Legal Principle & Question Decided

Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi), officially reported as 2026 LHC 4435. In this matter between Ehtasham Haider & 2 others and Additional District Judge etc, the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.

Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.

Full Judgment Text & Judicial Ruling

COURT: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) DECISION DATE: 29-06-2026 CASE DETAILS: Family 27447/26 ============================================================ Stereo. H C J D A-38. JUDGMENT SHEET IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Writ Petition No.27447 of 2026 Ehtasham Haider & others Versus Additional District Judge, Noorpur Thal & others J U D G M E N T Date of hearing: 29.06.2026. Petitioners by: Mr. Muhammad Imran Darwaish, Advocate. Respondents by: Mr. Zain Babar Ali , Advocate (for respondent No.3).

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J .- Through this constitutional petition, the petitioners have called in question the legality of orders d ated 07.01.2026 and 08.04.2026 passed by the learned Judge Family Court, Noorpur Thal (Executing Court), whereby their objections were dismissed, mutation No.3232 dated 21.12.2022 was cancelled, the attach ment of property was maintained and its sale through public auction was ordered , as well as the order dated 09.03.2026 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Noorpur Thal, whereby the petitioners' revision petition was dismissed and the order of the learned Executing Court was upheld. 2. Briefly stated, respondent No.3 obtained a decree for recovery of maintenance in favour of her minor children against Muhammad Ameen, the judgment debtor. During execution proceedings, the learned Family Court attached property measuring 01-kanal bearing Khata No.344/342 situated at Mouza Khai Khurd, Tehsil Noorpur Thal, vide order dated 16.07.2021. Despite the subsistence of the attachment order, mutation No.3232 dated 21.12.2022 was sanctioned whereby the attached property was transferred in favour of the present petitioners. Upon an application moved by the decree -holder, the learned Executing Court cancelled the mutation, dismissed the 2 W.P. No.27447 of 2026 objections of the beneficiaries thereof, restored attachment of the property and, upon persistent default of the judgment debtor in satisfying the decree, ordered sale of the attached property through public auction. The learned Revisional Court maintained the said order. Hence, the present petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration through their predecessor Mazhar Abbas, who had purchased the property under an agreement to sell dated 15.03.2018, whereafter a decree for specific performance was passed in his favour on 22.07.2022. He argues that the learned Executing Court had no jurisdiction to cancel the mutation sanctioned pursuant to a valid civil decree and that respondent No.3 herself has already challenged the decree through an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., which is still pending before the Civil Court. He contends that both the learned Courts below ignored the petitioners' valuable proprietary rights, their possession over the property, the construction allegedly raised thereon, and the irreparable hardship which would be caused b y auction of their only residential house. He lastly submits that the impugned orders are non-speaking, arbitrary and based upon conjectures. 4. Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.3 supports the impugned orders and submits that the attached prop erty could not legally be alienated after attachment . He further submits that mutation No.3232 was sanctioned during the subsistence of the attachment solely to defeat execution of the maintenance decree . He adds that the petitioners are close relatives of the judgment debtor and cannot claim the status of bona fide purchasers. He maintains that the decree for specific performance itself was obtained through a collusive consent statement after attachment of the property; and that no jurisdictional defect or material illegality has been committed by either of the learned Courts below warranting interference in constitutional jurisdiction. In support, he has referred to Mst. Najma Naz and another v. Mst. Farzana Kanwal and 3 others (2025 YLR 2806). 3 W.P. No.27447 of 2026 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have examined the available record with their able assistance. 6. The foundational fact of the case is neither disputed nor capable of dispute that the property in question stood attached by the learned Executing Court vide order dated 16.07.2021. Equally undisputed is the fact that mutation No.3232 in favour of the petitioners was sanctioned subsequently on 21.12.2022, i.e., long after attachment had taken effect. 7. Once an attachment order had been validly passed and remained operative, the judgment -debtor was legally incompetent to create any interest in the attached property so as to prejudice or defeat the rights of the decree -holder. The principle embodied in Section 64 of the Code of Ci vil Procedure, 1908, though forming part of the general law of execution, reflects the settled rule that any private transfer of attached property effected after attachment is void as against all claims enforceable thereunder. The object of the provision is to preserve the sanctity of the judicial process and prevent a judgment-debtor from frustrating execution through clandestine alienations. In Amjad Iqbal v. Mst. Nida Sohail and others (2015 SCMR 128) , the judgment -debtor, after attachment of his house i n execution of a decree passed by the Family Court, first purported to gift the property to his second wife and, thereafter, it was allegedly sold to the petitioner. The Executing Court dismissed the petitioner's application under Order XXI Rules 47 and 58 , C.P.C. seeking release of the attached property, and the orders of the Executing Court were maintained by the appellate and revisional Courts. The august Supreme Court, while dismissing the petition, held as under:

