JUDGMENT
On the 25th of May, 1972, Civil Miscellaneous No.4503‑C of 1971 in R . S . A . No.973 of 1970 was fixed before me for disposal. Instead of hearing the arguments on the interlocutory matter, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties I have today heard the arguments in the main appeal itself. This appeal is connected with R.S.A. No.974 of 1970 between the same parties represented before me. I have, therefore, sent for the other appeal also from the office and heard the learned counsel for the parties in these two appeals together.
2. On the 12th of September, 1967, Nazar Muhammad respondent brought a suit against his wife Mst. Nazir Begum appellant for the restitution of conjugal rights. It was alleged in the plaint that the parties were married on the 16th of December, 1956. After the marriage they lived together for about 10 years and she gave birth to five children out of this wedlock. Out of them three are alive. It was further alleged that about a year before the institution of this suit she left his house for her parents and then refused to return to him.
3. Afterwards on the 20th of October, 1967, Mst. Nazir. Begum appellant filed a cross suit against Nazar Muhammad respondent for the dissolution of her marriage on the ground that he has treated her with cruelty, failed to maintain her for more than two years and to perform her conjugal obligations for three years. It was also alleged that he has misappropriated the ornaments belonging to her and refused to pay the dower amounting to Rs.1,000. But these allegations were denied by the respondent who contested the suit.
4. Both the suits were consolidated and tried together. After recording the evidence on the 2nd of December, 1969, Ch. Irshad Ahmad, Judge Family Court, Sahiwal decreed the suit of the respondent for the restitution of conjugal rights and dismissed the other suit of the wife for the dissolution of her marriage. In the opinion of the Court the appellant failed to establish that the respondent treated her with cruelty. She was not able to prove that he had failed to maintain her for over two years or performed the conjugal obligations towards her for more than three years. She produced no evidence to establish that he had misappropriated the ornaments belonging to her. Relying on the original Kabin Nama the Court found that the dower for the marriage was fixed at Rs.50 only. On these findings the learned Judge Family Court decreed the suit of the respondent for the restitution of conjugal rights conditional on payment of the dower amount of Rs. 50 to her.
5. Dissatisfied with the decree in the two suits the appellant filed separate appeals. But on the 13th of June, 1970, the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, rejected both the appeals and affirmed the findings of the trial Court on all the issues.
6. In these circumstances the appellant has filed the above two Regular Second Appeals in this Court. Before me the learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that under section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) a Second Appeal is not competent against the decree passed by Ch. Irshad Ahmad, Judge Family Court, Sahiwal, between the parties. The two suits in this case were filed before and disposed of by the Judge Family Court established under this Act. In this case under subsection (1) of section 14 the First Appeal was disposed of by the District Judge at Sahiwal and as such no Second Appeal is competent against his decision in the matter.
7. Faced with this difficulty the learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that these two appeals could be treated as revisions under Article 102 of the late Constitution of 1962. In Mst. Gaman v. Taj Din P L D 1968 Lah. 1338 and Karim Bakhsh v. Mst. Mubarik Jan PLO 1970 Pesh. 169 it was held that a Family Court constituted under the Act is' a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose contemplated under Article 102 of the Constitution. The High Court exercises supervisory powers of the control over the Family Court constituted under the Act. In Karim Bakhsh v. Mubarik Jan PLO 1970 Pesh. 169 it was held that this power of supervision and control is for making and keeping the administration of justice pure and not to help any particular party. But Article 102 does not provide for any relief which is to be granted under it, nor does it refer to the qualification, which may entitle any body to the. Court for getting relief under it. In this connection the Court remarked as under:‑
"We observe that the Family Court has passed a decree for dissolution of marriage and that it could do under the Statute. We also note that under the relevant Statute no appeal is provided against such a decree except in one circumstance vide section 14 of the Act which is not arising herein. This section intends to confirm finality on the decree and to stop all controversies regarding the subsistence of the marital ties between the parties. The attempt of the petitioner to revive by this petition a controversy which stands concluded with the passing of the decree of dissolution of marriages by the Conciliation Court as well as by the decree of the Family Court tantamounts to subverting the purpose of the law. The grounds on which the judgment and decree of the Family Court is impugned, namely, that the evidence of dissolution of marriage recorded by the Conciliation Court should not have been permitted by the Family Court and that the Family Court should not have based his conclusion on the findings recorded by the Conciliation Court are not at all adequate to justify interference with the judgment and order passed by the Family Court in the present case."
8. For reasons discussed above, I find that these two appeals are not competent and are hereby rejected. But there shall be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.
A.A. /N‑132/L Appeals dismissed.