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Official Citation: 2026 LHC 4626
Court / Jurisdiction: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Tariq Saleem Sheikh)
Parties: Ansar Ali and other vs The State etc.
Ruling Summary: This decision was rendered by the Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Tariq Saleem Sheikh), officially reported as 2026 LHC 4626. In this matter between Ansar Ali and other and The State etc., the court adjudicated key questions of statutory construction, procedural regularity, and legal precedent under Pakistani law.
Core Holding: The honorable bench evaluated governing statutory provisions and judicial authorities to establish the rights of the parties, delivering the binding reasoning set out below.
COURT: Lahore High Court (Honorable Mr. Justice Tariq Saleem Sheikh) DECISION DATE: 21-01-2026 CASE DETAILS: Crl. Misc. 73022/25 ============================================================ Form No.HCJD/C-121 ORDER SHEET LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Crl. Misc. No. 73022-B/2025 Ansar Ali and another Vs. The State and another
S.No. of Order/ Proceeding Date of order/ proceeding Order with the signature of the Judge and that of the parties or counsel , where necessary
21.01.2026 Mian Ali Haider, Advocate, with the Petitioners. Mr. Abdul Samad , Additional Prosecutor General, with Tanzeel, ASI. Mr. Muhammad Irfan, Advocate, for the Complainant.
Tariq Saleem Sheikh, J. – Through this application, the Petitioners seek pre -arrest bail in case FIR No. 4226/2025 dated 20.09.2025 registered at Police Station Harbanspura, Lahore. The said case was in itially registered under section 420 PPC , but during the investigation, sections 468 and 471 PPC were added. 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that the Petitioners are real estate agents. The Complainant approached them to purchase a plot, whereu pon they introduced him to one Imran Raza, son of Farmaish Ali, as the owner of Plot No. 183, Block -A, Phase -IV, Al-Rehman Garden, Harbanspura, Lahore, measuring 05 marlas and 102 sq.ft. (the “Property”). The sale consideration was settled at Rs.6,400,000/-. According to the Complainant, under the Agreement dated 29.10.2024, he paid Rs.2,000,000/ - in cash as earnest money, then paid another Rs.600,000/ - in cash, and thereafter paid the remaining Rs.3,800,000/ - at the Petitioners’ office under an Agreement/Acknowledgment dated 31.12.2024. Possession of the Property was delivered to him, after which he commenced construction and allegedly incurred expenses of Rs.4,000,000/-. 3. Subsequently, one Zulfiqar claimed ownership of the Property and informed the Complainant that he had obtained an injunction against the Complainant from a competent court. On being confronted, the Petitioners allegedly admitted that they had received the entire sale consideration on behalf of the accused persons. They also acknowledged liability to return Rs.10,400,000/-, representing the sale price and construction expenses, and stated that the amount was Crl. Misc. No. 73022-B/2025 2
lying with them as Amanat. According to the Compla inant, they assured him that the Property would be transferred in his favour. However, neither was it transferred nor was the amount refunded. He further alleges that the title documents supplied to him at the time of sale were forged. 4. Mian Ali Haider , Advocate, contends that the FIR is founded on a misstatement of facts. He submits that the transaction was entered into directly between the Complainant and Imran Raza, who has since died, and any fraud, if committed, was attributable solely to the latte r. He argues that the Petitioners were neither parties to any agreement nor beneficiaries of the transaction but were merely marginal witnesses to a single agreement, namely the Agreement dated 31.12.2024. They neither received any part of the sale consideration, nor prepared any document, nor had any independent dealings with the Complainant. Counsel contends that the FIR was initially registered only under section 420 PPC and that the subsequent addition of sections 468 and 471 PPC is an afterthought intended merely to aggravate the case. He maintains that the investigation has yielded no evidence linking the Petitioners either to the preparation or use of the alleged forged documents or to the receipt of any amount from the Complainant. 5. Mr. Abdul Samad, Additional Prosecutor General (APG), has opposed the application. He contends that the Petitioners were not mere attesting witnesses but actively facilitated the transaction by introducing Imran Raza as the lawful owner, allegedly despite knowing that h e had no marketable title to the Property. They also negotiated the sale and procured execution of the agreements dated 29.10.2024 and 31.12.2024. He further submits that no mala fide or ulterior motive has been shown on the part of the Complainant or the police to justify the grant of pre -arrest bail. Therefore, the Petitioners are not entitled to the extraordinary relief sought. 6. The Complainant’s counsel, Mr. Muhammad Irfan, Advocate, has adopted the APG’s arguments. He maintains that the Petitioners provided the Complainant with the Transfer Letter dated 12.05.2021 and the Possession Letter dated 09.01.2023, purportedly Crl. Misc. No. 73022-B/2025 3