“6. ….. Both Hiba as well as the purpo rted sale in favour of the petitioner were nothing but sham transactions and its purpose was to ensure that the decree is not satisfied. The decree was nothing but for the maintenance of respondent No.2's own minor daughter. 4 W.P. No.27447 of 2026 Unfortunately, the respondent N o.2 in sheer disregard of his parental obligation has indulged in making all these unlawful transactions. …..”

8. Viewed in this perspective, the learned Executing Court rightly concluded that mutation No.3232 could not defeat the attachment already opera ting against the property. The cancellation of the mutation was thus a necessary consequence of the existing attachment and cannot be termed without lawful authority. 9. The principal defence advanced by the petitioners is that they are bona fide purchaser s for valuable consideration without notice. The plea is wholly devoid of substance. An order of attachment passed by a competent Court constitutes constructive notice to the public at large, and any subsequent transferee is deemed to have notice thereof a nd cannot avoid its legal consequences by merely pleading ignorance. Besides, the learned Executing Court has concurrently found that the petitioners are closely related to the judgment -debtor and were well aware of the pending litigation. The timing of th e impugned transfer, coupled with the relationship between the parties and the subsisting order of attachment, unmistakably indicates that the transaction was intended to defeat the realization of the maintenance decree. This view finds support from the ju dgment of the august Supreme Court in Muhammad Sadiq v. Dr. Sabira Sultana (2002 SCMR 1950), wherein it was held that a transfer effected after attachment is not legally sustainable and cannot defeat the rights of the decree -holder. The relevant extract reads as under: “5. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length. We find that there is no evidence on record to prove the genuineness and authenticity of the alleged agreements to sell dated 10-10-1996 and 30 -6-1998 purported to have been executed by the judgment -debtor and by Muhammad Ashraf respectively in respect of the sale of the attached property. The sale -deed was allegedly executed on 2 -6-1999 after the attachment of the property in dispute. Therefore, the sale -deed dated 2 -6-1999, even if executed, was rightly held, by all the Courts, to be invalid. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel in his behalf are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.” 5 W.P. No.27447 of 2026 10. Much emphasis has been laid upon the decree dated 22.07.2 022 passed in the suit for specific performance instituted by the petitioners' predecessor. This contention also lacks force. The record reveals that the decree was passed after the property had already been attached in execution proceedings. The judgment debtor not only filed a consenting written statement but also appeared before the Civil Court and unequivocally admitted the claim. Such conduct assumes considerable significance because, at that stage, execution proceedings relating to recovery of mainten ance were already pending and attachment had already taken effect. Prima facie , therefore, the sequence of events strongly suggests that the civil proceedings were utilized as a device to create an apparent legal shield against execution of the maintenance decree. Even otherwise, the attachment already operating against the property could not be nullified by a subsequent consent decree between the judgment debtor and another party. Consequently, the decree for specific performance did not confer upon the petitioners any superior right capable of defeating the rights of the decree-holder in execution proceedings. 11. Equally misconceived is the contention that respondent No.3 has already filed an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. challenging the decree for specific performance and, therefore, the executi on proceedings ought to remain suspended. The mere pendency of proceedings under Section 12(2), C.P.C. does not automatically stay the operation of the decree, nor does it suspend the execution proceedings pending before a competent Court. Unless a competent Court specifically restrains the continuation of the execution proceedings, the Executing Court is bound to proceed in accordance with law. Admittedly, no order staying the execution proceedings has been brought on the record. Reliance is placed upon Mst. Safia Bibi and others v. Additional District Judge and others (PLD 2019 Lahore 502), wherein this Court deprecated the practice of suspending execution proceedings in the absence of any specific injunc tive or stay order. The relevant extract reads as under: 6 W.P. No.27447 of 2026 “13. The Family Court under section 13(3) of Family Courts Act, 1964 was fully empowered to execute the decree for the payment of maintenance. The provisions of the said Act empowered the court to a dopt the mode provided for recovery of arrears of la nd revenue. In West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 various modes to recover the arrears of land revenue were spelt out and one of the modes was to recover the arrears through sale of the immovable proper ty of the defaulter. The Family Court in this case was fully competent to proceed with the execution proceedings, particularly when there was no injunctive order qua the proceedings of execution nor the execution of decree was under suspense from any compe tent court…”

