Al Wakeelo
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Your Digital Lawyer, Always on Duty
Initializing Secure Chambers
Petitioner: EMPLOYEES UNION VS Respondent: JOHNSON & JOHNSON PAK. Ltd., KARACHI
Court Name: Labour Appellate Tribunal Judge(s): Inamullah Khan Title: EMPLOYEES UNION vs JOHNSON & JOHNSON PAK. Ltd., KARACHI Case No.: Appeal No. KAR-546 of 1973 Date of Judgment:1973-08-08 Reported As: 1975 PLC 208 Result: N/A
Judgment DECISION This is an appeal against an order of the learned Presiding Officer of Sind Labour Court No. IV, Karachi, whereby the learned Labour Court dismissed the application of the appellant filed under section 22-A(ll) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). Section 22-A(ll) of the Ordinance reads as under :-- "Save as provided in subsections (10) and (l2), no Registrar, Labour Court or Tribunal shall take any action, or entertain any application or proceedings, in respect of any matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission.'* 2. The contention of Mr. Hameed M. Siddiqui, the learned Advocate for the appellant was that the cancellation of the registration of Trade Union was sought on the ground that the Trade Union was guilty of unfair labour practice. The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the determination of the question of unfair labour practice was within the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Commission and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to determine that question. This point requires consideration and can be gone into when the application under section 10 of the Ordinance filed by the respondent had been disposed of by the learned Labour Court. An appeal to the Tribunal is provided only against an order passed by the Labour Court under section 10 of the Ordinance. The appeal is premature. The appellant must await the decision of the application filed by the Management under section 10 of the Ordinance. 3. Mr. Hameed, the learned Advocate for the appellant, contended that the impugned order is an award. I do not think that the impugnedl order can be said to be a determination of any industrial dispute within theM meaning of the definition of award and, therefore, no appeal would lie| against the impugned order. The appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.