issued by Al-Rehman Garden in favour of Imran Raza, to substantiate his title to the Property. During the investigation, the Complai nant produced photographs before the Investigating Officer, which depict the Petitioners counting the cash received from him. Counsel contends that sufficient evidence exists to connect the Petitioners with the commission of the alleged offences. 7. In rebuttal, Mr. Haider submits that Imran Raza died on 22.02.2025. The Complainant did not initiate any civil or criminal proceedings against him during his lifetime, which casts doubt upon the prosecution case and suggests false implication of the Petitioners . He reiterates that the investigation has disclosed no evidence that the Petitioners prepared or were involved in the preparation of the Transfer Letter dated 12.05.2021 or the Possession Letter dated 09.01.2023. 8. Arguments heard, and record perused. 9. The grant of pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary relief. It is not to be extended as a matter of course and is intended to protect an accused from abuse of process or mala fide arrest. At this stage, the Court is required to make only a tentative asses sment of the investigative record , without undertaking a deeper appreciation of evidence which properly falls within the domain of trial. 10. The first issue concerns the offence of cheating. Section 415 PPC defines “cheating” as follows: 415. Cheating. – Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to d o anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that perso n [or any other person]1 in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.2 Explanation. – A di shonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.
1 Inserted by the Pakistan Penal Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980 (41 of 1980), s.2.
2 In Muhammad Bakhsh v. Emperor (AIR 1941 Lahore 460), the Lahore High Court pointed out that the definition of “cheating” in section 415 was defective and required modification in order to cover cases where one person is deceived and another person suffers or is likely to suffer damage or harm in body , mind, reputation or property in consequence of deception . The attention of the Government was again drawn t o this defect in Ghulam Mustafa v. The State (PLD 1960 Lahore 290), and then in Mst. Thari v. Mohammad and others (PLD 1973 SC 619). It was in 1980 that this defect was removed and section 415 was amended. (see note 1).
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11. The terms “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” are defined in sections 24 and 25 PPC, respectively. “Dishonestly” denotes doing anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another, while “fraudulently” connotes doing anything with intent to defraud but not otherwise. In Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1963 SC 1572), while construing the expression “fraudulently” in the context of forgery, the Supreme Court of India (SCI) explained that “defraud” comprises two elements, namely deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is not confined to pecuniary loss and may extend to harm caused to a person in body, mind, reputation or property. Read with these definitions, section 415 PPC requires deception, whether by fa lse representation, conduct, or dishonest concealment of facts, accompanied by the requisite fraudulent, dishonest, or intentional inducement contemplated by the section. 12. Section 415 PPC has two limbs. The first applies where a person is deceived and thereby fraudulently or dishonestly induced to deliver property, or to consent that any person shall retain property. The second applies where a person is deceived and intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted if he were not so deceived, and such act or omission causes, or is likely to cause, damage or harm to that person or any other person in body, mind, reputation, or property. The Explanation further provides that dishonest concealment of facts is decepti on within the meaning of the section. Thus, deception alone is not sufficient. It must be accompanied by the corresponding form of inducement required by section 415 PPC. 13. Section 417 PPC prescribes punishment for cheating simpliciter. Section 420 PPC, however, applies where cheating results in the dishonest inducement of a person to deliver property to any person, or to make, alter, or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into a valuable security.3 Section 420 PPC is narrower than section 415 PPC. The essential ingredients of section 420 PPC are:
3 “Valuable security” is defined in section 30 PPC.