Consequently, the pendency of proceedi ngs under Section 12(2), C.P.C. is of no legal consequence for deciding the present controversy. 12. The order passed by the learned Additional District Judge also calls for no interference. Although the petitioners had initially invoked an appellate remedy, the learned Revisional Court rightly noticed that the proper remedy available against the impugned execution order was revision under the provisions of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and in stead of dismissing the matter on technical grounds, converted the proceedings into revision in order to advance substantial justice. Thereafter, upon independent appraisal of the record, the learned Revisional Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Executing Court that the impugned mutation had been sanctioned during subsistence of the attachment and was intended to frustrate execution of the decree. Such conclusions neither disclose any misreading or non -reading of evidence nor suffer f rom any jurisdictional infirmity. 13. The subsequent order dated 08.04.2026, whereby the learned Executing Court directed sale of the attached property through public auction, is merely a continuation of lawful execution proceedings. The judgment debtor ha d persistently defaulted in satisfying the decree relating to maintenance of minor children and deliberately avoided appearance before the learned Executing Court. In these circumstances, the learned Executing Court had little option but to proceed in accordance with law for realization of the decretal amount. 7 W.P. No.27447 of 2026 14. The order demonstrates due observance of procedural safeguards. An independent auctioneer was appointed, remuneration was fixed, publication schedule was prescribed, public proclamation was directed to be made, market valuation was ordered to be obtained from the concerned Patwari for fixation of reserve price, and auction proceedings were scheduled accordingly. No violation of any mandatory provision governing execution proceedings has been pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners. 15. It also deserves mention that the decree sought to be executed pertains to the maintenance of minor children. Maintenance is not merely a money claim; rather, it embodies a continuing statutory obligation intended to secure the welfare, sustenance and upbringing of minors. Courts are, therefore, under a corresponding duty to ensure that such decrees are not rendered illusory by permitting judgment -debtors to defeat execution through colourable or collusive t ransfers of property. In Amjad Iqbal’s case supra, while strongly deprecating the practice of judgment -debtor fathers resorting to sham transactions to defeat the lawful maintenance claims of their dependents, the august Supreme Court emphasized that the C ourt, while exercising parental jurisdiction, "cannot just sit and be a spectator in this unholy and unlawful conduct of the respondent No.2," observing that such conduct reflected nothing but an intent "to starve his own minor daughter of her basic needs for survival." The impugned orders are fully consist ent with this salutary principle. 16. Needless to say, the petitioners have approached this Court not in challenge to the original order of attachment, which attained finality, but only after the Executin g Court declined to recognize a transfer affected during the subsistence of that attachment. Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to indirectly nullify the legal consequences of an attachment that was never challenged at the appropriate stage. Ent ertaining such a plea would permit parties to achieve indirectly what the law does not permit them to do directly. 8 W.P. No.27447 of 2026 17. The constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is supervisory in nature. It is not intended to prov ide another forum for re -appraisal of facts or substitution of concurrent findings recorded by competent Courts. Interference is warranted only where the impugned orders suffer from patent lack of jurisdiction, material illegality, procedural impropriety, violation of mandatory law, or perversity resulting in miscarriage of justice. The petitioners have failed to establish the existence of any such ground. On the contrary, both the learned Courts below have correctly appreciated the factual matrix, applied the governing legal principles and recorded concurrent findings supported by the material available on record. 18. For the foregoing reasons, I find no illegality, jurisdictional defect, material irregularity or perversity in the impugned orders dated 07.01.2026, 09.03.2026 and 08.04.2026, which may justify interference by this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. 19. Consequently, this writ petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. No order as to costs.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge

Approved for reporting.

Judge *A.H.S.*

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