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1955 PLD 456

MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, RAWALPINDI VS GHULAM HABIB

Petitioner: MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, RAWALPINDI VS Respondent: GHULAM HABIB

Court: Lahore High Court

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

P L D 1955 Lahore 456

P L D 1955 Lahore 456

Before B. Z. Kaikaus, J

MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, RAWALPINDI‑--Petitioner

versus

GHULAM HABIB‑--Respondent

Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 5/C of 1955 in Regular Second Appeal No. 33 of 1954, decided on 15th February 1955, under Order 23, rule 3, and section 151, C. P. C.

Punjab Municipal (Executive Officer) Act, (II of 1931), S. 6‑Executive Officer .has no authority to enter into agreement abandoning right of appeal against decree against Committee--- Contracts not binding on Committee unless in writing‑Contract affecting immovable property cannot be made by Executive Officer without sanction of Committee.

In an appeal filed by the Municipal Committee of Rawalpindi, the respondent took the plea that, the Executive Officer of the Committee had orally agreed with the res pondent not to appeal against the dismissal of their suit against the respondent provided the respondent paid Rs. 22‑8‑0 monthly rent instead of Rs. 11‑4‑0 in respect of a certain portion of a public street.

Held, that the Executive Officer has no authority to enter into an agreement abandoning the right of appeal.

The mere fact that "the executive power for the purpose of carrying on the administration of the municipality" is vested in the Executive Officer does not by itself empower him to enter into agreements on behalf of the Municipal Committee.

According to section 6 no contract can be binding on the Municipal Committee unless it is in writing.

According to section 6 (2), no contract affecting immov able property can be made by the Executive Officer unless it has been sanctioned by the committee.

As the agreement to abandon right of appeal affected immovable property and as it was entered into without sanction of the Committee, it was not binding on the Com mittee.

Sheikh Bashir Ahmad and Said Akbar Khan, for Appellant.

Iftikhar‑ul‑Haque Khan, for Respondent.

ORDER

KAIKAUS. J.‑--This judgment will dispose of Civil Miscellaneous No. 5/C in R. S A. No. 33 of 1954 and Civil Miscellaneous No. 6/C in R. S. A. No. 34 of 1954, which arise under the circumstances that follow.

The Municipal Committee of Rawalpindi filed two suits, one against Ghulam Habib and the other against Abdullah for their ejectment from certain portions of public streets. These suits were decreed but were dismissed on appeal by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Rawalpindi. Against the decrees of the learned Senior Civil Judge` Appeals Nos. 33 of 1954 and 34 of 1954 were filed in this Court. In the two applications with which I am going to deal, Ghulam Habib and Abdullah have stated that there has been an agreement between them and the Executive officer of the Rawalpindi Municipal Committee that they would in future, instead of paying Rs. 11‑4 as monthly rent, pay Rs. 22‑8‑and that the Municipal Committee would not file any appeal against the decrees of the learned Senior Civil Judge. They pray that these appeals be dismissed as incompetent on account of this agreement.

The Municipal Committee denies the existence of the agreement. It is not necessary, however, to go into the question whether the facts which are narrated in the applica tions of the two petitioners are correct. It is admitted by them that there is no agreement in writing. There are three reasons why, even if the allegations be correct, the Municipal Committee would not be debarred from filing in appeal. The first is that the Executive Officer of the Municipal Committee has no authority to enter into an agreement abandoning the right of appeal. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the provision in section 4 (a) of the Punjab Municipal (Executive Officer) Act, by which an Executive Officer is to carry on the administration of a Municipal Committee, is sufficient to empower him to compromise any such claim as was the subject matter of the two suits. I am of the opinion that the mere fact that "the executive power for the purposes of carrying on the administration of the municipality" vested in the Executive Officer does not by itself empower him to enter into agreements on behalf of the Municipal Committee. These words only imply that he is to carry into' execution the decisions of the Municipal Committee and that there is a responsibility on him of seeing that the administra tion is properly carried on. However, this provision does not grant him any powers which are not otherwise granted to him by the Executive Officer's Act. Powers are granted to him by' other 'clauses of section 4. In clause (b) of the section it is, provided that the rowers conferred, and the functions vested in the committee by virtue of the sections which are mentioned in the schedule of the Act shall he exercised by the Executive Officer. There are other provisions also in the section granting ‑to the Executive Officer certain 'powers So far as contracts are concerned, they are separately dealt with in section ti of the Executive Officer's Act and for this reason too contracts would not be within the purview of section 4. The second reason why the alleged agreement can have no effect is that according to section 6 no contract can be binding on the municipal Committee unless it is executed in accordance with section 6. According to section 6, the agreement in the present case would have to be in writing and to be executed as a personal agreement entered into by the Executive Officer. Admittedly, there is no such writing. The third reason is that according to section 6 (2), no contract affecting immovable property can be made by the Executive Officer unless it has been sanctioned by the committee. In the present case, by waiving the right to appeal the two petitioners would become entitled to retain possession of the pieces of land in dispute as tenants. It could not be said that this contract is not one affecting immovable property and it is clear that the Executive Officer would have no authority to enter into such a contract.

These two applications are dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

A. H. Applications dismissed.

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