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first, deception of a person; secondly, dishonest inducement of the person so deceived; and thirdly, delivery of property or dealing with valuable security in the manner contemplated by the section. In the absence of delivery of property or the making, alteration, or destruction of valuable security, the offence, if any, may fall within section 417 PPC (which is non-cognizable), but not section 420 PPC. 14. In Muhammad Nasim Khan and another v. Fida Muhammad Khan and another (1993 PCr.LJ 1795), the High Court held that the offence of cheating is not made out if no deception was practised and there was no consequential pecuniary loss. It further held that, for the purposes of establishing cheating, the requisite dishonest intention must exist at the time of making the act or promise and cannot be inferred merely from its subsequent non -fulfilment. Similarly, i n Bashir Dawood and others v. Tanveer Ahmed and another (2000 PCr.LJ 1230), it was held that dishonest or fraudulent intention must exist at the inception of the act and cannot be presumed merely from subsequent non-performance. 15. The SCI has applied the same principles while construing section 420 IPC, which is pari materia to section 420 PPC. It has consistently held that mere breach of an agreement, subsequent non - performance, or failure to refund consideration does not constitute cheating unless the evidence on record shows dis honest or fraudulent intention at the inception of the transaction. Deception alone is insufficient unless it results in the dishonest inducement contemplated by the penal provision.4 16. It is necessary to highlight the distinction between cheating and c riminal breach of trust because the FIR uses the expression Amanat, which is sometimes used to suggest criminal breach of trust. Cheating and criminal breach of trust rest on different juridical foundations. 5 Cheating requires deception and dishonest inducement at the inception of the transaction. Criminal breach of
4 See: Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal , (2007) 12 SCC 1, Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State of Jharkhand and another (2025 INSC 1151), Dr. Sharma’s Nursing Home v. Delhi Admn. and others , (1998) 8 SCC 745, Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and others v. State of Bihar and another , (2000) 4 SCC 168, Mariam Fasihuddin and another v. State [2024] 1 S.C.R. 623. 5 Dr. Waqar Hameed v. The State and another (2020 SCMR 321) , Muhammad Hussain v. The State (1988 PCr.LJ 1280). Crl. Misc. No. 73022-B/2025 6
trust, on the other hand, proceeds on the basis of entrustment followed by dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use, or disposal. However, the mere use of that expression does not determine t he nature of the offence. In the present case, the transaction pleaded in the FIR is essentially a sale of immovable property. The subsequent allegation that the amount was described as Amanat does not, by itself, convert the payment of sale consideration into entrustment within the meaning of criminal breach of trust. 17. The offence of forgery must next be examined. Section 463 PPC defines “forgery” as the making of a false document or part of a document. Such making must be with the intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to induce any person to enter into any express or implied contract. It also covers the making of a false document with the i ntent to commit fraud or with knowledge that fraud may be committed. Section 464 PPC explains when a person is said to make a false document. Section 466 deals with forgery of a record of a court or of a public register. Section 467 relates to forgery of v aluable security, will, etc. Section 468 penalizes forgery for the purpose of cheating. Section 471 punishes the fraudulent or dishonest use of a forged document as genuine by a person who knows, or has reason to believe, that the document is forged. 18. In Nasir Abbas v. The State and another (2011 SCMR 1966), the Supreme Court of Pakistan explained that, under section 468 PPC, the two essential elements of the offence are “forgery” and “cheating.” Under section 415 PPC, “cheating” includes, inter alia , the element of deceiving a person fraudulently or dishonestly with a view to inducing the person so deceived to do something, or to omit to do something, which he would not have done or omitted if he had not been so deceived. The actus reus under section 468 PPC is the making of a false instrument, whereas the mens rea is threefold, namely: (i) that the document is used to induce someone to accept it as genuine; (ii) that the person before whom the document is produced will accept it as genuine and, in so d oing, will do some act or omit to Crl. Misc. No. 73022-B/2025 7
do something, whereby he or some other person is damaged or injured, or that the document is intended to support any claim or title or to commit fraud; and (iii) that the maker of the false instrument or document is aware that the document in question is false. The Court further explained that section 471 PPC is attracted when a person, though not the maker of the forged document, uses it as genuine “fraudulently” or “dishonestly,” knowing or having reason to believe that it is a forged document. Thus, under this provision, the actus reus is the use of a forged document as genuine, and the mens rea is the dishonest intent coupled with knowledge or reason to believe that the document is forged. 19. In Md. Ibrahim and others v. State of Bihar and another, (2009) 8 SCC 751, while considering provisions pari materia to sections 463, 464, 467 and 471 PPC , the SCI explained that the condition precedent for forgery is the making of a false document. A person does not make a false document merely because he executes a document in his own name while falsely claiming title to property. The Court, however, clarified that where a person sells property knowing that it does not belong to him and thereby defrauds the purchaser, he may commit cheating if the other ingredients of that offence are established. Such conduct does not for that reason alone amount to forgery, because the execution of a document in one’s own name while falsely claiming title is not the making of a false document within the meaning of section 464 PPC. By the same reasoning, for section 468 PPC, there must be material connecting the accused with the making of a false document for the purpose of cheating. For section 471 PP C, it must be shown that the accused used the forged document as genuine and did so fraudulently or dishonestly, with knowledge or reason to believe that it was forged.6 20. With the above principles in view, I turn to the present case. There are, in subs tance, two allegations against the Petitioners. First, they introduced Imran Raza to the Complainant as the owner of
6 The same distinction between cheating and forgery was reiterated in Mariam Fasihuddin and another v. State [2024] 1 S.C.R. 623: 2024 INSC 49. Crl. Misc. No. 73022-B/2025 8
the Property and facilitated the transaction. Second, the ownership documents supplied at the time of sale are alleged to be forged . The question, at this stage, is not whether the transaction was genuine, but whether the present record prima facie connects the Petitioners with dishonest inducement from inception or with the preparation, procurement, or knowing use of the alleged forged documents. 21. In property fraud cases, a distinction must be maintained between mere attestation of a document and active participation in deception. A marginal witness, by signing an agreement, ordinarily certifies its execution. He does not, by that act al one, guarantee the vendor’s title or assume responsibility for the contents of the transaction. In Sh. Muhammad Sharif Uppal v. Sh. Akbar Hussain and others (PLD 1990 Lahore 229), which arose from civil proceedings, it was observed that a marginal witness is only a witness to execution and is not, merely as such, bound by the contents of the document. The principle is relevant only to this limited extent. Criminal liability may still arise where there is material showing prior knowledge of the fraud or participation in the deception. Conversely, where a property dealer knowingly introduces a person with no title as owner and shares the dishonest int ention from inception, his role may transcend that of a mere witness. 22. In the instant case, the Petitioners are alleged to have introduced Imran Raza and to have been present when the amount was paid. The Complainant has also produced photographs which, according to him, depict the Petitioners counting the money. Even if these photographs are considered at this stage, they may show the Petitioners’ presence during payment or handling the cash. They do not, by themselves, establish that the Petitioners knew that Imran Raza was not the owner of the Property or that the title documents were forged. 23. The allegation that the Petitioners supplied the Transfer Letter dated 12.05.2021 and the Possession Letter dated 09.01.2023 must also be assessed in t he light of sections 468 and 471 PPC. Even if those documents were furnished through them, the record does not presently connect the Petitioners with their preparation or Crl. Misc. No. 73022-B/2025 9
procurement. None of the documents in question bears their signatures. Nor has any ci rcumstance been pointed out from which it may be inferred, even tentatively, that they knew, or had reason to believe, that the documents were forged. 24. The remaining allegation, at its highest, is that the Petitioners facilitated the sale transaction and that the money was paid in their office. Whether this conduct was innocent facilitation, negligent dealing, or dishonest participation in the transaction is a matter requiring evidence. The record at this stage does not demonstrate dishonest intention from inception. 25. It is also relevant that sections 420 and 471 PPC are bailable, whereas section 468 PPC is non -bailable but does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) Cr.P.C. The non - bailable element of the case thus rests principally on section 468 PPC. However, on the available record, that provision is not prima facie attracted against the Petitioners, for the reasons already discussed. In these circumstances, their arrest would not serve any legitimate investigative purpose. 26. For the above reasons, I accepted this application by a short order of even date, confirmed the ad interim pre -arrest bail earlier granted to the Petitioner s, subject to their furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.200,000/ - each with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.
(Tariq Saleem Sheikh) Judge Naeem
Approved for reporting
Judge